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Abstract 
Noting the inadequacies of existing IR theories to explain the security policies of states in the 
global south and the frequent intra-state conflicts there, this research demonstrates the 
analytical capacity of the insecurity dilemma as an alternative framework. The research 
develops the insecurity dilemma first and then applies it on the Chinese-Tibetan conflict.  
Over sixty years of violence and dialogue has brought the Chinese and the Tibetans no closer 
to a resolution of their conflict. The insecurity dilemma provides a nuanced understanding of 
the underlying reasons for this protracted conflict. This research argues that, conscious of its 
weakness as a state, which has implications for state, regime and ‘national’ security, China 
has pursued state-building through its policies on religion, language, education and economy 
in Tibet. Beijing has also denied the existence of a ‘Tibet Issue’ and rejected a number of 
Tibetan proposals for autonomy out of fears that they threaten their state-building project in 
Tibet. Conversely, Tibetan identity insecurity, generated by the Chinese policies, migration 
and cultural influences inside Tibet, explains both the Dalai Lama’s unpopular decision to 
give up his erstwhile aspiration for Tibetan independence as well as his steadfast demands for 
autonomy and unification of all Tibetans under one administration. Identity insecurity also 
drives the multi-faceted Tibetan resistance both inside Tibet and in the diaspora. Although the 
intentions of both Beijing and the Tibetans are to increase their respective securities 
identified above, the outcome is greater insecurity for both, plunging them into dilemmatic 
cycles of state-building and hardening of policies on the Chinese side and strengthening of 
identity and resistance on the Tibetan side. This study gives play to a multiplicity of actors, 
objectives and strategies on both sides and examines the feed-back effect that exists between 
the Sino-Tibetan conflict and the regional and global political strategic and ideological 
competitions. 
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Chapter 1 
 
The Missing Link: Security and the Sino-Tibetan Conflict 
 
  
Questions and the Central Argument  
Since 1949, when the Chinese communists began to incorporate the Tibetan regions into the 
People’s Republic of China (PRC), the Tibetans and the Chinese have been locked in a conflict 
in which both sides have used violence in various forms to overpower the other side as well as 
subtler hearts-and-minds approaches to win over the other side and dialogue to resolve their 
differences peacefully. However, sixty years of violent conflicts and peaceful efforts have 
brought the two sides no closer to a resolution of their differences.  This is in spite of the fact that 
in the post-Mao era, constituencies for a negotiated settlement have existed on both sides of the 
Sino-Tibetan divide.1 Even if their influence fluctuated with political currents in China and 
calculations in exile, they continue to perceive mutual incentives in a peaceful settlement during 
the lifetime of the current Dalai Lama.  
 For Beijing, an agreement would improve social and political stability and satisfy its 
craving for domestic and international legitimacy for its rule over Tibet with the Dalai Lama’s 
signature for the first time in history. It would remove an irritant in bilateral relations with India, 
the United States and Western European countries. More significantly, China can remove a 
weak-spot that could be exploited by hostile powers in a future conflict, which has recurrent 
precedents in the history of the Sino-Tibetan relations. Furthermore, a reasonable approach to 
Tibet may have a positive influence on Taiwanese attitude toward re-unification with China.2 In 
the context of Beijing’s ‘peaceful rise’ or ‘peaceful development’ strategy, an agreement with the 
Tibetans would enhance China’s international image around the world, especially in its wary 
neighbourhood. As the Economist observed, ‘[T]alking to the Dalai Lama about the future of his 
homeland [and giving more democracy to Hong Kong], would do more to impress China's 
                                                 
1
 Melvyn C. Goldstein, The Snow Lion and the Dragon: China, Tibet and the Dalai Lama, Berkeley and Los 
Angeles: University of California Press: 1997; Tashi Rabgey and Tseten Wangchuk Sharlho, Sino-Tibetan Dialogue 
in the Post-Mao Era: Lessons and Prospects, Policy Studies No. 12, East-West Centre, Washington, D.C., 2004: 20-
35, 40-47. 
2
 The Economist, ‘China's Great Game in Asia,' 29 March, 2007. 
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neighbors than a decade's worth of state visits and free-trade agreements.’3 Clearly, Beijing 
would profit from settling the Tibetan problem while the current Dalai Lama is alive to sell the 
deal to the apprehensive Tibetans. 
It goes without saying that most Tibetans would welcome an agreement that allows a 
degree of political and cultural autonomy for their homeland, especially given their constant 
fears for the survival of their identity under the prevailing regime of Chinese policies, which 
explains Dharamsala’s4 diligent and sometimes desperate pursuit of negotiations. Yet, the 
conflict rages on as strongly as ever. 
This gives rise to the main research question of this research:  how can we use theoretical 
resources from international relations, security studies and area studies (Chinese studies and 
Tibetan studies) to better understand the reasons for the intractability of the Sino-Tibetan 
conflict? A more specific set of empirical questions have to be asked to make this big question 
more manageable for this research. Why does Beijing deny even the existence of a ‘Tibet issue’, 
offering only to talk about the Dalai Lama’s return after saddling it with difficult preconditions? 
Why does Beijing persist in its hard-line policies in Tibet, despite the widespread Tibetan 
protests and riots and international opprobrium? Conversely, why does Dharamsala insist upon 
political autonomy for a unified Tibet even as Beijing calls these the greatest obstacles?5 Why do 
the Tibetans inside Tibet regularly risk life, limb and livelihood by challenging the might of the 
Chinese state? In sum, what explains the protracted nature of the Sino-Tibetan conflict?  
To answer these questions, this dissertation frames the Sino-Tibetan conflict as a 
dilemmatic and dynamic interplay of the threat perceptions of the Chinese Party-state and the 
insecurities of the Tibetan nation. These insecurities do not exist as isolated islands; they have 
feed-back effects in shaping each other’s policies and behaviours. They are both structurally 
generated and inter-subjectively shaped. This dissertation will demonstrate the resultant 
character of the Sino-Tibetan conflict as a cyclical action-reaction process, understood in terms 
of Chinese state building policies and practices and the Tibetan resistance against them. This 
cyclical metaphor will be developed in Chapter Two. Furthermore, this chapter will explain that 
                                                 
3
 Ibid. 
4
 Dharamsala is the seat of the Dalai Lama and the Tibetan Government-in-exile.  
5
 Lhakpa Phuntsok, ‘The Dalai Lama’s Demands are Obstacles to Talks,’ Reuters, 26 May, 2006. 
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this security-based analysis is a novel approach to the study of this conflict which has bedevilled 
the reconciliation efforts of Beijing and Dharamsala. Overall, it will be shown that the Sino-
Tibetan conflict is a complex case that has both unique characteristics as well as generally 
applicable lessons for the study of other intra-state (ethnic) conflicts.  
The following review of the existing literature on the conflict and the subsequent 
introduction of the analytical framework and methodology used in this research develop the 
above argument and approach. The methodology section is followed by the definition some key 
concepts—weak states, state-building and identity—that constitute the insecurity dilemma and 
contextualisation of their usage in this research. It is also necessary to justify the application of 
the concept of weak state to a rising power like China. It then puts into perspective the role of the 
non-Chinese frontier nations in Chinese security agenda. After explaining the geographical 
interpretation of Tibet, the chapter finally outlines the structure of this dissertation. The reader is 
requested to anticipate the review of the relevant theoretical literature in Chapter Two. 
 
Overview of the Literature on the Sino-Tibetan Conflict  
The social scientific study of Tibet reached critical mass only in the 1980s, arguably because of 
increased access to research opportunities and materials inside Tibet, internationalization of the 
Tibetan issue and the frequent pro-independence demonstrations between 1987 and 1993 in 
Tibet. Comparatively, the academic literature on Tibet is considerable today. Janet Gyatso’s 
Presidential Address during the 10th Conference of the International Association of Tibetan 
Studies (IATS) held at Oxford University in 2003, reveals the growing strength of Tibetological 
research: 
But just a glimpse at the program for our current seminar will tell you how much we have advanced 
even further since then [1989]: from an almost exclusive focus upon history, philology, and 
philosophy, to now a very hefty body of critical work in art history and ethnomusicology, not to 
mention literary theory, history of science, cultural criticism, feminist criticism, and of course, 
information technology.6 
 
However, Gyatso’s address reveals another aspect of Tibetology: the dearth of political science 
research on Tibet, especially on the political aspects of the conflict. This is puzzling given the 
                                                 
6
 Janet Gyatso, ‘Presidential Address, Tenth Seminar of the International Association of Tibetan Studies Oxford, 
2003,’ Journal of the International Association of Tibetan Studies, No. 1, October 2005: 1-5; available at 
www.thdl.org?id=T1216. 
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level of popular, media and political interest it generates. Consequently, the existing academic 
analyses of the conflict have been conducted largely by anthropologists, historians and 
Buddhologists.  
 Of course, the existing scholarship on the conflict is broad and high quality. Part of the 
literature is holistic, attempting to rope in multiple aspects of the conflict in one analytical 
effort.7 Others focus on specific issues germane to their own expertise: Chinese policy,8 Tibetan 
exile movement,9 dialogue,10 legal status,11 history of both specific episodes12 and longer 
epochs,13 and its use for contemporary political contestation,14 Chinese economic policy in 
Tibet,15 Chinese education policy in Tibet,16 Buddhism and Tibetan identity in contemporary 
Tibet,17 the politics of modern Tibetan music,18 and western perceptions and representations of 
                                                 
7
 Goldstein 1997; Warren W. Smith, Jr. Tibetan Nation: A History of Tibetan Nationalism and Sino-Tibetan 
Relations, Boulder, CO, and London: Westview Press, 1996; China’s Tibet? Autonomy or Assimilation, Lanham, 
Boulder, New York, Toronto and Plymouth: Rowman and Littlefield Publishers, 2008; Dawa Norbu, China's Tibet 
Policy, Richmond: Curzon Press, 2001; Barry Sautman and June Teufel Dreyer (Eds.) Contemporary Tibet: Politics, 
Development, and Society in a Disputed Region, Armonk, NY, and London: M.E. Sharpe, 2006; Robert Barnett and 
Shirin Akiner (Eds.) Resistance and Reform in Tibet, London: Hurst and Company, 2004; Anne-Marie Blondeau 
and Katia Buffetrille (Eds.) Authenticating Tibet: Answers to China’s 100 Questions, Berkeley, Los Angeles and 
London: University of California Press, 2008.  
8
 Allen Carlson, Beijing's Tibet Policy: Securing Sovereignty and Legitimacy, Washington: East-West Center, 2004. 
9
 Jane Ardley, Tibetan Independence Movement: Political, Religious and Gandhian Perspectives, London and New 
York: RoutledgeCurzon, 2002. 
10
 Rabgey and Sharlho 2004. 
11
 Martyn Berkin, The Great Tibetan Stonewall of China: The Status of Tibet in International Law and International 
Policy on Tibet, Chichester: Barry Rose Law Publishers, 2000; Robert McCordale and Nicholas Orosz (Eds.) Tibet: 
The Position in International Law, (Report of The Conference of International Lawyers on Issues Relating to Self-
Determination and Independence for Tibet, London 6-10 January 1993), Stuttgart and London: Hans-Jörg Mayer 
and Serindia, 1994.  
12
 Melvyn C. Goldstein, On the Cultural Revolution in Tibet: The Nyemo Incident of 1969, Berkeley, Los Angeles 
and London: University of California Press, 2009; Ronald D. Schwartz, Circle of Protest: Political Ritual in the 
Tibetan Uprising, New York: Columbia University Press, 1994. 
13
 Melvyn C. Goldstein, A History of Modern Tibet, 1913-1951: The Demise of the Lamaist State, Berkeley, Los 
Angeles and London: University of California Press, 1989; A History of Modern Tibet: The Calm Before the Storm: 
1951-1955, Berkeley, Los Angeles, London: University of California Press, 2009; Tsering Shakya, Dragon in the 
Land of Snows: A History of Modern Tibet since 1947, New York: Columbia University Press, 1999;  Alex McKay 
(Ed.) Tibet and Her Neighbours: A History, London: Hans-Jörg Mayer, 2003. 
14
 John Powers, History as Propaganda: Tibetan Exiles Versus the People’s Republic of China, Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2004; Elliot Sperling, The Tibet-China Conflict: History and Polemics, Policy Studies 7, 
Washington DC: East West Centre, 2004. 
15Andrew Martin Fischer, State Growth and Social Exclusion in Tibet: Challenges of Recent Growth. Copenhagen: 
Nordic Institute of Asian Studies Press, 2005. 
16
 Catriona Bass, Education in Tibet: Policy and Practice since 1950, London: Tibet Information Network and Zed 
Books, 1998. 
17
 Melvyn C. Goldstein and Mathew Kapstein (Eds.), Buddhism in Contemporary Tibet: Religious Revival and 
Cultural Identity, Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass Publishers, 1998.  
  
5 
 
Tibet and the Tibetans and how they influence the nature of the conflict.19 Collectively, they 
advance more complex understandings of the events, personalities, places and issues that are 
otherwise presented in black and white polemics in certain quarters. Yet, there are significant 
shortcomings which this dissertation seeks to address. 
 In Geopolitical Exotica, Dibyesh Anand, perhaps the only international relations (IR) 
scholar on Tibet, observed that ‘Tibet rarely figures in the international politics literature.’20 He 
is spot on and Tibetology bears part of the blame. IR specialists in the community of 
Tibetologists are rare and there is little analysis of the conflict employing theoretical tools from 
international politics. As Gyatso observed, Tibetology is dominated by anthropologists, 
Buddhologists and historians.21 Not surprisingly, at least two senior Tibetologists have conveyed 
to the author their disapproval of political science and IR approaches to the study of Tibet. The 
reasons for this deplorable situation are multiple, ranging from the understandable unfamiliarity 
of these scholars to IR’s theoretical maze, especially its cutting-edge developments, to their 
consequent inability to engage with its theories and the state-of-the-art insights. Another major 
impediment is the state-centrism of traditional IR,22 which drives Tibetologists away from it and 
influences their analysis of the Sino-Tibetan conflict. 
This is exacerbated by a form of self-censorship that is created by the political sensitivity 
of the Tibet issue in Beijing and Lhasa and the limited research opportunities on political aspects 
of the conflict in Tibet and China, unless of course the researcher holds unambiguously pro-
Chinese views.23 Accordingly, most aspiring Tibetologists make the pragmatic choice of 
                                                                                                                                                             
18
 Tibet Information Network, Unity and Discord: Music and Politics in Contemporary Tibet, London, 2004. 
19
 Donald S. Lopez, Jr. Prisoners of Shangri-La: Tibetan Buddhism and the West, Chicago and London: University 
of Chicago Press: 1998; Dibyesh Anand, Geopolitical Exotica: Tibet in Western Imagination, Minneapolis and 
London: University of Minnesota Press, 2007; Thierry Dodin and Heinz Rather, Imagining Tibet: Perceptions, 
Projections and Fantasies, Boston: Wisdom Publication, 2001; Frank K. Korom (Ed.) Constructing Tibetan 
Culture: Contemporary Perspectives, Quebec: World Heritage Press, 1997. 
20
 Anand 2007: xv. 
21
 Gyatso 2005: 2. 
22
 Anand 2007: xv. 
23
 The Princeton scholar Perry Link has written about the susceptibility of foreign scholars to Chinese censorship 
and self-censorship. See Perry Link, ‘China: The Anaconda in the Chandelier,’ The New York Review of Books, Vol. 
49, No. 6, April 11, 2002; also see Carsten A. Holtz, ‘Have China Scholars All Been Bought?’ Fear Eastern 
Economic Review, April 2007. The fate of the so-called ‘Xinjiang Thirteen’ has been the latest instance of China 
exercising access-denial by ‘banning’ 13 American scholars who published a book on Xinjiang. Frederick Starr 
(Ed.) Xinjiang: China’s Muslim Borderland, New York: M.E. Sharpe, 2004. For a debate on this issue, see ‘How 
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specialising on less politically sensitive topics. Some of them make analytical forays into the 
conflict from the safety of their less controversial disciplines, sticking to issues germane to their 
research interests. While the interdisciplinary effort no doubt enriches the analysis and certainly 
brings valuable insights to the table, the literature is poorer for its lack of cutting-edge IR 
insights. Concepts such as realpolitik and nationalism are employed in underdeveloped and dated 
forms, bereft of the theoretical complexity that contemporary IR brings to bear on them. These 
raise a number of problems in the existing analyses of the conflict. 
First, the literature misses the inter-subjectivity and mutuality characteristic of the 
conflict. The existing scholarship analyses either Chinese policies without adequate 
consideration of how Tibetan diplomatic positions in exile and activities within Tibet influence 
and shape those policies24 or the Tibetan struggle in isolation from the Chinese policies and 
practices.25 Those that do examine the policies and practices on both sides fail to recognize and 
demonstrate analytically the mutuality and interactivity of the conflict.26 To the extent that 
mutual influence and causation is examined, it is often unidirectional: They either explicate how 
Chinese policies are shaped by the Tibetans and their supporters27 or how Chinese policies and 
                                                                                                                                                             
Can US Scholars Resist China’s Control?’ New York Times, 1 September, 2011; available at 
http://www.nytimes.com/roomfordebate/2011/09/01/can-us-colleges-defend-academic-freedom. 
24
 Carlson 2004: 2 argues that the fundamental driver of Beijing’s Tibet Policy has been its ‘concerns about 
defending Chinese sovereignty—[specifically] jurisdictional sovereignty—over the region.’ He Baogang, ‘The Dalai 
Lama’s Autonomy Model: A One-Sided Wish?’ in Sautman and Dreyer, 2006: 67-84. He attributes Chinese policy 
towards Tibet and its definition of autonomy to Marxism and a Dengist form of economic determinism. 
25
 Ardley 2002. 
26
 Smith 1996, for instance, identifies the resurgence and persistence of Tibetan nationalism to the Chinese invasion 
and subsequent policies, but attributes those Chinese policies to the traditional Chinese security practice of cultural 
assimilation, modern Chinese nationalism, Marxism-Leninism-Maoism, colonialism and insecurity, without much 
attention on the influence of Tibetan positions and behaviour. Rabgey and Sharlho 2004 document the twists and 
turns of the Sino-Tibetan dialogue in the post-Mao era, but do not chart clearly the mutuality of the policies and 
practices of the two sides. Sperling 2004 and Powers 2004 examine how the Chinese and the Tibetans have 
deployed militating interpretations of history to buttress their current political goals, but fail to point out and explore 
the mutuality underlying these adversarial rhetorical exercises. Norbu 2001chronicles the tumultuous history of 
Sino-Tibetan relations from the strategic rivalry between the Tang and Tibetan empires down to the contemporary 
conflict, but fails to analytically and consciously examine the mutuality, interactivity and inter-subjectivity. 
27
 Goldstein in ‘Introduction,’ Goldstein and Kapstein (Eds.), 1998: 1-14 and Mathew Kapstein, ‘A Thorn in the 
Dragon’s Side: Tibetan Buddhist Culture in China’ in Governing China’s Multi-Ethnic Frontiers, Morris Rossabi 
(Ed.), Seattle and London: University of Washington Press, 2004: 230-269 focus on how Chinese policy towards 
Tibetan Buddhism is influenced by the activities of the Tibetans in Tibet and exile, especially the Dalai Lama. Tom 
Grunfeld, ‘Tibet and the United States’ in Sautman and Dreyer (Eds.), 2006: 333-342 argues that American support 
hardens Dharamsala’s positions and emboldens the Tibetans inside Tibet to rise up against Chinese rule, which in 
turn hardens Chinese policies inside Tibet. Unlike other proponents of this theory, most prominently Goldstein, 
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practices fuel Tibetan nationalism.28 Goldstein’s The Snow Lion and the Dragon is exceptional, 
in that he posits the adverse effects of Chinese policies in the mid-1980s as fuelling the Tibetan 
grievances which exploded in the form of the 1987-1993 protests in Lhasa and elsewhere.29 He 
also explains how the protests in Tibet and Dharamsala’s positions and activities contributed to 
the hard-line policy shift in 1989.30 However, Goldstein is silent on how Chinese security 
practices shape Dharamsala’s diplomatic positions and behaviour. In fact, Goldstein attributes 
Tibetan demands for autonomy and unification and dissidence inside Tibet to an irrational form 
of Tibetan nationalism, which represents another major flaw in the literature. 
Inadequate attention on the social and inter-subjective nature of the conflict leads to 
internal contradictions. Goldstein, for instance, dismisses human rights violations—‘such as 
abusing prisoners or arresting monks for peaceful demonstration’—as irrelevant to the ‘heart of 
the problem.’31 Yet, he documents how the arrest of peacefully demonstrating monks on 1 
October 1987 sparked off the riots that rocked Lhasa.32 As he further argues that these riots 
contributed to the 1989 hard-line shift in Beijing’s policy, he unwittingly shows that human 
rights violations are just as consequential. The 2008 riots also began when ordinary Tibetans 
reacted to the beatings and arrests of monks and nuns demonstrating peacefully. Hence, human 
rights abuses and the perception of how the Chinese and their Tibetan collaborators treat 
ordinary Tibetans and view Tibetan identity do have important feed-back effects on the severity 
of the conflict. Dismissing the role of human rights abuses, Goldstein asserts that the ‘heart of 
the problem’—a nationalistic conflict over territory—predated the establishment of the PRC. 
Smith also uses a primordialist approach in his account of Tibetan nationhood and nationalism.33 
Such attribution of primordial and static quality to the conflict acknowledges neither the 
structural and discursive evolutions nor the underlying inter-subjectivity and mutuality. This 
                                                                                                                                                             
Grunfeld entirely ignores the implications of Chinese policies and practices on Dharamsa’s positions and how they 
exacerbate both the incidence and aggressiveness of Tibetan uprisings. 
28
 Shwartz 1994; Smith 1996. 
29
 Goldstein 1997: 84-85. 
30
 Ibid: 87-93. 
31
 Ibid: x. 
32
 Ibid: 79. 
33
 Smith 1996. Anand, on the other hand, gives a modernist/constructivist reading of nationalism in the Tibetan 
diaspora. Dibyesh Anand, ‘(Re)imagining nationalism: identity and representation in the Tibetan 
diaspora of South Asia,’ Contemporary South Asia, Vol. 9, No. 3, 2000: 271–287.  
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dissertation introduces a more social, inter-subjective and evolutionary approach, while 
acknowledging the structural factors at work, thereby promoting an alternative understanding of 
the conflict. 
Second, the existing literature treats Tibetan positions and activities as nationalistic and 
the Chinese policies and practices as security-driven.34 The archetypal academic work that 
displays this tendency is Goldstein’s Snow Lion and the Dragon, arguably the most influential 
work on the conflict.35 He contends that the Dalai Lama and Dharamsala hold ‘deeply 
nationalistic convictions’ that are ‘not favourable to the kinds of major concessions by which the 
Dalai Lama could resolve the current impasse.’36 In fact, he opens his book thus: ‘The Tibet 
Question, the long-standing conflict over the political status of Tibet in relation to China, is a 
conflict about nationalism—an emotion-laden debate over whether political units should directly 
parallel ethnic units.’37 Of course, he is referring to Tibetan nationalism. 
However, Goldstein views Chinese policies and practices in Tibet through the lens of 
state and regime security. Beijing’s refusal to entertain political autonomy for Tibet in the 1980s 
is attributed to security considerations: ‘It was looking to enhance its stability and security in 
Tibet, not lessen it by turning over political control of Tibet to its “enemies” in Dharamsala, let 
alone give them control over a greater Tibet.’38 He referred to Beijing’s hard-line policies inside 
Tibet and towards the Dalai Lama after 1989 as a ‘strategy to enhance their security in Tibet.’39 
The Chinese settlers in Tibet are seen as instruments for increasing China’s security, at least, as 
potential tools in the future.40 The juxtaposition of Chinese security and Tibetan nationalism is 
even more apparent when he argues that for the ‘long term security and goodwill China 
wants...Tibetan’s deep-seated ethnic sensitivities must...be addressed.’41 Goldstein is not alone in 
such proclivities, as mentioned above. However, IR’s tradition of rampant state-centrism is 
partly responsible for perpetuating such academic and intellectual practices.  
                                                 
34
 Ibid; Schwartz 1994; Smith 1996; ‘The Transformation of Tibetan National Identity’ in McKay 2003: 207-214.  
35
 Nicholas D. Kristof, ‘Fed Up With Peace,’ New York Times, 18 May, 2009. 
36
 Goldstein 1997: 111-12. 
37
 Ibid: ix. 
38
 Ibid: 74. 
39
 Ibid: 92. 
40
 Ibid: 95. 
41
 Ibid: 130-31. 
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Dominated by neorealism and neoliberalism, traditional IR operated under the 
assumption that states are the only actors that matter in international politics.42 Some theories are 
dismissive even of states that are not ‘great powers’.43 For the most part, they deny the agency of 
supranational and sub-state actors. Some variants of constructivism are also state-centrist.44 As a 
sub-field of IR, some security theories also exhibit such state-centrist tendencies.45  
As alluded to above, a latent version of this state-centrism filters into the thinking of 
Tibet scholars from other disciplines and influences their analyses of the conflict. Consequently, 
they find it difficult to even accommodate the notion that Tibetan agendas could be security-
driven. They simply lack the language and conceptual apparatus to articulate such a notion. If 
security-provision is a fundamental duty, raison d’être, of states, then non-state groups like the 
Tibetans cannot have security fears, needs and agency; they can only have nationalistic impulses. 
The Party-state’s security agendas could be threatened by the nationalistic Tibetans and their 
external masterminds, never the other way round. Ethno-nationalism is a familiar and convenient 
frame for interpreting the Tibetan aspirations and actions. However, IR and security studies have 
evolved theoretically to acknowledge the significant agency of non-state actors such as 
transnational civil society and terrorist groups,46 diasporas,47 multinational companies, ethnic, 
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religious and linguistic groups and supra-national organisations such as the European Union.  
After all, most of the wars fought after the Cold War have been intra-state, inter-ethnic and/or 
religious. The biggest security threat of late to the world’s sole super-power has not been a state, 
but a transnational terrorist organisation, Al Qaeda. This dissertation reflects these positive shifts 
in IR theory. 
 The above-mentioned discrepancy in the depiction of the two sides’ policies and 
practices leads to perceptual, discursive and representational imbalances. Security is considered a 
public good and its provision a fundamental duty, hence raison d’être, of states; it appears 
natural, rational and incumbent upon states to pursue security. Nationalism, however, has an 
image problem: it is perceived as emotional, irrational and threatening.48 Furthermore, while 
one’s own nationalism is ‘patriotism,’ desirable and positive, others’ nationalism is ‘dangerously 
irrational, surplus and alien,’ which is worsened by the popular tendency to associate nationalism 
with its most extreme manifestations such as Fascism and ethnic-cleansing.49 Predictably, the 
Chinese attribute Tibetan aspirations to ‘separatism’, ‘local nationalism’ 50 and increasingly to 
‘ethnic cleansing’ by top officials.51 This dissertation imputes security rationales to both Chinese 
policies and Tibetan demands for autonomy and administrative unification. Chapter Seven 
discusses the link between popular Chinese nationalism and Beijing’s policies, demonstrating 
that security and nationalist imperatives operate in both camps. 
Thirdly, the existing scholarship either uncritically valorises Tibetan protests and riots in 
Tibet, failing to subject those episodes to due scrutiny as to the costs and benefits in terms of 
core Tibetan interests, or reject them outright as machinations of Dharamsala and ‘hostile’ 
foreign forces and invariably harmful to the Tibetans inside Tibet. In Circle of Protest, the 
definitive book on the 1987-1993 Tibetan uprising, Schwartz writes, ‘If there is one thing that 
this book illustrates, it is the capacity for resistance—and plain stubbornness—that Tibetans 
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continue to display in their response to Chinese political control in Tibet.’52 In view of the 
reservations expressed by some leading Tibetans, including the 10th Panchen Lama53 and other 
intellectuals on those protests, a more balanced assessment of the necessity and timing of Tibetan 
protests is in order. The insecurity dilemma provides the strategic and dispassionate logic for 
such an evaluative task. 
Finally, although security motives have often been invoked, one struggles to find 
systematic and theoretically informed scholarship on the linkage between Chinese threat 
perception and policy towards Tibet,54 let alone integrate Tibetan insecurities into such a 
framework. Despite the discourses of vulnerabilities and threats in Beijing and Dharamsala, 
scholarship on the conflict treats the security dimension only partially in both senses of the word. 
Security is the missing link in the study of the Sino-Tibetan conflict. The following section 
sketches the framework of the insecurity dilemma which will position the concept of security at 
the centre of any analytical effort in relation to the conflict. 
 
The Analytical Contributions of this Dissertation 
To perform the tasks set up above, we need a framework that integrates structural, ideational and 
inter-subjective factors into a coherent analysis in the context of a society that subsumes the 
Tibetans, Chinese and other transnational and international actors. Most established IR and 
security theories are inadequate to the task at hand. There is a gaping mismatch between the 
empirical reality of contemporary international relations and the traditional IR and security 
theories. Indeed, in the contemporary world, sovereign states do not have a monopoly over 
international political and security affairs. In other words, international relations has become 
much more crowded with a whole host of non-state actors. The contemporary security agenda 
transcends the traditional political and military concerns to include a whole spectrum of 
economic, ideational and environmental values. Consequently, brutal and protracted intra-state 
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conflicts have replaced inter-state conflicts in both frequency and severity. Most of these 
conflicts take place in the so-called global south or the Third World. Hence, traditional theories 
that were developed in at a particular phase of European or Western historical context and 
purpose fail to engage meaningfully with the world problems of a radically transformed world. 
As Ayoob pointed out, neorealism and neoliberalism fail to ‘explain adequately the behaviour of 
the primary units constituting the international system [by ignoring the historical experience and 
contemporary security practice of states in the global south]’ and ‘fail to explain sufficiently the 
origins, both as beginnings and causes, of the majority of conflicts in the international system 
today.’55 However, the efforts of Ayoob and Job to introduce an alternative framework has been 
criticised for being state-centrist and neglecting the security practice of the non-state actors.56 
Barnett asked, ‘why cling to a state-centric definition of the discipline that seems to provide little 
explanatory value?’ This research is the answer to Barnett’s question. 
This research applies the insecurity dilemma to the Sino-Tibetan conflict described as a 
dilemmatic and dynamic interplay of the insecurities of the Tibetan nation and the Chinese Party-
state. The insecurity dilemma means that when an insecure state, owing to a sense of state 
weakness, engages in state-building to mitigate its perceived insecurities, weaker ethno-national, 
racial, religious, linguistic and ideological groups within that state feel that the state’s policies 
threaten their identities, and retaliate in ways that are almost as multi-faceted as the arsenal of 
statecraft.57 An important caveat is in order: while the possibilities in terms of the adversarial 
non-state groups are numerous as mentioned above, this dissertation will focus on ethno-national 
groups. Although the state and its domestic adversary or adversaries begin with the goals of 
security-maximisation, the outcome is greater insecurity for both. This plunges them into 
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counter-productive action-reaction cycles of state-building and resistance. Additionally, 
uncertainty being a central feature of the strategic situation facing the two adversaries, they face 
irresolvable dilemmas about how to interpret each other’s behaviour and how to fashion the 
appropriate responses. The insecurity dilemma synthesizes insights from existing perspectives to 
produce a coherent, policy-relevant analysis and explains the specific positions of the two 
principal parties, but also integrates the transnational and international dimensions into that 
analysis.58  
This dissertation examines the links between Beijing’s security-driven state-building 
programme and its religious, linguistic, educational and economic policies in Tibet. It will 
explore the security imperatives behind Beijing’s hard-line position of denying the existence of a 
larger ‘Tibetan Issue’ and talking only about the Dalai Lama’s return. It also reveals the security 
rationale behind Beijing’s negative responses to Dharamsala’s autonomy proposals and its 
preconditions such as the Dalai Lama’s declaration of Tibet as a historically integral part of 
China. Insecurity and uncertainty expose state policies to the vagaries of worse-case calculations, 
which is indeed the case with Beijing’s Tibet policy. 
Conversely, this dissertation will examine how Chinese policies, migration and cultural 
practices in Tibet generate insecurities among the Tibetans, not the least identity insecurity. It 
also analyses reasons behind the Dalai Lama’s unpopular concessions and his refusal to 
compromise further or to give in to the Chinese preconditions. Tibetan identity insecurity will be 
presented as the chief cause of the largely peaceful and occasionally violent protests and riots 
and other subtle forms of resistance inside Tibet. Indeed, security or rather insecurity will be 
shown to have an all-pervasive role in Tibetan thinking and behaviour towards China.  
Employing the insecurity dilemma, this dissertation begins with the structural root: China 
as an insecure multi-national empire behaving like a state, whose power and influence is rising. 
However, the analysis goes beyond the simple narrative of power-imbalance by examining the 
inter-subjectivity of identities and interests and the mutuality of behaviour between the Chinese 
Party-state and the Tibetan nation. The result is a security-driven analysis that takes into account 
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the interactive or social nature of the conflict. This reveals a cyclical pattern in the hardening of 
Chinese policies and Tibetan uprisings. Michael Davis puts this rather nicely: 
China’s military occupation and CCP rule have spawned a cycle of resistance and further repression. 
Repression over the years has meant not only armed invasion and crackdowns but also the sacking and 
razing of Buddhist monasteries during the Cultural Revolution, the suppression of religion, the 
imprisonment and coerced “re-education” of dissidents, as well as the forced relocation of rural 
dwellers to less remote and more urbanized areas. Tibetan resistance has occasionally involved open 
popular dissent and rebellion, but more often has been a matter of smaller-scale resistance by monks, 
nuns, and others against Chinese rule and its methods.59 
 
Breaking this mutually detrimental cycle is imperative for any Sino-Tibetan rapprochement. 
However, this dissertation does not treat the Tibetans and the Chinese as monolithically 
unified actors and examines a multiplicity of actors, objectives and strategies on both sides of the 
dispute. Moreover, the Tibetans and the Chinese are not duelling in isolation from the rest of the 
world. The Sino-Tibetan conflict is nested within the larger regional and international political 
and strategic dynamics and the insecurity dilemma allows the examination of how this feed-back 
effect operates between the two apparently separate levels of analysis. This dissertation ropes in 
all these various aspects into a coherent analysis. 
 
The Methodological Approach 
To achieve these objectives, this research will use a number of methods within qualitative 
methodology. Specifically, it will employ an empirical, holistic single-case-study methodology 
in the sense of both intrinsic case studies to get deeper understanding of particular cases as well 
as instrumental case studies to provide insights into broader phenomena using particular cases.60 
Within these broad parameters, I will employ different strategies to meet different research 
objectives. I will use historical analysis to study the history of Sino-Tibetan relations before and 
after the Communist invasion. This research analyses the agency of various non-state actors 
(unit-level actors and factors), not just systemic factors. Methodologically, therefore, it 
                                                 
59
 Michael C. Davis, ‘The Quest for Self-Rule in Tibet,’ Journal of Democracy, Vol. 18, Number 4, October 2007: 
162. 
60
 Robert E. Stake, ‘Case Studies’ in Handbook of Qualitative Research, Norman K. Denzen and Yvonne S. Lincoln 
(Eds.), Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications Inc., 2000: 437. 
  
15 
 
constitutes a ‘thick description’.61 A ‘thick description’ of Tibetan-Chinese relations produces a 
detailed account of the historical, social, political and strategic contexts within which policies 
and positions are formulated, articulated and implemented on both sides. As such, thick 
description of a case study provides others with a ‘database for making judgements about the 
possible transferability of findings to other milieu.’62 In other words, it provides generalisations 
for analysing intrastate conflicts, ethnic conflicts and Third World security. A caveat is in order: 
the claim to ‘thick description’ here is akin to the way some neo-classical realists use it to 
‘provide a richer portrait of the dynamism and complexity’ of the insecurity dilemma and its 
Sino-Tibetan instance.63 Thick description requires the researcher to gain ‘deep cultural 
immersion and understanding of a subject.’ 64 In that sense, this author is particularly well-placed 
as he himself is a product of the Sino-Tibetan conflict.  
Having been born during the Cultural Revolution in Tibet where he lived and directly 
experienced Chinese policies. As a teenager, he left his parents and family behind for educational 
opportunities in India, where he became part of the Tibetan refugee community. Subsequently, 
having studied and lived in America and the United Kingdom, the author has become part of the 
global Tibetan diaspora and observed closely how the Sino-Tibetan conflict plays out in the 
transnational and international arenas. Furthermore, having always been in touch with parents, 
family and friends still in Tibet, the author has a unique sense of intimacy with the local issues 
there. The author’s understanding of the issues germane to the conflict is a cumulative product of 
keen observation since high school days and more recent academic work. This background has 
enhanced the research conducted for this dissertation.  
In addition, whenever possible, this research will use the method of triangulation, ‘using 
multiple perceptions [and datasets] to clarify meanings…or…interpretations… [and to] clarify 
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meaning by identifying different ways the phenomenon is being seen.”65 As such, I will cross-
reference data from materials ranging from primary and secondary sources in Tibetan and 
English, government documents, Think Tank, NGO and conference reports, personal interviews 
and conversations, translations of Chinese language documents, books and online sources, 
English and Tibetan language audio-visual materials from Tibet and outside, and media reports 
from Tibet, China, India and the West. The combination of these sources allows an in-depth 
examination of the conflict.  
However, given the objectives set out above, namely to focus on both sides of the 
conflict, the author’s background is a liability. Frankly, it has been a challenge at times to write 
this dissertation precisely because of my particular circumstances. However, the author has had a 
wholesome training in political science and social scientific research in America and the LSE, 
where he was socialised into the virtues of healthy scepticism, balance and objectivity and the 
pit-falls of bias in research. While it would be humanly impossible to observe absolute balance 
and objectivity even in scientific research, the author hopes that the above-mentioned training 
and acculturation have moderated any egregious prejudices in this dissertation. Furthermore, the 
author’s excellent dissertation supervisor should be trusted to have weeded out grave instances of 
partiality. In any case, laying bare my background is an effort at intellectual transparency so that 
the reader is forewarned of any biases.  
Practically, the research methodology will work with a two-pronged strategy. First, the 
above-mentioned sources will be examined to get a first-cut understanding of the conflict. 
Secondly, insights from these sources will be corroborated through additional research to 
confirm or qualify the preliminary insights gleaned from the first reading of the primary and 
secondary texts and other types of sources. Field work was conducted in India, which is home to 
the Dalai Lama and the Tibetan Government-in-exile and the largest Tibetan community outside 
of Tibet. The field work took the form of primarily elite-led, key informant interviews, 
supplemented by informal discussions with other stake-holders for deeper understanding of the 
relevant issues. However, because of repeated unrests in Tibet and Chinese travel restrictions to 
Tibet, especially to Tibet Autonomous Region for Tibetan exiles, the author had to shelf 
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advanced plans for field work in Tibet and China. This entails a weak point in this dissertation, 
but the author has attempted to rectify this shortcoming in four main ways.  
First, an eagle eye was kept on the coverage of Tibet in the English language Chinese 
media, both print and online, which are used by the Party-state to propagate their policies and 
positions. Secondly, the English language publications of official documents and statements by 
the Chinese government and its agents on Tibet are consulted extensively. Third, BBC’s World 
Wide Monitoring (formerly known as Summary of World Broadcasts), which contains an 
exhaustive and up-to-date archive of English language media stories on China and Tibet, 
including Chinese publications in that language, and crucially translations of Chinese language 
media stories and official statements on all aspects of culture, society, economics and politics. 
Finally, the active, albeit repeatedly closed down, Tibetan blogosphere in Chinese and Tibetan 
language inside Tibet, and the contents of literary magazines and other forms of popular culture 
such as pop and folk music, were closely monitored to get a full sense of the situation inside 
Tibet and the collective psyche of the Tibetans there. It goes without saying that every effort has 
been made to speak with Tibetans who have recently left Tibet either for asylum, educational and 
academic purposes. 
Finally, it must be pointed out that the Chinese-Tibetan dispute could be considered a 
tough test for the insecurity dilemma because on the one hand, the Tibetans are widely held to be 
pacifists, including in their national struggle, and on the other hand, China is one of the strongest 
powers in the world today with one of the most draconian internal security machineries.66 On the 
face of it, one would not expect a protracted conflict there, but this dissertation demonstrates that 
the insecurity dilemma operates just as brutally in Sino-Tibetan relations. 
 
Key Concepts and Definitions 
Before introducing the chapters, the key concepts constituting the insecurity dilemma—weak 
states, state-building and identity—need to be defined and contextualised. However, the purpose 
here is not to engage in a critical analysis or a comprehensive literature review. 
                                                 
66
 Bennett, Andrew and Elman, Colin. “Case Study Methods in the International Relations 
Subfield,” Comparative Political Studies, Vol. 40, No. 2, February 2007: 173; King, Keohane and Verba 1994: 209. 
  
18 
 
Weak States 
As the introduction of the insecurity dilemma above referred to (and as Chapter Two will 
develop), the insecurity dilemma is a phenomenon that preys upon weak, insecure states. If state 
weakness is fundamental to the insecurity dilemma, how do we understand the reality of weak 
states? What causes state-weakness? 
State weakness has a number of causes. For some scholars, state-weakness is a legacy of 
colonial cartography of both capitalist and communist powers and late entry into the state system 
and an indication of their early-stage of state-making or state-building.67 For them, state-
weakness equals underdevelopment at the early phase of state-building. Former multi-national 
empires attempting to construct modern nation-states after expanding into the homelands of other 
peoples could also exhibit the same symptoms of weakness. For Chistopher Clapham and Jeffrey 
Herbst, state-weakness is the result of ‘misplaced forms of sovereignty’: conferring sovereignty 
on ‘post-colonial entities with no history and experience of performing as or organising a 
state.’68 Robert Jackson makes a similar argument with his concept of ‘quasi-states’ by which he 
means ‘Ramshackle states…not allowed to disappear juridically, even if for all intents and 
purposes they have either fallen or been pulled down already.’69 For Nelson Kasfir, state-failure 
is caused by the absence of a ‘controlling authority’ or anarchy which creates the right conditions 
for the toxic mix of security-motivated security dilemmas and the greed-driven predation.70 Van 
de Walle argues that state-failure is a function of how a weak state manages its economic 
troubles.71 But how can one tell a weak state from a strong one? 
Many scholars have attempted classifications of states along a weak-strong continuum. 
Caroline Thomas uses institutional capacity, represented by despotic power and infrastructural 
power as the criteria.72 Joel Migdal uses ‘state capacities’ defined as ‘the ability of state leaders 
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to use the agencies of the state to get people in the state to do what they want them to do.’73 
Keith Jaggers defines state-building as ‘the state’s ability to accumulate power’ and differentiates 
states in terms of power as national capability, political capacity and institutional coherence.74 
While each of these capability-based approaches advance the understanding of state-building, 
they suffer from lack of attention to legitimacy and the failure to appreciate the role of the 
despotic/military variable in propping up apparently strong institutions, which may not survive 
as soon as the military support is removed. Buzan argues that ‘[a]rmed forces might sustain 
[institutions]…but institutions without mass support are much more precariously positioned than 
those with it.’75 Erin Jenne and Rotberg call this condition ‘the seemingly strong case’ of weak 
states.76 The dissolution of the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia illustrate dramatically the 
weaknesses of the above power-centred approaches.77 As Joseph Nye wrote, ‘politics is not 
merely a struggle for physical power, but also a contest of over legitimacy.’78 
Fundamental to regime legitimacy and state cohesion are not just concentration of 
coercive power in the centre and performance in the provision of public goods, but also shared 
identities and values. Without shared identity or values among the people living in a state, the 
legitimacy of the regime and the existence of the state would be constantly challenged from 
inside. This would also compromise the international legitimacy of the state and make it 
vulnerable to encroachment by foreign actors. As such, the degrees of socio-political 
homogeneity or polarity are as important as the concentration of power and institutional 
effectiveness for the strength of a state. Hence, an approach that synthesises the materialist, 
institutionalist and ideational approaches is necessary.  
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Barry Buzan provided just such a framework for understanding state-weakness and the 
national and international security implications.79 Critiquing the ‘politico-territorial billiard-ball’ 
or ‘like-unit’ model of the state in traditional international relations as too restrictive, Buzan 
produces a broader conception of the state consisting not just of  the established territorial and 
institutional variables, but also a third factor—socio-political cohesion.80 He argues that states 
differ from each other not just in terms of material power or institutional capacity, but also socio-
political cohesion. Accordingly, he posits the state as a triadic entity consisting of (1) an ‘idea’ or 
identity, (2) institutions and (3) a ‘physical base’ (territory and population).81  Naturally, the 
varying degrees of these three components determine the condition of the state itself with 
consequent implications for security.82 With these ideas, Buzan develops a typology of strong 
and weak states and distinguishes strong/weak states from strong/weak powers.83 As he writes,  
Strength as a state neither depends on, nor correlates with, power. Weak powers, like Austria, the 
Netherlands, Norway and Singapore are all strong states, while quite substantial powers like 
Argentina, Brazil, Nigeria, Indonesia and Pakistan, are all rather weak as states. Even major powers, 
like China and the Soviet Union, have serious weaknesses as states.84 
 
The variable of socio-political cohesion is the pivot around which the distinction between state 
strength and state power turns. While state power is a function of the material capabilities, socio-
political cohesion determines state strength or weakness. 
Buzan is not alone in going beyond material power and institutional capacity as metrics 
of state-strength to include ideational variables. Muthiah Alagappa argued that in addition to 
material capabilities, states ‘vary widely on…the capacity for self-government, monopoly over 
the legitimate use of force and internal pacification, cohesiveness as a political community, 
capacity for international interaction, and participation in the regional and global economies.’85 
Edward Azhar and Chung-in Moon also advanced similar ideas with their concepts of political 
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‘hardware’ (physical capabilities) and ‘software’ (legitimacy, integration, and policy capacity).86 
This dissertation adopts this broader understanding of the state. Buzan’s distinction of 
weak/strong states centred on ‘socio-political cohesion’ from weak/strong powers, which is 
determined by the relative military and economic capabilities of states, is especially useful.87 The 
triadic conception of the state is also useful from the stand-point of security analysis as it enables 
a more comprehensive understanding of the logics of vulnerability and threats. 88  
Next, the insecurity dilemma theorists tell us that states attempt to break-out of their 
weaknesses and insecurity through active state-building. It is necessary to clarify the meaning 
and nature of state-building as employed in this dissertation. 
State-Building 
Just as the state is an essentially contested concept, state-building also reflects the various 
theories of the state. In brief, there are institutionalist, realist power-based, post-colonial, 
taxonomist and ideational approaches to the study of both state-weakness and state-building. 
Francis Fukuyama identified four ‘aspects of stateness’: organizational design and management, 
political system design, basis of legitimation and cultural and structural factors.89 He defined 
state building as ‘the creation of new governmental institutions and the strengthening of existing 
ones.’90 Fukuyama is primarily interested in state building from the angle of economic 
development and how external actors can design and export state institutions,91 but he ignores 
the agency, aspirations and predilections of the domestic non-state actors. The fact that most 
weak states have national, ethnic, linguistic, religious and ideological conflicts that destroy state 
institutions at birth or prevent them from maturing is lost to Fukuyama.92  
Combining realist and institutionalist perspectives, Keith Jaggers defined state-building as 
the state’s ability to augment its own power—power as national capabilities, political capacity 
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and institutional coherence.93 Mohamed Ayoob developed another perspective that married 
realist and post-colonial ideas, which he aptly called ‘sub-altern realism’. Based mainly on 
Charles Tilly’s conception of state functions but also informed by Jaggers and Azar and Moon, 
Ayoob defined state-building as strengthening war-making, policing and taxation capacities.94 
War making refers to expansion and consolidation of territory and population and imposition of 
order in contested regions, policing to maintain order at home, and taxation to extract resources 
from the territory and population at home to support the first two activities. Ayoob contends that 
the ability of the state to perform these three activities depends upon the coercive powers at its 
disposal. He finds a negative relationship between the stage of state-building and the level of 
domestic violence used by the state, and posits a positive relationship between security and the 
level of state-building.95 
Other scholars have focused on the causes and indicators of state-weakness to produce a 
taxonomy of states.96 Rotberg and his colleagues studied 41 countries and categorised them into 
four groups according to the severity of their deficiencies: weak, failing, failed and collapsed 
states. They prescribe a number of specific steps to build or rebuild the states from their various 
stages of weakness: designing and introducing an enforceable system of rule of law with courts, 
police and prison services; training of police, judges, bureaucrats and politicians; restructuring 
and reorienting the armed forces; building the transportation and communications and financial 
infrastructures. In short restoring legitimacy in the eyes of the citizens through, legal, economic 
and political performance constitutes the task of state-building.  
Buzan’s conception of the state as consisting of an identity, institutions and physical base 
provides another set of ideas into state-building that consciously incorporates an ideational 
element into state-building. Securing the idea of the state involves nation-building and 
ideological homogenisation. Institutional capacity-building for mobilisational, penetrative and 
extractive effectiveness is also important. However, Buzan’s idea of the ‘physical base’ does not 
lend itself well for state-building purposes, except to mean population build-up and territorial 
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expansion—not always desirable or controversial at least. This dissertation will be guided by a 
notion of state-building that includes nation-building and ideological propaganda to fortify the 
idea of the state or state identity, consolidating the institutions, and economic development as 
represented by infrastructure-building. The ultimate objective of these aspects of state-building 
is to reinforce the socio-political integrity of the state. 
 
Identity  
As proposed above, the insecurity dilemma is the militating relationship between state-building 
and the identity insecurity of non-state groups. It is also important to define identity and the 
sense in which this dissertation uses it. As the debate between the so-called Copenhagen School 
and McSweeny on the alleged ‘reification’ and ‘objectification’ of identity illustrates, identity is 
a controversial concept in security studies and IR.97 The rationalists/positivists (realists and 
liberals) consider identity as objectively given a priori and indeed that all the constituent units, 
namely states, have the common identity of being self-interested actors while post-positivists 
treat identity as possessing no objective quality and subject to social construction and constant 
negotiation.98  
The split in IR mirrors the debate in the literature on national identity and nationalism, 
where ‘primordialists’ and ‘perennialists’ treat national identity as ‘culturally given’, historically 
‘continuous’, and ethnically ‘fixed’.99 ‘Modernists’ on the other hand contend that nations have 
been socially constructed creatures of modern processes and phenomena such as technology (the 
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print press for instance), capitalism, industrialisation, public education, social communication 
and state elites.100 Benedict Anderson argued that the nation is an ‘imagined community’ that 
was made possible by the onset of print technology.101 Ernest Gellner wrote that the nations are 
modern day inventions made possible by mass education and literacy.102 Eric Hobsbawm called 
the nation an ‘invented tradition’ involving primary education, public ceremonies, and ‘mass 
production of public monuments.”103 Karl Deutsch attributed nation-formation to the intensity 
and ‘complementarity of social communication’ which is aided by modern processes such as 
industrialism and the market economy and the pressures these processes put on individuals to 
identify with a national group.104 The ethnic conflict literature is also split on identity along 
similar lines.105 
Rogers Brubaker and Fred Cooper summarises the above insights: 
Identity can be understood as a ground or basis for social or political action, a collective phenomenon 
denoting some degree of sameness among members of a group or category, a core aspect of individual or 
collective ‘selfhood’, a product of social or political action, or the product of multiple and competing 
discourses.106  
 
Notwithstanding the debates on the novelty or antiquity of national identity and its modes of 
emergence, this dissertation will adhere to the understanding that at any given time, identity is 
constituted by ideas, practices and symbols that help individuals identify themselves as members 
of one community and different from other groups. Chapter Two explains why and how identity 
can be used for analytical purposes and its role in the insecurity dilemma. 
 
China as a Strong Power, Weak State: Since the hype and reality of China’s rise militates 
against the application of the weak state label on China, it is important to explain this analytical 
decision. The PRC is indeed a complex case. 
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 When Chairman Mao declared the establishment of the PRC in 1949, China became a 
Leninist totalitarian state.107 China started strong in terms of ideological legitimacy, territorial 
defence, monopoly over coercive resources, and mobilisational and penetrative powers over 
society, but its totalitarian apparatus concealed a number of weaknesses. These weaknesses were 
not just reflective of the nature of totalitarian regimes, but also constitute the legacy of two and a 
half decades of Mao’s erratic policies such as the collectivisation of agriculture (1958-1978), the 
anti-rightist campaign (1957-1958), Great Leap Forward (1959-1961) and the Cultural 
Revolution (1966-1976).108 These national disasters combined with numerous regional ones 
claimed the lives of 40-55 million people, according to conservative Western estimates.109 The 
China scholar Frederick C. Teiwes sums up the state of the Chinese state by the death of Mao in 
1976: 
Mao Zedong left a difficult legacy for the post-Mao state: a fractured and grievance riddled society, a 
party-state with reduced legitimacy and weakened dominance over society, faction-infested 
institutions, ambiguous official norms, and a divided top leadership.110 
 
After the ouster of the Gang of Four and Mao’s heir Hua Guofeng, Deng Xiaoping met these 
challenges by ushering in the so-called Reform Era (Gaike Kaifang), a period of economic 
reforms and rapid growth and limited political reforms.111  
However, as the pro-democracy protests of 1989 demonstrated, the post-Mao state in the 
1980s was beset by the related problems of rampant corruption, institutional deficiencies and 
lack of legitimacy of the regime.112 In effect, the post-1978 reforms had failed to resolve the 
socio-political problems that Mao bequeathed to his successors. As the editors of The Tiananmen 
Papers found from official Chinese documents, inflation, corruption in the political system, 
“crisis of faith” among the intellectuals’, rising crime, ideological decay, disaffected youth and 
students, and most crucially a divided leadership at the top echelons of the party-state hierarchy, 
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were the primary ‘seeds of the crisis.’113 The harsh military crackdown on 4 June, 1989 and the 
subsequent arrests and exile of the leaders and participants in the protests, strong and continued 
economic growth and the heavy programme of nationalistic political education have ensured the 
survival of the CCP, but the fundamental contradictions of rapid economic and social 
transformation and political authoritarianism continue to afflict the Chinese state to this day.  
About 100, 000 mass unrests were recorded in China in 2010, rising year on year from 
only 8,700 in 1993.114 Discontented groups include factory workers agitating for better wages 
and working conditions, college students protesting fake degrees, demobilised soldiers angry 
about joblessness, taxi-drivers protesting new regulations, rural residents angered by inadequate 
compensation for confiscated land, minorities demanding greater autonomy or protesting 
Chinese encroachment into their ancestral lands. The environment is a mess and its mine-safety 
record is the worst in the world.  The list is endless. On the other hand, China completed the 
Three Gorges Dam and the Qinghai-Tibet Railway, sent an astronaut into space, shot a satellite 
in space with a missile, and hosted the 2008 Olympics, all monumental if controversial 
achievements. China’s economic miracle is continuing unabated, its military is modernising fast, 
and its diplomatic muscle is increasing in equal proportion. China’s roaring economic growth, 
2.3 million strong and modernising army and growing diplomatic assertiveness are also causing 
disquiet in various foreign capitals.115 A parallel public and academic ‘Chinese threat’ discourse 
has gained currency, especially in America,116 replacing an earlier China collapse theory.117 The 
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European Council of Foreign Relations’ report A Power Audit of EU-China Relations is a 
European version of this China threat theory.118 
To assuage the fears of China’s rising power, the Chinese have had to heavily propagate 
their concepts of ‘peaceful rise’ (heping jueqi)119 and ‘peaceful development’ (heping fazhan)120 
in recognition of their new-found stature.121 A more confident nationalism has developed at 
home too.122 Abroad, a more confident and sophisticated diplomacy has forestalled, at least 
temporarily, a balancing coalition in its periphery while cementing its economic position in 
Africa and Latin America.123 At home and abroad, China’s rise is shaping how people think and 
speak about and behave towards China. 
So what should one make of these contradictory signs from China? Using the metric of 
socio-political cohesion and exploiting Buzan’s dichotomy between strong/weak powers and 
strong/weak states, this dissertation posits China as a strong power with some significant 
weaknesses as a state. 
Scholars have focused as much on China’s state-weakness as on its rising power. Minxin 
Pei observed, ‘The only thing rising faster than China is the hype about China.’124 He warns, 
‘Advocates of engagement and containment both assume China’s rise as a given, and their 
differing policy prescriptions focus on projected Chinese strength, rather than in its 
weaknesses.’125 Pei calls China an ‘incapacitated’ state because of its poor record of providing 
public services—public safety, education, health, environmental protection, law enforcement and 
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regulation, rural public finance and jobs—and the CCP’s weakening mobilisation capacity, 
internal corruption, state-society tensions and institutional breakdown.126 China, he writes, is 
unable to fully honour its international commitments or perform critical functions such as 
‘environmental protection, non-proliferation, anti-narcotics, migration, control of the spread of 
HIV/AIDS, and poverty alleviation.’127 
 Shaoguang Wang declared China ‘weak’ overall based on six criteria that he deems 
essential to govern effectively: monopoly of force, resource extraction, national identity and 
mobilisation, regulation of society and economy, institutional coherence and resource 
redistribution.128 He attributes this weakness to the intrusiveness of the Chinese state, 
lawlessness and crime rate, public finance problems, unresolved national identity issues, and 
inadequate regulatory capacity.  Peter Navarro fears that China’s implosion due to inhuman 
labour conditions, rural poverty, dispossession of land and homes for industrial development, 
heavy tax burden, corruption, population aging, poor, unequal access to public services, 
environmental disasters, AIDs crisis and ethnic separatism, could be more “sudden, wrenching, 
and violent.”129 Governing China’s Multiethnic Frontiers examines the various problems posed 
by non-Chinese nationalities in China.130 Summarising the implications of these various 
constraints, Susan Shirk characterised contemporary China as a ‘fragile super-power’—
economically dynamic and internationally secure and confident, but domestically fragile and 
insecure.131 Indeed, the burgeoning literatures on China’s state-society relations, governance, 
democratisation and national minorities portray the PRC as a ‘struggling giant’132 or a ‘fragile 
super-power’, confirming Buzan’s observation that ‘even major powers, like China…have 
serious weaknesses as states.’133 These confirm the soundness of the analytical decision to 
classify China as a strong power and weak state.   
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As major protests in Tibet, Xinjiang and Inner Mongolia in 2008, 2009 and 2011 
respectively demonstrate, one such weakness is a “[n]ational identity [that] is not a fully resolved 
issue,” especially in the multi-ethnic frontier regions.134 The non-Chinese nationalities, 
especially the Tibetans, Uighurs (Xinjiang Automous Region) and Mongols (Inner Mongolian 
Autonomous Region) present socio-political challenges to China’s self-identification as a 
modern unitary ‘nation-state’. Indeed, the socio-political challenges that the Party-state faces 
from these nations constitute the basis for this dissertation. The next section provides an 
overview of the security challenges that they pose to China with a view only to provide a broader 
analytical context for the subsequent chapters on Tibet. 
 
Frontier Nationalities, Chinese Nationality Policy and Security  
Security concerns or perceived threats to security more than anything else shape China’s 
nationality policy. Li Ruihuan, former Politburo member was clear on this during a forum 
organised by the State Nationalities Affairs Commission in 1994.135 Tibet, Xinjiang and Inner 
Mongolia present the most serious threats from among the 55 minority nationalities. The latest 
incarnation of the ‘three evils’ in Chinese official-speak (terrorism, separatism and religious 
fundamentalism) that threaten the ‘territorial integrity and security of states, as well as their 
political, economic and social stability’ are clearly enunciated with Xinjiang, Tibet and Inner 
Mongolia in mind.136 Why do these minorities, who are numerically insignificant in comparison 
to the 1.214 billion Han Chinese,137 pose such threats to rising China?  The answer to this 
question is multi-faceted, touching upon sovereignty, territorial integrity, legitimacy, Marxist and 
nationalist ideologies, the Leninist political system and state institutions, national identity, 
national image (or face; Ch. mianzi) and regime survival. In this overview, China’s security 
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concerns are organised in terms of political, military and societal security, suggesting that 
Beijing’s calculations go beyond traditional security issues. 
 
Political Security: The disputes with the Tibetans, Uyghurs and Mongols always touch a raw 
nerve in China because fundamentally at stake from Beijing’s perspective is Chinese 
sovereignty. Adhering to a Westphalian notion of sovereignty and no doubt influenced by 
China’s recent history of victimisation by imperialist powers, Beijing is sensitive to the slightest 
sense of violation of its sovereignty.138 Its behaviour is a textbook case of fetishisation of 
sovereignty and its indivisibility.139 The perceived threats to Chinese sovereignty originate from 
domestic actors, in this case ethnic nationalities demanding complete freedom or greater 
autonomy, and their supporters in foreign states who are perceived to be trying to contain or 
sabotage China’s rise.140 The current trend in international relations is to speak about sovereignty 
as a bundle of rights and responsibilities.141 When it comes to national minorities and their 
homelands, Beijing has preserved its static and conservative interpretation of all elements of 
sovereignty, even as it has relaxed its economic authority practices in China itself.142 In short, a 
clear sense of threat to Chinese sovereignty prevails in China’s academic and official circles. 
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Tibetans, Uyghurs and Mongols also threaten China’s territorial integrity.143 Loss of 
territory and the associated resources and strategic advantages weigh heavily on Beijing’s 
calculus. The religious and cultural underpinnings of Tibetan, Uighur and Mongolian 
nationalism also threaten or obstruct the dominant ideology (formerly communism, now 
increasingly Chinese nationalism), which provides the ordering and legitimating principles of the 
Party-state. The Leninist political system and its institutional structure that keeps the CCP in 
power, especially the Regional National Autonomy Law which allows China to control the 
restive non-Chinese nationalities, are also threatened by the latter’s nationalist and separatist 
activities. In the Tibetan case, democratic aspiration is problematic for a regime that relies upon 
the Leninist political system for survival and views democracy as a western tool to undermine 
China’s rise.  
The legitimacy of China’s rule and policies in minority regions and its international 
image are constantly put into disrepute, to the great consternation of the Chinese, by the 
combination of local uprisings, international campaigns of the diasporas and criticism of foreign 
governments and international institutions. Politics is also a ‘contest of over legitimacy’144 and 
denial of legitimacy is a familiar strategy of weaker actors. The Tibetans, Uighurs and Mongols 
question the legitimacy not just of current policies, but also of Chinese sovereignty over their 
regions, which is tantamount to denying the legitimacy of the contemporary Chinese state. The 
Party’s loss of control over ideology, erosion of institutional integrity and the deficit of 
legitimacy has direct bearing on regime survival. 
Regime survival is an over-riding consideration for the Party and its leaders.145 Shirk 
argues that China’s ‘communist leaders have a deep sense of domestic insecurity…. Chinese 
leaders are haunted by the fear that their days in power are numbered.’146 She finds that ‘ethnic 
unrest’ is one of the threats confronting Beijing.147 The threat to regime security from the 
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Tibetans and Uighurs operates through the ubiquitous practice of deliberately conflating regime, 
state and societal securities of the dominant nation in authoritarian states like China. Regime 
security in the PRC could be analytically broken up into three levels: the survival interests of the 
Chinese Communist Party, the bureaucratic interests of the institutions especially invested in 
minority affairs, such as the United Front Department, and the survival interests and privileges of 
the local elites, including the Tibetans and Uighurs who have been co-opted into the ruling 
regime.  
Secessionism and irredentism are obvious threats to state, regime and national security, 
but internal, non-secessionist aspirations for greater rights and autonomy by any one of the 
minority problems are worrisome for the Party, especially in the contexts of both the ultra-
nationalistic atmosphere in China and the uncertainties underlying state-minority relations. The 
domino-effect of Beijing’s accommodation of one ethnic group’s aspirations setting off similar 
demands from other minorities is interpreted as a threat to national unity and state security, with 
obvious implications for regime security.148 The anticipation of adverse reaction by Chinese 
nationalists to concessions to minorities weighs heavily on Beijing's security assessments.  
 
Military Security  
In Xinjiang, Chinese military strategists have concerns about Pan-Islamic and Pan-Turkic 
subversion, while in Tibet, indigenous separatism and the domestic and international popularity 
of the Dalai Lama are security risks.149 Indian influence in Tibet via the exile administration is 
seen with great suspicion.150 Western ideological and strategic designs to undermine China’s rise 
through the Tibetan Trojan horse is a familiar narrative in official and intellectual circles. In 
Inner Mongolia, Pan-Mongolism and local discontent have been causes of concern.151 Direct 
foreign military interventions, Kosovo and Iraq style, and gradual ‘peaceful evolution’ strategies 
to change China’s political system and undermine CCP rule have been raised repeatedly in 
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official, military and intellectual discourses.152 The fears of domestic separatism and foreign 
intervention are connected with the fears of the loss of the strategic advantage that Tibet and 
Xinjiang confer on the PLA and the natural resources that are critical for the resource-hungry 
Chinese economy. As the People’s Liberation Army is the Party’s army, the threat perception of 
the military officers concerns not just the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the state but also 
the Party’s survival.153 Furthermore, a part of China’s military resources and investments are tied 
up in these remote regions populated by strongly anti-Chinese natives to forestall any 
contingencies involving either the locals and/or adjoining powers, whose future relations with 
China are clouded by uncertainty.154 Also the imperatives of economic development, Beijing’s 
strategy of choice to foster loyalty in these remote regions, eat up resources that could otherwise 
be devoted to its military modernisation program to challenge America and its allies.155 It is clear 
from the above that there are significant overlaps between political and military security. 
 
Societal Security 
National identity is the main referent object of societal security. The existence of separate 
Tibetan, Uighur and Mongolian identities present the greatest threat to the unitary self-image of 
the Chinese state.156 Li Dezhu, former Minister, State Ethnic Affairs Commission, warned 
against the threat from non-Han identities when he said that ‘blind, excessive or even destructive 
development of ethnic culture must be guarded against’, while calling for the exploitation of 
ethnic culture for tourism ‘[u]nder the condition that it is properly protected.’ 157 Li Rihuan, the 
former politburo members, was more explicit:  
The minority population in China, which is close to 100m, is scattered throughout the country. 
Autonomous minority regions account for 64 per cent of the country's total area. Therefore, we take 
unity among various nationalities as the basis of discussion on people's unity, territorial integrity and 
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national unity. In the absence of unity among various nationalities, China will lapse into turmoil and 
fragmentation and will no longer be what it is today.158 
 
Given such fears, the party-state does its best to neutralise the threat through the promotion of 
what Zhao calls ‘state-led nationalism.’159 While the means employed have varied, the 
assimilationist logic of rendering the nation congruent to the state—state-led nation building—
has been a constant feature of Chinese nationality policy throughout the life of the PRC.160 
 Hence, because of their separate identities, geography and histories and transnational and 
international linkages, the frontier nations present a security challenge to China that is more 
serious than the simple demographic numbers suggest.161As Goldstein wrote: 
What is distinctive about China’s multi-ethnic composition…and what makes it relevant to thinking 
strategically about its rising power is the concentration of minority people in vast border regions 
(especially Xinjiang, Tibet and Inner Mongolia) [over 60 per cent of its landmass]…. The security 
challenge is complicated by a long-standing potential for separatist movements, abetted by culturally 
similar or politically sympathetic foreigners just across the border, that could fragment the Chinese 
state.162  
 
Non-traditional security challenges such as terrorism, drugs and criminal organisations are also 
relevant, especially with the potential for collusion between these organisations and separatist 
movements. How then has China dealt with these vulnerabilities and threats?  
It is not surprising given these security challenges that China’s nationality policy has 
always had a security rationale with regime security, state security and societal security 
components.163 Chapter Five of this dissertation examines how China has addressed these threats 
and vulnerabilities through various policy instruments with state-building goals in Tibet.  
Regional National Autonomy (RNA) has been the most prominent instrument in the 
arsenal of China’s nationality policy. Beijing has used a variety of other instruments ranging 
from violent military operations to positive inducements such as the state-sponsored nationality 
identification program, the United Front, affirmative action and economic development. Maoist-
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style political campaigns such as the Cultural Revolution, Strike-Hard Campaigns, the Spiritual 
Civilization Campaign and the Patriotic Education Campaign—with overwhelming ethnic 
dimensions in minority regions—have been employed in the ‘nation-state’ construction project. 
In Tibet, a vicious anti-Dalai Lama campaign has been on-going since 1994. The ethnic 
identification project, RNA and the United Front approach were conceived before 1949, while 
affirmative action and economic development were deployed after 1978. The various political-
ideological campaigns have been conducted throughout the existence of the PRC.164  
This overview of the security challenges from the frontier nations provides a broader 
context in which the subsequent empirical chapters on Tibet should be understood. This 
dissertation examines how these policy instruments and their implementation relate to Beijing’s 
state-building ambitions, how they are interpreted and countered by the Tibetans, giving rise to a 
cyclical action-reaction dynamic. 
 
Which Tibet?   
It is important to define Tibet geographically. Tibet means different things to different people, 
not least to the Tibetans and the Chinese. The geographical definition of Tibet is a matter of 
dispute not just between Beijing and Dharamsala, but also among academic Tibetologists. In 
fact, the geographical demarcation of Tibet is arguably the biggest stumbling block in the 
Chinese-Tibetan dialogue. Beijing considers only Tibet Autonomous Region (TAR) as Tibet, 
while Dharamsala and most Tibetans claim most of the Tibetan plateau, which includes the 
Tibetan inhabited areas of Qinghai, Gansu, Sichuan and Yunnan provinces.  
 For analytical reasons, this dissertation will adhere to the larger geographical definition 
of Tibet. Since this issue is integral to the contemporary Sino-Tibetan dispute and dialogue, the 
analytical reasons will be explained in Chapter Five. Let it suffice to say here that the Eastern 
Tibetans, both in Tibet and exile, are actively involved in every aspect of the Tibetan resistance 
against China. Furthermore, most Eastern Tibetans are remarkably articulate and dogged in their 
assertion of their homelands as an integral part of Tibet. As the Eastern Tibetans and their 
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homelands are discursively and practically ensconced in the Sino-Tibetan conflict, it makes no 
analytical sense to airbrush them out of the conflict as scholars like Melvyn Goldstein do. 
When this dissertation refers to Eastern Tibet, it means the Tibetan areas of Qinghai, 
Gansu, Sichuan and Yunnan provinces. For the Tibetans, Eastern Tibet is further divided into 
‘provinces’ [tib]: Kham [] or Doto [	tib
tib	] (parts of Sichuan, Qinghai, Yunnan and 
TAR) and Amdo [	tib] or Dome [	tib	] (parts of Qinghai, Gansu and Sichuan). Central and 
Western Tibet or Utsang [	] corresponds roughly to the current boundaries of TAR. 
The reader is referred to Map 2 (page vi) for a better sense of the geographical location and 
administrative division of the Tibetan plateau. 
 
Organisation of the Dissertation 
This dissertation consists of eight chapters divided into four parts. Part I (Chapters One and Two) 
introduces and contextualises the empirical and theoretical issues that constitute the core of this 
dissertation. Part II (Chapters Three and Four) puts the dissertation in the context of the longer 
historical relations between China and Tibet. Part III (Chapters Five to Seven) picks up the 
historical thread from Chapter Four, but examines with greater analytical depth the cyclical core 
of the insecurity dilemma, its transnational and international dimensions and its role in the 
Tibetan uprising in 2008. Part IV (Chapter Nine) concludes the dissertation with a summary of 
the main findings and contributions, and sketches the possible future scenarios of the Sino-
Tibetan conflict and the insecurity dilemma.  
Chapter Two critiques and develops the original version of the insecurity dilemma or 
what this dissertation refer to as classical insecurity dilemma to enable it to better explicate the 
security practices of weak and insecure states and the dynamics of intra-state conflicts in such 
states. Brian L. Job came up with the concept of the insecurity dilemma.165 Mohamed Ayoob’s 
‘security predicament’166 contains the same structural features and insights as Job’s insecurity 
dilemma, although Ayoob accords more prominence to external actors. The chapter notes the 
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intellectual parallel between John Herz’s ‘security dilemma’167 and Herbert Butterfield’s 
‘security predicament’168 on the one hand and Job’s ‘insecurity dilemma’ and Ayoob’s ‘security 
predicament’ on the other hand. The chapter first differentiates the insecurity dilemma from the 
security dilemma and then develops the insecurity dilemma to address the flaws in its classical 
versions so as to equip it better to handle the tasks of explaining the security practices and 
conflicts within weak states. Thus, the insecurity dilemma is reconceptualised to guide the 
subsequent chapters dealing with the Sino-Tibetan conflict. It is important to reiterate that the 
action-reaction dynamic between the state and its adversaries takes the shape of cycles of state-
building and ethno-national resistance. The chapter also considers ways to mitigate or resolve the 
insecurity dilemma.  
Chapter Three gives a fresh perspective on the history of Sino-Tibetan relations through 
the prism of the insecurity dilemma. The chapter particularly focuses on the political and cultural 
practices of pre-PRC foreign overlords in Tibet and the Tibetan responses. Specifically, it 
examines the correlation between Tibetan tolerance or rebellion against foreign rulers and the 
latter’s attitudes and practices towards Tibetan identity and autonomy. Doing so, the chapter 
traces the evolution of the Tibetan-Chinese relations towards the insecurity dilemma, spanning 
the long period between the imperial rivalries in the 7-9th century to the PRC’s annexation in 
1949-1950.  
Chapter Four continues the historical narrative and chronicles the unleashing of the 
insecurity dilemma from the moment of Communist China’s incorporation of Tibet up to the 
imposition of martial law in 1989. In short, China’s state-building program with its nation-
building, institution-building and infrastructure-building dimensions and the resultant Tibetan 
uprisings was detailed to demonstrate in stark fashion the insecurity dilemma that was let loose 
upon the Tibetan plateau. The imposition or steps towards the imposition of direct Chinese rule 
and the accompanying existential threats that Tibetan identity felt from Chinese policies and 
practices will be shown to have caused the 1987-1993 Tibetan uprising.  
Chapter Five commences the deeper analysis of the insecurity dilemma after 1989. 
Guided by the theoretical insights developed in Chapter Two, it examines the threat perception 
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and state-building impetus behind the hardening of Beijing’s Tibet policy after 1989. It also 
gives an overview of the security concerns that drive China’s state-building project in Tibet. This 
chapter constitutes the first half of the cycle of the insecurity dilemma in the reform period. 
Chapter Six picks up the analytical thread and completes the cycle by examining how 
these policies, migration and cultural influences for strengthening the Party-state’s position in 
Tibet generate greater societal insecurity among the Tibetans. Next, the positions and strategies 
that the Tibetans have used to address their societal insecurity will be analysed. The chapter then 
closes by pointing out how these Tibetan identity security measures heighten the Chinese 
political, military and societal security concerns discussed in the previous chapter; thus 
completing the cycle of the insecurity dilemma. 
One of the key features of the reconceptualised insecurity dilemma is the salience of 
diasporas and external forces in the domestic conflict. One of the Tibetan strategies to confront 
Beijing has been for the diaspora to actively internationalise the Tibet issue. Because of Tibetan 
advocacy and normative, ideological and geopolitical reasons beyond the Tibet issue, the Sino-
Tibetan conflict has acquired transnational and international dimensions. Chapter Seven isolates 
and examines how these dimensions contribute to the insecurity dilemma by positing a three-way 
feed-back effect among the Tibetans, Chinese and the international community. Specifically, the 
chapter investigates how the Tibet issue impinges on China’s relations with America, India, 
Europe and Taiwan and, potentially, Russia in the future. This chapter explores how Tibetan 
Buddhism, with adherents in various parts of the world, has been an asset for the Tibetans in 
their political struggle. 
This external dimension and indeed the dynamic Sino-Tibetan core of the insecurity 
dilemma were on full display during and after the 2008 uprising, which this dissertation posits is 
a more spectacular and pent up Tibetan response to the hardening Chinese policies since 1989. 
Chapter Eight examines the identity insecurity at the heart of the Tibetan grievances which 
boiled over into the most serious challenge to Chinese rule since the 1959. Tibetan insecurity, the 
chapter shows, is a product of the hard-line policies pursued by the Chinese after 1989. The 
chapter also notes the hardening of Chinese policies in response to the uprising, and the 
insecurity and identity strengthening that this is already provoking in the Tibetan regions. 
  
39 
 
Conditions are being created for another Tibetan upheaval, bringing the insecurity dilemma full-
circle.  
How can this mutually detrimental cycle of repressive policies and uprisings be broken? 
Chapter Nine summarises the main findings and contributions towards scholarship in security 
studies, international relations and the conflict. It concludes by sketching the likely future 
scenarios for the conflict and examining the prospects for reconciliation and the insecurity 
dilemma’s place in those scenarios.  
 
Conclusion 
This chapter introduced the Sino-Tibetan conflict and the relevant scholarship, the research 
questions, the central argument and the analytical framework used in this dissertation. 
Specifically, this dissertation will show that mutual insecurities drive the action-reaction process 
of the Sino-Tibetan conflict. The insecurity dilemma allows a more social and inter-subjective 
analysis of the conflict and addresses the shortcomings of the existing analyses of the conflict. 
After explaining the methodology, the key terms were defined and contextualised and the 
rationale for using the weak state concept in the context of China was explained as were the 
security challenges posed by the frontier nations. After outlining the geographical definition of 
Tibet, the final section introduced the structure of this dissertation. The next chapter develops the 
insecurity dilemma as an analytical framework and sets up the analysis of the Sino-Tibetan 
conflict.  
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Chapter 2  
State-Building, Societal Security and the Insecurity Dilemma 
 
In the previous chapter, I asked the empirical question of what explains the intractability of 
the Sino-Tibetan conflict. Some more specific questions relevant to the Tibetans and Beijing 
were also raised. In answer, the Sino-Tibetan conflict was posited as a dilemmatic interplay 
of the mutual insecurities of the Tibetan nation and the Chinese Party-State. The insecurity 
dilemma was introduced as the theoretical framework to address those questions in order to 
make sense of the protracted nature of the conflict. However, the insecurity dilemma as 
originally conceived by scholars of Third World security like Job and Ayoob, which this 
research calls the classical insecurity dilemma, is really a frame-work to explicate the security 
practices of insecure states in the global south. It is not adequately equipped to handle the 
analysis of intra-state conflicts in these states and exhibits a number of flaws. This chapter 
develops the insecurity dilemma by addressing these flaws to enhance its analytical power.  
The chapter begins by mapping the conceptual origins of the insecurity dilemma by 
discussing the traditional notion of security dilemma, the various ways in which this concept 
has been adapted to analyse intra-state conflicts. Then, the insecurity dilemma is 
distinguished from the security dilemma and developed in a number of ways. First, the 
concept of societal security or identity security is incorporated to allow for a more adequate 
analysis of the security practices of adversarial non-state groups, including their transnational 
and international relations. Second, more play is given to transnational and international 
actors in the insecurity dilemma. To demonstrate the role of transnational and international 
factors in the insecurity dilemma, the agency of diasporas on the side of both the state and the 
aggrieved ethno-national group will be examined. Third, the interactive role that historical 
and contemporary experience and future uncertainty play in the arousal and perpetuation of 
insecurities and mutual threat perceptions is explicated. The insecurity dilemma, thus 
reconceptualised, illuminates the security practices of both the state and the rival sub-state 
political communities—national, ethnic, religious, racial and ideological.1 The chapter then 
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demonstrates the cyclical dynamics of the strategic interaction between the state and its 
domestic adversaries, giving due attention to the state, sub-state and external actors. Finally, 
the chapter will consider how the insecurity dilemma could be alleviated, and concludes by 
summarising the key findings.  
 
Anarchy and the Security Dilemma 
The security dilemma has become one of the most important theoretical tools for 
understanding and explaining international politics. As the most recent authoritative work 
contends, ‘the security dilemma gets to the very heart of politics among nations.’2 John Hertz 
coined the term ‘security dilemma’ in 1950, which he defined thus: 
Wherever such anarchic society [groups living “alongside each other without being organized into 
a higher unity”] has existed…groups or individuals living in such a constellation must be, and 
usually are, concerned about their security from being attacked, subjected, dominated, or 
annihilated by other groups and individuals. Striving to attain security from such attack, they are 
driven to acquire more and more power in order to escape the impact of the power of others. This, 
in turn, renders the others more insecure and compels then to prepare for the worst. Since none 
can ever feel entirely secure in such a world of competing units, power competition ensues, and 
the vicious circle of security and power accumulation is on.3 
 
Around the same time, Herbert Butterfield described a similar structure-induced dynamic, 
which he described as the ‘absolute predicament and the irreducible dilemma.’4  
Later scholars have remained largely faithful to the definition of the security dilemma 
that Hertz and Butterfield advanced.5 Describing the structural condition of the international 
system, anarchy essentially means the absence of a legitimate authority to referee disputes 
among states with the capabilities to enforce international law, i.e. punishing errant states and 
protecting law-abiding ones. In Kenneth Waltz’s words, absence of a government with 
‘monopoly on the legitimate use of force’ in the international arena fosters self-help 
behaviour among states.6 Self-help behaviour under uncertainty over the intentions and 
capabilities of other states puts a premium on worst case calculations, driving the security 
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dilemma. However, Booth and Wheeler put forward an insightful restatement of the security 
dilemma in 2008.7 
Exploiting the semantic difference between a paradox and a dilemma, Booth and 
Wheeler reconceptualise the security dilemma as a ‘two-level strategic predicament’:  
The first and basic level consists of a dilemma of interpretation about the motives, intentions and 
capabilities of others; the second and derivative level consists of a dilemma of response about the 
most rational way of responding.8 
 
The outcome of insecurity contrary to prior expectations of security when states and other 
actors take defensive-minded actions is merely a paradox, a perverse outcome, not a 
dilemma.9 The dilemma, at one level, is a product of uncertainty about the adversary’s 
intentions and capabilities, and at a ‘derivative’ level, how to respond appropriately to the 
other’s moves. Booth and Wheeler argue that the security dilemma can be overcome, not just 
mitigated as even some realists allow for, through the force of norms, institutions, 
cooperation and the cultivation of trust and what they call the ‘security dilemma 
sensibility.’10 This is a significant departure from the dominant realist view which mostly 
portrays the security dilemma as an inescapable prison or an irresolvable tragedy. While the 
security dilemma remains a theory mainly for the analysis of inter-state relations, it has been 
adapted by a number of scholars to explain intra-state conflicts. 
   
Ethnic and Societal: Intra-state Security Dilemmas  
Barry Posen was the first scholar to use the security dilemma to explain domestic conflicts.11 
As he puts it, ‘when imperial order breaks down’ in a multi-ethnic country, an ‘emerging 
anarchy’ takes hold and an intense security dilemma ensues.12 Domestic politics begin to 
resemble the anarchic international system, complete with the tragic quality of inter-group 
competitions. Posen’s unmodified use of the security dilemma to explain domestic conflicts 
has met with scathing criticism.  
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Lapid and Kratochwil argued that ‘without an explicit theoretical treatment of group 
differentiation, which, in turn, generates the “anarchical environment”, structural arguments 
[such as Posen’s] do not explain conflict, but merely re-describe it.’13 Paul Roe added that 
Posen weakens his argument by claiming that ‘…there were plenty of signals of malign 
intent,’ which takes away the tragic quality since ‘signals of malign intent’ imply real threats, 
not imagined products of uncertainty. What Posen describes as a security dilemma could 
therefore be merely a security problem.14 Furthermore, the complete collapse of imperial 
regimes or central governments is a rare occurrence. As Rotberg finds, a collapsed state—‘a 
vacuum of authority’—is ‘a rare and extreme version of a failed state.’15 Therefore, the utility 
of Posen’s version of the security dilemma to explain intra-state conflicts is limited. 
Relatedly, the total absence of the state that the security dilemma implies is problematic. 
Posen’s characteristic privileging of structural variables and disregarding the role of identity 
in intra-state conflicts also fly in the face of the ethnic, racial, religious, national and 
civilisational provenance of many of these conflicts.16 As Lapid and Kratochwil argued, 
Posen’s neglect of identity renders his structural approach incapable of explaining ethno-
national intra-state conflicts. 
Contrary to Posen’s silence, identity is at the heart of Paul Roe’s ‘inter-societal security 
dilemma’ or ‘societal security dilemma.’17 He incorporates the concept of societal security as 
conceived by Buzan and his Copenhagen School colleagues into the security dilemma. 
Identity is for inter-societal security dilemma what sovereignty is for its inter-state security 
dilemma. Identity, he argues, is not just a referent object of security, but also a defensive or 
offensive weapon, a source of security for one group and insecurity for adversaries. Here Roe 
is engaging with insights such as Buzan’s: 
For threatened societies, one obvious line of defensive response is to strengthen societal identity. 
This can be done by using cultural means to reinforce societal cohesion and distinctiveness, and to 
ensure that society reproduces itself.18 
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Identity-based security dilemmas can be set off inasmuch as ‘the actions of one society, in 
trying to increase its societal security (strengthening its own identity), causes a reaction in a 
second society, which in the end, decreases the first society’s own societal security.’19 In fact, 
both societies become more insecure at the end of this action-reaction process. Some 
instances of nationalism and ethno-nationalism could be manifestations of such identity 
wars.20 Yet, societal or identity security can also be threatened or defended with military, 
economic and political and bureaucratic instruments.21 
However, like Posen, Roe ignores the state in his security dilemma. The state stays 
silently in the background or completely out of the picture. In reality, the state is a significant 
actor and frameworks attempting to understand intra-state conflicts should factor in the role 
of the state unless it is one of the rare cases where the state and its institutions have 
completely collapsed.  
Stephen Saideman rectifies this in his ‘ethnic security dilemma’ by bringing the state 
back into the analysis. He argues that ‘[t]o understand ethnic security dilemmas, we must 
consider the role of the state in mediating or influencing the competition by ethnic groups for 
security.’22 For him the distinguishing feature of ethnic security dilemmas is the role of the 
state as, with its resources, the state ‘can be an ethnic group’s greatest ally or adversary.’23 
States matter because between the extremes of anarchy and the ideal-type nation-state where 
one homogenous nation enjoys perfect security, ‘states exist and shape the course of ethnic 
politics.’24 Here Saideman is articulating the widespread reality in which the state and its 
resources and institutions are captured by one group, to the detriment of all other groups: 
In many political systems, the state may be biased toward or against particular ethnicities, so 
competition among the different ethnic groups for control of the state. If my group does not 
capture the state, someone else’s will, and then we will be at the mercy of the state….If the state 
cannot protect the interests of all ethnic groups, then each group will seek to control the state or 
secede so that they can control their own state, decreasing other group’s security and decreasing 
the state’s ability to provide security for any group.25 
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In such an environment, certain anarchy-driven features of international politics play out in 
the domestic arena.26 However, the excessively materialist ontology of his security dilemma 
has no place for identity and cultural factors. For Saideman, access or alienation from the 
resources of the state, which determine the economic, physical and political security of the 
ethnic groups, is the difference between a united and cohesive state and one with warring 
groups attempting to capture the state or to secede from it to build their own states. 27 This is 
an opportune time to introduce the insecurity dilemma inasmuch as it, at least, acknowledges 
the role of adversarial ethno-national groups and their identity, even though they are used as 
mere stage-props in the state-centrist analysis of the security policies of the Third World 
states. 
 
State-Building and Classical Insecurity Dilemma 
In the annals of the insecurity dilemma, Brian Job’s The Insecurity Dilemma: National 
Security of Third World States and Mohamed Ayoob’s The Third World Security 
Predicament: State Making, Regional Conflict, and the International System stand out as 
foundational texts. In fact, in the intellectual development of the insecurity dilemma, Job and 
Ayoob occupy positions analogous to the primacy of Hertz and Butterfield in the 
conceptualisation of the security dilemma. Job and Ayoob did for Third World security with 
the ‘insecurity dilemma’ and ‘security predicament’ respectively, what Hertz and Butterfield 
did for international security with the ‘security dilemma’ and ‘security predicament.’ Writing 
contemporaneously, both pairs arrived at broadly similar insights and conclusions about 
international and Third World security, albeit with some differences.  
 
Brian Job’s Insecurity Dilemma 
For Job, the tenets of the security dilemma as derived from realism do not fit the empirical 
reality of security practices in the Third World. That is because (1) the states do not coincide 
with a single, united nation, i.e. they are not nation-states; (2) the regimes in power lack 
popular legitimacy; (3) the states lack institutional capacity to provide equal security for all 
their citizens; and (4) threat perception is domestically-orientated rather than externally-
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directed to the international system.28 Job locates the dilemma in the security competition 
between the states and various national and ethnic groups, who do not share the interests of 
the states and the identities of the groups which dominate the powers, institutions and 
resources of the state.29   
Job defines the insecurity dilemma in terms of the paradoxical nature of the state-group 
strategic interaction that ensues when a weak and insecure state attempts to increase its 
security through state-building. State-building threatens groups with identities and interests 
distinct from the group in control of the state and provokes resistance movements to secure 
their identities. The security competition thus unleashed is characterised by two ‘contrasting 
conditions’ relating to the domestic and international contexts:  
[F]irst, an internal predicament in which individuals and groups acting against perceived threats to 
assure their own security or securities consequently create an environment of increased threat and 
reduced security for most, if not all, others within the borders of the state; and second, a resulting 
paradox regarding the external security environment.30 
 
The domestic paradox refers to the self-defeating nature of the security competition between 
the state and its internal adversaries, which results in less ‘effective security’ for all, less 
‘effective state-capacity’ to provide security and increased vulnerabilities to foreign 
encroachments.31 This domestic predicament is rooted in state weakness:    
The weakness of the state…hinges upon the paradox that the more the regime attempts or needs to 
exercise the coercive machinery of the state, the more directly repressive the regime’s actions 
against its competitors in the internal security arena, the more obvious is its ‘weakness.’32 
 
The implication is that the more repressive the state building policies and practices are, the 
more resistance they provoke from their domestic adversaries. Job associates the insecurity 
dilemma with weak states, a ubiquitous condition in the Third World, which he attributes to 
the adverse consequences of decolonisation, under- and unequal economic development, 
multi-ethnic societies and authoritarian regimes. He argues that most of the Third World 
countries were born into insecurity at the time of decolonisation. 
However, another paradox operates at the interface between the domestic and the 
international: the state is protected from external threats by the norms of the international 
community such as the inviolability of sovereignty and territorial integrity, even when the 
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internal competitions have weakened and incapacitated the states to deal with foreign 
encroachments.33 Job recognises a limited degree of interaction between the state and the 
international society by way of regional security pacts and arms-trade.34 Beyond that, he 
denies the agency of external actors in the exacerbation or alleviation of the insecurity 
dilemma. Of course, he is deafeningly silent on the complex transnational and international 
linkages of the adversarial groups.  
A number of symptoms reveal the insecurity dilemma in the Third World states: 
militarization, repression and state terror, diversionary tactics, and regional security pacts 
among conservative ruling elites to help each other suppress domestic forces of change and 
liberalization.35 ‘[L]eadership personality cults, extreme militarism and heightened forms of 
nationalism’ are extreme symptoms of state-weakness.36 Job’s insecurity dilemma is certainly 
an improvement over the unmodified application of the security dilemma to intra-state 
conflicts. 
It relaxes the requirement of anarchy, which is experienced only in conditions where 
the state has collapsed completely which Rotberg finds extremely rare.37 The insecurity 
dilemma explains a larger universe of intra-state conflicts where the state is still active and 
anarchy has not necessarily set in. Extending the empirical scope expands the explanatory 
strength of a theory.38 As Roe commends, ‘Job’s work widens the utility of the security 
dilemma at the intra-state level by concentrating not on disintegrating states as such, but 
“weak” ones.’39 The exploitation of the weak/strong state conceptual apparatus is analytically 
profitable. Therefore, unlike the security dilemma, Job accords due importance to the state in 
the analysis of intra-state conflicts. Furthermore, Job recognises the role of non-state actors 
and identity in intra-state conflicts, although he stops short of theorising their security 
practices.  
However, Job’s insecurity dilemma is problematic for three main reasons. First, Job 
overstates the argument that the primary security threats to the weak states come from 
domestic forces and that externally, the prevailing international norms protect their 
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sovereignty and territorial integrity. Job posits that the internal-external nexus exists only to 
the extent to which a particular regime becomes militarily dependent upon external arms 
suppliers or participate in regional security pacts.40 In doing so, he underestimates the 
involvement of transnational and international actors in the insecurity dilemma. As explained 
later in this chapter, a feed-back effect exists between the domestic conflict and its 
transnational and international environment. 
Second, the under-development of the security practices of non-state security actors 
including their external relations is equally problematic. Job glosses over them as ‘contending 
forces’ or ‘various forces’ and leaves it unclear what values they seek to secure from what 
threats and how. Although Job places himself in the context of a broadened security agenda, 
which renounces the centrality of the state and its political and military securities, he 
relegates the role of these non-state challengers to the state—‘ethnic, religious, or national 
communities’—to a theoretical limbo. Their existence is acknowledged, but only as props in 
a state-centrist analysis. Their security requirements are lumped into a vague category of 
‘irreconcilable demands,’ and not explored satisfactorily. Consequently, Job ignores the 
transnational and international linkages and activities of these actors too. 
Third, Booth and Wheeler’s critique of security dilemma theorists of conflating the 
paradoxical and dilemmatic elements also applies to Job’s insecurity dilemma. He is silent on 
the dilemmas of interpretation and response, concentrated as he is on the paradoxical 
outcome. This follows from his disregard for the role of uncertainty. Despite these problems, 
Job has furnished the foundations for a framework that serves the dual purpose of explicating 
the security policies of insecure states in its basic form and studying intra-state conflicts after 
some development. 
 
 
Mohammed Ayoob’s ‘Security Predicament’  
Although Job came up with the term ‘insecurity dilemma,’ Ayoob was contemporaneously 
engaging with the same theoretical ideas under the rubric of the ‘security predicament’ in 
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Third World countries.41 In point of fact, Ayoob’s treatment of the theoretical and empirical 
ideas is considerably more sustained, substantive and coherent than Job’s edited volume. 
Ayoob has emerged as the standard bearer of the theoretical insights that constitute the 
insecurity dilemma under the more recent nomenclature of ‘subaltern realism’.42 
 Like Job, Ayoob begins by critiquing the deficiencies of the traditional Western-centric 
security theories to make sense of security practices in the non-Western world. For him 
traditional approaches, primarily realism and idealism [liberalism], are too preoccupied with 
military security and threats from outside the sovereign state.43 These tendencies are 
endogenous to the particular Western historical experience and the advanced stage of 
statehood in most Western countries.44 Such a conception of security is problematic in the 
parlance of the Third World 
...because the three major characteristics of the concept of state security as developed in the 
Western literature—namely, its external orientation, its strong link with systemic security, and its 
binding ties with the security of the two major alliance blocs during the Cold War—have been so 
thoroughly diluted in the Third World that the explanatory power of the concept has been vastly 
reduced when applied to Third World contexts.45 
 
 Thus, Ayoob proposes a primarily political conception of security that is intimately 
connected with state-building, ‘a major enterprise in which Third World countries have been 
engaged since decolonization.’46 Ayoob then defines ‘security-insecurity...in relation to 
vulnerabilities—both internal and external—that threaten or have the potential to bring down 
or weaken state structures, both territorial and institutional, and governing regimes.’47 Guided 
by this definition, he characterises the Third World, including powerful countries like India, 
China and Brazil, as ‘weak, vulnerable and insecure’ on account of a number of shared 
characteristics: 
Lack of internal cohesion, in terms of both great economic and social disparities and major ethnic 
and regional fissures; lack of unconditional legitimacy of state boundaries, state institutions, and 
governing elites; easy susceptibility to internal and inter-state conflicts; distorted and dependent 
development, both economically and socially; marginalisation, especially in relation to the 
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dominant international security and economic concerns; and easy permeability by external actors, 
be they more developed states, international institutions, or transnational corporations.48 
 
Consequently, the Third World teeters between the conflict-prone conditions of weak or 
quasi-states and failed states.49 
Ayoob’s main point of departure, just like Job’s, is that security and state-building in 
the Third World cannot be understood in isolation from each other; they are mutually 
constitutive and informative practices.50 
[T]he internal dimension of security, which is inextricably intertwined with the process of state-
making, is the core variable that determines the Third World state’s security problematic.... a solid 
grasp of the state-building process in the Third World is analogous to the beginning of wisdom for 
students and scholars of Third World security.51 
 
The pressures of late state-making, late entry into the modern state-system and the distortions 
of colonialism produce a ‘security predicament’ that deviates substantially from the 
contemporary experience of most Western states—‘a vicious circle of violence and counter-
violence as regimes are challenged and react with brutal force.’52 He elaborates on the 
security predicament in terms similar to Job’s insecurity dilemma: 
[T]he internal dimension of security is of paramount importance in the totality of the Third World 
state’s security calculus.... internal insecurities fundamentally determine the security predicament. 
These insecurities, in turn, are intimately related to the on-going process of state-building in post-
colonial societies. They are manifested through the state’s attempts to impose its version of 
political order, often by force, and through the equally frequent violent resistance to such 
imposition by substantial segments of the Third World’s population.53  
 
However, Ayoob allows far more agency for external factors in the security predicament 
through trade and economic dependence, proliferation of conventional and non-conventional 
weapons, and international interventions.54 He devoted separate chapters to explicate the 
‘internal dimension’ and ‘external dimension’ of the security predicament.55 ‘[E]xternal 
variables,’ he writes, ‘have tremendous influence in determining the outcome of specific 
attempts at state building. These external pressures emanate from both the regional and the 
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global environments in which Third World states operate.’56 This is the chief distinguishing 
feature between Job’s insecurity dilemma and Ayoob’s security predicament.  
Raimo Vayrynen critiqued that this allowance for external variables detracts from his 
basic position that internal threats to the stability of Third World states are dominant.57 This 
is a misreading of Ayoob’s security predicament since he does not privilege domestic threats 
over external ones; unlike Job, he treats them as equally significant. Furthermore, this is a 
frivolous criticism as an either-or selection between internal and external factors is self-
limiting and flies in the face of the overwhelming empirical evidence of fusion between the 
domestic and the international patterns of enmity and amity. A ‘theory should be just as 
complicated [or parsimonious] as all our evidence suggests.’58 Capturing the internal-external 
interplay contributes to the theoretical sophistication of the insecurity dilemma.  
However, Ayoob’s security predicament shares some flaws associated with Job’s 
insecurity dilemma. Firstly, it is unabashedly state-centric. Michael Barnett charges that 
Ayoob’s corpus engages in a ‘fetishization of sovereignty’ and that his scholarship is state-
centric to the point of defending genocidal authoritarian regimes.59 Secondly, as a 
consequence of the above, he ignores the security practices of non-state groups. As Barnett 
writes: 
His framework highlights the concerns of regimes that find themselves beset by security 
challenges and marginalises the societal groups that are now constructed as a “threat”…. [I]f, 
according to Ayoob, IR theory should be explaining the “large majority of conflicts” that occur at 
any time and if those conflicts are not interstate but rather intrastate, then why cling to a state-
centric definition of the discipline that seems to provide little explanatory value?60 
 
Indeed, for both Job and Ayoob, the under-theorisation of the nature and security practices of 
these internal challengers to the state is a strange omission for they attribute the insecurity 
dilemma to the persistent identities and resistance of these groups, which the state and the 
regime deem as existential threats. Finally, both Job and Ayoob are silent on the role of 
uncertainty in his security predicament and ignore the relevance of identity for the most 
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part.61 We will come back to these themes in the next section, but first an overview of other 
attempts to develop and apply the insecurity dilemma to various empirical problematiques is 
in order. 
To date, there has been one attempt at developing the insecurity dilemma as a theory62 
and two applications of the framework to explain empirical and historical cases.63 Georg 
Sorensen argues that since international conflicts have receded in frequency and severity at 
the same time as the increasing occurrence and brutality of intrastate conflicts, the security 
dilemma has given way to the insecurity dilemma. He claims that the promotion of liberal 
values or democracy as a solution for the insecurity dilemma throws up a ‘liberal value 
dilemma’, which he defined as ‘the fact that attempts to promote liberal values risk leading to 
illiberal outcomes both in the short and in the longer term.64 He illustrates the ‘value 
dilemma’ with the Danish cartoon affair in September 2005, which involved a Danish 
newspaper publishing cartoons of the prophet Mohammed. Sorensen then demonstrates this 
value dilemma in the American National Security Agenda (2006), in which democracy 
promotion has been clearly identified as an element of US security strategy.65 In short, 
Sorensen observes a perverse relationship between the liberal intentions behind democracy 
promotion and the illiberal outcomes in target societies. However, Sorensen jumps the gun by 
analysing the liberal solution before understanding the insecurity dilemma properly and 
addressing its shortcomings. Apart from conflating the paradox with the dilemma, Sorensen 
fails to overcome the state-centrism of the earlier scholars.  
Glenn applies Job’s insecurity dilemma on the conflicts plaguing ‘Southern’ and post-
communist ‘quasi-states’.66 Hong has used the insecurity dilemma to argue that the former 
South Korean President Syngman Ree’s repeated declaration of his willingness to militarily 
attack North Korea between 1953 to 1960 was not just reflective of his desire to reunify 
Korea, but was also a bargaining tactic to extract stronger American security guarantees, and 
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most crucially to secure his own authoritarian regime from the growing domestic 
opposition.67  
Ronnie Lipschutz has developed a post-Cold War version of the insecurity dilemma 
which differs from the Hobbesian realist notion of the security dilemma in that anarchy is not 
required.  Lipschutz’s insecurity dilemma ‘arises out of uncertainty, out of a never fully 
predictable world.’68 What Lipschutz demonstrates here is that uncertainty does not 
necessarily require anarchy, but difference of identity: ‘the insecurity dilemma arises not 
from threats but from difference.’69 In other words, uncertainty of identity, the difficulty of 
picking ‘us’ from ‘them’ when the over-arching enemies of the Cold War have disappeared, 
has led policy makers and analysts to imagine all sorts of enemies, engendering deep 
insecurities.70 Uncertainty and identity will occupy prominent places in the revised insecurity 
dilemma developed below.  
However, thus far the insecurity dilemma has been largely about the security practices 
of weak and insecure states. It is not well-equipped to illuminate the messier affairs of intra-
state conflicts. Since the security practices of the states in these domestic conflicts have been 
discussed above under classical insecurity dilemma, that of the state’s ethno-national 
opponents need to be developed further. To pick up the theatrical metaphor, the non-state 
groups should be liberated from the ignominy of being used as mere stage props. They should 
be endowed with character and agency in the insecurity dilemma. For this purpose, a 
framework that explicates the security practices of the state’s domestic challengers, describes 
the strategic dynamics of the state-group interaction and pays equal attention to the external 
factors is necessary. The rest of this chapter is devoted to addressing these themes with a 
view to developing a framework that elucidates the complexities of intra-state conflicts with 
special attention on ethno-national conflicts, and which is equally attentive to the state, ethnic 
groups and external players.  
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Societal Security and Domestic Adversaries of the State 
The insecurity dilemma reconceptualised in this section preserves and builds upon some of 
the basic ideas advanced by Job and Ayoob:  the internally-directed threat perceptions of 
weak and/or insecure states, mutually constitutive and informative relationship between the 
security policies and state-building in such states, and the perverse outcomes of the security-
seeking behaviour of states and their domestic adversaries, i.e. enhanced insecurity for both 
sides. However, I develop the framework in four crucial areas in the following pages. First, 
the concept of societal security is deployed to explicate the security practices of ethno-
national groups. Secondly, as a consequence of examining the security practices of both the 
state and its internal security competitors, a clearer picture of the internal dynamics of the 
strategic interaction emerges, especially when the concept of uncertainty is drafted into the 
mix. Third, it clarifies the role played by external actors and integrates diasporas into the 
framework. The insecurity dilemma thus conceptualised becomes a cyclical, action-reaction 
process, driven by regime, state and societal security. 
Societal security was conceived in response to the violent ethnic conflicts that ravaged 
Central and Eastern Europe and the Former Soviet Union in the 1980s and 1990s.71 It is 
defined as ‘the ability of a society to persist in its essential character under changing 
conditions and possible or actual threats.’72 ‘Societal insecurity exists when communities of 
whatever kind define a development or potentiality as a threat to their survival as a 
community....’73 Defined in these terms, societal security highlights the importance of the 
‘essential character’ or identity in the practice and analysis of security.74 
Indeed, identity has made a strong come-back in international relations and security 
studies.75 ‘[C]ulture and cultural identities…are shaping the patterns of cohesion, 
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disintegration, and conflict in the post-Cold War world,’ declared Samuel Huntington.76  He 
controversially wrote on civilizational identity. Identities of the ethnic and national varieties 
have also received attention in security studies and international relations in the post-Cold 
War world.77 This ‘return’ of identity in international relations has a strong basis in the 
empirical reality of the post-Cold War global politics. An overwhelming majority of the wars 
since the Second World War, more so after the Cold War, have been intra-state wars along 
ethnic and religious lines.78 Accordingly, security studies went through a ‘widening and 
deepening’ turn that challenged the traditional military- and state-centrist agenda of the field, 
opening it up to other actors and values including identity.79 It was in these contexts that 
societal security emerged as a distinct analytical framework within security studies.80  
Societal security has found its strongest champion in the Copenhagen School (CS),81 
but it was originally conceived by Buzan as one of a five-dimensional state security agenda 
consisting of military, political, economic, societal and environmental security.82 The 
reconceptualisation of societal security in the course of Buzan’s participation in CS’s 
research program freed it from the state- and military-centrism of Buzan’s earlier works. CS, 
with Buzan and Waever at the core, argued that since the state and society are rarely 
coterminous and represent two different entities, they also constitute separate referent objects 
of security that generate different logics of threats and vulnerabilities.83 Although Buzan’s 
original thesis that societal security is a dimension of state security is not entirely thrown out 
of the window, the crucial dividing line between state and societal security is that while 
                                                 
76Huntington 2002: 20. 
77
 Buzan 1991; Buzan et al 1998; Fearon James D. "Committment Problems and the Spread of Ethnic Conflict." 
In The International Spread of Ethnic Conflict: Fear, Diffusion, and Escalation, (Eds.) David A Lake and 
Donald Rothschild, Princeton NJ: Princeton University Press, 1998: 107-26; Glenn 1997; Donald Horowitz, 
Ethnic Groups in Conflict, Berkeley: University of California Press, 1985; Huntington 2002; Lake 1995; Posen 
1993; Roe 1999;  Waever et al 1993. 
78
 Klaus Jurgen Gantzel, “War in the Post-World War II World: Some Empirical Trends and a Theoretical 
Approach” in David Turton (Ed.) War and Ethnicity: Global Connections and Local Violence, Suffolk and 
Rochester: The Boydell Press, 1997: 123-44; Barbara F. Walter, “Introduction,” in Barbara F. Walter and Jack 
Snyder (Eds.) Civil Wars, Insecurity, and Intervention, New York and Chichester: Columbia University Press, 
1999: 1; Booth and Wheeler 2008: 72; Lapid and Kratochwil 1997: 4. 
79
 Buzan and Hansen 2009: 187-225; Roland Danreuther, International Security: The Contemporary Agenda, 
Cambridge and Malden: Polity, 2007: 13-55. 
80
 Graeme P. Herd and Joan Lofgren, “‘Societal Security,’ the Baltic States and EU Integration,” Cooperation 
and Conflict, Volume 36, Issue 3, Sept. 2001: 274-75; Roe 1999: 42-43. 
81
 Waever et al 1993; Buzan et al 1998; Buzan and Waever 1997.   
82Buzan 1983.  
83
 Buzan et al 1998: 119; Herd and Lofgren 2001: 275; Roe 1999: 274-75.  
  
56 
 
sovereignty serves as the ultimate value in state security, identity is the core value and the 
organisational principle for societal security.84 As the Copenhagen School argues: 
Definitionally, societal security is about large, self-sustaining identity groups; what these are 
empirically varies in both time and space.85 
 
It should be emphasised that the Copenhagen School’s innovation is not so much to 
completely decouple societal security from state security, inasmuch as it could still be a 
component of the multi-sectoral agenda of state security, as to conceive of a duality of state 
and societal security that may overlap with each other at times, but also function as distinct 
analytical frameworks. As Buzan and Hansen point out: 
[Society security] opened up for the study of ‘identity security’ and pointed to cases where state 
and societies86 did not align, for instance when national minorities were threatened by ‘their’ state, 
or where the state, or other political actors, mobilised society to confront internal or external 
threats.87 
 
Roe also noted, ‘Societal security is retained as a sector of state security, but it is also a 
referent object of security in its own right.’88 As such, societal security illuminates both some 
aspects of the security policies of states and the resistance movements of specific minority 
groups in those states. As the Copenhagen School writes, ‘In instances, where state and 
nation do not line up, the minority nation will be the point of reference for actors ranging 
from a counter-elite trying to achieve secession or independence…to groups defending the 
cultural identity of the minority.’89 Roe, for instance, employs his societal security dilemma 
to analyse the adversarial relations between the Croatian proto-state (i.e. before its formal 
independence, but when it behaved like one in the period February-August 1990) and the 
Serbian minority in Krajina and the newly democratic Romanian state and its Hungarian 
minority.90 As such, societal security captures the reality that many states are home to 
multiple societies, contrary to traditional IR’s neat assumption that the state and national 
identity are coterminous.   
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Inasmuch as identity is the primary value and organising principle, societal security is 
synonymous with ‘identity security.’91 In these identity conflicts, groups marshal as much 
material hard power and cultural soft-power as possible to defend and promote their own 
identity, often at the perceived expense of rival groups. The battles for territory and political 
and economic resources are conducted to win the overarching war to protect and promote 
group identities. In the face of perceived threats, the groups also respond by strengthening 
their own identities. Some instances of nationalism or ethno-nationalism, and religious and 
ideological fundamentalisms are extreme reactions to perceived identity threats. In some 
instances, the security of one’s identity requires the construction and denigration of an 
‘other,’ leading to what Elisabeth Le called ‘spirals of anti-other rhetoric.’92 Rhetoric is 
another means of attacking and defending identity, which fuels the ‘action-reaction 
process…of escalating nationalisms.’93 Societal security or identity security captures these 
themes and dynamics.94 
Although this is not the place to respond to Lapid and Kratochwil’s call for a theory 
of ‘group differentiation’ or identity, it suffices to mention that identity is constituted by ideas 
and practices that help individuals identify themselves as members of one community and 
differentiate themselves from other groups. It enables ‘the self-conception of communities 
and of individuals identifying themselves as members’ of that community.95 What then are 
the acceptable referents of societal security? How does identity come into being? How can it 
be threatened and defended?  The next section addresses these questions. 
 
The Logics of Vulnerabilities and Threats 
The Copenhagen School identifies ‘tribes, clans, nations (and nation-like ethnic units…), 
civilizations, religions and race’ as referent objects of societal security.96 This research will 
focus on ethno-national societies as referent objects of security. The issue of deciding what 
constitutes a viable society or identity group is subject to the debates about whether identity 
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is objective, fixed and pre-existing (primordialist and/or perennialists) or invented/imagined 
and instrumentalist (modernists and social constructivists), as discussed below. It is also 
subject to the criticism of reifying identity. The Copenhagen School resolves this problem by 
arguing that while they subscribe to the constructivist notion of identity formation, there 
comes a ‘point where identities have become fortified to such an extent that they function as 
fixed in security discourse.’97 Buzan and Hansen contend that this separation of identity 
construction from the phase when it becomes fixed and objective ‘social facts’98 and 
conducive to scientific analysis is a legitimate analytical decision.99 Having established the 
referent objects of societal security and by implication the relevant security actors, we 
consider below the logics of vulnerability and threats in relation to societal security. 
Insofar as identity is the chief value that a society seeks to secure, it perceives the 
vulnerability of and threats to its identity from three main sources: migration, horizontal 
competitions (cultural imperialism) and vertical competitions (assimilationist state policies or 
separatist movements).100 These are analytically distinct but practically overlapping 
phenomena that operate on a spectrum ranging from ‘intentional, programmatic and political 
at one end to unintended and structural at the other.’101 Threats to identity can be both explicit 
programs of assimilation and suppression and interference in the reproduction of that identity 
across generations through migration and cultural influences. 
First, large scale migration of people with different cultures would change the 
objective composition of the population and the cultural landscape of one’s homeland, raising 
fears of dilution of identity and assimilation. The Copenhagen School illustrates this with 
examples of Chinese migration to Tibet and Russian migration to Estonia, but the fears of 
many Americans over the threat of Hispanic immigration to American identity102 and the 
European fears of a Muslim exodus in the event of Turkey’s membership in the EU are 
emblematic of the insecurities that migration provokes even in apparently stable societies. 
Second, horizontal competition in the form of overriding cultural influences from other 
societies could also threaten identity. The fears of American popular culture expressed in 
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various parts of the world and the fears of the English language in France are examples of 
perceived horizontal competition or ‘cultural imperialism.’103 Third, vertical competitions in 
the form of assimilationist/integrationist projects conducted by the state or secessionist 
movements could set off identity insecurities among disgruntled minorities and the 
state/dominant groups respectively.104 Examples of the former are Tibetan interpretations of 
Chinese policies in Tibet, the Russians in Estonia and other Baltic states and the Quebecois in 
Anglophone Canada, while Quebec, Catalonia and Basque and Kurdistan exemplify how 
secessionist movements could render insecure the national identities of Canada, Spain and 
Turkey respectively. Finally, in certain circumstances, depopulation in the form of forced-
sterilisation and ethnic cleansing can also become a societal security issue. In practice, these 
types of threats can be expressed and perceived in various combinations. For instance, the 
threat is magnified when migration and cultural imperialism are interpreted as deliberate 
programs of state policy.  
However, the introduction of society as security referent objects, which entails the 
salience of non-state actors and identity, has been controversial. Neo-realists consider that 
unless they have military and political security implications, identity and sub-state actors do 
not fall under the purview of security studies. According to such analysts, it just obfuscates 
the clarity of the concept of security.105 From the other end of the theoretical divide—critical 
IR theory—William McSweeny charges that societal security is an intellectual fad and that 
the Copenhagen School’s treatment of identity is too ‘objectivist’ and ‘reifies’ society and 
identity.106 Buzan and team agree that identity is socially constructed, but they add that it is a 
case of ‘sedimentation’ which allows it to be treated more or less like an ‘object’ in the 
positivist sense.107 Michael Williams points out the Schmittian realist roots of CS—especially 
Schmitt’s politics of enmity and the concept of ‘the political’—and argues that McSweeny’s 
concerns about society and identity are largely misplaced.108 Smith maintains that the CS’s 
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innovations of societal security and securitisation are still state-centric and limits the 
understanding of developments such as September 11.109 In fairness to CS: 
The Copenhagen School explicitly constituted this [societal security] as a middle position between 
traditionalist state-centrism [and the fixity and objectiveness of identity] on the one hand and 
equally traditional Peace Research’s and Critical Security Studies’ calls for individual or global 
security [and extreme fluidity of identity] on the other.’110  
 
In any case, the analytical utility of the concept outweighs its residual state-centrism. 
Indeed, the benefits of the analytical move of untying society from the state in 
security analysis is obvious from the empirical observation that (1) many politically 
significant societies do not have their own states (e.g. Palestinians, Kurds, Kashmiris, Sri 
Lankan Tamils, Tibetans and Uighurs), (2) oftentimes, the state is the chief threat to the 
security of large groups of people, especially in the recurrent context of one group controlling 
the resources and instruments of the state, (3) the emergence of sub-state, transnational and 
supra-national loci of loyalties at a time of eroding state-sovereignty.111  
However, one major shortcoming of societal security is its underdevelopment of the 
methods and instruments that societies wield to defend their identity. In relation to this, it 
might also be charged that it neglects the role of external players in the domestic societal 
security competitions. The following section considers this theme briefly. 
 
Responding to Societal Insecurity 
The Copenhagen School writes that societal insecurity can be addressed through action taken 
by the society itself or by relying on the state to confront the perceived threats.112 Placing the 
onus of protecting identity on the state’s agenda through political legislation and regulation, 
of migration for instance, and military action is only possible if the ethno-national group in 
question controls the state or if the state is uniformly responsive to the interests of all ethnic 
groups within its territory. As mentioned above, more frequently than not, the state is the 
main source of threat to societal security, especially in the global south and multi-ethnic and 
multi-cultural countries. Hence, ethno-national groups have to provide their own security by 
trying to dominate the existing government, forming their own government, or through self-
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reliance.113 Some insecure groups choose secession to set up their own state as the best 
guarantee of identity security. Thus societies pursue both domestic power-sharing and/or 
separatist goals to protect identities. In both their domestic and separatist efforts, these groups 
try to harness transnational and international forces to augment their options and resources 
against the state.  
Roe also ponders the means and instruments that ethnic groups employ to achieve 
identity security. The means of defence depends on the nature of the threat. Quoting Robert 
Hayden’s insight that besides the dramatic cases of ethnic cleansing, legal and bureaucratic 
means could also be employed to ‘to bring about the same end: the elimination of the 
minority,’ Roe argues that ‘the countervailing measures are also likely to be non-military in 
nature.’114 He adds that in the same way that defensive military postures could be interpreted 
as hostile by others in traditional security dilemma, the non-military defensive measures 
could be ambiguous enough to set off insecurities in other groups.115 What specifically are 
these non-military measures? 
 The Copenhagen School and Roe agree that one counter-measure against threats to 
one’s identity is cultural. This is neither a new phenomenon nor the exclusive insight of the 
Copenhagen School. Edward Said wrote that during colonialism, ‘Along with armed 
resistance in places as diverse as nineteenth century Algeria, Ireland and Indonesia, there also 
went considerable efforts in cultural resistance almost everywhere….’116 This is also what 
cultural nationalism means: ‘the moral regeneration of the historic community…recreation of 
their distinctive civilisation’ and rejection of foreign practices.117 The Copenhagen School 
puts it more concretely. Culture can be defended with culture: ‘[i]f one’s identity seems 
threatened…the answer is a strengthening of existing identities. In this sense, consequently, 
culture becomes a security policy.’118 However, societal security can be defended through 
conventional means too. 
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 Ethnic and political nationalists, unlike cultural nationalists, seek to protect their 
identity not just through cultural regeneration, but also through control of an exclusive 
territory and state institutions.119 Identity can also be defended through violence ranging from 
stone-pelting riots and demonstrations to terrorism to military action.120 What the 
Copenhagen School and Roe ignore, however, is that ethnic groups can also engage in formal 
and informal alliances with a variety of transnational and international actors to secure their 
identities, as will be shown below.121 
 Having used societal security to explicate the security practice of the internal ethno-
national challengers to the state, the next section conceptualises the cyclical strategic 
dynamics--the core of the insecurity dilemma—through which it interacts with the state’s 
security practice.   
 
The Cyclical (Core) Dynamics of the Insecurity Dilemma 
State-group interactions are often conceived as spirals or cycles.122 The insecurity dilemma is 
a cyclical process too: ‘a vicious circle of violence and counter-violence as regimes are 
challenged and react with brutal force.’123 
As shown earlier, state-building by an insecure state sets off the insecurity dilemma by 
threatening the societal security interests of ethno-national groups. The insecurity of the state 
and the regime is attributable to the peculiar characteristics of states in the global south: state-
weakness. Weak states are insecure as a legacy of colonialism, both capitalist and communist, 
due to their early-stage of state-making or state-building, and late entry into the state 
system.124 Multi-cultural and multi-ethnic states are prone to existential insecurities. State-
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weakness and insecurity could also be self-induced in the case of empires that aspire to 
become nation-states after expanding into the homelands of other peoples. But what is 
distinctive about most weak states is that state-building replicates the European experience—
hence, there are some similarities such as primitive despotism—but in a highly circumscribed 
environment and accelerated process.125 Consequently, as Buzan notes, ‘domestic violence is 
endemic in such states.’126As Ayoob, Weiner, Job and others contend, state-building in the 
global south is characterised by ‘hegemonic’ rather than ‘accommodative’ ethnic policies 
wielded by one dominant group for its own interests. As Ayoob noted: 
Most separatist movements arise from the fact that whereas Third World societies are 
overwhelmingly multi-ethnic in their composition, many Third World state elites deny this reality 
and attempt to construct mono-ethnic states…that are dominated by a single ethno-linguistic or 
ethno-religious group….127  
 
Hence, ‘[T]he character of many third world states encourages ethnic separatism.’ 
Myron Weiner concurs: 
Hegemonic rather than accommodative ethnic politics characterize the new states. In country 
after country, a single ethnic group has taken control over the state and used its power to 
exercise control over others…. In retrospect, there has been far less ‘nation-building’ than many 
analysts had expected or hoped, for the process of state-building has rendered many ethnic 
groups devoid of power and influence.128 
 
Job adds that ‘the regime in power…usually lacks the support of some significant component 
of the population, because the regime represents the interests either of a particular ethnic or 
social sector, or of an economic or military elite.’129 The nature of state-building in these 
states is conducive of the insecurity dilemma as state and regime practices provoke 
insecurities in groups that do not share either the identity or the interests of the state.130 The 
resistance of these groups heightens the insecurity of the states, strengthening their state-
building impetus. This cyclical action-reaction process of state-building and resistance is the 
dominant pattern of domestic politics in these countries. 
As figure 1 shows state-building and societal response in the insecurity dilemma are 
not processually and temporally detached from each other. One side’s defensive action (state-
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building or ethnic resistance) and the other side’s interpretation of these acts as threatening 
are processually simultaneous and mutually reinforcing. Furthermore, inasmuch as societal 
security is also a sector of state security (where the state, dominated by one ethnic group, 
mobilises that ethnic society to confront external and internal threats) and some groups seek 
to secede and establish their own states—this can be considered an early phase of ‘state-
building’— state-building and societal response are not mutually exclusive provinces of the 
state and ethnic groups respectively. Thus, both in process and agency, state-building and 
societal security merge into each other at some level, but they can also be analytically 
separated to study their distinctive roles in the cycle of the insecurity dilemma. The key point 
to note here is that the dilemmatic mutuality between the state and adversarial ethnic groups 
keeps the insecurity dilemma cycling on. 
A final question of critical import still remains. What generates the ‘dilemma’ in 
insecurity dilemma, if not anarchy? In other words, what mediates or conditions the tragic 
processing of threats and generation of insecurities between the state and its opponents? The 
answer is acute uncertainties about each other’s current and future intentions (which fosters 
fears for the future), which is tempered by historical experiences. Booth and Wheeler 
emphasise the ‘importance of the shadow of the past as well as future uncertainty in shaping 
how actors manage their dilemmas of interpretation and response….’131 Lake and Rothchild 
agree: 
…when ethnicity is linked with acute social uncertainty, a history of conflict and, indeed, fear of 
what the future might bring, it emerges as one of the major fault lines along which societies 
fracture.132 
 
Vesna Pesic was more concise: ethnic strife is the product of the ‘fear of the future, lived 
through the past.’133 Indeed, historical experience can either alleviate or exacerbate the fears 
that uncertainty produces.134 
The distinguishing feature of the insecurity dilemma is that uncertainty is not 
necessarily generated by anarchy. Uncertainty or paucity of reliable information can also prey 
upon hierarchic structures. This has been abundantly documented in the literature on the 
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Principal-Agent (P-A) problem or ‘agency dilemma’ that deals with problems such as moral 
hazard, conflicts of interest, hidden action and hidden information and the so-called 
Madison’s dilemma between the principal (who hires) and the agent (who is paid to pursue 
the principal’s interests) under conditions of incomplete or asymmetric information in all 
manners of hierarchical relations in the domestic, transnational and international contexts.135 
If formally contracted and mutually beneficial relations such as the P-A relationship are 
victims of mutual uncertainty, so will it prey upon conflictual ethnic relations in which a 
compact is either non-existent or has broken down. This is a salient point because the lack of 
attention on uncertainty in Job’s and Ayoob’s versions leads them to conflate the paradox for 
the dilemma. The real dilemma is in the inability of the state and adversarial groups to 
interpret each other’s’ current and future intentions and capabilities and to respond to each 
other’s security-driven actions. Insecure and unsure, worst-case calculations shape their 
policies and practices, hardens their positions and heighten the dilemma.136 This engenders 
credible commitment problems and the need for credible security guarantees.137 Even though 
structural conditions are different, the insecurity dilemma shares the tragic quality of the 
security dilemma through uncertainty.138 Theoretically, more benign options exist for both 
the state and its adversarial ethnic groups, but uncertainty compels them to play their tragic 
roles. 
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Figure 1: The insecurity dilemma in process 
The nature of state-building and the manner of societal response determine the severity of the 
insecurity dilemma. As figure 2 shows, theoretically, the state and its opponents are not 
restricted to hegemonic and assimilationist forms of state-building and resistance 
respectively. State-building can be inclusive and ethnic response tolerant. In practice, the 
nature of state-building and the manner of ethnic response would be anywhere on the 
spectrums bounded by these ideal-type behaviours. Yet, uncertainty and the worst-case 
thinking that it spawns push them towards imperial forms of state-building and resistance 
(fourth box in figure 2). The notations in the upper right corners in each box represent the 
outcomes for the state and the notations in the lower left corners stand for the outcomes for 
the ethnic groups. 
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Figure 2: Choices and Outcomes in the insecurity dilemma 
 
 
External Factors in the Insecurity Dilemma 
However, the above outcomes are rarely down only to the state and adversarial ethnic groups; 
external factors are frequently involved. Although Job’s conception of the insecurity dilemma 
underplays the role of external factors, in reality, they play strong roles in many internal 
conflicts.139 Erin Jenne has developed a theory of ‘triadic’ ethnic bargaining based on the 
fluid interactions among disgruntled minorities, host governments (which are often 
dominated by a majority ethnic group) and external patrons, whom she calls ‘lobby actors.’140 
As such, international actors (as in foreign states) and transnational actors (as in individuals, 
organisations and groups operating across state borders) have to be factored into the 
insecurity dilemma.141 
Indeed, just as states and regimes find allies in neighbouring regimes in regional 
security pacts to counter domestic opponents, the latter also forge links with other states, 
international organisations, norm entrepreneurs and ethnic kin, including diasporas, for 
economic, political, military and cultural support. Some scholars characterise ‘ethnic linkages 
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among people across state boundaries as functionally equivalent to alliances between two 
states.’142 As such both the state and its internal rivals engage in balance of power strategies 
by seeking formal alliances and informal associations with external forces. The ability of 
non-state groups to forge links with foreign states and organisations depends upon the 
existence of sympathetic overseas ethnic kin and the quality of relations between the state in 
question and other states. Weak states with underdeveloped state identities or unstable 
institutions, regardless of their material capabilities, are vulnerable to external interventions, 
not just domestic subversion.143 External vulnerabilities drive states to suppress internal 
opposition to begin with, but that creates more incentives for these groups to seek external 
support.  
The salience of external forces in the insecurity dilemma also weakens Job’s 
contention that international norms protect the juridical sovereignty of weak states. Jackson 
also finds that ‘quasi-states…. often appear to be juridical more than empirical entities.’144 
While the legal sovereignty of states may sometimes be preserved by the material interests of 
other states, not just by prevailing international norms, all aspects of state sovereignty are 
routinely violated by both internal and external forces.145 Stephen Krasner wrote ‘that the 
principles associated with both Westphalian and international legal sovereignty have always 
been violated….Westphalian and international legal sovereignty are best understood as 
examples of organized hypocrisy.’146 Empirical confirmations of the violation of sovereignty 
are plentiful in world politics. 
The extent of the domestic-international nexus in ethnic conflicts is evident from the 
research programs on their spread and impact on foreign policies and international security, 
and the propriety, timing and strategies of international interventions. While Ayoob is far 
more expansive than Job regarding the involvement of foreign states in internal conflicts, his 
state-centrist agenda crowds out the agency of non-state actors. Diasporas are one of these 
non-state transnational phenomena. Since other non-state actors such as the networks of 
transnational terrorist groups, norm entrepreneurs and civil society groups have received 
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considerable attention, it is important to establish the links between diasporas and the 
insecurity dilemma. 
 
Diasporas in the Insecurity Dilemma 
While diasporas have received significant interdisciplinary attention over the years, as 
demonstrated by the existence of a journal dedicated to its study—Diaspora: A Journal of 
Transnational Studies—international relations scholarship on the subject is sparse.147 The 
broader literature on diasporas is sharply divided on the definition and formation.148 The 
definitional schism centres on whether its categories should be outside the historical (Jewish) 
paradigm or should include a more comprehensive ‘vocabulary of transnationalism’.149This 
dissertation adopts for working purposes Adamson and Demetriou’s definition:  
A diaspora can be defined as a social collectivity that exists across state borders and that has 
succeeded over time to (1) sustain a collective national, cultural or religious identity through a 
sense of internal cohesion and sustained ties with a real or imagined homeland and (2) display an 
ability to address the collective interests of members of the social collectivity through a developed 
internal organizational framework and transnational links.150  
 
This definition transcends the orthodoxy of the Jewish paradigm, but also contains sufficient 
specifications to protect the concept from obfuscation. In sum, transnational ties of solidarity 
and loyalty to a parent-nation and homeland and the development of internal cohesion and 
organisational framework are central to the meaning of contemporary diasporas.   
There is also a vigorous disagreement on the origins of diasporas centring on 
primordialist, instrumentalist and constructivist theories.151 These contestations 
notwithstanding, what is important here is to examine how diasporas are relevant to the 
insecurity dilemma, which involves interrogating the relationship between diasporas and 
other collectivities such as states and nations and the conflicts that erupt at the borders of 
these competing loci of identity and loyalty. 
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 Indeed, diasporas are the quintessential ‘inter-mestic’ phenomena that serve as a 
conveyor belt between domestic and international politics. By definition and by virtue of their 
organisational and spatial logics, diasporas have one foot in their homeland through shared 
identity, economic and political influence, citizenship and political representation, and 
another foot in their host states through citizenship or residency status. This transnational 
location, buttressed by the forces of globalisation, has encouraged both non-state political 
entrepreneurs and state elites to engage in ‘coalition-building and political action…across 
national borders on a global, as well as a national and local, stage.’152 The political salience 
of the diaspora in international relations is a result of complex interactions among the 
diaspora-sending (home) state and/or ethno-national groups within that state, diaspora-
receiving (host) states, and the diasporas.  
First, diasporas could be instruments in the foreign policies of host states.153 The 
spread of liberal-democratic values through interaction between diasporas and their 
homelands, conducting propaganda in shared language and appointing them to formal 
positions (in embassies, for instance) to deal directly with the government and citizens of 
their homeland in pursuit of the host-state’s interests are some of the ways in which the thesis 
of diasporas-as-foreign-policy-instruments works. Barack Obama’s appointment of Gary 
Locke as American ambassador to China and the use of Chinese journalists to broadcast news 
and analysis through the Voice of America and Radio Free Asia are illustrative. Second, 
home-state elites also use diasporas for economic and foreign policy purposes; hence, they try 
to strengthen and appeal to the shared identities with the diasporas.154 For instance, the Indian 
government’s celebration of Pravasi Bharatiya Divas (Day of the Indians Abroad) and 
granting dual citizenship to Indians abroad in select countries in the 1990s are motivated by 
the economic benefits and security instrumentality of the Indian diaspora. In his inaugural 
speech on Pravasi Bharatiya Diya, then-Prime Minister Atal Behari Bajpayee acknowledged 
the Indian state’s ‘parental obligations’ towards the Indians abroad, praised their contribution 
to India’s growth, and recognised their ‘tireless championing of [India's] cause’ whenever 
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‘India faced a threat to its security or territorial integrity.’155 However, as King and Melvin 
show in their study of the ‘bleached diasporas’ of Russians, Ukrainians and Kazaks, who 
ended up in the wrong state after the collapse of the Soviet Union, home states  face 
constraints in their ability to mobilise and use diasporas for foreign policy purposes. These 
constraints include the lack of domestic consensus over the utility of maintaining relations 
with the diasporas, competing foreign policy priorities within the home state, and the 
economic resources at its disposal to court the diaspora, the level of cultural and national 
solidarity and attachment to the homeland within the diaspora.156 The host-state also faces 
similar constraints. Third, diasporas maintain relations with the home states because of 
material interests or nationalist solidarity. This is not always a given as the level of ties differ 
from one case to another.  
Here, we are talking about what Sheffer calls ‘state-linked diasporas’ whose 
homelands happen to be sovereign states controlled by parent-nations from which the 
diaspora became dispersed.157 Conversely, ‘state-less diasporas’ maintain cultural, political 
and economic ties with trans-border co-nationals whose homeland may be occupied and 
dominated by another state158 or ended up in the wrong state as result of colonialist 
cartography or other historical contingencies. These patterns of diaspora-state interaction 
provide clues to the agency of diasporas in foreign policy and international security, which 
has relevance to the insecurity dilemma. 
Stephen Van Evera has hypothesized that war is more likely when states see diasporas 
and the territories that they live in as foreign policy issues.159 Kalevi Holsti argued that in the 
context of cultural and religious ties between elites and communities living across state 
borders, ‘reasons of affinity and sentiment rather than power…and hard-headed cost-benefit 
analyses’ determine state decisions on war and peace.160 This is especially the case when 
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violence between a co-ethnic/national or co-religious minority and the majority and/or 
dominant group in another state has broken out.161 Since the prevailing trend in much of the 
non-Western world is for one dominant ethnic/national group to monopolise the state and try 
to assimilate other groups, this condition is realised more often than not.162 Such identity-
based cross-border ‘alliances’ and ‘state-sponsored irridentism’ render many multi-
ethnic/national states insecure.  
Diasporas are not passive and hapless victims or beneficiaries though. They are 
‘independent actors’ in the security arena, actively campaigning as ‘ethnic lobbies’ and 
‘advocates of multi-cultural foreign policy’ in the host-state, and to ‘democratize 
authoritarian homeland regimes’.163 Diasporas could be ‘advocators of peace processes’ or 
spoilers: ‘a major source of violence and instability in their homeland.’164 As such, diasporas 
play active roles in the insecurity dilemma by buttressing state-building in their home-state, 
supporting disgruntled co-nationals through material contribution domestically and lobbying 
and public relations efforts internationally. The case for external agency in domestic conflicts 
is strong indeed. The next logical question is whether and how the insecurity dilemma can be 
resolved or mitigated. The final section of this chapter ponders this important question. 
 
 
 
Can the Insecurity Dilemma be Resolved? 
A number of ways to alleviate ethnic conflicts have been prescribed in the burgeoning 
literature in this sub-field of international politics. They include (1) outright victory of one 
side, usually the state, (2) physical separation: secession and partition (3) democratisation, (4) 
third-party intervention and mediation and (5) power-sharing arrangements.  
 
Decisive Victory 
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The decisive victory of one side results in the annihilation of the defeated side as a viable 
security actor. This mode of ending conflicts has been described as the historical norm and 
prescribed by reputable scholars.165 This is also the logic underlying Ayoob’s argument that 
the Third World states should be allowed to consolidate their state-making or state-building 
process, unencumbered by human, minority and self-determination norms.166 The implication 
is that the states should be allowed to militarily rout, politically neutralise and culturally 
assimilate adversarial groups to become coherent, stable and legitimate entities capable of 
effectively discharging their domestic and international obligations. Buzan also concludes 
that ‘the creation of stronger states is a necessary condition for both individual and national 
security… [even though it] may have negative consequences for the security of many 
individuals and groups caught up in the process.’167 For these analysts, domestic opponents of 
the state have to be sacrificed in the interests of stronger states, betraying the state-centrism 
of their scholarship. 
 The appeal of decisive victory is that it has been the historical norm and that it is 
longer lasting than negotiated settlements.168 Yet, apart from being normatively questionable 
for its neglect of human and collective rights, the outright victory premise is problematic on 
practical/empirical grounds. Left alone, internal wars drag on for decades, far longer than 
inter-state wars, with huge costs not just to the active combatants but also to innocent 
civilians.169 According to the Correlates of War (COW) database, internal conflicts last 
almost twice as long as inter-state wars.170 As Toft finds, 
[T]he combination of the proliferation of weak states, refinements in insurgency strategy, and the 
wide distribution of small arms has made it relatively more difficult for even well-supplied and 
well-led combatants to achieve victory. Meanwhile, the damage from civil wars has become more 
difficult to contain, as guns and fighters flow across borders and disrupt trade and the domestic 
politics of neighboring states.171 
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Indeed, wars frequently spread internationally with dire consequences for regional and 
international security, instead of ending with one side’s quick and decisive victory.172 In any 
case, in today’s globalised and inter-dependent world, turning a blind eye to the ravages of 
internal conflicts until one side is completely defeated is not an easy option any more. 
 
Secession and Partition  
Another set of solutions that focus on physically separating the adversarial groups is 
partitioning of the groups into territorially defensible enclaves or even separate states 
(secession).173 Arguing that other measures do not address the ‘fundamental security 
dilemmas’, Chaim Kaufmann prescribed that the ‘international community should endorse 
separation as a remedy for at least some communal conflicts; otherwise the processes of war 
will separate the populations anyway, at much higher human cost.’174 Like outright victory, 
separation is also seen as a more lasting solution. However, separation and partition have bad 
images in the age of the state, especially in the face of the historical record of partition in 
places like India, Palestine, Ireland and Cyprus. There are three main reasons for this: (1) 
separation and violence creates more violence and suffering for innocent civilians. (2) They 
spawn new conflicts, which spread internationally. (3) They result in culturally insular ‘rump 
states’ with autocratic governments.175 Fearon argued that separation and partitioning through 
international intervention only encourage other separatist movements and that the norm of 
partition will make all the states insecure with destabilising implications for the state-
system.176 Since outright victories and separation are too costly, practically difficult and 
potentially counter-productive, political agreements and institutional solutions have been 
increasingly pursued. 
 
Democratisation 
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Democratisation or political liberalisation has become a popular response to internal 
conflicts, especially after the Cold War.177 This is a variant of the democratic peace thesis of 
international relations, which posits that democratic states do not fight other democracies, 
although they are as likely to go to war with authoritarian states as the latter are with 
democracies and other autocratic states.178 The pacific nature of democracies is attributed to 
(1) the norms and cultures of peaceful dispute resolution through dialogue, compromise, 
cooperation, tolerance and reciprocity, (2) the institutional and structural constraints such as 
the requirement to mobilise broad-based support of the citizenry to legitimise the war, the 
requirement of vertical and horizontal accountabilities and checks and balances, and (3) the 
knowledge and perception of the leaders that other democracies are subject to the same norms 
and constraints.179 The domestic version of the democratic peace theory states sees 
democracies as more internally peaceful because ‘social conflicts that might become violent 
are resolved through voting, negotiation, compromise, and mediation.’180  
 However, democracy has also been seen as part of the problem, if not the problem, in 
ethnic conflicts. Jack Snyder argued that elites threatened by democratic transition and ethnic 
entrepreneurs could exploit ethnic differences and conflicts to stay in power and protect their 
privileges, especially in the early phase of democratisation.181 Democracy could also 
exacerbate old social cleavages and open up new ones in multi-ethnic/cultural societies 
because of its emphasis on competition and freedom of expression, especially when existing 
institutions are not able to handle new societal demands.182 This is especially likely when the 
crucial democratic institutions such as political parties and civil society are organised along 
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narrow tribal, caste, ethnic, religious and linguistic lines.183 One scholar went so far as to 
argue that ‘murderous [ethnic] cleansing is modern, because it is the dark side of 
democracy.’184 His specific thesis is that both liberal and socialist ideals of democracy have 
brought about instances of ‘murderous cleansing’ because the demos have become associated 
with ethnicity and the proletariat respectively. This makes minority ethnicities and classes 
victims of genocidal pogroms.185 As democratization could sometimes exacerbate the 
insecurity dilemma rather than resolve it, its utility in resolving ethnic conflicts is ambiguous 
to say the least. Yet, democracy does provide various options for the institutionalisation of 
power-sharing principles, as discussed below, to mitigate the insecurity dilemma.  
 
Third Party Mediation 
Third party mediation and credible power-sharing arrangements require neither the 
annihilation of one side nor the break-up of an existing state, but they target head on the 
uncertainties and mutual insecurities by providing information and security guarantees to 
both combatants.186 As Rothchild and Lake argued: 
Where ethnic groups possess effective safeguards, share pacific expectations, and feel secure in 
their relationship with the state and each other, intergroup competition tends to be constructive. 
Ethnic leaders are not fearful for their group’s future and can operate within existing political 
institutions to maximise group interests…. But where safeguards, shared norms, and pragmatic 
perceptions are absent, the prevailing incentive structure may encourage ethnic leaders to adopt 
damaging courses of action.187 
 
Germane to this argument is the credible commitment problem. Under conditions of 
uncertainty, groups cannot commit to a negotiated settlement or adhere to a signed agreement 
because they fear deception and post-settlement exploitation—‘defection’ in the language of 
the prisoner’s dilemma—and annihilation as a political community.188 To overcome these 
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fears, designing credible security guarantees against such threats is paramount, with 
particular attention to ‘the needs of those who feel vulnerable to the majority-backed state.’189 
The challenge ‘is to keep the minority/ies from losing.’190 Third party mediation and power-
sharing institutional adaptation are the most commonly prescribed security guarantees.  
Third party mediation can reassure the groups that they will be ‘protected, violations 
detected, and promises kept’ through verification and punitive use of countervailing force, or 
‘a package of carrots and sticks.’191 In addition, third parties can help mitigate uncertainty by 
providing information that the adversaries would otherwise have incentives to conceal from 
each other.192 However, international mediation is not always possible and effective or even 
desirable, but power-sharing agreements could serve similar purposes. 
 
Power-Sharing: Consociationalism, Federalism and Autonomy 
Power-sharing and power division arrangements instil confidence and a sense of self-
direction in terms of interests and identity, which is crucial for mitigating insecurities. Power-
sharing and power division can be both horizontal in the sense of proportional representation 
and distribution of administrative power in consensus or consociational democracy,193 and 
vertical in the sense of centre-periphery division and sharing of power in federal and 
autonomous set-ups.194 Power-sharing is achievable in democratic as well as authoritarian 
contexts and institutional adaptation is crucial in both. Institutionally, there is a scholarly 
consensus in the democratisation literature that divided societies are more stable and peaceful 
if (1) power is decentralised or devolved, (2) the political system is parliamentary rather than 
presidential—within parliamentary systems, proportional representation is preferable to the 
Westminster system—and (3) there are adequate checks and balances to ensure both 
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horizontal and vertical accountability.195 The cumulative effect of these various security 
guarantees is ‘injecting an important degree of predictability and structure to the competitive 
process.’196 The upshot is that these measures mitigate the insecurities arising from 
uncertainty and help overcome the mistrust generated by historical experience. For these 
reasons, power-sharing will be central to my discussion of the possible ways out of the Sino-
Tibetan insecurity dilemma.  
 
Conclusion 
This chapter began by mapping the conceptual terrain of the insecurity dilemma, beginning 
with the traditional notion of the security dilemma. After discussing the various ways in 
which it has been adapted to analyse intra-state conflicts and the associated problems, the 
insecurity dilemma was introduced and developed as a theoretical framework for analysing 
intra-state conflicts with special attention on ethnic conflicts. The resultant analysis of the 
mutually-directed security practices of the state and its internal adversaries reveals a cyclical, 
action-reaction conceptualisation of the insecurity dilemma. Finally, the chapter considered 
some ways to alleviate the insecurity dilemma. The next chapter traces the origins of the 
insecurity dilemma in Tibet to the nationalist Chinese re-imagining and aspiration to 
construct a modern Chinese ‘nation-state’ out of the Qing Empire, and its legacy right up to 
the founding of the PRC in 1949. 
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Chapter 3 
  
The Long (Historical) March to the Insecurity Dilemma 
 
  
This dissertation postulated the contemporary Sino-Tibetan conflict as an insecurity dilemma. 
However, Sino-Tibetan relations date back to the 7th century. Is this history relevant to the 
present? At what point in this history did the insecurity dilemma emerge? This chapter will 
show that Sino-Tibetan relations since the 13th Century was more complicated than Beijing 
and Dharamsala would like to admit. History is highly contested and politically mobilised 
wherever nations and states are in conflict. The history of the Sino-Tibetan relations is no 
exception.1 Beijing claims: ‘For more than 700 years the central government of China has 
continuously exercised sovereignty over Tibet, and Tibet has never been an independent 
state.’2 Tibetan independence was a mere ‘fiction of the imperialists.’3 Some Chinese 
accounts assert Chinese control over Tibet since the 7th century and characterise embassies of 
the Tibetan emperors visiting the Chinese courts as tribute missions.4 Dharamsala counters 
that when Communist Chinese forces ‘invaded’ Tibetan areas in 1949, ‘Tibet was an 
independent state in fact and at law.’5 The Tibetans argue that after the disintegration of the 
Tibetan empire, Tibetan regions came under varying degrees and durations of control by 
Mongols, Gorkhas of Nepal, Manchus and British India, but the association of Tibetan rulers 
with the Mongols and Manchus ‘was personal in nature and did not at any time imply a union 
or integration of the Tibetan state with, or into, a Chinese state.’6 These divergent 
interpretations of history have significant bearing on contemporary affairs.  
A sticking point in the currently floundering Sino-Tibetan dialogue is Beijing’s 
precondition that the Dalai Lama should publicly announce that Tibet has been historically an 
integral and inalienable part of China. The Dalai Lama has resisted such a step, claiming that 
re-writing Tibetan history for current politics is tantamount to lying. Since history casts such 
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a long shadow over Tibet’s present and future, it is crucial to get a proper perspective into it.    
The insecurity dilemma will be the organising frame of this history. 
Due to space constraints, this abridged history will begin with the Mongol conquest of 
Tibet and China in the 13th century. To be sure, between 618 to 843 AD, the Tibetan Yarlung 
Dynasty and the Chinese Tang Dynasty actively competed for territorial expansion, strategic 
superiority, imperial prestige and civilizational parity, resulting in ‘almost constant conflict 
and periodic attempts at peace-making’ through warfare, diplomacy and matrimonial and 
balancing alliances.7 In total 15 military conflicts, 7 ‘sworn treaties’ and two matrimonial 
alliances were conducted between the two empires.8 Yihong Pan noted that the treaties of 783 
and 821/822 resemble a ‘modern day treaty concluded between sovereign equals.’9 In 842, 
when the last Tibetan emperor was assassinated by a Buddhist monk, Tibet entered into what 
is called the ‘time of fragmentation (tibtib) or fragmentation (tibtib),10 lasting 
from 869 to 1264. In China, the Song Dynasty (960-1260) replaced the Tang. In both 
fragmented Tibet and Song China, cultural flowering in religion, philosophy, art, literature, 
medicine and scientific achievements replaced military conquest and the two peoples were 
politically isolated from each other.11 In any case, Song China was a ‘diplomatic peer’ of 
Vietnam, Nanzhao, Tibet, Xixia, and the Qidian Liao.12 As such the insecurity dilemma is not 
relevant to this period.   
 
Tibet and China in the Mongol Empire 
However, when Tibet and China were enjoying periods of cultural advancement, deep in the 
steppes of Mongolia, a force of unprecedented strength was gathering pace. By 1206, 
Chinggis Khan had unified the perennially warring Mongol tribes and begun to expand in all 
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directions.13 His four sons and grandsons divided his sprawling empire into four khanates 
corresponding to Persia, Southern Russia, Central Asia and East Asia. The East Asian part of 
the empire passed into the hands of Ginggis’ third son, Ogodei (1229-1241), his son Mongke 
(1251-1259) and Khubilai (1260-1294) until the Ming Dynasty drove the Mongols out of 
China.14 Ogodei conquered the Jin Dynasty in 1234. Khubilai Khan, arguably Ginggis’ most 
able grandson, declared himself emperor of China in 1271, taking the dynastic title of Yuan, 
although it took him until 1279 to conquer the Chinese Song Dynasty.15 This was the first 
time in history when the relationship between Tibet and a regime in Beijing became 
structurally possible for a process like the insecurity dilemma to take root. 
 Beijing claims that Tibet became an integral part of China during the Yuan Dynasty.16 
Dharamsala, as noted above, deny that relations with the Mongols integrated Tibet into a 
Chinese state.17 A TGIE publication on Mongol-Tibetan relations, which they characterise as 
a Patron-Priest Relationship (PPR) or Cho-Yon (tib!tib), asserts: 
This unique central Asian symbiosis entailed the protection and making of offerings by the secular 
patron to his spiritual teacher and master, in return for religious teachings and the bestowal of 
spiritual protection and blessings by the lama to his patron. This was in no way a relationship 
between a ruler and his subject.18 
 
Dharamsala questions the Chineseness of the Mongols, and argues that Tibetan-Mongol 
relations predated the Mongol conquest of China, and that Tibetan-Mongol PPR was unique 
among the relationships that the Mongols maintained with their conquered domains.19 
 Tibetan princes and lamas pledged to pay annual tributes to Ginggis Khan in 1207 and 
Tibet was spared from military invasion and the consequent destruction that many other 
countries suffered at the hands of the marauding Mongol hordes. Having come across Tibetan 
Buddhists in the kingdom of Xixia, Kotan Khan, a Mongol ruler in present day Gansu 
province, invited Sakya Pandita Kunga Gyaltsen, the most famous Tibetan Buddhist teacher 
of the day, to his court in 1244.20 Sakya Pandita arrived at Kotan’s court with two young 
nephews in 1246 and died there in 1251.21 Kapstein posits that Tibet was incorporated into 
the Mongol empire in 1252, when Mongke Khan, who became the Great Khan or supreme 
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lord of the entire Mongol empire, dispatched a military expedition into Tibet.22 By that time, 
various Mongols princes were allying with different Tibetan Buddhist sects, with a view to 
gaining spiritual influence in exchange for military protection.23  
 One of Sakya Pandita’s nephews, Dogon Choegal Phagpa, was appointed Khubilai 
Khan’s Imperial Preceptor and made the ruler of Tibet in 1264 after Khubilai himself became 
Great Khan in 1260.24 This grant was made in return for Phagpa’s tantric Buddhist teachings 
to the imperial family and other services such as inventing a new script for use with the 
Mongolian language and for imperial bureaucracy.25 Although luminaries from other the 
sects of Tibetan Buddhism were still being courted by other Mongol princes, the Sakya sect 
emerged dominant by virtue of Phagpa’s role and Khubilai’s patronage. 
 The peculiar relationship that evolved between Khubilai and Phagpa came to be 
known in Tibetan sources as Cho-Yon (Priest-Patron) or Yon-Cho (Patron-Priest) relationship. 
This is an important concept as a similar relationship later developed between the Dalai 
Lamas and the Manchu emperors. Some Tibetan and Mongol lamas also participated in a 
limited form of PPR with Nationalist China. PPR became a distinct Tibetan political ideology 
that informed their relations with foreign powers for centuries.  
Dharamsala’s denials notwithstanding, Mongol-Tibetan relationship did have an 
element of political subordination.26 As Powers observed, ‘it was a relationship of 
dependence and subordination.’27 This is evidenced by the administrative reforms introduced 
by the Mongols in Sakya-ruled Tibet.28 TGIE interprets these administrative interventions as 
‘part of the protection and assistance which the patron offered to the priest. It did not entail or 
imply Mongol rule of Tibet.’29 PPRs were actually more complicated than such Tibetan 
contentions or the rival Chinese assertions of sovereignty (imputing modern Western political 
concepts back to medieval Asian relations). There were times when PPRs entailed political 
subordination, but also times when there was no political substance.30 Moreover, PPRs also 
developed between specific monasteries and teachers and lay Tibetan rulers or wealthy 
families without any political content. 
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With the declining Mongol power in China, the fortunes of Sakya as a power centre in 
Tibet also suffered and in 1350, one of the governors, Changchup Gyaltsen, overthrew 
Sakya/Mongol rule and established the Phagmodrupa Dynasty in Central and Western Tibet, 
roughly equivalent to modern day TAR.31  
Does the political subordination of Tibet to the Yuan Dynasty mean that Tibet became 
an integral part of China, as the Chinese assert? Tibet was a ‘vassal state,’ a ‘separate 
subjugated country’ of the Mongol empire enjoying ‘full...autonomy or self-rule,’ but not an 
integral part of China.32 The basis for this conclusion is (1) that Tibet was simply not 
included as part of China in the official dynastic records of the Yuan Dynasty, (2) and the 
vagueness and inconsistencies in modern Chinese sources, official and otherwise, on the date 
and circumstances of Tibet’s and China’s incorporation into the Mongol empire and the 
nature of Mongol rule over Tibet.33 Tibet was ruled through the Sakya Tibetan clerics much 
like Korea, Burma, Vietnam and other vassals were ruled by native kings while China and 
other conquered countries were ruled directly by the Mongols. When the historians of the 
succeeding Ming dynasty wrote the dynastic history of the Yuan, as was the practice in 
imperial China, they excluded Tibet from Chinese territory.34 
 Another feature of Mongol-Tibetan relations of that time is that far from posing an 
existential threat to Tibetan culture, the Mongols allowed Tibetans to govern themselves 
according to their traditions, patronised Tibetan Buddhism and appointed Tibetans to the post 
of Imperial Preceptor, which was advantageous for the propagation of Tibetan Buddhism. As 
such, the Tibetans tolerated Mongol/Yuan over-lordship and valued the imperial patronage 
for their culture. Jangchup Gyaltsen’s rebellion in 1350 was more an internal Tibetan 
sectarian ouster, inasmuch as he supported the Kagyu sect of Tibetan Buddhism and Mongol 
influence in Tibet by then was only nominal. 
Eighteen years after the Tibetans, the Chinese drove out the Mongols and established 
the native Ming Dynasty.35 Ming-Tibetan relations were even more tenuous and Sino-Tibetan 
relations after the Yuan dynasty reverted back to the mutual isolation of the Song era. In 
much of Tibet, the Phagmodrupa dynasty ruled until 1434. The next one hundred years were 
characterised by internecine warfare between power centres based in Lhasa and Tsang, which 
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patronised the Geluk and Kagyu sects respectively.36 Eventually, the Geluk and Kagyu forces 
reached out to Mongol adherents of their sects to militarily resolve the stalemate. This 
conflict dragged on until 1642, when the 5th Dalai Lama and his Qoshot Mongol ally, Gushri 
Khan, emerged victorious over the Kagyu and Chogthu Mongols.37  
Thus another period of PPR between a Tibetan Lama and a Mongol ruler began. 
Eastern Tibet maintained tribute-cum-trade relations with the Ming but were politically 
governed by Tibetan lamas and native chieftains.38 Ming China and Central Tibet remained 
politically isolated from each other, although spiritual relations developed between some 
lamas and Ming emperors.  
To be sure, the Ming dynasty pretended to have inherited Yuan ‘rule’ over Tibet, 
creating offices ostensibly to administer Tibet and granting titles to Tibetan lamas.39 
However, the writ of these offices was confined to the Tibetan periphery and they were not 
‘part of the political power structure of Tibet.’40 The titles were not meant to confer prestige, 
recognition or political authority as the lamas were already highly regarded and did not 
require Ming recognition. Tsongkapha, the most famous lama of the day repeatedly turned 
down Emperor Chengzu’s invitations. The Ming interest in Tibetan lamas was also 
predicated upon the need to manage the still formidable and Buddhist Mongol tribes from 
threatening China.41 In short, Tibet was not part of Ming China. As Sperling contends, 
‘[t]here was no Ming political authority over Tibet—no ordinances, laws, taxes etc., imposed 
inside Tibet by the Ming.’42 The Ming Dynasty eventually succumbed to a combination of 
internal demoralisation and the Manchu onslaught giving way to the Qing dynasty (1644-
1911).43 
 
Tibet and China in the Manchu Empire 
The next crucial phase in Sino-Tibetan relations, more appropriately Qing-Tibetan relations, 
was more chequered from the perspective of political and cultural practices: early Qing-
Tibetan relations resembled the symbiotic arrangement characteristic of Yuan-Tibetan 
relations, while the late Qing policies became more politically integrationist and culturally 
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assimilationist, provoking violent Tibetan resistance and nationalism, in both Lhasa and 
eastern Tibet.   
Manchu-Tibetan relations predated the Manchu takeover of Beijing in 1644. The pre-
dynastic Manchu rulers, Nurhaci and Abahai had converted to Tibetan Buddhism, 
specifically the Sakya sect, and patronised it decades before conquering China.44 The 
Manchus had come under the influence of Tibetan Buddhism as an externality of the religio-
political exchanges between Tibetans and Chahar Mongols whose homeland bordered 
Manchuria. Nurhaci and Abahai appointed Tibetan Buddhists of Mongol ancestry as royal 
teachers and advisors.45 Shortly after the Manchus captured Beijing, the 5th Dalai Lama 
established PPR with the Qing dynasty and visited Beijing in 1652-1653, meeting emperor 
Shunzhi. 46  
 Dharamsala asserts that Qing-Tibetan PPR did not connote political subordination of 
Tibet to China.47 Beijing on the other hand claims that the Qing inherited unbroken 
‘sovereignty’ over Tibet from the Yuan and Ming dynasties.48 Tibet’s status during the Qing 
was more ambiguous than either representation. 
At the height of its power, the Qing dynasty exerted considerable administrative and 
political control over Tibet, clearly proving political subordination. The Qing gained political 
leverage in Tibet during the interregnum between the deposition and death of the 6th Dalai 
Lama, who disappointed the Tibetan and Mongol elite with his bohemian life-style, and the 
installation of the 7th Dalai Lama in 1720 with Manchu backing. The young 7th Dalai Lama 
was escorted to Lhasa by a Manchu army, the first of a number of Manchu military and 
administrative interventions in Tibet. Around 1725, Tibet’s administration was reformed 
whereby the Regent (#tib$tib) was replaced by the Council of Ministers or Kashag (%) 
under the supervision of the Dalai Lama. A Qing representative known as the Amban was 
also posted in Lhasa.49 When Tibet was invaded by Nepal in 1792-94, a Qing army marched 
into Tibet for the second time to help dislodge the invaders, leading to another round of 
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administrative and political adjustments: Tibet’s border defence and foreign relations were to 
be handled by the Amban and the reincarnations of the Dalai Lama and Panchen Lama to be 
chosen by drawing lots from a golden urn.50 These reforms were promulgated as ‘Regulations 
for Resolving Tibetan Matters’ in 1793. From this peak, Qing influence and Tibetan 
observance of the regulations waned to the point of irrelevance. The golden urn fell into 
disuse and the Tibetans rejected Qing interference in Tibetan foreign affairs.51  
As such, Tibet was neither an integral part of China as PRC officials and Chinese 
historians assert nor completely independent. Tibet’s status vis-à-vis the Qing is better 
described as a vassal or protectorate, neither an integral part of China nor its political equal.52 
Britain’s characterisation of China’s position in Tibet at that time as ‘suzerain’ and Tibet’s 
status as an ‘autonomous State’ with control over its own foreign and defence matters reflects 
this ambiguity.53 Yet, studying the evolution of that relationship over time is instructive in 
terms of the relevance of the insecurity dilemma. 
The first half of the Qing period was characterised by friendship, mutual respect and 
benefit for both polities. Even before the Qing conquest of Beijing, the Qing emperors 
showered Tibetan Lamas and monastic communities with reverence, patronage and 
protection.54 When the 5th Dalai Lama visited Beijing in 1652-1653, he was received with 
great imperial ceremony and honour which was unique among the many Qing vassals of that 
time.55 As Tuttle wrote:  
Qing imperial support for (and attempts to control) Dge lugs pa [Gelukpa] Tibetan Buddhism in 
Central Tibet, Amdo, Khams, Mongolia, and localities such as Wutaishan (Tib. Rib o tse lnga) 
and Jehol led to an unprecedented expansion of Tibetan Buddhism outside the confines of the 
Tibetan cultural region.56 
 
Far from undermining Tibetan identity, the Qing Dynasty put in place rules and practices to 
protect it from Chinese and other cultures.57 The Qing also provided Tibet security from 
external dangers as the above-mentioned response to the Nepalese invasion demonstrates. 
However, the level of Qing patronage ‘waned and vanished’ as the dynasty weakened in the 
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19th century.58 Ironically, Qing weakness also gave rise to more coercive practices and 
assimilationist policies towards the Tibetans. 
 
Han Ascendance, Assimilationism and Rebellion 
This turn of events happened in the context of the rise of Han Chinese in the Qing 
bureaucracy including on Tibetan affairs,59 and their adoption of Western political ideas such 
as nationalism, territoriality, statehood and sovereignty.60  The Great Game in Tibet between 
British-India and Czarist Russia, which resulted in the British invasion of Tibet in 1904 and 
the first exile of the 13th Dalai Lama to Mongolia, engendered insecurities in Beijing and 
gave an external stimuli for the increasingly hard-line approach towards the Tibetans.61 A 
combination of insecurity and ideological shifts and internal and external structural 
transformations gave rise to more assimilationist policies towards Tibet during the dying 
decades of the Qing dynasty. 
The British invasion, described as an ‘inglorious chapter’62 and a ‘Pyrrhic victory’63 
provoked deep insecurities in Beijing.64 The Han Chinese governor of Sichuan province said: 
‘Tibet is a buttress in our national frontiers—the hand, as it were, which protects the face—
and its prosperity or otherwise is of the most vital importance to China.’65 The Qing dynasty, 
increasingly fronted by nationalistic Chinese officials, took drastic last-gasp measures to 
integrate Tibet administratively and culturally with China.66  
In 1903, the governor of Sichuan petitioned the Qing court for permission to bring in 
Chinese colonists to develop the mining and agricultural industries in the Tibetan regions of 
Sichuan (Kham). When the British invaded Central Tibet, the above program was quickly 
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expanded all over Kham, whereby the autonomy of the traditional Tibetan rulers was 
abolished and direct Chinese rule established, the number of monks in monasteries reduced 
and the recruitment of monks banned for 25 years, and land was granted for French Catholic 
missions in Batang.67 The Tibetans rose up in violent resistance in which the Chinese official 
responsible for these policies, Feng Chuan, and his entourage and two French missionaries 
were killed.68 After a bloody suppression of the rebellion and the destruction of the Batang 
monastery, Zhao Erfeng was appointed to carry on the task of pacifying and integrating 
Kham into China.  
The integrationist design is clear from Zhao’s enforcement of a set of regulations in 
Kham, starting in Batang. According to these regulations, (1) all inhabitants of Batang were 
subjects of the Chinese Emperor and subject to Chinese magistrates, (2) all taxes were to be 
paid to the Chinese, (3) traditional taxes to Tibetan rulers were abolished and (4) the Tibetans 
there were subject to Chinese laws.69 In addition to these political and legal measures, he 
gave 
…protection and assistance to Chinese settlers...promoted [Chinese] education to change Tibetan 
customs and regulated those customs that differed from the customs of China, from marriage and 
funeral arrangements to sexual relations, clothing and hygiene.70  
 
Zhao placed the control of Tibetan monasteries in the hands of Chinese officials and curtailed 
the building of new monasteries.71 In another manifestation of the ideological influence of the 
West on Chinese elites, Zhao modelled his policies and practices on the colonial ventures of 
Western countries and Japan.72  
In central Tibet, the Ambans and their deputies had always been Manchus or Mongols 
in the past.73 However, by the time of the British invasion, Han Chinese Ambans and 
assistants were posted in Lhasa. These Chinese nationalists not only desired to put all of Tibet 
under direct Chinese rule, but also attempted to sinicise Tibet’s administration and culture.74 
One Amban, Chang Yintang, who came to Tibet in 1906, was called ‘nosey Amban’ (&
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'tib() because of his intrusiveness in Tibetan politics.75 In 1908, Zhao Erfeng, then 
governor of Sichuan was appointed Amban in Lhasa to replicate his programs of 
administrative integration and cultural assimilation all over Tibet. Although his appointment 
was withdrawn in 1909, the Ambans in Lhasa took advantage of the absence of the Dalai 
Lama, who was in exile following the British invasion, to attempt similar measures in Central 
Tibet. 
They planned to raise and train a large army (separately from the Tibetan army), 
secularise the Tibetan government, build road and telegraph lines and exploit resources.76 A 
Chinese school and a military college were also opened in Lhasa in 1907 and 1908 
respectively.77 In 1909 the Dalai Lama reached Beijing and had audiences with the Emperor 
and Empress Dowager, where he was given an unprecedentedly demeaning title ‘Our Loyal 
and Submissive Vice-Regent,’ and was instructed to ‘obey the laws of the Sovereign State 
China’ and to ‘follow the established custom of memorializing us, through the Imperial 
Amban, and respectfully await our will.’78  
The policies and practices of the Chinese officials on the ground, even as the Dalai 
Lama was returning to Lhasa from Beijing, contradicted the assurances of continued 
patronage of Tibetan Buddhism and better treatment of Tibetans, which he thought the 
Manchu Emperor and Dowager had given him.79 On his way to Lhasa, the Dalai Lama 
learned that Chinese troops were advancing towards Lhasa and once safely inside Tibet, he 
wrote letters to Britain, Russia, France and Japan to ‘cause the withdrawal of the Chinese 
troops.’80 He also wrote to the Manchu Emperor that ‘big worms are eating little worms... 
Please recall the Chinese officer and troops who recently arrived in Kham. If you do not do 
so, there will be trouble.’81 When The Dalai Lama reached Lhasa on 25 December, 1909, he 
was reassured by the Amban that the Chinese force was only a small contingent for patrolling 
the trade marts. The Dalai Lama learned that he had been duped when a much larger Chinese 
forced entered Lhasa. He fled again, this time to India, and lived in exile in Darjeeling from 
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1910 to 1912. The Qing court responded by deposing him again from both his spiritual and 
political offices.82 
The late Qing policies, husbanded by Chinese nationalists such as Zhao Erfeng, 
clearly fall under the rubric of state-building: ‘modern China’s first state building attempt in 
its south-west border regions.’ 83 The state-building impetus was aroused by the insecurities 
emanating from Tibet, not the least on account of the 1904 British invasion. China’s 
insecurities and state-building impetus were shaped by western political ideas and the rise of 
the Chinese in the Qing officialdom. The most salient features of the state-building 
programme were attempts to replace the institutional and cultural contexts which worked well 
for Yuan-Tibetan and early Qing-Tibetan relations: abrogating Tibetan autonomy and 
attempting cultural assimilation, ‘the end of indirect rule.’84 Tuttle ponders the former 
institutional mechanism and its breakdown: 
As long as the interests of the ethnic elite in Tibet were served by cooperating with the 
neighbouring ethnic elite of the Manchu Qing empire, these ethnically different elites formed a 
stable, mutually supportive community that dominated the vertically integrated Tibetan Buddhist 
cultural world. However, with the rise of Chinese nationalism and efforts at modernizing the Qing 
empire along the lines of a European nation-state, the lateral relations were weakened and the 
vertical identification became stronger.... During most of the Qing dynasty’s reign the Tibetan and 
Manchu elites were able to cooperate because neither made an effort to spread its culture or 
political system where such was not welcome.85 
 
In short, these reforms turned an age-old tradition that ‘allowed imperial rule to rest lightly on 
top of the Tibetan cultural and political world’ into a state-building project that envisioned 
transforming Tibet into a ‘firmly integrated territory of the nascent nation-state.’86 The 
cultural component of Qing state-building was even more consequential: ‘Whenever Tibetan 
Buddhist institutions have been threatened, Tibetan elites have responded defensively; 
whenever they have been supported, the Tibetan elites have cooperated.’87 While the Yuan 
and early Qing policies patronised Tibetan Buddhism and insulated Tibetan identity from 
both vertical and horizontal threats, the late Qing became hostile towards Tibetan identity and 
autonomy. The Tibetan response to Qing state-building was predictably violent and 
symptomatic of the insecurity dilemma.  
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 The Tibetans of Kham responded with a violent uprising in April 1905, killing the 
mastermind of the reforms and his entourage and two Catholic priests.88 The brutality of the 
crackdown at the hands of General Ma Weiqi and Zhao Erfeng only provoked a fiercer 
rebellion towards the end of 1905, which took until the summer of 1906 to suppress.89 When 
Zhao was appointed Amban in Lhasa and his younger brother Zhao Erhsun, the Viceroy of 
Sichuan, in 1908 to bring the whole of Tibet under direct Chinese rule, the Dalai Lama and 
the Tibetan government in Lhasa also responded nationalistically.  
As Tuttle wrote, ‘These Chinese attempts to colonise Tibetan areas made a nationalist 
of the Dalai Lama.’90 And, as Lin suggests, China’s state-building programme ‘propelled the 
Tibetans to engage in their own state-building efforts in order to free themselves from the 
upsurge in Han Chinese influence and pressure.’91 Correspondence between the 13th Dalai 
Lama and the Qing court during his exile in India and the Republican government 
subsequently reveal the depth of the animosity engendered by the Chinese practices. Eight 
months after deposing the Dalai Lama, the Qing court confronted the almost insurmountable 
hurdle of replacing a living Dalai Lama and offered to reinstate him to his spiritual office, but 
not to his political role.92 The Dalai Lama responded that he had ‘lost confidence in China’ 
and that Tibet and China cannot have the same relationship as before.93 Upon the abdication 
of the Qing emperor on 12 February, 1912, Yuan Shikai, President of the new Republic of 
China wrote to the Dalai Lama apologising for past excesses and ‘restoring’ him to his office 
and titles.94 The Dalai Lama replied that he did not require any rank or title from Beijing and 
declared his intention to ‘exercise both temporal and ecclesiastic rule in Tibet.’95 
Provocatively, he traced the source of his authority to the Buddha’s teachings from India. As 
Goldstein notes, ‘[H]e cut even the symbolic tie with China.’96 From India, the Dalai Lama 
organised a secret War Department, started a rebellion inside Tibet and expelled the Qing 
forces via India in April 1912. He returned to Lhasa in January 1913 and declared Tibet’s 
independence.97  
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The threat to Buddhism was central to the Tibetan resistance. In Kham, Qing 
measures against the monasteries and the clergy and patronage for Christian missionaries 
were most provocative. When Chinese troops advanced towards Lhasa, the 13th Dalai Lama 
wrote to ‘Great Britain and all the Ministers of Europe’ that the Chinese forces ‘wish to 
abolish our religion.’98 He wrote to the Qing court that he escaped to India to avoid the 
destruction of religious institutions akin to the Muslim invasion of India.99 Once back in 
Tibet, he exhorted the Tibetans ‘to preserve all Buddhist institutions in Tibet.’100 
Furthermore, there was an international dimension to this nascent insecurity dilemma too. 
Confirming the Europeanisation of Chinese political world view, Chinese officials in 
the turn of the 20th century went on a diplomatic offensive to claim ‘sovereignty’ over Tibet 
as opposed to mere suzerainty as the British conceded.101 The Tibetans responded by 
replacing Beijing with New Delhi and London as sources of protection.102 As such, China’s 
state-building efforts compelled the Tibetans to actively engage with the international 
community. The Dalai Lama sought British, Russian, French and Japanese support against 
China in his letters written on 7 November, 1909. 
In short, the disruption of the time-tested institutional format of Beijing-Lhasa 
relations and introduction of assimilationist Chinese policies wrecked Sino-Tibetan relations 
at the twilight of the Qing Dynasty, which collapsed in February 1912. Tibet was given a new 
lease of life, but how did the Tibetans use this second chance? How did the new regime in 
China deal with Tibet? 
 
Tibet and Nationalist China (1912-1949) 
The Tibetan regions under the rule of Lhasa escaped Chinese rule and exercised de facto 
independence. The 13th Dalai Lama, who had learnt the hard way how vulnerable Tibet was 
and the necessity of a strong and efficient army and bureaucracy, introduced various 
modernisation reforms to create a centralised nation-state. Eastern Tibet, on the other hand, 
remained in a perpetual state of flux contested by Lhasa and Beijing, ruled sometimes by 
Chinese warlords, sometimes by Lhasa officials or by local Tibetan chieftains or Lamas. 
However, the eastern Tibetans were spared the sort of policies that the late-Qing authorities 
imposed there, as the Chinese were engaged in bloody conflicts among warlords, the civil 
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war between the Nationalists and the Communists and the war against Japanese occupation. 
Republican China, though incapable of taking practical measures to incorporate Tibet into 
China, nevertheless continued to claim Tibet as a part of China. China’s state building in 
Tibet, therefore, was conducted through ideology and propaganda and remained practically 
divorced from Tibetan society.  
 The above-mentioned exchange between Yuan Shikai and the Dalai Lama just after 
the collapse of the Qing dynasty set the tone for Sino-Tibetan relations during the Republican 
and Nationalist eras. Lhasa was not just determined to be independent from China but also to 
reclaim the whole of eastern Tibet.103 As the Dalai Lama told the Tibetans in his declaration 
of independence, ‘...I am now in the process of driving out the remnants of Chinese troops in 
Do Kham in eastern Tibet.’104  However, by 1913, Chinese forces had regrouped and retaken 
most of eastern Tibet, which unnerved Lhasa in the light of its recent experiences. To face 
this threat, the Dalai Lama embarked on a series of reforms, beginning with increasing the 
size of the Tibetan army and upgrading its weaponry and training. By 1914, a reorganised 
and bigger Tibetan army under the Command of Kalon Jampa Tendhar was dispatched to 
Kham, where he recruited local militias and drove out the Chinese forces from some Tibetan 
areas.105 This was taking place at the same time as a tripartite conference organised in Simla, 
India, between the British, Tibetans and the Chinese, which came to be known as the Simla 
Convention (October 1913-July 1914). The delegates discussed the demarcation of the border 
between Tibet and China and split Tibet into ‘Inner Tibet’ and ‘Outer Tibet’ with different 
levels of authorities to be exercised by Beijing and Lhasa in each segment.106  
Although the Chinese representative initialled the Agreement, Beijing immediately 
repudiated the agreement. Hostilities resumed in Eastern Tibet and escalated to a full-scale 
war in 1917-1918, when a disgruntled Chinese General attempted to repeat Zhao Erfeng’s 
invasion of Tibet.107 The beleaguered Chinese forces sued for peace and requested British 
mediation. Eric Teichman, a diplomat in the British Consulate in Chengdu, travelled to the 
battle zone and negotiated a peace settlement.108 This conflict sensitised the Lhasa authorities 
to the need for further strengthening of the army in terms of numbers, weapons and 
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organisation. The consequent efforts to extract tax and resources from the aristocratic and 
monastic estates sparked a disastrous conflict between the Tibetan government and the estate 
of the 9th Panchen Lama (1883-1937), who protested that the new taxes were unprecedented 
and invalid. The conflict forced him to flee to China in 1923, where he eventually died.109 
The strengthened military also provoked a debilitating power struggle between the 
westernised military officers and their aristocratic supporters, and the conservative monastic 
faction and its aristocratic allies.110 Amidst rumours of a military coup attempt, the monastic 
and conservative factions won over the Dalai Lama to abort his entire modernisation 
program.111 
The death of the Dalai Lama on 17 December, 1933 plunged Tibet immediately into a 
power-struggle followed by a brief civil war between two Regents, providing for the first 
time since 1913 a small opening for China to send a ‘condolence’ mission to Lhasa.112 
Although, General Huang Musong was unsuccessful in his political mission to persuade the 
Tibetans to integrate with China, he left behind two officials with a wireless set in Lhasa, 
who were expelled in 1949.113 One of the last Nationalist Representatives in Tibet, Shen 
Tsung-Lien, wrote perhaps the most compelling testimony for Tibet’s independence: ‘since 
1911 Tibet has to all practical purposes enjoyed full independence. It has its own currency 
and customs; it runs its own telegraph and postal service; it maintains a civil service different 
from any other part of China; it even keeps its own army.’114 Lien was of course referring 
only to Lhasa-controlled regions of Tibet.  
 Indeed, from 1911 to 1950, Tibetan autonomy and identity did not face an existential 
threat as the Chinese were pre-occupied with their own civil war and with overthrowing the 
Japanese occupation. Nationalist claims of sovereignty over central Tibet were purely 
‘rhetorical grandstanding’ to ‘maintain its Nationalist facade and political legitimacy.’115 In 
eastern Tibet where the Nationalists maintained nominal rule through a combination of 
Chinese (Han and Hui) warlords and native Tibetan rulers, Tibetan identity did not 
experience the sort of existential threats that late Qing policies presented. In fact, the 
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Nationalists rediscovered the value of Tibetan Buddhism for their state-building ambitions in 
Tibet and Mongolia.116 A limited and modern version of PPR was conceived, although the 
Chinese intention was to integrate Tibet into the modern Chinese state, not to hold an empire 
together.  
 The expulsion of the Nationalist Chinese mission in 1949 proved a pyrrhic victory as 
Maoist Communists, wedded to very different values, especially their aversion towards 
religion and traditional cultures, and unencumbered by civil wars and foreign occupation, 
came to power in China that same year and invaded Central Tibet in 1950. However, the 
Communists had been active in China since the 1920s and it is instructive to examine the 
CCP’s positions towards the Tibetans, Uighurs and Mongols during this period. The security 
instrumentality of the CCP’s practice of Regional National Autonomy in the minority regions 
is obvious from how the Party changed its tune on nationality policy depending upon its own 
security position in China before and after the conclusion of the Chinese civil war. 
 To enlist the support of national minorities in the Chinese civil war and the anti-
Japanese war, the Communists promised self-determination, including the right to secede 
from China, to non-Han nationalities.117As early as 1920, Mao wrote to Cai Hesen118: ‘we 
must…assist Mongolia, Xinjiang, Tibet and Qinghai to achieve self-government (zizhi) and 
self-determination (zijue).’119 The 1922 Manifesto of the Second Congress of the CCP 
proposed that Mongolia, Xinjiang and Tibet would become autonomous, self-governing 
regions in a Chinese federal republic, while the Third Congress of 1923 resolved that Tibet, 
Mongolia, Sinkiang and Qinghai shall always be affiliated with China, but they may exercise 
the right of national self-determination.120 After falling out with the Nationalists in 1928, the 
CCP began to support the right to secession of these nationalities. A 1930 meeting in 
Shanghai, for instance, recognised the right to secede.121 Article 14 of the 1931 Resolution of 
the First All-China Congress of Soviets on Question of National Minorities stated that ‘the 
Chinese Soviet Republic categorically and unconditionally recognises the right of national 
minorities to self-determination.’ It also promised the ‘toiling masses’ of ‘Mongolia, Tibet, 
Xinjiang, Yunnan, Guizhou, and others, where the majority of the population belong to non-
Chinese nationalities…the right to determine for themselves whether they wish to leave the 
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Chinese Soviet Republic and create their own independent state, or whether they wish to join 
the Union of Soviet Republics, or form an autonomous area inside the Chinese Republic.”122  
However, as soon as the second anti-Japanese alignment with the Nationalists was 
formed in the late 1930s, the CCP ceased mentioning the right to secede, promising only a 
Chinese federation, with which the non-Chinese nationalities had the freedom to join. Mao 
told Edgar Snow123 in 1936, ‘When the people’s revolution has been victorious in China, the 
Outer Mongolian Republic will automatically become a part of the Chinese federation, at 
their own will. The Mohammedan and Tibetan peoples likewise will form autonomous 
republics attached to the China federation.’124 By 1938, the rhetoric had shifted to equality 
vis-à-vis the Han and establishing a unified state with the Han, although occasional promises 
of federation persisted until 1947.125 In his address to the Enlarged Sixth Plenary Session of 
the sixth Central Committee in 1938, Mao said that the CCP would ‘allow the Mongol, Hui, 
Tibet, Miao, Yi, and Fan nationalities to have equal rights with the Han’ and ‘the right to 
manage their own affairs and establish a unified state with the Han people.’126 The scene was 
set for the about-turn that the CCP took on its nationality position once it came to power in 
1949. 
 Article 50 of the Common Program of the first CPPCC on 29 September, 1949 
epitomised this U-turn; national equality, unity and cooperation to ‘oppose imperialism and 
their own public enemies… [n]ationalism and [Han] chauvinism’ were emphasised.127 
Federalism and self-determination had disappeared; instead, regional autonomy was promised 
to national minorities (Article 51).128 With the overthrow of imperialism and the Nationalists, 
the CCP justified its about-face by arguing that self-determination had been achieved for 
everyone, including non-Han nationalities. Self-determination was interpreted as a right for 
the Chinese to forge a unified and sovereign nation-state.129 Since Han chauvinism of the 
feudal and nationalist past had been supposedly invalidated and eliminated, there was no 
reason for the minorities to secede from China. Ethnic unrest in the first few years of 
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Communist rule was also attributed to residual Han chauvinism owing to lack of ‘Marxist 
education’ and grasp of ‘the nationality policy of the Central Committee.’130  
 
Conclusion:  
History is integral to the substance of the Sino-Tibetan conflict as both Dharamsala and 
Beijing advance radically different histories of their centuries old relations. Beijing asserts 
unbroken China sovereignty over Tibet since the Yuan dynasty and that the notion of Tibetan 
independence is an imperialist plot against China. Dharamsala questions the Chineseness of 
the Mongols and Manchus and argues that relations between the Tibetan Lamas and Mongol 
and Manchu emperors were personal in nature, i.e. between a priest and a patron, and did not 
entail political subordination of Tibet to either the Yuan or Qing empires. These are not just 
rhetorical contestations over the past, but also entwined with current agendas on both sides. 
Beijing stipulates as a precondition for negotiations that the Dalai Lama publicly declare 
Tibet as a historically integral and inalienable part of China. The Dalai Lama has so far 
refused to ‘re-write’ the history of Sino-Tibetan relations. History, he said, should be left to 
academic historians and lawyers to adjudicate. Charting a middle-way between the duelling 
extremes, this chapter provided an abridged version of a long history that tracks the genesis 
of the insecurity dilemma in Sino-Tibetan relations. 
Analysis of the Yuan and Qing relations with Tibet reveal that respect for Tibetan 
culture and political autonomy were crucial determinants for Tibetan cooperation or rebellion 
against foreign overlords. The Tibetans as a nation remained divided under different 
jurisdictions and the hidebound and corruption-ridden Lhasa government failed to capitalise 
on the Chinese problems during the Nationalist era to consolidate its international status, 
conduct domestic reforms and make adequate defence preparations. Tibet paid the steepest 
price that any state could pay: death at the hands of Mao’s PRC in 1950. The next chapter 
examines how the insecurity dilemma ravaged Sino-Tibetan relations during the first three 
decades of PRC’s direct rule over the Tibetans.  
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Chapter 4 
 The Insecurity Dilemma in Communist Tibet (1950-1989) 
 
This chapter picks up the historical narrative from Chapter Three. Crucially, it demonstrates 
the workings of the insecurity dilemma in the historical period between the Chinese take-over 
of Tibet (1949-50) and the imposition of martial law in 1989. This analytical history details 
China’s state-building efforts and the stubborn Tibetan resistance at a time when the full 
force of the insecurity dilemma was unleashed on the Tibetan plateau. 
On 1 October, 1949, Chairman Mao declared the founding of the PRC and quickly 
reasserted control over eastern Tibet. Radio broadcasts announced plans afoot to ‘liberate’ the 
rest of Tibet and Taiwan.1 The Tibetan government conducted a spurt of military and political 
reforms at home and diplomatic activity to seek international support, but it proved too little, 
too late.2 On 7 October, 1950, the PLA invaded the town of Chamdo, defeating the Tibetan 
army through sheer speed and numbers.3 A panicky and paralysed Lhasa asked the 15 year 
old Dalai Lama to assume full religious and political authority; an enthronement ceremony 
was held on 17 November, 1950.4 Beijing demanded that the Tibetan government sent its 
representatives to Beijing to negotiate the ‘peaceful liberation of Tibet,’ failing which the 
PLA threatened to march to Lhasa. When armed defence failed and concrete international 
support was not forthcoming,5 Lhasa dispatched a delegation headed by Ngabo Ngawang 
Jigme to Beijing for negotiations. Confronting thinly veiled threats of further military action 
and acting against the express instruction from the Tibetan government ‘The Agreement of 
the Central People’s Government and the Local Government of Tibet on Measures for the 
Peaceful Liberation of Tibet’ (17-Point Agreement, hereafter) was signed and Tibet’s 
independence came to an abrupt end. 6  
The history of PRC’s incorporation and rule over Tibet could be analysed in four 
phases: grudging coexistence under the 17 Point Agreement (1951-1959); Democratic 
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Reforms (1959-1965) and Cultural Revolution (1965-1976); reform and cultural revival, 
uprising and martial law (1978-1989); and integration, development and uprising (1989-
present). Since the post-1989 period is detailed in chapters 5, 6, and 8, this chapter will 
examine the first three periods and chronicle the forceful advent of the insecurity dilemma. 
 
The 17 Point Agreement and Grudging Coexistence (1951-1959) 
The 17-Point Agreement became the basis of a ten year attempt at co-existence. The full text 
of the Agreement is given in appendix 1, but the key terms state that the Tibetans would 
return to the ‘family of the motherland’ and assist the PLA’s arrival in Tibet, Beijing would 
handle Tibet’s external affairs and institute a ‘military and administrative committee’ and a 
‘military division headquarter’ in Lhasa. In exchange, Tibet’s traditional socio-political 
system including the economic base of the monasteries and the ‘status, functions and powers’ 
of the Dalai Lama and Panchen Lama would be preserved, and that reforms will be conducted 
only after consultation with, and agreement of, and under the leadership of the Tibetan 
government and elite. Religious belief and the development of written and spoken Tibetan 
language will be upheld.  
 Lhasa was initially shocked by the terms of the Agreement, particularly the 
renunciation of Tibet’s independence and the deployment of PLA in Tibet, but under the 
circumstances, accepted the Agreement.7 For some of the Tibetan elite, the Agreement 
provided enough safeguards for Tibet’s cultural, social and political autonomy.8 Most 
importantly, the Agreement appeared to protect the power and privileges of the ruling elite 
and to uphold religious freedom in Tibet. On the other hand, the Chinese believed that the 
Tibetans had accepted Chinese sovereignty and communist reforms in principle. Shakya 
wrote, ‘Each party saw what they wanted in the agreement.’9 Thus, the 17-Point Agreement 
was doomed from the start, as the following account of the implementation bears out. 
 
Insecurity, State-Building and Co-existence 
By the end of 1951, the population of Lhasa had doubled with the arrival of the Chinese 
troops and officials.10 Once China acquired control over Tibet, it faced the task of defending 
and securing their conquest, which it immediately began through a variety of state-building 
                                                          
7
 Shakya 1999: 70-1, 89-91. 
8
 Ibid: 90. 
9
 Ibid: 209. 
10
 Ibid: 93. 
100 
 
measures. The insecurity underlying the state-building project is clear from Mao’s 
instructions in 1952 to the Chinese cadres working in Tibet. He identified the lack of the 
PLA’s ‘material base,’ absence of Chinese settlers (unlike Xinjiang), and the favourable 
balance of ‘social influence’ of the ‘Dalai clique’ in Tibet as the chief challenges.11 He 
advised the cadres to concentrate on ‘production, trade, road-building, medical services and 
united front work.’ These were nation-building, institution-building and infrastructure-
building projects. 
First, the Chinese took a number of steps geared towards nation-building. Under strict 
orders to observe a code of conduct that was designed to dispel Tibetan fears and create a 
good image of the Chinese and the PLA in particular, propaganda teams visited remote areas 
showing films and performing songs and dances, publicising the 17-Point Agreement, and 
providing free medical care to rural Tibetans. However, ordinary Tibetans proved far more 
impervious to the Chinese advances than sections of the ruling elite.12 The Chinese also took 
steps to win over the ecclesiastical community. During the Monlam Festival in February 
1951, the Chinese included the monastic heads in the decision-making process and 
distributed alms and money to the monks following traditional Tibetan and Qing practices.13 
Trips were organised for influential Tibetans for educational and inspection tours to industrial 
cities in China with a view to impressing them with China’s modernisation and industrial 
might and to use them for international propaganda.14 In 1955, the Dalai Lama, Panchen 
Lama and other leading Tibetans visited Beijing and other Chinese cities and participated in 
the National People’s Congress sessions, a major propaganda coup showing ‘Tibetan 
acquiescence to Chinese rule.’15 
At the same time, the Chinese exploited traditional divisions and fomented new 
cleavages within Tibetan society. The exclusion of eastern Tibetan regions from the 17 Point 
Agreement was based on the legalistic fact that they were not politically under the control of 
Lhasa at the time of the invasion. The Chinese also exploited the long-standing rift between 
the Tibetan government and the Panchen Lama’s estate.16 Central Tibet was divided into 
three rival regional blocs: the Tibetan Government in Lhasa headed by the Dalai Lama, the 
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Panchen Lama estate and Chamdo Liberation Committee (CLC).17 To be sure, traditional 
Tibetan divisions lent a helping hand to these Chinese tactics, but the Chinese took this divide 
and rule strategy one step further by upgrading numerically insignificant groups within Tibet 
as separate nationalities. This was part of the larger state-sponsored Nationality Identification 
Programme in the 1950s through which many new nationalities were ‘invented’ from the 
Chinese and other nationalities.18 The intention behind this Programme was to counter the 
nationalisms of the frontier nations by including ‘many small internal nationalities’ to 
‘trivialize the definition of ethnicity “to the detriment of the frontier nations”’.19 Katherine 
Kaup found the ‘invention’ of the Zhuang by the Communists designed to help incorporate 
the south-west into the Chinese state.20 G.F. Hudson, a scholar on the Zhuang nationality 
wrote that ‘the communist state granted the Zhuang the status of ethnic minority in order to 
obfuscate the issues of Xinjiang, Tibet and Mongolia and to send message to Uighurs, 
Tibetans, and Mongols that they were not in a position to demand more recognition.’21 
 In Tibet, Monpas, Lhobas and Sherpas were raised to the status of separate 
nationalities by ‘ethnographers’ using Stalin’s definition of nationhood. Fischer argues that 
the construction of nationalities ‘occurred due to very specific local political reasons, dictated 
primarily by the state.’22 He finds in the Chinese discourse on ethnic groups in Tibet a line of 
reasoning that goes like this: ‘Tibetans are not the only ethnic group in the TAR, and it is 
therefore unreasonable for them to be making special claims for themselves.’23 In short, 
China worked hard at nation-building in both the positive sense of attracting the Tibetans to 
identify themselves as Chinese and the negative sense of undermining the integrity of the 
Tibetan nation. 
Simultaneously, the Chinese created a rash of official and quasi-official institutions, 
including the Education Committee and sub-committees, the Grain Procurement Board to 
solve the problem of PLA food shortages,24 the Tibetan Military District Headquarters 
(TMDHQ) and the Preparatory Committee of the Tibet Autonomous Region (PCTAR). The 
Youth Association and Women’s Association were semi-official bodies charged with 
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propaganda work such as showing movies and organising trips to China.25 Tibetan lamas 
were co-opted into the Chinese Buddhist Association and given high positions.26 The most 
significant military-political institutions were TMDHQ and the PCART. 
On 10 February 1952, TMDHQ was inaugurated with great pomp and fanfare lasting 
three days.27 Composed of eight Chinese and two Tibetan officers, including a Chinese 
Commander and Tibetan Deputy Commander, TMDHQ was ‘seen as a key to establishing 
effective Chinese rule in Tibet.’28 TMDHQ was also aimed at gaining control over the 
Tibetan army, reducing intra-Chinese conflicts between the Military Regions, and to 
incorporate Tibet into China’s military-administrative apparatus.29 Predictably, the Chinese 
demanded that the Tibetan army be incorporated into the PLA, because as primitive as it was, 
the remnants of the Tibetan army constituted a threat to the Chinese objectives in Tibet.  
TMDHQ was a compromise over a Military Administration Commission (MAC) that 
the Chinese forced upon the Tibetan delegates during the ‘negotiation’ of the 17-Point 
Agreement with threats of further military action in Tibet. It was meant to implement the 
Agreement and ‘“decide” all important political and military issues.’30 Because the Tibetans 
strongly opposed its creation, Mao postponed it until the PLA’s ‘material base’ and ‘social 
influence’ in Tibet had improved considerably to ‘go over the offensive in the future.’31 This 
strategic logic guided the entirety of the ‘gradualist’ policy that Beijing practised outside 
eastern Tibet in the 1950s. 
PCTAR’s establishment was even more consequential. The Chinese allowed the 
traditional Tibetan government to exist, but they wanted to establish a parallel administrative 
structure, which would initiate and run new projects and reforms, with the goal of gradually 
rendering the ‘traditional government structure...redundant.’32 PCTAR was established 
during the Dalai Lama’s trip to Beijing in 1955 and inaugurated on 22 April 1956 with great 
fan-fare in Lhasa with an 800-strong delegation from Beijing. PCTAR was described as ‘an 
authoritative body for consultation and planning during the transitional period before the 
establishment of the Autonomous Region of Tibet.’33 For the Chinese, PCART was 
instrumental in speeding up reforms and integrating Tibet within PRC’s administrative 
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structure. The Dalai Lama was appointed Chairman, but Zhang Guohua, Deputy Chairman, 
was in charge of the Committee.34 PCART became the main centre of power and the Tibetan 
government had neither the power nor the resources to challenge its supremacy.35 As Shakya 
wrote, ‘Clearly, the organisational structure of the PCART had reduced the traditional power 
and status of the Tibetan government.’36 On paper, the establishment of PCART was a 
triumph of Chinese diplomacy and pragmatism, but it proved a pyrrhic victory as it provoked 
strong opposition from the Tibetan masses.37 
The ordinary Tibetans, who saw the Dalai Lama as their supreme leader, were 
seriously disturbed by his loss of prestige and power and that of the Tibetan government. 
Their anger was directed as much to the Chinese as to the elite, who they felt had betrayed 
their leader and government by working for PCART or escaping abroad with their wealth.38 
The erstwhile apolitical Tibetan masses became politicised. Their animosity against the 
Chinese was exacerbated by the seeming ubiquity of the Chinese in a land where seeing one 
was a rarity before 1952. This was a direct result of the establishment of PCART as the 
mushrooming of institutions under its umbrella was accompanied by a flood of Chinese 
civilian and military personnel. 39 These cadres often appeared culturally insensitive and 
intrusive. Most Tibetans viewed them with suspicion and hostility.40 The Tibetans interpreted 
these developments as violation of the 17-Point Agreement.41 As we shall see, PCART and 
associated institutions contributed considerably to the Tibetan uprising in 1959 and the 
breakdown of the 17-Point Agreement. The Chinese also realised the importance of building 
infrastructure to integrate Tibet closer to China. 
By the end of 1955, the Qinghai-Tibet road and the Dartsedo (Ch. Kangding)-Lhasa 
road had been constructed. This was achieved by employing some 30, 000 Tibetan nomads 
and farmers on road construction projects who received wages. However, by the mid-1950s, 
the Chinese had to cut costs and asked the Tibetans to provide free labour for ‘construction of 
the motherland.’42 The Chinese claimed that the roads reflected the ‘concern and care which 
the CCP and Chairman Mao have for the Tibetan people.’43 There were other reasons though. 
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Roads made it easier to mobilise and propagandise the Tibetan masses, transport supplies 
faster for the PLA, lessened the dependence of the Tibetan economy on India, and generally 
to establish firmer control over Tibet.44 It addressed some of the Chinese security concerns.   
Internationally, China also achieved a major victory in the form of the ‘India-China 
Agreement on Trade and Intercourse between Tibet Region of China and India’ signed on 29 
April, 1954, in which India accepted China’s sovereignty over Tibet.45 Although America 
had been interested in the Tibet issue since the late 1940s,46 India’s acquiescence to the 
Chinese position made it difficult for Washington to support Tibet. The Dalai Lama and the 
Tibetan government could not reciprocate the American advances without credible 
commitment from them to deliver substantial diplomatic and military assistance. Chinese 
state-building in Tibet and assertion of sovereignty over Tibet went hand in hand. 
 
The Storm from the East 
Despite this triumph in international relations, a storm was brewing much closer to home in 
eastern Tibet. Unbound by the 17-Point Agreement, the Chinese policy and practices in 
eastern Tibet were considerably different from the ones in Central Tibet. Eastern Tibetans 
were treated as Chinese and subjected to radical communist reforms beginning around 1954.47  
Immediately after the Communists overran eastern Tibet in 1949, they started building 
the administrative and Party structures there. By 1956, Eastern Tibet was organised into 
Tibetan autonomous districts.48 By 1953, the Communists started land reforms targeting the 
monasteries and local elites, classifying people into different class groups, confiscating 
weapons and forcibly settling nomads, beginning in Gyalthang, Kham (Yunnan).49 The 
officials and PLA travelled from village to village confiscating land and property from 
landlords and traditional leaders and redistributing these with great ‘propaganda and fanfare’ 
to the poor, albeit after taking the best of everything for themselves, including land and 
livestock.50 Land and property redistribution was accompanied by persecution of landowners 
and traditional leaders through ‘struggle sessions’ (
tib), public humiliations, and 
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arrests in order to eliminate any potential leadership for resistance. However, many of these 
social, political, and religious leaders were not regarded as class exploiters even by the lower-
class Tibetans, but as respected and revered figures representing Tibetan cultural, religious 
and national identity. The communist reforms went beyond taking away the autonomy of the 
local elite to humiliating and persecuting them in public. 
The Chinese call these ‘Democratic Reforms’ to abolish ‘serfdom, a grim and backward 
feudal system’ and claim that it was the ‘yearning of the overwhelming majority of the 
Tibetan people.’51 However, they were also a ruse to ‘expose and eliminate all Tibetan 
opponents to Chinese rule...facilitating not only Chinese control over Tibet but social control 
as well.’52 The Chinese pushed on with the reforms despite popular opposition and appeals of 
the Dalai Lama and local Tibetan elites like Geshe Sherab Gyatso.53 The Eastern Tibetans 
saw the reforms first and foremost as an attack on their value system and identity.54 
  Tibetans of all classes and regions were united by a common culture and their faith in 
Buddhism and deeply resented the reforms that threatened the existence of their religious 
institutions.55 Consequently, the Tibetan regions of Gansu, Qinghai, Sichuan and Yunnan 
rose up in violent rebellions attacking Chinese civilian and military personnel in their 
localities.56 When Tibetan villagers resisted land reforms, the ensuing fighting forced them to 
seek sanctuary in local monasteries, which the PLA besieged and bombed from the air.57 
Hundreds of Khampas and Amdowas fled to central Tibet bringing news of the persecution of 
monks and religion in their homelands. As the fighting continued in the east, the number of 
refugees in and around Lhasa increased to about 58,000 families, according to one estimate.58  
Far from winning over the lower classes, Democratic Reforms ignited a broad-based 
Tibetan resistance. The persecution of the local elites ‘was more successful in creating 
resistance to the Chinese than it was in creating “proletarian class consciousness.”’59 While 
the United Front was able to co-opt some members of the upper class, they failed to 
anticipate the nationalistic reaction engendered by their persecution of the non-cooperative 
elements. The Tibetans simply saw the collaborators as traitors and the rebellious ones as 
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national heroes. In retrospect, treating more than half the Tibetan population that lived 
outside Lhasa’s rule as Chinese and conducting radical communist reforms was a 
fundamentally flawed policy.60 It added more fuel to the powder-keg that the Chinese-
Tibetan relations were fast turning into in Lhasa. 
 
Growing resistance in Central Tibet 
Although the need to win over the Dalai Lama and the Tibetan elite and the terms of the 17-
Point Agreement lubricated Sino-Tibetan relations well enough to avoid open conflict in 
Central Tibet, the relations were always on a knife-edge. Tibetan resistance in Lhasa took the 
form of civil disobedience and peaceful protests and petitions. 
The first opposition came from the two Prime Ministers, Lukhangwa and Lobsang 
Tashi. They refused to sell grain to the starving PLA, to integrate the Tibetan army into the 
PLA, rejected  Chinese demands for the Tibetan army to march with the Chinese flag instead 
of the Tibetan one, prevented direct communication between the young Dalai Lama and the 
Chinese officials, and demanded the return of Chamdo to the authority of the Tibetan 
government before discussions on how to implement the 17 Point Agreement could take 
place.61 The prime ministers’ open challenge to the Chinese became nationalistic folk-lore 
among the ordinary Tibetans.62 
Simultaneously, the Chinese also attracted opposition from the common Tibetans.63 
As early as 1951, posters denouncing the Chinese as ‘enemies of the faith’ (!), calling 
for their withdrawal and the restoration of the Dalai Lama’s powers were pasted on the walls 
of Lhasa during festivals.64 Popular groups calling themselves ‘People’s Representatives’ (tib
	"	tib) or ‘Lhasa People’s Great Organisation’ (	tib	$%tib) organised various 
anti-Chinese activities in Lhasa, including the criticism of Chinese policies and their presence 
in posters and petitions and blockading the offices of the Chinese officials.65 With 
considerable difficulty the Chinese managed to pressure the Dalai Lama to dismiss the Prime 
Ministers and the Tibetan government to break up the People’s Representatives in 1952.66 In 
1954, another popular group ‘People’s Assembly’ (tib	tib	&) came into being 
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principally to dissuade the Dalai Lama from visiting China.67 Although his 1954-1955 trip to 
Beijing and talks with Mao brought a brief respite from the tensions, the escalating fighting in 
eastern Tibet spilled over into Central Tibet. PCART’s establishment revived popular 
opposition in Lhasa. 
The above mentioned ‘People’s Assembly’ re-emerged in 1956 to put up posters in 
Lhasa calling for the Chinese to leave Tibet. The People’s Assembly ‘represented the 
culmination of Tibetan resentment against...the erosion of the authority of the Dalai Lama.’68 
As noted above, the people’s ire was directed as much against the Chinese ‘invaders’ as to 
the Tibetan elite for abandoning the Dalai Lama. The ‘People’s Assembly’ was created by 
private traders and low-level officials who had lost confidence in the senior officials to 
defend the Dalai Lama and Tibetan interests.69 Under Chinese pressure, three leaders of the 
People’s Assembly were arrested by the Tibetan government, one of whom died in detention. 
The other two were released under pressure from the public and monasteries. Under these 
circumstances, the Dalai Lama visited India in 1956 and considered seeking asylum there, but 
returned to Tibet after the Chinese Prime Minister Zhou Enlai reassured him that ‘Democratic 
Reforms’ would be postponed for ten years if necessary.70 Indian Prime Minister Nehru also 
persuaded him to return. 
 However, the Dalai Lama returned to a tense Lhasa with hundreds more refugees 
from eastern Tibet arriving with fresh news of persecution and destruction of monasteries and 
camping around Lhasa. Outwardly, relations improved slightly owing to the postponement of 
reforms for reasons ranging from the desire to win over the increasingly suspicious Dalai 
Lama and popular opposition to waning revolutionary zeal and economic problems in China 
itself.71 Not only did the Chinese postpone reforms in central Tibet, they also relaxed the pace 
of reforms in eastern Tibet and attempted to win over leading figures from that area.72 
However, the destruction of monasteries and persecution of respected figures had damaged 
the relations between the Chinese and eastern Tibetans beyond repair. 73 There was nothing 
the Chinese could do to stop the rebellion spreading as the eastern Tibetans escaped and 
moved around with relative freedom in Central Tibet.74  
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Around the same time, the Tibetans exploited their common culture to stiffen 
opposition to the Chinese. Led by merchants from the east with the notion that the Dalai 
Lama’s well-being and Tibetan fortunes could be safeguarded through Buddhist rituals, they 
conducted long-life rituals for the Dalai Lama and offered him a throne of gold funded by 
donations from all over Tibet in May 1957. Shakya writes: 
The ceremony had serious political and social implications. For the first time all Tibetan people 
were united in common purpose and shared values, which helped to identify the common enemy. 
The Chinese were labelled Tendra (brtan dgra) “the enemy of the faith” and the Khampa 
resistance groups were seen as the “fidei defensor [defender of the faith].”75 
 
This was undoubtedly Tibetan nation-building in the face of Chinese threats. Tibetan 
opposition also appeared in an unlikely place: Beijing, the heart of political China. There, 
Tibetan students organised a group called ‘Defence against Invasion’ (
'(tib)), which 
denounced the 17-Point Agreement and PCART, quarrelled with Chinese lecturers about 
Tibetan history and even criticised Prime Minister Zhou Enlai for suggesting that Tibetans 
should follow the Manchus and adopt Chinese culture.76 
Emboldened by Mao’s Hundred Flowers Campaign, such Tibetan opposition induced 
a degree of soul searching and policy debate among the Chinese officials. Reflecting the 
sharp divisions between the South-West and North-West Military Regions, officials from the 
two groups blamed each other’s Han Chauvinism for Tibetan grievances.77 As China lurched 
towards the Great Leap Forward and the introduction of the commune system, policy 
implementation in Tibetan areas also became increasingly hard-line. The cycle of rebellions 
and suppression escalated in the east, which in turn had a direct bearing on the stability of 
central Tibet. In the most significant development in 1958, the eastern Tibetan warriors who 
had been driven from their homelands, regrouped in central Tibet and formed a unified outfit 
known as Four Rivers, Six Ranges (*
+tib	,) or the Volunteer Force for Defence of the 
Faith (-)tib). Their numbers swelled into tens of thousands and constituted a 
formidable challenge for the PLA in Tibet, albeit being poorly armed and having an 
ambiguous relationship with the Tibetan government. 
 
Transnational and International Developments 
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The Chinese invasion and the uncertain politics of co-existence had driven many religious 
and political figures from both eastern and central Tibet into exile in India. The former Prime 
Minister and two of the Dalai Lama’s elder brothers topped a sizable diaspora based in the 
town of Kalimpong. The formation of the ‘Four Rivers, Six Ranges’ was welcomed with joy 
there. 
 The revolt in the east, the formation of the guerrilla organisation and the diaspora in 
Kalimpong provided an opening for America to provide covert support to the Tibetans.78 
Select groups of Tibetans were trained in guerrilla warfare in American military bases and 
air-dropped inside Tibet.79 Supplemented by American arms-drops, the guerrillas inflicted 
considerable casualties on the PLA. While the American objective was merely to destabilise 
China rather than restore Tibetan independence, in the eyes of the Chinese, the American 
intervention represented an anti-CCP ‘international conspiracy’ and ‘a direct threat to China’s 
security.’80 This explains the ferocity with which the PLA suppressed the rebellion in eastern 
Tibet and its pressure on the Tibetan government to use its army to quell the guerrillas in 
central Tibet.  
The Tibetan government prevaricated and astutely asked the Chinese to enlarge and 
equip the Tibetan army with better weapons, which was the last thing the Chinese desired. 
The Chinese also allowed the re-activation of some of the institutions of the Tibetan 
government, such as the cabinet and National Assembly, which they had previously stopped 
from convening, so that these bodies would be blamed for the unpopular act of cracking 
down on Tibetan rebels.81 In the end, under Chinese pressure and the approach of the Dalai 
Lama’s final public examination for the Tibetan monastic equivalent of a PhD in early March 
1959, the Tibetan government sent an official delegation to ask the rebel headquarters in 
Southern Tibet to halt the fighting against the Chinese. The members of the delegation, 
however, joined the rebels. The Tibetan army was not used because the Lhasa officials 
suspected that the Chinese were trying to instigate a civil war among the Tibetans and 
because the guerrillas enjoyed the sympathy of many Tibetan officials and the masses.82 The 
PLA could not fight the rebels directly as that would be counterproductive to their long-
                                                          
78
 Shakya 1999: 170-80; Knaus 1999: 145-46. 
79
 Ibid: 171; Knaus 1999: 146-49. 
80
 Shakya 1999: 170-71. 
81
 Ibid: 180; ."

tib/ [Phala Thupten Woden], 0tib)tib1	2
&	 [Abridged Personal 
History], 1)tib1	tib
3tib4 [Oral History Series No. 2], LTWA, Dharamsala, 1996: 37-38. 
82Ibid: 181. 
110 
 
standing strategy of winning over the central Tibetans. Amidst this three-way stalemate, 
Lhasa erupted against Chinese rule on 10 March, 1959. 
 The 10 March, 1959 Uprising is one of the most written-about topics in recent Tibetan 
history and consideration of space rules out a detailed examination here.83 In March 1959, 
Lhasa was crowded with pilgrims from all corners of the Tibetan plateau and beyond to 
attend the Monlam Festival. The Chinese officials tendered an innocuous, retrospectively 
speaking, but conspiratorially worded, ill-timed and generally mishandled invitation for the 
Dalai Lama to attend a theatrical performance at the Chinese military camp.84 Although the 
venue and date of attendance were suggested by the Dalai Lama himself, a mixture of facts 
and rumours circulating in Lhasa planted fears in Tibetan minds that the Chinese planned to 
kidnap the Dalai Lama.85  
The Chinese kept the invitation secret from even the Tibetan cabinet ministers until 
the day before, 9 March, 1959. They told the Commander of the Dalai Lama’s body-guard 
regiment that the Lama should come without his Tibetan body-guards, contrary to normal 
practice, and that they should be posted two miles away from the PLA camp.86  
For international propaganda in the face of the open revolt in eastern Tibet, the 
Chinese had been pressuring the Dalai Lama to attend the 1959 NPC session in Beijing.87 
Rumours circulated in Lhasa that a number of Chinese planes had landed in Damzhung 
airport outside Lhasa.88 Reports from eastern Tibet about the abduction of lamas and leaders 
during social events exacerbated Tibetan fears.89 The Dalai Lama dismissed the notion of a 
Chinese kidnap plan,90 but the rumour spread through Lhasa like a prairie-fire during the 
night of 9 March. Tens of thousands of Tibetans gathered outside the Dalai Lama’s palace in 
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the morning of 10 March, 1959 to ‘protect’ him by preventing him from visiting the Chinese 
camp.91 They laid siege, curtailing the movement of the officials into and out of the palace. 
The crowd shouted both anti-Chinese and anti-aristocratic slogans and physically 
assaulted Tibetan officials seen to be collaborating closely with the Chinese regime.92 One 
official who was especially close to the Chinese met with a violent death as the crowd 
attacked him with stones, sticks and swords and horsemen dragged his body around the city.93 
To avoid open conflict and the inevitable Chinese crackdown, the Dalai Lama reassured the 
crowd that he would ‘never’ visit the PLA camp.94 Although this persuaded most of the 
crowd to end the blockade they marched to other parts of the city to hold anti-Chinese 
protests. A meeting of the Tibetan officials was held in the afternoon of 10 March and a sharp 
division emerged between those who supported the protestors and those who believed that the 
protests endangered the security of the Dalai Lama.95 The officials in support of the protests 
mobilised the Tibetans of Lhasa and held demonstrations and rallies denouncing the Chinese 
and the 17-Point Agreement and called for Tibetan independence.96  
For the next seven days, while the ordinary Tibetans protested continuously, the Dalai 
Lama and his cabinet had become isolated from the events outside, unable to control the 
protestors or to gain the trust of the Chinese. By 13 March, the Tibetan government 
authorised the distribution of arms to the rebels and fierce fighting broke out in Lhasa with 
high Tibetan casualties. For the Tibetan cabinet, the security of the Dalai Lama was 
paramount and the only way to ensure that was to whisk him out of Lhasa. In the evening of 
17 March, the Dalai Lama escaped, dressed as a common Tibetan soldier.97 The Chinese had 
taken over and hoisted the Five Star flag over Potala and Norbu Lingka palaces by 23 March 
and the Tibetan rebellion lost steam.98 En route to the Indian border, the Dalai Lama 
repudiated the 17-Point Agreement. On 28 March, Zhou Enlai dissolved the Tibetan 
government, replacing it with PCART and appointed the Panchen Lama as acting Chairman 
in the Dalai Lama’s absence.99 Two days later, the Dalai Lama and his entourage crossed the 
Indian border, signifying the end of co-existence and the 17-Point Agreement—the beginning 
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of a new epoch. From the above account, it is clear that the insecurity dilemma was at work, 
complete with Chinese state-building policies targeting Tibetan autonomy and identity and 
the predictable Tibetan response in the form of diplomacy, non-cooperation, armed rebellion 
and international advocacy. Consistent with the insecurity dilemma, defence of Tibetan 
identity was the principal cause of the uprising in 1959.100 As Shakya wrote, ‘The revolt was 
essentially in defence of the value system of the ordinary men and women, to which the Dalai 
Lama was central.’101 The following section outlines the consequent hardening of Chinese 
policies in all of Tibet, especially with regard to Tibetan identity. 
  
Democratic Reforms and the Cultural Revolution (1959-1976) 
While the Dalai Lama and his entourage formed an administrative structure (TGIE)102 to look 
after the tens of thousands of Tibetans who followed him into exile, PCART became all-
powerful in Tibet. No longer constrained by the 17-Point Agreement or the necessity to win 
over the Tibetan elite, the Chinese suppressed the pockets of resistance and rolled out 
Democratic Reforms in all Tibetan regions.103 The Tibetans describe the next two decades as 
‘hell on earth’ thrusting the Tibetans to ‘depths of suffering and hardship’104 while the 
Chinese claim to have ‘emancipated’ one million ‘serfs and slaves’ to become masters of 
their ‘country [China], as well as Tibet.’105 To be sure, following the armed revolt of the 
Tibetans and international criticism, and the leftist turn in Maoist China, Chinese policies in 
those decades were the harshest from the perspectives of Tibetan identity and autonomy.  
The Panchen Lama’s criticism of Chinese policies in the early 1960s is perhaps the 
most persuasive, given that it was the Chinese communists who compelled the Tibetan 
government to recognize him as the genuine reincarnation and to allow him to return to his 
traditional seat during the discussion of the 17-Point Agreement. Moreover, unlike the Dalai 
Lama, he chose cooperation with the Chinese over exile in India and has never publicly 
supported Tibetan independence. The Chinese also groomed him up as a possible alternative 
and/or counter to the Dalai Lama and continue to call him a ‘patriotic’ Lama. Unexpectedly 
for the Chinese and against the advice of his attendant and advisor, the Panchen Lama 
                                                          
100
 Shakya 1999: 209-10; Norbu 2001: 210-27. 
101
 Shakya 1999: 210. 
102
 Nehru and his government were initially resistant to the idea of a Tibetan government-in-exile on Indian soil. 
103
 For detailed examinations of the so-called Democratic Reforms, see Smith 2008: 36-39 and 51-119; Shakya 
1999: 236-313. 
104
 The Dalai Lama, ‘March 10th Statement of H.H. the Dalai Lama,’ 10 March, 2009; available at 
http://www.dalailama.com/news.350.htm. 
105
 State Council, White Paper on Democratic Reform in Tibet, 3 March, 2009. 
113 
 
submitted a petition to the central authorities on 18 May, 1962 based on his observations.106 
Written in Chinese, this became famous as the ‘70, 000 Character Petition.’ 
He wrote that Chinese reforms and policies in Tibetan areas since the 1950s had 
placed the Tibetan nationality on the verge of extinction because ‘Tibetan language, costume 
and customs and other important characteristics’ were disappearing.107 The Tibetan language, 
he wrote, ‘has been taken by those foxes who called themselves lions, and toyed with at will 
and for no reason.’108 He decried the destruction of 97% of monasteries and 93% reduction in 
the number of monks in central and western Tibet alone. He added that ‘I and 90% of the 
Tibetans cannot endure’ the ‘elimination of Buddhism’ through neglect of study, practice and 
transmission.109 He criticised the Chinese officials of short-sightedness and narrow-
mindedness for using their political power and ‘many different methods to vigorously, 
publicly and unscrupulously’ coerce the Tibetans to destroy their own monasteries, statues 
and stupas, and ‘unscrupulously’ insulting Buddhism by using religious scriptures and 
pictures of the Buddhas as fertiliser and shoe-soles.110 He assailed the Chinese claim that the 
Tibetans destroyed their own cultural sites because of ideological awakening as ‘sheer 
nonsense’ arising from the ‘complete lack of understanding of the actual situation in 
Tibet.’111  
Furthermore, he attacked the Chinese cadres of ‘falsely accusing and slandering’ 
Tibetans in areas where rebellions did not take place, just so that they can oppress them, of 
suppressing and attacking Tibetans as counter-revolutionaries for the mere act of chanting 
scriptures for the happiness of mankind, and carrying out ‘bloody suppression and attacks’ 
without investigation and believing in groundless rumours of rebellion.112 He described these 
practices as ‘absolutely preposterous and extremely clumsy’ and called the Chinese Party 
Secretaries as ‘propitiation secretaries’ for being too scared to report the truth to the central 
authorities. The above discussion puts paid to the general perception that cultural destruction 
in Tibet took place only during the Cultural Revolution.  
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The Panchen Lama’s petition is the boldest and most extensive criticism of Maoist 
policies made by an official in the whole of China, not to mention by another minority 
official.113 The Party itself declared that the Panchen Lama’s petition exceeded Peng Dehui’s 
10, 000-character criticism of Mao’s policies written in 1959.114 On 28 March, 1987, the 
rehabilitated Panchen revealed that he actually understated the figures in the Petition out of 
fear. Predictably, the Panchen Lama was labelled an enemy of the party, people and socialism 
in 1964, persecuted with violent public ‘struggle-sessions’ and incarcerated for 14 years in 
prisons and house-detentions.115 However, worse was in store as two years after the Panchen 
Lama’s incarceration, the Cultural Revolution (1966-1976) engulfed Tibet and China.  
The establishment of the Tibet Autonomous Region (TAR) in 1965 did nothing to 
cushion the violent destruction that awaited Tibet. Autonomy was an Orwellian farce. As 
Shakya writes, ‘In reality, the creation of the TAR brought Tibet even closer to China. It 
legally buried the 17-Point Agreement...by confirming that Tibet was no longer a “unique 
area” within the PRC.’116 As Smith argued, ‘Institutions of Tibetan political “autonomy” 
formed a facade of Tibetan leadership and popular political participation behind which the 
Chinese continued to exercise all real political power.’117 The Sinologist George Mosely 
wrote that regional autonomy meant just the opposite: ‘regional detention.’118 Even this 
pretence of autonomy was assailed during the Cultural Revolution.119 With the enforcement 
of the commune system, which ‘meant an unprecedented degree of centralized control,’ even 
the autonomy of individuals and families to make day-to-day decisions was taken away. As 
Wang writes: 
If a Commune member wanted to get half a kilo of butter he had to report to his production team 
in advance and then work his way through a series of procedures involving team leaders, 
accountants and warehouse keepers. The remaining private elements of the economy were almost 
totally wiped out.120  
 
In this totalitarian context, Tibetan culture was reduced to rubbles in the ensuing campaigns 
against ‘The Four Olds’ during the Cultural Revolution.  
Under Mao’s injunction to destroy the Four Olds (old ideas, old culture, old customs 
and old habits), Chinese and Tibetan Red Guards rampaged against Tibetan culture. 
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Whatever the nature of the Cultural Revolution in China itself and whatever the original 
intentions of the authorities, every aspect of Tibetan culture was destroyed, ‘reformed’ or 
banned.121 As Shakya contends, ‘The effect was to destroy Tibet’s separate identity. The 
Chinese now propagated a policy of total assimilation and Tibetan identity was reduced to the 
language alone, although...even this had come under attack.’122 Goldstein concurs: “The 
Chinese Communist Party….placed Tibetan traditional culture and religion under severe 
attack.’123  
However, the Party Central lost control of the campaign, which dissolved into brutal 
factional fighting all over China between rival groups of Red Guards divided along class 
lines.124 In Tibet, the factional conflict played out between the Nyam-drel or United Front 
(5tib)) and Gyen-log or Rebel (6tib)tib) groups. Consistent with the logic of the 
insecurity dilemma, even at the height of the Cultural Revolution, Tibetans exploited the 
factional anarchy to fight for their culture and identity.  
The most well-known example is the Nyemo Revolt of 1969.125 Beginning in 1968, 
Tibetans in Nyemo County (west of Lhasa), led by Trinley Chodon, a nun claiming to be 
possessed by the spirit of Gongmey Gyalmo [tibtib7)tib], the celestial aunt and advisor of 
Gesar, the mythical king in the Tibetan epic, Gesar of Ling [8tibtib	9], rose up in a violent 
rebellion that spread to eighteen counties.126 Her fame spread far and wide because of her 
presumed prophetic and healing powers. Trinley and her supporters allied with Gyenlog 
because of its anti-establishment crusade against the Nyamdrel faction. Nyamdrel were 
associated with the destruction of Tibetan culture, the brutal suppression of the 1959 uprising 
and the enforcement of democratic reforms and most recently the commune system. With her 
charismatic leadership, she inspired the rural Tibetans to attack the Chinese officials and 
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Tibetan collaborators, often with extreme brutality.127 Her success inspired other Tibetans to 
claim to be mediums of one or another of Gesar’s warrior-ministers, all claiming to be 
working for the restoration of Buddhism in Tibet.128 The revolt culminated in attacks on the 
PLA in a village named Bagor, where twenty PLA soldiers and cadres were killed, and 
attacks on the headquarters of Nyemo County.129 A huge contingent of PLA soldiers with 
reinforcements from other counties had to be deployed to subdue the rebels. The operation 
resulted in the death of many of the rebels and the arrest of the nun and her colleagues and a 
Lama who had performed the ritual, Opening the Nerve Door (:;tib<tib), to spiritually prepare 
her for possession by Gongmey Gyalmo.130 They were all executed in Lhasa in 1970.131 
Although economic reasons definitely played some role and it was entwined with the 
tumultuous factionalism of the Cultural Revolution, the Nyemo Revolt was primarily a 
‘cultural response’ which was ‘inspired by the Tibetan’s desire to regain some measure of 
social, psychological and cultural freedom.’132 It was provoked by ‘the constant attack on 
their culture by the Chinese.... The total negation of traditional Tibetan cultural and religious 
authority elicited an extreme response from the Tibetans.’133 The violent and relentless 
socialist nation-building met an equally violent millenarian cultural response. Even at the 
height of the Cultural Revolution, the insecurity dilemma found violent expression. 
The Cultural Revolution ended when Mao died in 1976. Tibetans emerged from the 
Cultural Revolution demoralised and anomic. All the monasteries had been reduced to ruins 
or ransacked off their religious contents. The ubiquitous monks had disappeared and any 
expression of Tibetan identity was banned, except their language whose grammatical rules 
and vocabulary had also been changed to suit the new ideology. On the surface, the Chinese 
appeared to have succeeded in assimilating the Tibetans and ‘Tibet ceased to have any 
distinctive characteristics.’134 The Panchen Lama’s assessment is compelling again. 
Persecution and incarceration had neither broken his spirits nor dampened the force of 
his criticism. On 28 March 1987, he told the TAR Standing Committee of the NPC in Beijing 
that he stood by his criticisms in 1962, adding that Chinese policies in the previous two 
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decades ‘have been detrimental’ to the Tibetan nationality. He criticised the large number of 
Chinese officials in Tibet for their corruption, Chinese immigration and the neglect of 
education, especially Tibetan language education.135 In 1988, he said in his address to a 
meeting of Chinese Tibetologists, ‘Before 1959, there were 5000 monasteries in the Tibetan 
areas.... 99.98 per cent of them were destroyed. Only seven or eight survived.’136 Even the 
surviving ones were in various states of disrepair. On 23 January, 1989, he told a meeting of 
government and religious leaders at Tashi Lhunpo that Tibet had lost far more than it had 
gained from Chinese rule in the preceding three decades.137 The following day, at a meeting 
of monastic heads and reincarnate lamas, he detailed the destruction that Buddhism had 
endured since the 1950s.138 The Panchen Lama’s criticisms are borne out by independent 
scholars.139 Goldstein writes: 
Between the rebellions, food shortages, and struggle sessions against “class enemies”... [t]he full 
loss of life is not clearly known, but the damage to Tibet’s culture was substantial.... [I]n the 
period after the 1959 uprising, Buddhism was destroyed and Tibetans were forced to abandon 
deeply held values and customs that went to the core of their cultural identity.140 
 
Deng Xiaoping’s ushering in of the Reform Era (Găigé kāifàng) in 1978 brought about 
liberalisation on a number of fronts, not least on culture and economy in Tibet. Would these 
reforms attenuate or worsen the insecurity dilemma?  
 
Reform, Resistance and Martial Law (1978-1989) 
Deng’s liberalisation, including the initiation of dialogue with the exiled Dalai Lama gave a 
sense of optimism to the bewildered Tibetans. Chinese-Tibetan relations in the post-Mao era 
began on a cautiously positive note. China began by releasing and rehabilitating a number of 
Tibetans who had taken part in the March 1959 rebellion and some officials of the former 
Tibetan government who had been imprisoned during the Cultural Revolution. The 10th 
Panchen Lama was also released on 10 October, 1977 and politically rehabilitated in 1978,141 
followed by Bapa Phuntsok Wangyal.142 Over 2300 Tibetans who were wrongly accused and 
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incarcerated during the Cultural Revolution were also given monetary compensation.143 
Travel restrictions were relaxed, enabling some Tibetans in exile to visit Tibet and those in 
Tibet to travel to India and Nepal for family visits, pilgrimage and religious teachings. 
Beijing also initiated contact with the Hong Kong-based elder brother of the Dalai Lama, 
Gyalo Dhondup, resulting in his meeting with Deng in Beijing in 1979. Deng reportedly told 
Dhondup: 
The basic question is whether Tibet is part of China or not. This should be kept as the criteria for 
testing the truth…. So long as it is not accepted that Tibet is an integral part of China, there is 
nothing else to talk about.144 
 
Tibetan exile officials and western scholars have interpreted this as meaning that apart from 
independence, all other issues could be discussed.145 This rather ambivalent statement 
became the basis of a dialogue process that lasted until 1993. Deng also invited the Dalai 
Lama to send fact-finding delegations to inspect the local situation inside Tibet, leading to 
four fact-finding delegations and two exploratory talks between 1979 and 1985. A mix of 
objective realities, pragmatic imperatives and confidence in the Tibetans’ ideological loyalty 
to Beijing accounted for the relaxation of policy and initiation of dialogue, including allowing 
the exile fact-finding missions.  
First, the CCP abandoned the Cultural Revolution-era policy of violent assimilation 
and returned to the traditional Chinese belief that the frontier-barbarians would voluntarily 
adopt the ‘superior’ and ‘advanced’ culture of the Chinese. This was also compatible with the 
Marxist idea of the eventual withering away of national and religious identities in favour of 
proletarian identity in the course of revolution.146 However, conditions should be created 
conducive for such a process of ‘acculturation’ to work even if that meant giving ground 
temporarily. A broader set of incentives was necessary to win Tibetan hearts and minds.  
When the post-Mao Chinese leaders realised the failure of repressive and violent 
socialist transformation to flatten national identities, indeed confronted its counter-
productivity, the search for a new strategy ensued culminating in a National Frontier Defense 
Work Conference in April 1979. The new strategy of affirmative action to win over minority 
nationalities was unveiled. The scope of the affirmative action policy is three-fold: political 
representation for groups, social welfare for individuals and economic development of their 
regions.   
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 First, the Autonomy Law specified that one or both of the chairman and vice-
chairman of the standing committees of the People’s Congress of an autonomous entity must 
come from the nationality exercising autonomy in that area.  Similarly, the chairman of an 
autonomous region, prefect of an autonomous prefecture and head of an autonomous county 
must be a member of the titular nationality. Other posts in the government should be 
occupied by members of national minorities resident in that autonomous region.  Cadres 
working for the organs of self-government should be recruited from the nationalities resident 
in that autonomous area.  This aspect of the affirmative action policy also included recruiting 
national minority elites to symbolic positions at the national level. An electoral law passed 
during the 1982 NPC meeting required that the proportion of national minority delegates 
should be around 12 per cent, almost twice the proportion of their population at 6.7 per cent. 
In practice, these local, regional and national posts are personally remunerative and 
prestigious, but they are ceremonial ‘positions without power’ as one Tibetan put it.147 The 
next chapter examines the quality of administrative autonomy and representation the Tibetans 
enjoy. Suffice to say here that independent scholars have pointed out these provisions as 
lacking in practical substance in Xinjiang, Inner Mongolia and Tibet.148   
The second set of inducement policy, aimed at the social welfare of individual 
members of national minorities, include more relaxed birth control measures and quotas and 
lower entrance requirements for minority college students.149 The third component of 
affirmative action is the economic development of minority regions. Economic development 
was seen as an instrument to dampen ethnic nationalism, the argument being that ‘ethnic 
minorities want to gain economic benefits through the autonomous system. They will not 
make trouble if their economic problems are solved.’150 The Second Tibet Work Forum in 
1984 in Beijing ushered in economic development as the cornerstone of Beijing’s Tibet 
policy—‘to get rich as soon as possible’ was the slogan. The idea that national minorities will 
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stop being problematic when economic development makes them wealthy seems to be 
prevalent in the minds of Chinese officials and intellectuals. 151 The inducement policy as a 
whole had the security purpose of containing ethno-nationalism and creating a unitary ‘Han-
dominated’ nation-state: 
The [inducement] policy was not based on any desire to celebrate differences. Although the CCP 
vowed to develop ethnic minority regions, this goal was inextricably linked to its ability to 
maintain a unitary Chinese nation-state…. As opposed to empowering minorities, the inducement 
policy was meant to create a peaceful, unified, and essentially Han-dominated multinational 
state.152 
 
As such, the affirmative action policies have a mix of nation-building, institution-building 
and infrastructure building missions.  
 All these apparently positive developments were in line with the overall opening up 
strategy that Deng and his liberal heir Hu Yaobang had for China itself. Beijing’s overtures 
were partly fuelled by its confidence, based on erroneous reports from its local officials, that 
the Tibetans had been ideologically transformed from their subservience to feudal elites and 
superstitious religious beliefs. Ren Rong, the Han Chinese Party Secretary in TAR had been 
reporting to Beijing that the political situation in Tibet was such that the Tibetans solidly 
backed the party and the motherland.153 Nothing could be farther from the truth as the 
reception given to the exile delegations robustly demonstrated.  
Apparently, even the Dalai Lama and the exile government were not sure how the 
Tibetans inside Tibet were feeling about the Dalai Lama and Chinese-Tibetan relations 
broadly, especially given the Chinese propaganda that the Tibetans were happy and the 
reports that China had managed to ‘indoctrinate’ the younger generation of Tibetans.154 When 
the delegations visited Tibetan areas in TAR and other provinces, they were mobbed by 
thousands of emotionally-charged Tibetans who recounted terrible tragedies that they had 
suffered, much to the embarrassment of the Chinese officials.155 When the first delegation 
including an elder brother of the Dalai Lama visited the Tibetan regions of Qinghai province 
(Amdo), they were given a rapturous welcome by the local Tibetans. Embarrassed, Beijing 
called Lhasa up to ask what was likely to happen if the delegation was allowed to visit Lhasa. 
Party Secretary Rong reassured Beijing that the Lhasa Tibetans were more ideologically 
advanced than the farmers and nomads of Amdo and supported the party unambiguously. The 
scenes in Amdo would not be repeated in Lhasa. Before the arrival of the delegation, 
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neighbourhood meetings were organised all over Lhasa to advise the Tibetans to not allow 
their resentment of the ‘old society’ to get out of control and not to spit and throw stones at 
the exile delegation. In Lhasa, the emotional reception the delegation received surpassed 
anything they had witnessed in six months of touring. As Goldstein writes, 
Thousands upon thousands of Lhasans mobbed the delegation. Many cried and prostrated, others 
offered ceremonial scarves, fighting to touch the Dalai Lama’s brother, and a few shouted Tibetan 
nationalistic slogans such as “Tibet is independent” and “Han go home.156 
 
The tragedies and continuing suffering were laid bare. Despite Beijing’s objective of using 
economic development to wean the Tibetans away from the Dalai Lama and repeated 
proclamations of success on this front, the Tibetans have left no doubt that they were squarely 
behind the Dalai Lama.  
However, in its dialogue with the Dalai Lama, even Hu Yaobang had taken a stance that 
was unacceptable to Dharamsala. During a meeting with Gyalo Dhondup, Hu presented a 
five-point agenda for negotiations, which essentially treated the ‘Tibet Question’ as one 
between Beijing and the Dalai Lama’s personal future and denied the existence of any other 
issues beyond that. The main points of his proposal were that the Dalai Lama had to 
recognise that China ‘has entered a new stage of long-term political stability, steady 
economic growth and’ and unity among the nationalities; the Dalai Lama and his 
representatives should be ‘frank and sincere’ and stop ‘quibbling over the events in 1959; the 
Dalai Lama was welcome to return and would be reinstated to the same political status and 
privileges that he enjoyed in the 1950s, but he would have to live in Beijing and not hold any 
posts in Tibet.157 This proposal had no space for the Tibetan aspirations for greater political 
autonomy or the unification of all Tibetan areas, let alone one that rejected the supremacy of 
the Communist Party. Dharamsala rejected Hu’s proposal as trying to reduce the issue of 6 
million Tibetans to one concerning the personal status of the Dalai Lama. In 1982, another 
exile delegation was dispatched ‘to tackle the real business.’ The delegation proposed the 
unification of all Tibetan regions into a single administrative region which should be given 
the same status that Beijing was offering to Taiwan and Hong Kong, namely ‘One Country, 
Two System’.158 Beijing immediately rejected this proposal, arguing that unlike Taiwan and 
Hong Kong, Tibet had already been liberated and enjoyed socialism, and that Hu’s five-point 
proposal was the only basis for negotiations. Officially, Beijing has consistently maintained 
this position ever since, even as Dharamsala packaged its two central demands differently 
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over the decades. This deadlock would later cause the dialogue process to falter after four 
exile fact-finding missions and two exploratory talks took place between 1979 and 1985. 
Emboldened by Hu Yaobang’s limited liberalisation of policy, the Tibetans demanded 
greater religious and linguistic rights and Tibetanisation of the administration, among others, 
and the top leadership was quite willing to accommodate some of these demands as long as 
they did not lead to the CCP’s loss of power and demands for Tibetan independence.159 In 
May 1980, General Secretary Hu Yaobang led his own fact-finding mission to TAR, where 
he found the conditions far more appalling than he expected. He proclaimed a six-point 
reform package for Tibet, which contains: 
 (1) An ethnic dimension—making the Tibet Autonomous Region more Tibetan in overall character 
by fostering a revitalisation of Tibetan culture and religion, including more extensive use of Tibetan 
language, and by withdrawing large numbers of Chinese cadre and replacing them with Tibetans; 
and (2) an economic dimension—rapidly improving the standard of living of individual Tibetans by 
temporarily eliminating taxes and “below market” quota sales, and developing infrastructure to 
allow Tibet to grow economically in the years ahead.160 
 
Hu was scathing in his criticism of the local officials in internal reports and speeches, 
accusing them of throwing the millions of Yuan in Central subsidies into the Kyichu River.161 
Yet, Hu’s liberal reforms met an immediate backlash within the bureaucracy and after 
some initial steps such as the withdrawal of some Chinese cadres and the recruitment of 
Tibetan officials, suffered set-backs or were negated by other policy decisions. First, his 
criticism was deeply resented by the entrenched Chinese cadres who felt that their sacrifices 
for the party and the motherland were being treated as a failure. They complained to the 
Central Committee. Secondly, the cadre withdrawal program came to a screeching halt as the 
Chinese regions where they came from could not re-absorb them. In any case, this well-
intentioned effort to ‘Tibetanise’ Tibet was more than cancelled out by the decision taken 
during the Second Tibet Work Forum held in Beijing (27 February—6 March, 1984) to open 
up Tibet for business and trade by the ethnic Chinese. This opened a flood-gate of Chinese 
migration into Tibet, the consequences of which have been far-ranging for Tibetans and their 
relationship with China.   
More to the point, a faction within the bureaucracy, including some sinicised 
Tibetans, felt threatened by these linguistic and administrative demands of the Tibetans and 
the apparent concessions by the government. When it was announced on 19th July, 1986 that 
Tibetan would be established as the main language of administration on a trial basis, a faction 
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of Chinese and leftist Tibetan cadres feared the consequent loss of their domination in Tibet 
to Tibetan cadres who were more conversant with that language, while others feared the 
destabilising potential of empowering the linguistic pillar of Tibetan identity.162 Leftist 
Tibetan cadres raised objections because they were functionally illiterate in the Tibetan 
language. As Shakya wrote, “[T]he resistance came not only from the Chinese cadres but the 
Tibetans who were threatened by the younger and better educated cadres.”163 A local 
incarnation of regime insecurity was at play here. The prospect of the return of the Dalai 
Lama and a new regime similarly threatened those regional and national cadres and 
institutions whose careers and raison d’être depended upon the maintenance of the status quo 
in Tibet. 
 Relaxation in the religious sphere was even more sensitive. Despite the initial 
opening, considerable restrictions remained on religious freedom since the monasteries were 
seen as the nerve-centres of Tibetan nationalism and the biggest challenge to Chinese rule.164 
Although the Party was resigned to allowing some role for religion in Tibet, albeit wary of 
inflaming separatism,165 it could not hide its true agenda with regard to religion in Tibet. In 
1983, the Party had reiterated the ultimate withering away of religion as a matter of 
ideological and policy objectives.166 As some scholars put it, the limited official tolerance of 
religion in Tibet was ‘purely strategic.’167 Yet, it was not entirely up to the CCP. The spurt of 
religious revival in the early 1980s took everyone by surprise, rattling the Chinese 
officials.168 Arjia Rinpoche, who was a high-ranking official within the Buddhist bureaucracy 
in China before escaping in 1998 wrote that much of this revival, including the renovation of 
monasteries and recognition of reincarnations happened largely outside the official 
framework.169 Only when the scale of the revival became obvious, and the religious 
bureaucracy risked becoming irrelevant did the State Administration for Religious Affairs of 
the PRC bring in regulations for monastic restoration and the recognition of reincarnate 
Lamas.170 The CCP’s loss of control in Tibet, if not of China’s, was genuinely feared as an 
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outcome of a separatist movement organised along ethnic, religious and linguistic lines. Thus 
state security and regime securities were seen to be at stake. 
These domestic challenges were enhanced by a number of external events. When it 
became apparent that dialogue was going nowhere, what with Beijing’s hard-line on even the 
definition of the Tibet Question, and fearful of becoming irrelevant, TGIE unleashed an 
international campaign to wrest back initiative and to address the asymmetry in power.171 
Consequently, the Dalai Lama gave a high-profile political address before the US 
Congressional Human Rights Caucus on 21 September, 1987. The talk was received 
favourably in the US Congress, which took a series of legislative and practical measures to 
support the Tibetans.172 While in the past the Dalai Lama always avoided political issues 
during his travels outside India to avoid inconveniencing his hosts, the Indians, Chinese and 
Americans knew that this trip would be qualitatively different.173 The Indian government 
withdrew its ‘minder’ who always accompanied the Dalai Lama on his foreign trips in the 
past, ostensibly to avoid complicity. The Chinese pressured the Americans to stop the Dalai 
Lama’s ‘anti-Chinese political activities’, to which the Americans responded that the Dalai 
Lama is visiting on his ‘private capacity.’174 The nature of the Dalai Lama’s visit and choice 
of venue revived Chinese fears of the pre-1974 Tibetan-Indian-American covert alignment 
against Communist China. This was accompanied by similar interests and support in Western 
Europe as early as 1986, arousing fears of a broader Western conspiracy against China and 
the CCP. 175   
Beijing responded by protesting internationally and intimidating the Tibetan 
population at home. The Chinese propaganda apparatus sprang into action with the Party-
controlled media accusing the US of interfering in China’s internal affairs and the Dalai 
Lama of trying to split the mother-land.176 A clip of the Dalai Lama being feted in the US 
Congress overlaid with a text denouncing his visit was shown on state TV, which only 
inspired the Tibetans. On 24 September, 1987, fifteen thousand Tibetans were assembled in a 
stadium in Lhasa to a mass sentencing of eleven Tibetans for ‘criminal offences’, including 
two death sentences. It was widely believed that some of the Tibetans were political 
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prisoners.177 Attended by leading Party officials, the Tibetans were lectured in strident 
ideological terms to ‘preserve unity and stability’ and to abide by the ‘Four Cardinal 
Principles.’178 Beijing’s concerns about transnational Tibetan activism and foreign 
entanglement became exacerbated when Lhasa was rocked by a series of pro-independence 
protests and riots beginning on 27 September, 1987, a week after the Dalai Lama’s address in 
the US Congress.138 separate protests and riots are known to have taken place between 
September 1987 and August 1992.179  
In the midst of these tumultuous events in Tibet, the Dalai Lama delivered a speech at 
the European Parliament in Strasbourg on 15 June, 1988, which developed the issues he had 
raised in the US Congress a year earlier.180  This statement has come to be known as the 
‘Strasbourg Proposal.’ He proposed that Beijing could handle Tibet’s foreign affairs and 
defence, but Tibet could pursue its foreign relations in all other areas through a ‘Foreign 
Affairs Bureau’ on top of managing its own internal affairs; the three traditional ‘provinces’ 
[%tib)>] should be unified into one administrative unit; this unified entity should be 
allowed to practice a liberal democratic political system complete with a ‘popularly elected 
chief executive, a bicameral legislative branch, and an independent judicial system’; China 
could maintain a limited military presence in Tibet for defence purposes, but regional 
consultations should be conducted to declare Tibet a ‘zone of peace.’  This was the first time 
that the Dalai Lama had publicly declared his willingness to give up Tibetan independence in 
exchange for political autonomy. Not surprisingly, The Strasbourg Proposal was not just 
rejected by Beijing but also proved to be very controversial among the exile community, 
inviting charges of betrayal and buckling under foreign pressure.181 The Strasbourg Proposal 
became the basis of the Middle Way approach that the Dalai Lama and TGIE follow to this 
day in their search for a negotiated solution with Beijing.182 As the next chapter explains, 
Dharamsala has modified the key components of the Middle Way approach since then, but 
greater political autonomy and unification of all Tibetans within one administration would 
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remain constant, albeit in slightly revised forms. However, despite repeated communications, 
Sino-Tibetan dialogue had more or less collapsed under the weight of the strong divergence 
between the two sides on the core issues. 
In any case, by March 1989, repeated protests and riots rendered the situation serious 
enough for Beijing to impose martial law in Lhasa on 8 March, 1989.183 The death of the 
Panchen Lama previously on 28 January, 1989, left Beijing without a respected Tibetan 
intermediary to steer the Tibetans away from protests and riots against Chinese rule. The 
announcement of the Nobel Peace Prize for the Dalai Lama on 5 October, 1989 heightened 
suspicion and fears in Beijing of a concerted Western interventionism to contain China’s 
development and rise.184 As Rabgey and Sharlho observed, ‘With Chinese suspicions of 
Western motives reaching new heights, Beijing’s distrust of the Dalai Lama grew along with 
its perception of his increasing alignment with the West.’185 Happening around the same time 
as the Tiananmen Square events and the collapse of communism in Europe and reforms in the 
Soviet Union, Beijing feared that China would fall victim to the same dynamics of ethnic 
conflicts, loss of Communist power and dismemberment of the state.  
How did Chinese-Tibetans relations go from the optimism of the late 1970s and early 
1980s to the riots and martial law in 1989? To make sense of this radical break-down in 
relations, it is necessary to appreciate how events both internal and external to Tibet and 
China exacerbated the PRC’s existing insecurities on Tibet and to understand the nature and 
pace of the reforms and how they were perceived by the Tibetans.  
First, the 1989 policy-shift was a response to certain regional, domestic, transnational 
and international events that accentuated the existing insecurities. It was not a sudden 
development, but rather the culmination of years of struggle between liberal and conservative 
elements in Lhasa and Beijing on the issue of how to address the security challenges.186 
Specifically, China’s pre-existing insecurities over Tibet were heightened by the 
contemporary demands of increasingly assertive and restive Tibetans at home, the 
international campaigns of the exiles, particularly the activities of the Dalai Lama, difficulties 
with India and fears of Western intervention or intrigue in Tibet. Given an added ring of 
gravity and immediacy by the changes in the Soviet Union and the domino-like collapse of 
Communist regimes in Eastern and Central Europe, these perceived threats pushed China’s 
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Tibet policy into the hard-line mode, which persists to this day.187 Indeed, security was 
central to Chinese calculations in Tibet in the late 1980s.188 As Schwartz wrote, 
Tibet retains enormous strategic importance for China as a border area and potential arena for 
conflict. Security is always a serious concern. Thus, no policies can be implemented in Tibet 
without the approval of the military, which retains close links to the TAR administration.189  
 
And as Barnett observed, security issues or stability in the official lexicon was the primary 
focus in those years.190 The hard-line policy shift was a reaction to a number of insecurity-
generating developments both internally and externally. 
 
Conclusion 
Maoist China not only took away the autonomy of eastern Tibetan rulers, but also persecuted 
them in the 1950s. In addition, treating eastern Tibetans as Chinese, radical communist 
reforms targeting the traditional elite and Tibetan identity were conducted, provoking a 
broad-based armed revolt which spread into central Tibet. Although central and western Tibet 
enjoyed the gradualist terms of 17-Point Agreement, the unmistakable state-building policies 
provoked a massive uprising in 1959 in Lhasa, resulting in the escape of the Dalai Lama to 
India and repudiation of the 17-Point Agreement. The Tibetans saw the Chinese practices as 
undermining the authorities of the Dalai Lama and Tibetan government and targeting Tibetan 
identity. They resented the economic pressures on the local economy from the increasing 
Chinese population. The eastern Tibetan refugees and the harrowing stories of religious and 
political persecution in their homelands confirmed their suspicions of what the Chinese 
intended to do: depose the Dalai Lama and eradicate Tibetan identity. The insecurity dilemma 
was back with a vengeance in Sino-Tibetan relations. 
As the Dalai Lama busied himself with building up the exile institutions, the Tibetans 
inside Tibet were subjected to democratic reforms and the Cultural Revolution, which all but 
annihilated Tibetan identity. Even during the Cultural Revolution, Tibetans in various parts of 
Tibet rose up in violent revolt between 1968 and 1969, confirming the tenacity of the 
insecurity dilemma to manifest even during times of utter terror and repression. After Mao’s 
death in 1976, Deng Xiaoping ushered in more liberal policies on a number of fronts, but a 
number of domestic and external set-backs reinforced the complex of threats that had worried 
Beijing over its incorporation of Tibet: concerns about separatism and the fears of the loss of 
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sovereignty, territory, and CCP or factional power as well as institutional integrity, and 
ideological and national identity threats led to the hard-line shift in Beijing’s Tibet policy and 
dialogue with Dharamsala in 1989. 
Chapters Five and Six examine how these hard-line policies were implemented and 
received by the Tibetans. Would the insecurity dilemma loosen its stranglehold? Chapter Five 
picks up the historical narrative from here to begin drawing the cyclical dynamic of the 
insecurity dilemma in a more analytical sense, focusing on the post-1989 era. From here, the 
chapters will be more analytical, although to the extent that analytical requirements permit, a 
sense of chronology would still be observed. 
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Chapter 5 
Security, State-Building and Beijing’s Tibet Policy 
 
Having set the historical context in the two previous chapters, we now turn to the specifics of 
the recent and contemporary Sino-Tibetan encounter, with analytical focus on the post-1989 
period. It examines the dynamic interplay of the mutual insecurities of the Chinese Party-
State and the Tibetan nation through the transmission belt of China’s Tibet policy. The 
theoretical insights from security studies outlined in Chapter Two will be applied, 
representing a significant departure from the existing literature on the conflict. This chapter 
will demonstrate that Beijing’s Tibet policy is designed to meet the Party-State’s security 
challenges in Tibet.  
First, the various Chinese policies and instruments deployed towards the Tibetans 
after 1989 in the pursuit of state-building will be examined. Next, the basic Chinese security 
interests and concerns arising from the Tibetan goals and strategies, which drive Beijing’s 
Tibet policy, will be studied in a more coherent manner. To demonstrate the cyclical 
dynamics and interactive mutuality of the insecurity dilemma (i.e. between Chinese state-
building and Tibetan resistance)—indicating the processual simultaneity of the Chinese and 
Tibetan security thinking and actions—mutual signposts will be given at appropriate places in 
this and the next chapter.  
 
Security and China’s Hard-Line Policies (1989-2008) 
As mentioned in the introductory chapter, China’s security concerns in Tibet, Xinjiang and 
Inner Mongolia involve fears over sovereignty, territorial integrity, legitimacy, organising 
ideology, the Leninist political system and state institutions, national identity and image and 
regime survival. Zhang Qingli, former Party Secretary of TAR, clearly reveals Tibet’s import 
for China’s security: 
Tibet’s strategic position is extremely important; it is an important security screen in China’s 
southwest. Tibet’s special features in history, current state, environment, and geography 
determine that its development and stability are always closely linked to national sovereignty and 
security. Tibet is a focal point in our struggle with international anti-China forces. The desire of 
hostile forces to finish us is still alive, their desire to throw us into chaos, has not changed, and 
they have all along tried to make use of the so-called Tibet question to contain and split China. 
Supported by international anti-China forces, the Dalai clique has continually changed its 
methods, frequently caused incidents, damaged social stability, and plotted so-called Tibet 
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independence.... Our struggle against the Dalai clique and the western hostile forces supporting it 
is long term, sharp, intense and complex.1   
 
Coming straight from the horse’s mouth, as it were, Zhang’s statement is both informative 
and representative of the Chinese security thinking over Tibet. Zhang hints at Beijing’s 
military-strategic and political security interests in Tibet, but societal security from the 
Chinese perspective is also relevant. Various policy instruments have been employed after 
1989 to realise these security objectives. The threat and use of coercive force to meet 
ideological, political and military objectives in Tibet has been an enduring and well-
documented feature of Chinese rule in Tibet from the beginning.2 Yet, it will be shown that a 
variety of subtler instruments have also been used. 
Picking up from the previous chapter, in response to the pro-independence 
demonstrations and riots Tibet, Wu Jinghua, the liberal Yi minority Party Secretary of TAR, 
was replaced by Hu Jintao on 12 January, 1989. Beijing ordered the imposition of martial law 
in Lhasa on 7 March, 1989, effective from 8 March. Due to a number of reasons discussed in 
the previous chapter, a Politburo meeting in Beijing unveiled on 19 October, 1989, the hard-
line policy of rejecting political liberalisation, repressive enforcement of stability and rapid 
economic development inside Tibet and the side-lining the Dalai Lama.3 It reflected a loss of 
faith in the liberal policies of the Hu Yaobang and Wu Jinghua to win Tibetan loyalty. In fact, 
they were seen as increasing nationalistic sentiments, leading to ethnic riots. It was also 
indicative of the loss of faith in the Dalai Lama to ‘play a constructive role in Tibet.’4 In 
broad terms, the new policy came to be known as ‘grasping with both hands’, involving 
accelerated economic development through massive state subsidies and investment and 
ruthless enforcement of stability in Tibet through the use of the police, military and other 
security agencies.5 A third element of the hard-line policy was a continuation of the Maoist-
style political campaigns of mass mobilisation and ideological indoctrination.6 Shakya is 
most suggestive of the implications for the insecurity dilemma of the new policy:  
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The new policy would emphasise those factors which engendered greater integration of the region 
with the rest of China, and which would avoid laying any stress on Tibet’s separate identity. The 
monasteries and other institutions would be tamed and made to follow stricter guidelines laid 
down by Beijing.7 
 
China’s Tibet policy in the 1990s and the first decade of the 21st century adhered closely to 
the broad parameters of coercive stabilisation, economic development and political-
ideological campaigns. A number of different policy instruments have been used to achieve 
the political, military and societal security objectives of nation- and state-building. Introduced 
at various historical junctures since the incorporation of the Tibetan regions into the PRC, all 
these instruments predate the policy-shift in 1989. Although the prominence of some 
instruments may have waned over time in the overall repertoire, the Chinese continue to draw 
from them every now and then.  
The Nationality Identification Programme is illustrative. Although the main work of 
identification was done in the 1950s by ‘ethnographers’ using Stalin’s definition of 
nationhood, the Chinese continue to exploit the security instrumentality of that project. In the 
wake of the Tibetan protests in 2008, Zhu Xiaoming, Deputy-Director of Beijing-based China 
Tibetology Research Center and former official in the United Front Department, criticised the 
Tibetan demands for administrative unification with this argument: ‘Besides, the Qinghai-
Tibet Plateau is actually a multi-ethnic region. Apart from Tibetans, there are more than 10 
ethnic groups living on the plateau for generations, such as Han, Hui, Mongolian, Tu, Monba 
and Lhoba.’8 This confirms Zhao’s argument that Beijing’s aim behind the Nationality 
Identification Project was to ‘obfuscate’ and negate the aspirations of the non-Chinese 
minorities.9 Similarly, the affirmative action policies that were introduced as a result of the 
National Frontier Defense Work Conference in 1979 continue to this day and feature 
prominently in both the official and popular Chinese discourses on Tibet and the Tibetans.10 
Chinese officials and people frequently remind the Tibetans of the preferential treatments 
they receive and accuse them of being ungrateful, and advertise these when confronted by 
criticism from third parties. However, the instruments that most defined Beijing’s Tibet 
policy after 1989 have been its reliance on the coercive forces (PLA, PAP, PSB and police 
and the wider surveillance apparatus), economic development, political campaigns and the 
United Front. Connections will also be identified between these policies and the nation-
building and institutional and infrastructural dimensions of state-building. However, these 
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instruments are deployed within the broader legal and political context of the Regional 
National Autonomy system. Different sections of this chapter will demonstrate the widened 
gap between the legal provisions of autonomy and the reality of its practice in Tibet in the 
functional areas of administration and political representation, culture (religion and 
language), education and economy. All these areas fell under the axe of the hard-line shift in 
policies.11 However, for Hu Jintao, the newly appointed Party Secretary, the immediate order 
of business was to quell the Tibetan uprising through martial law. 
 
Stabilising Tibet through Martial Law 
Securing the situation—stopping the frequent Tibetan protests and riots in Lhasa even under 
martial law—occupied the attention of the Chinese authorities well into the early 1990s.12 A 
number of coercive steps had to be taken ranging from a massive show of PLA force, arrests 
and sentencing of participants in the uprising, introduction of an identity card system (Ch. 
shengfenzheng), a wide-spread drive to identify anti-Chinese elements, including in the Party 
and government, a political campaign known as ‘screening and investigation’ [tib	

tibtib], and expulsion of monks and nuns from their monasteries and nunneries and 
foreigners from Tibet.13 Under martial law, Major-General Zhang Shaosong, Political 
Commissar of the Tibet Military District, was in charge of stabilising Tibet. The PLA 
presence in Lhasa was beefed up with reinforcement from other parts of Tibet and China 
under the Chengdu Military Region, who subjected the Tibetans to frequent demonstrations 
of military power.14 As Schwartz wrote: 
On 10 March…forty truckloads of soldiers were positioned around the Jokhang, each truck 
equipped with a mounted machine gun. Also deployed were trucks fitted with multiple rocket 
launchers, with the rockets pointed towards the Jokhang temple. Other such trucks were 
positioned along Dekyi Sharlam near the Potala, with rockets pointed at the palace…. [I]t was an 
assertion of Chinese power directed at the symbols of Tibetan national identity.15  
  
Although martial law was lifted on 2 May, 1990, the threat and use of state-violence has been 
ever present.  
Military intimidation was accompanied by the trial and sentencing of participants in 
the protests and riots for a range of violent and non-violent political offences, with the latter 
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group receiving stiffer sentences.16 Between 1987 and 1991, over 3000 Tibetans were held 
under detention without trial and 179 Tibetans received prison sentences.17 Chinese court 
documents attested to the participation and incarceration of state employees and party 
members for involvement in the protests.18 Simultaneously, a vigorous two-stage campaign 
of ‘screening and investigation’ involving work units, government departments and 
neighbourhood committees to ferret out ‘those who plan behind the scenes to cause 
disturbances’, ‘those who command the organisations’, and the ring-leaders and principal 
members of secret counter-revolutionary organisations’, and ‘instigators of evil counter-
revolutionary propaganda’—in short, anti-Chinese protestors and sympathisers within the 
state and party hierarchy and beyond.19 The monasteries and nunneries in and around Lhasa, 
besieged by armed PLA soldiers since the imposition of martial law, were also subjected to 
‘screening and investigation’. By April 1990, 200 monks and nuns were expelled from their 
religious institutions and prohibited from performing religious duties outside of their homes, 
forcing many of them to escape to Nepal and India.20 Perceiving that the presence of foreign 
tourists and journalists emboldened the Tibetans and to prevent information about the 
crackdown from getting out, they were expelled, some of them under gun-point, and 
prohibited from entering Tibet.21 These measures constituted what the Chinese authorities of 
the time referred to as a move from ‘passive’ or reactive policing to ‘active’ or pre-emptive 
policing.22 Collectively, these steps were successful in stemming major protests by the time 
Chen Kuiyen replaced Hu Jintao as TAR Party Secretary in March 1992. As altitude sickness 
forced him to spend about five months each year in Beijing, Hu Jintao ‘left no lasting impact 
                                                 
16
 Xinhua, 13 September 1989, in FBIS, 13 September 1989: 57; Shwartz 1994: 168-169; Barnett 2008: 319-
321. 
17
 Barnett 2008: 319. 
18
 Schwartz 1994: 169-70. 
19
 tib		tibtib	tib	tibtib		tibtibtibtibtibtib	
tibtib !	"tib#$tibtib%tib&tib'tib(tib)
tib [Document no. 13 (27 July, 1989) ‘Work 
Plans of the Regional Party and the Regional People’s Government’s for Resolutely Striking Splittists and Other 
Serious Criminals through Screening and Investigation’] in 	tib+tib	,	-tib.tib	tib/tib0tib
+tib	tib1tib [‘Selected Study Documents for Discussion by Party Members’], Organisation 
Department of the TAR Party Committee, March 1990: 78-98 (for internal circulation only). For a complete 
translation, see Schwartz 1994: 235-243. 
20
 Human Rights Committee of LAWASIA and Tibet Information Network (TIN), Defying the dragon: China 
and human rights in Tibet: a report issued jointly by the Human Rights Committee of LAWASIA, the Law 
Association for Asia and the Pacific and T.I.N., the Tibet Information Network, Manilla and London, 1991: 18-
19; Schwartz 1994: 30-31. 
21
 Schwartz 1994: 167; Barnett 2008: 323-325. 
22
 Gyaltsen Norbu, ‘Comrade Jiangcun Luobo’s [Gyaltsen Norbu] speech at the Regional Conference on Basic 
Work on Public Security in Grassroots Units, 17 October 1990,’ Party Circular no. 20, Office of the Tibetan 
Autonomous Region party Committee, 20 November 1990, numbered for restricted circulation. Translated from 
Chinese in TIN, Background Papers on Tibet, September 1992: 54-6; Schwartz 1994: 188; Barnett 2003: 230. 
134 
 
on Tibet.’23 Chen Kuiyen, reputed for his hard-line views, inherited the policy of ‘grasping 
with both hands’ which he implemented with notorious harshness towards Tibetan identity 
and aspirations. This shows that while policies are formulated in Beijing, Party Secretaries 
have considerable scope for personalising the implementation of policies with either positive 
or negative implications for the Tibetans. 
   
Chen Kuiyen, Third Tibet Work Forum and Economic Development 
Economic development has always been part of the policy mix since the reform era began. As 
mentioned in the previous chapter, the Second Tibet Work Forum in 1984 made economic 
development the cornerstone of Beijing’s Tibet policy—‘to get rich as soon as possible’ was 
the slogan. Hu Jintao had also arrived with a programme of investment and commodity 
market expansion in Tibet.24 Under the more stable conditions, Chen Kuiyen was able to 
focus attention on economic development, buoyed by Deng’s famous Southern Tour to 
promote economic reforms in early 1992 and the availability of growing economic resources 
to spend in Tibet. However, what was different about the push for economic development this 
time was its explicit linkage with security: ‘raising standard of living…as a way to dilute 
Tibetan nationalism’.25 This was no doubt influenced by the Marxist economic-determinist 
thought that held that ethno-national identity and religious belief are features of a pre-modern 
stage of socio-economic development that will wither away in the course of modernisation.26 
Chen proved to be a staunch believer in economics as the panacea against Tibetan 
nationalism.27 He said in Chamdo: 
Only with economic development and improvement or prestige of the country, and with people 
getting rich and tired of splittist groups can they finally make correct judgements and give up their 
purpose of splitting the country…. If the economy develops well, the spiritual civilisation will 
find a solid ground, and long-term stability within Tibet will be based on very reliable and solid 
ground…. With economic development their confidence in the country will be greatly increased, 
and the trend of unification and loving the central government will be enhanced.28 
 
Economic backwardness, he added, made the Tibetans succumb to their ‘religious illusion’ 
and strengthened their ‘splittist’ ideas. Chen’s ideas were entirely in sync with the prevailing 
attitude in Beijing as the outcome of the Third Tibet Work Forum demonstrated.  
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 The Party’s Central Committee organised the Third Work Forum in Beijing in July 
1994 to formulate the work programme in Tibet for the next five years.29 It was presided by 
Premier Li Peng and attended by General Security Jiang Zemin, Chairman Li Rihuan, Hu 
Jintao and Chen Kuiyen, among other national and regional officials. The Forum set out two 
main goals for the next five years. First on the card was rapid economic development by 
achieving 10% economic growth per year and doubling of Tibet’s GDP by 2000.30 Sixty two 
developmental projects worth 2.38 billion RMB (US $270 million) were unveiled. The first 
stock exchange in Lhasa was opened to expand TAR’s market economy. There was also a 
visible shift in emphasis from agricultural development to energy and light industry and 
infrastructure. The second element of the Third Work Forum was the strict enforcement of 
stability which called for a wide-ranging effort against Tibetan nationalism.31 This included 
‘resolute opposition’ against separatists and the purging of cadres in the state and party 
hierarchy who had shown the slightest signs of ‘local nationalism’ and a renewed campaign 
against the Dalai Lama’s spiritual and political authority.32 Cognizant of the foundational role 
of culture in Tibetan nationalism, there was also a vigorous effort to chip away at the 
distinctiveness of Tibetan identity. As Jiang Zemin put it in his address, ‘it is also necessary 
[for the Tibetans] to absorb the fine cultures of other nationalities in order to integrate the fine 
traditional cultures with the fruits of modern culture.’33 The cultural element will be treated at 
length in the following section.  Here it is important to remind ourselves of the security 
instrumentality of economic development in China’s Tibet policy.  
 The issue of Chinese migration into Tibetan areas, which has been an integral element 
of the economic development strategy, is illustrative in this regard. The decision to open 
Tibet for business and economic activities by Han and Hui Chinese was taken deliberately 
during the Second Tibet Work Forum in 1984, despite opposition from Tibetan officials.34 
Since then Beijing has consistently refused to regulate and restrict, let alone terminate, the 
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flow of non-Tibetans.35 As a result, a large number of legal and illegal Han and Hui migrants 
have since flooded and dominated economic life in the major urban centres of Tibet.36 The 
Qinghai-Tibet railway line has only stacked the demographic odds further against the 
Tibetans. The policy of deliberate settlement and encourage or enabled migration is 
consistent with the security and nation-building rationale of packing in as many nationalities 
and ideally Han Chinese as possible in any one autonomous entity. As Goldstein argued,  
Beijing’s reluctance to terminate this influx is, of course, also politically and strategically 
motivated. The large number of non-Tibetans living and working in Tibet provides Beijing a new 
and formidable pro-China “constituency” that increases its security there. One can easily imagine 
that if China’s control over Tibet became seriously threatened by militant violence, not only 
would more troops be rushed in, but new laws could be promulgated to make the large Han 
presence permanent by offering attractive perks to induce the “floating population” to accept 
permanent status in Tibet.37  
 
He noted further that Beijing is banking on a ‘process of acculturation in which the more 
“advanced” Han will open up Tibetans to new ideas and attitudes and create a new, “modern” 
Tibetan in the process who will not be so influenced by religion and lamas.’38 This is 
consistent with the frequent call by the Chinese leaders for the Tibetans to ‘absorb the fine 
cultures of other nationalities’ or to engage in ‘cultural exchanges between Tibet and the 
mainland’, a euphemism for the Tibetans adopting Chinese traditions.39 At the same time, 
Chinese migration curtails the Tibetans ability to practise regional autonomy in the economic 
field when better-educated, better-skilled, and better-connected Chinese dominate the centres 
of economic and political power in Tibet. As Fischer contends: 
[T]he current development strategies pursued over the last decade in the Tibetan areas, while 
producing rapid, albeit polarising growth, have engendered an ethnically exclusionary dynamic in 
both rural and urban areas…. [A]mong those who do experience exclusion in the Tibetan areas, 
most tend to be Tibetan.40 
    
Security was also the central rationale behind the Western Development Campaign (Ch. Xībù 
Dàkāifā), the flag-ship project of Beijing’s economic development strategy in Western China, 
which was officially launched in 2000. The Western Development Campaign (WDC) is an 
extension of the existing economic development strategy with higher levels of urgency, 
investment and wider participation base including other Chinese provinces.41 As Fischer and 
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others have shown, WDC has a programmatic bias towards ‘hard’ or physical infrastructure 
building at the expense of developing human resources or soft infrastructure.42  
Chinese officials and scholars have openly confirmed that security considerations were 
central to the inception and implementation of WDC in Tibet.43 Jiang Zemin told a Tibet 
Work meeting that Tibet’s development is important for ‘national unity and social stability, to 
the unification and security of the motherland, and to our national image and international 
struggle.’44 Independent observers also underline the security imperatives behind WDC in 
Tibet.45 In fact, the subsidisation and infrastructure-heavy economic development model, 
which predates WDC, belies ‘strategic and military/security concerns’ which ‘are reflected in 
the main drivers of economic growth in the TAR over the past decade.’ 46 As Fischer argued,  
Subsidisation policies of the Chinese government, especially in the TAR are more likely guided 
by strategic and security/military concerns.  The past five decades of subsidisation of the Tibetan 
areas have been part of an effort to secure their integration into China and to build up the 
infrastructure necessary for maintaining control over both the local population and the remote 
borderland areas. In particular, military interests in the TAR cannot be underestimated….47  
 
As such, responding to security fears in its western periphery, WDC was a state-building 
project, a 21st century avatar of the traditional mission civilatrice that the Han Chinese 
practised towards neighbouring ‘barbarians.’48  
The policy of ‘grasping with two hands’ with emphasis on economic development and 
political repression was extended during the Fourth Tibet Work Forum held in Beijing from 
25-27 June, 2001.49 Jiang Zemin identified ‘two major issues’ to be ‘resolved’ in his speech: 
‘The first issue is to accelerate development and the tasks relating to economic and social 
development remain arduous. The second issue is to promote stability.’50 He was clear about 
the security rationale: 
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[T]he development, stability and safety of Tibet is related to the strategic implementation of great 
western expansion, to national unity and social stability, to the unification and security of the 
motherland, and to our national image and international struggle.51 
 
Development, stability and security were also the central themes in the Fifth Tibet Work 
Forum held in Beijing in January 2010.52 Calling Tibet a ‘special contradiction’ with 
relevance to national unity, social stability, national security and foreign relations, President 
Hu Jintao said: ‘the theme of the work of Tibet must be the promotion of development by 
leaps and bounds and long-term stability.’53 The new Party Secretary of TAR, Chen 
Guoquan, began his term in September 2011 by vowing to pursue economic development and 
stability (euphemism for security).54 It is clear that economic development has been the 
centre-piece of China’s Tibet policy throughout the post-Mao period. Unsurprisingly, Beijing 
invokes economic development as the main legitimising factor in its rule over Tibet.  
Indeed, in statistical terms, rapid progress has been made and the living standards of 
the Tibetans have been visibly raised. TAR’s GDP increased from 91.18 million RMB in 
1998 to 138.73 million RMB in 2001 with an annual growth rate of 17.4%.55 After posting 
negative growth until 1995, the annual percentage change in real per capita GDP grew 8.7% 
in 1996 and registered double digit growth ever since with 16.3% in 2001.56 In 2007, TAR’s 
GDP was 34.22 billion RMB with a growth rate of 14% over the previous year.57 As 
admirable as these statistics are, they also mask some unsavoury realities.  
TAR’s economy is so heavily and increasingly dependent upon subsidies from 
Beijing that some Chinese economists have dubbed it ‘blood-transfusion economy.’58 By the 
mid-1990s the rate of subsidization was around 45% of TAR’s GDP, rising to 71% in 2001 
and almost 75% in 2003.59 Hence, the main source of the scintillating GDP growth in TAR is 
direct subsidies from the Centre and government spending. Government officials and Chinese 
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nationalists make much of these subsidies, but such high levels of subsidies perpetuate 
inefficiencies and distortions with grave implications for long-term growth prospects.60 More 
government spending in TAR goes towards capital construction and government 
administration, including a large portion for the internal security apparatus, and less towards 
education, health and agriculture, relative to national spending on these sectors. In 2001, 
33.3% of government expenditure in TAR went towards infrastructure-building such as the 
Qinghai-Tibet Railway, 14% to government administration and only 8.5% to education, 
compared to the national figures of 12.5%, 9% and 15.5% respectively.61 At the least, these 
spending priorities foster the perception that Beijing is more interested in controlling Tibet 
than improving the conditions of the Tibetans.  
Furthermore, because most of the subsidy and government spending go into capital 
construction and administration, the investment makes its way back to China in the form of 
contracts for Chinese-owned or state-owned construction companies or as wages for 
labourers from China.62 Fischer, therefore, calls Beijing’s economic support to Tibetan areas 
‘Boomerang Aid.’63 Moreover, most of the development is concentrated in the urban centres 
of Tibet where the majority of the Chinese migrants reside and away from the rural areas 
where 85 per cent of the Tibetans live.64 For these reasons, economic development has been 
part of the problem in Tibet rather than the solution that Beijing is still banking upon. 
 
Tibetan Buddhism, Language and Education 
However, as mentioned above, Beijing’s security strategy in Tibet has always included a 
cultural component, i.e. either cultural revolution-style destruction or more or less subtle 
attempts at mission civilatrice. In the post-1989 era, the assault against Tibetan culture was 
noticeably reinforced under Chen Kuiyen around the mid-1990s. Barnett wrote that ‘the 
decision to attack Tibetan religion or culture per se was unprecedented in the post reform 
era.’65 This section examines how this ‘cultural control’ was implemented in the illustrative 
areas of Tibetan Buddhism, Tibetan language and education, and points out the implications 
for the insecurity dilemma. 
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The Constitution and Autonomy Law provide the right to believe or not to believe in 
any religion and guarantees state protection of ‘normal religious practices.’66 Compared to 
the nightmarish periods of ‘Democratic Reforms’67 (1950-1965) and Cultural Revolution 
(1965-1976), religious policy in the post-1978 era has been more relaxed. The relaxed 
environment of the1980s enabled a revival of Tibetan Buddhism in all Tibetan areas, 
especially in Kham and Amdo, where, as parts of neighbouring Chinese provinces, Tibetans 
also enjoyed more religious freedom.68 Many monasteries and temples that survived the 
Cultural Revolution were renovated and opened for worship and many that sustained damage 
were rebuilt.69 Most of the renovation and rebuilding was made possible by the ‘vigorous’ 
faith of the Tibetans ‘who gave their time and money, and also with the funds collected by 
Tibetans in exile.’70 However, some touristy sites like Potala and Norbu Lingka Palaces and 
Jokhang Temple in Lhasa received substantial state funding for renovation.71 Rituals and 
various devotional activities such as pilgrimage, prostrations and prayer flags were permitted 
and religious scriptures were printed and openly circulated. Some lamas from exile travelled 
to Tibet to teach or direct renovation work, while others like the 10th Panchen Lama, who 
stayed in Tibet and became victims during the Cultural Revolution, were rehabilitated and 
resumed some of their traditional roles.72 
 However, ‘liberalisation was intended to provide an opportunity for the last vestiges 
of superstitious belief to quietly wither away.’73 As Blondeau puts it, liberalisation was 
‘purely strategic’. As mentioned earlier, in 1983, the Party established ‘the natural withering 
of religion’ through socio-economic transformation as the long term goal of its religious 
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policy, since ideology and coercion had failed during the Maoist era.74 Such a sanguine view 
was ill-advised as the speed with which Tibetan Buddhism was revived in the 1980s 
unnerved the Chinese. The revival also revealed the intense devotion that most Tibetans still 
felt towards the Dalai Lama. Between 1987 and 1993, monks and nuns led many pro-
independence demonstrations in Lhasa in support of the Dalai Lama.75 Following the failure 
of the Dalai Lama and Beijing to work together to choose the reincarnation of the 10th 
Panchen Lama in 1995, Beijing unleashed a series of campaigns against the Dalai Lama, 
banning his photographs and requiring monks, nuns and lay Tibetans to criticise him, which 
continues to foment unrest in various Tibetan regions.  
Since the 1990s, China has put increasing restrictions on Tibetan Buddhism in all 
Tibetan regions. Chen Kuiyen, then TAR Party Secretary, made his intentions clear when he 
wrote to Beijing in 1994: 
The continuous expansion of temples and Buddhist monks and nuns should be contained. We 
shall not allow religion to be used by the Dalai clique as a tool for their splittist activities. This is 
an outstanding and key issue concerning party construction in Tibet. Under the precondition that 
we shall rely on education, we shall also take some forceful measures to stop this perverse trend.76 
 
Several instances show the fall-out of the vice-like control on religion that Chen and his 
subordinates oversaw in the Tibetan regions. Two high ranking lamas, Arjia Rinpoche and 
the Karmapa, escaped into exile due to the continuing restrictions on religious study and 
practice and the requirements to criticise the Dalai Lama and legitimise the Chinese-
appointed Panchen Lama.77 In February 1998, Arjia Rinpoche, who held high offices in the 
Chinese Buddhist Association and the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Committee, 
escaped ‘the repressive climate’ which included being ‘coerced into publicly supporting 
China’s increasingly anti-Tibet agenda, including taking part in carefully orchestrated rituals 
engineered to undermine the authority of the Dalai Lama.’78 The Karmapa escaped in 2000 
citing restrictions on religion and the fear of being used by the Chinese to serve their anti-
Tibetan agenda.79 The demolitions in 2007 of the statues of an eighth century Indian saint 
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Padmasambhava in Samye (funded by Chinese Buddhists from the Mainland) and Ngari 
testify to the continuing restrictions on Tibetan Buddhism.80 On 18 July, 2007, Beijing 
announced ‘Order No. 5’, a regulation essentially prohibiting Tibetan lamas from 
reincarnating without prior approval from the Chinese government.81 Clearly, Beijing has the 
selection of the next Dalai Lama in mind, inflaming Tibetan resentment. Eastern Tibet has 
also come under increasing restrictions since the 1990s, exemplified by the fates of Serta 
Larungar Institute and Yachen Institute.  
 Serta Institute in Kham (Sichuan), started by the charismatic abbot Jigme Phuntsok in 
1980 with 100 Tibetan students, grew into a monastic town with 9300 resident disciples, 
including about 1000 Mainland and overseas Chinese.82 In June 2001, officials from Beijing 
came to Serta to reduce the number of monks and nuns to 1000 and 400 respectively, which 
led to the demolition of some 2000 dwellings.83  The same fate befell Yachen Institute in 
Sichuan, just months after the crackdown in Serta.84 A Chinese student, a middle-aged 
medical doctor, who joined Yachen after expulsion from Serta, summed up the rationale of 
fear behind the patriotic education campaign in Tibetan Buddhist institutes: 
The [Chinese] authorities told teachers from Larung Gar and Yachen that they were forbidden to 
teach Vajrayana [referring to Tibetan Buddhism] to Chinese or to travel to China to teach. And 
they said that Chinese are forbidden to follow or receive Buddhist talks from Tibetan lamas. So 
many Chinese are coming to these areas where Tibetans usually live, but really the authorities 
don’t want us to have connections with any lamas here. The Chinese government knows that the 
more people believe in the Buddha the more those people will respect the Dalai Lama. So it is a 
threat to the government’s idea of unity if either Tibetans or Chinese believe in the Buddha.85 
 
The death sentence later commuted to life in prison of Tenzin Deleg Rinpoche, another 
popular reincarnate Lama, on allegations of masterminding a series of bomb-blasts in 
Chengdu is another illustration. The common thread in all these cases is that the CCP and the 
government sensed rival power-centres with local and national dimensions. Such fear has 
prompted the repression of Tibetan Buddhism at the slightest sign of threat to the Party-State.  
Kapstein captures Beijing’s dilemma with regard to its policy on Tibetan Buddhism: 
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[B]y suppressing Tibetan Buddhism, Tibetan resentment and hence the longing for freedom are 
increased; but by adopting a liberal policy, the very cultural system that most encourages the 
Tibetans to identify themselves apart from China continues to flourish.86 
 
Beijing has adopted a policy of allowing limited religious practice but undermining the whole 
edifice of Buddhism by promoting materialism and atheism, as expounded by the Party’s 
racial theoretician Li Dezhu, who until recently was the director of the State Nationality 
Affairs Commission.87 Addressing the ideological and political threats from Tibetan 
Buddhism is a major concern for Chinese leaders. Initiated by Chen Kuiyen, Tibetan 
Buddhism has been a special target for his successors, not the least for Zhang Qingli, who 
described the Central Party Committee as the real Buddha for the Tibetans and enforced 
existing restrictions on religion ever more strongly.88 
The Tibetan language also fell victim to the hardening policy regime under Chen and 
his successors. The right to use and develop the spoken and written languages of the 
nationalities is also provided in the Constitution and Autonomy Law.89 A White Paper on 
Tibetan culture claims that the TAR government ‘has paid great attention to maintaining and 
safeguarding the Tibetan people's right to study, use and develop their spoken and written 
language.’90 While it is true that Tibetan language fonts have been devised for Internet 
communication, independent Tibetan blogs and websites and books, where the fonts should 
find application, are closely monitored and closed down or banned for carrying political 
content.91 Furthermore, the cumulative effect of other policies, the abandonment of positive 
developments in the early 1980s, and the privileging of Mandarin Chinese in education and 
public life are undermining the place of Tibetan language in Tibet.92 One Western scholar 
lamented that ‘maintaining and improving Tibetan language education is proving to be a 
difficult uphill struggle.’93 This represents a worsening situation even in comparison to the 
early to mid-1980s. 
In 1987, the Panchen Lama and Ngaboe Ngawang Jigme pushed the TAR People’s 
Congress to draft a major policy document, ‘The Provisions on the Study, Use and 
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Development of Spoken and Written Tibetan’ which laid out the modalities for implementing 
Tibetan language education in schools and its use in public life.94 Both Tibetan and Chinese 
languages were to be taught, but Tibetan was to take centre-stage as the medium of 
instruction through secondary schools and beyond.95 The White Paper on Tibetan Culture 
claims that the aforementioned policy document was ‘implemented’ and that it ‘put the work 
related to the study, use and development of spoken and written Tibetan language on a legal 
track.’ In reality, it never went beyond a trial period.96 Although the students who 
participated in the trial produced much stronger results in all subjects including Chinese 
language than their counterparts who were taught in Chinese, the project was abandoned 
altogether in 1996.97 Tibetan medium instruction is available only up to primary schools in 
TAR now.98 Around the same time as the shelving of the Tibetan language education trial, 
the Tibetan translation offices were downgraded, Tibet University was ordered to stop 
admitting new students for two years and a number of renowned Tibetan scholars were asked 
to retire early.99 In 2010, authorities in Qinghai province, where the freedom and quality of 
Tibetan language education has been greater, proposed using Chinese as the medium of 
instruction in all schools, provoking thousands of Tibetan students in a number of different 
places to protest openly.100 
As in the case of Tibetan Buddhism, hostility towards Tibetan medium instruction 
arises from its association with ‘separatism’.101 Merely talking about Tibetan language 
education could get one into political trouble.102 Some Tibetan officials and scholars had 
argued that the neglect and hostility towards Tibetan language instruction actually 
exacerbated separatist sentiments and recommended that a satisfactory implementation of 
Tibetan medium instruction will go a long way towards resolving the nationalist problems in 
Tibet.103 The centrality of language and Buddhism in Tibetan national identity, which sits 
uncomfortably with Beijing’s security and state-led, Han-supremacist nationalism, invites the 
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hostility of regional and central authorities. As Bass observed, the strong connection between 
the Tibetan language and national identity has invited violent attacks during leftist periods in 
the past.104 Chinese nationalists today are using more subtle methods than their Cultural 
Revolution predecessors. For Chen and his bosses, Tibetan nationalism was rooted in Tibetan 
religion, which is rooted in Tibetan culture and language, as he is known to have stated in an 
internal meeting in 1997.105 No wonder, he suggested that Tibetan children in Tibet should be 
taught more Chinese language to raise ‘the cultural quality of the Tibetan nationality’.106 
Other aspects of Tibetan culture also came under attack. Chen and his subordinates 
sought to control the form and content of intellectual and artistic life in Tibet.107  For Chen, 
‘Tibetan intellectual endeavour was…a threat to security, and thus in need of control.’108 In 
an infamous speech he gave in July 1997, which reveals the ideological and theoretical ideas 
guiding his policy and practices, he called Buddhism ‘foreign’ to Tibetan culture and 
instructed Tibetan scholars and intellectuals to reflect this in their work and to stop eulogising 
the 17th century Tibetan politician and intellectual Sangay Gyatso and the 14th Dalai Lama. 
Instead, he advised them to praise the Communist Chinese ‘revolutionary heroes’ who have 
contributed to ‘safeguarding the unification and territorial integrity of the motherland’ and 
‘their lofty ideas, creative activities, spiritual values, and moral character’ in their works.109 
Chen even lectured the Tibetan dancers, musicians and filmmakers on the flaws of traditional 
Tibetan performance arts and urged them to perform more communist propaganda pieces 
from the 1950s and 1960s and create more such works.110 He called upon Tibetan 
intellectuals and artists to engage in ‘exchanges and merging with cultures of other 
nationalities’, which is a euphemism for adopting Chinese cultural traditions. These are not 
the views of a lone Chinese chauvinistic official, but are widespread across the 
officialdom.111 After Chen’s transfer to Henan province in 2000, his successors continue to 
enforce these measures against Tibetan culture. To be sure, the Tibetans and the Chinese 
authorities are playing a cat-and-mouse game with each other, with the latter trying to 
undermine or change as much of Tibetan culture as possible and the former using all 
available space and opportunity to resist these measures by reasserting their cultural identity.  
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Political Campaigns and Nation Building 
As mentioned in the previous section, Tibetan culture, especially as it relates to Tibetan 
Buddhism is seen as the basis of Tibetan nationalism and a security threat. The Dalai Lama 
and what the Chinese call the ‘Dalai clique’ abroad and ‘separatists’ in Tibet were singled out 
for particular hostility. As Chen Kuiyen said in a speech to important non-Party personalities 
in Tibet:  
Outside the region, there are the Dalai clique and its Western supporters; within the region, there 
are splittists and their behind-the-scenes sympathizers. They will seize every opportunity to make 
trouble. It is obvious to all that class struggle is far from being over in Tibet.112 
 
To combat these domestic and exile enemies, the Chinese also subjected the Tibetans to a 
number of political campaigns, especially beginning in the mid-1990s. 
State-sponsored mass political campaigns have been recurrent features of Chinese 
politics since 1949. These campaigns invariably assume ethnic dimensions in minority 
regions. Patriotic Education Campaigns, Strike Hard Campaigns, Spiritual Civilisation 
Campaigns and the anti-Dalai Lama Campaign and have been conducted continuously since 
the mid-1990s. In Tibet, without exception, they evolve into campaigns against the Dalai 
Lama and components of Tibetan identity in the cloak of anti-separatism.113 The case of PEC 
in Tibet is instructive.114 As Smith writes, ‘In Tibet, the purpose of the campaign was to 
transform Tibetan national identity into Chinese identity, to eradicate Tibetans’ loyalty to the 
Dalai Lama, and to cultivate Tibetan loyalty to China instead.’115 The nation-building and 
state-building objectives are apparent. 
Patriotic Education Campaign was initially conducted all over China after the 
Tiananmen Square massacre. It ‘represented a state-led effort to rebuild the legitimacy of the 
[CCP]…on the basis of non-Communist ideology rather than Marxism or anti-traditional 
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iconoclasm….’116 Two dominant themes of the campaign were [Han] Chinese tradition and 
history (especially of the CCP and its achievements) and national unity and territorial 
integrity.117  
In Tibet, when the campaign was first launched in 1996, monks and nuns were special 
targets because of the centrality of religion to Tibetan national identity. The main goals of 
PEC in Tibet have been to undermine the influence of the Dalai Lama, teach the Chinese 
version of Tibet’s history to the Tibetans, and to promote atheism and materialist values to 
control Tibetan Buddhism and undermine Tibetan traditions. This is clear from the study 
materials and regulations issued by Chinese government offices.118 Tibetan students, officials 
and others were also subjected to PEC.119 Party and government cadres in TAR have also 
been targeted for education.120 Cadres and students are prohibited from visiting monasteries 
or demonstrating religious faith, such as taking religious objects to work, and taking part in 
religious festivals.121 In 1998 and 2000, Tibetan cadres were told to withdraw their children 
from Tibetan exile schools or lose their jobs and pension, so that they will not be corrupted 
with separatist thoughts.122 Although, PEC has been declared officially over in 2000, it is 
being actively conducted in the Tibetan regions.  
To complement PEC in the nation-building project, Spiritual Civilisation Campaign 
was launched in the mid-1990s to create a modern economy and socialist spiritual civilisation 
and to eradicate ‘feudal thinking, superstition and out-dated conventions and bad habits’ i.e. 
Tibetan culture and traditions’123 and Strike Hard Campaigns against ‘separatists and serious 
criminals.’124 An additional anti-Dalai Lama campaign was launched officially in January 
1995, ‘when vitriolic attacks on the Dalai Lama inside Tibet reached levels unprecedented 
since the Cultural Revolution.’125 In Tibet, all such campaigns boil down to attacks on the 
Dalai Lama and Tibetan traditions under the guise of fighting separatism and crime.  
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Regional National Autonomy: Institutional Integration and Nation Building  
To reiterate, Beijing has wielded the above instruments within the broader policy framework 
of the Regional National Autonomy (RNA). As mentioned in the previous chapter, RNA has 
been the most prominent element of China’s nationality policy. RNA derives its legal 
strength from the Regional National Autonomy Law (Autonomy Law), as per Article Four of 
the PRC Constitution of the PRC.126 Article Four provides that  
Regional autonomy is practised in areas where people of minority nationalities live in compact 
communities; in these areas organs of self- government are established for the exercise of the right 
of autonomy. All the national autonomous areas are inalienable parts of the People's Republic of 
China. The people of all nationalities have the freedom to use and develop their own spoken and 
written languages, and to preserve or reform their own ways and customs.127  
  
The Tibetan areas are divided into one Tibet Autonomous Region (TAR), 10 Tibetan 
Autonomous Prefectures (TAP), and 2 Tibetan Autonomous Counties (TAC). The Tibetan 
areas of Kham and Amdo were organised into TAPs and TACs in Qinghai, Gansu, Sichuan 
and Yunnan provinces by 1956.128 TAR, corresponding to the areas under the rule of the 
Dalai Lama before 1950 (Central and Western Tibet), was formally established on 1 
September 1965.  
The Party-State’s security is the raison d’être of the RNA system. A White Paper on 
autonomy in TAR claims: ‘To institute regional ethnic autonomy in Tibet is the natural 
requirement for safeguarding national unification and national solidarity, and for the equal 
development and common prosperity of the Tibetan people and people of other ethnic groups 
in China.’129 Since the other areas covered by the Autonomy Law have been discussed 
separately in the above sections, we will discuss here briefly the written and practical realities 
of autonomy as experienced by the Tibetans in administration and representation. 
 
Administration Autonomy and Political Representation 
The Constitution and the Autonomy Law specify that the People’s Congresses and 
Governments are the organs of autonomy with the power to enact autonomy regulations and 
specific regulations consonant with the local political, economic and cultural characteristics 
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of the nationality or nationalities in that jurisdiction. Since TAR was established in 1965, the 
number of Tibetan cadres has steadily increased as the following table shows.130 
Year  No. of Tibetan Cadres  %__  
1965  7508     32.9 
1978  20, 023    44.5 
1981  29, 406    54.4 
1994  37, 000    66.6 
2005  49, 752    73.88 
 
The number of Tibetans in the Party increased from 7 in June 1956, 3000 in 1963 and 40, 000 
in 1988 to 57,000 in 1991.131 Government employment is certainly remunerative for the 
individual cadres and their families, but increases in their numbers do not translate into 
greater self-rule for the Tibetans as a group. Although Beijing brandishes these figures as 
proof that Tibetans enjoy genuine autonomy,132 they are problematic for a number of reasons. 
First, the official claim is ‘highly problematic as most high-ranking Tibetan cadres 
wield only titular power. Candidates for the chairpersons of the TAR are chosen by Central 
leaders, while TAR Party Secretaries are appointed by central Party leaders and are non-
Tibetans…. Only regional government leaders are Tibetans….’133 Second, the Tibetans are 
better-represented in cultural and religious institutions with less power and less well-
represented in the most powerful Party and state institutions such as the Tibetan Party 
Committee, People’s Congress and government.134 Third, the centrality of security, with 
emphasis on open-ended themes like stability and anti-separatism and the disproportionate 
influence of the PLA and internal security agencies are curtailing Tibetan autonomy. Tibetan 
officials complain that even demanding Tibetan language education and its use in public life 
invites accusations of separatism.135 In his letters to Hu Jintao, Phunwang, the veteran 
Tibetan revolutionary denounced this obsession with stability and anti-separatism as ‘residual 
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leftist opportunism.’ 136 Consequently, anti-separatism and anti-Dalai Lamaism has become a 
‘“money-earning tree” for some departments to keep on asking for funds from the Central 
Government.’137 On the other hand, Tibetan cadres cannot articulate Tibetan interests 
publicly for fear of being branded ‘separatists’ or associated with the ‘Dalai clique.’  
The quantity of laws and regulations passed in the local People’s Congresses are as 
misleading as the number of Tibetan cadres. Although official sources claim that as of 2005, 
120 local laws and regulations have been enacted by TAR, these laws and regulations are 
only formalistic repetitions of national or provincial laws, not separate legislations by the 
autonomous organs.138 In fact, not a single piece of separate autonomous legislation has been 
passed successfully in any of the five autonomous regions of China. This is perhaps because 
of the requirement of approval by higher executive and legislative bodies, which are 
dominated and controlled by Han Chinese, for local legislations to become laws, and the 
asymmetric state-versus-nationality conflicts of interest build into the RNA system.139 When 
the TAR Regional People’s Congress in Lhasa legislated a basic law for TAR in the 1980s, as 
the Constitution and Autonomy Law provide for, fifteen draft versions were rejected by the 
NPC Standing Committee in Beijing before it was abandoned.140  The unitary self-image of 
the party-state and its unilateral practices frequently trump Tibetan autonomy. 
Perhaps, the most symbolically telling statistic is that a Tibetan has never been 
appointed TAR Party Secretary, the most powerful regional position. Tibetans have been 
appointed heads of the regional government, but they play second fiddle to the Party 
Secretary who supervises all ‘political and administrative work’ in Tibet and is accountable 
only to Beijing.141 This has implications for the insecurity dilemma because all but one TAR 
Party Secretary have been Han Chinese, with a reputation of hostility towards the Tibetans’ 
separate identity and interests.142 As one analyst puts it, this renders autonomy ‘only 
theoretical’.143 Wu Jinghua (1985-88), an ethnic Yi, was exceptional in winning Tibetan 
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approval for his relatively more liberal attitude and respect for Tibetan culture.144 In minority 
regions, the ethnicity of the Party Secretary makes both perceptual and practical differences.  
The institutional context of making Tibet policy, over and above the regional 
government and its ‘autonomous’ organs, clearly reveals the salience of security as the key 
driver of Beijing’s policy towards Tibet. In the post-Mao era, the United Front Department 
has been the nominal manager of China’s policy towards the Dalai Lama and Tibetan 
exiles.145 However, decision-making has been much more crowded with the involvement of 
the PLA, Public Security Bureau, Ministry of National Security, Foreign Ministry and the 
State Council.146 Above the United Front, a ‘Leading Small Group’ has been instituted to 
give overall direction and coordination to Tibet policy-making at the highest level. Headed by 
the chairperson of the Chinese People’s Consultative Conference (CPPCC), the Leading 
Group includes the head of the United Front Department, Minister of Public Security and the 
Foreign Minister.147 The perpetual involvement of the PLA and the internal security 
apparatus in Tibet has been seen as an impediment to the exercise of autonomy in Tibet.148 
Possibly, it contributes to the hard-line positions in the dialogue process as the military has 
increasingly taken tougher stances on key issues than the government.149 Above the Leading 
Small Group, the general policy direction is set during Tibet Work Forums through which the 
Party General Secretary, President and Prime Minister exercise overall control. 
In short, these institutional hurdles, concentration of power in the Party and Centre, 
the obsession with unitary statehood and the political climate of fear and suspicion makes 
Tibetan autonomy into an Orwellian exercise. Chinese security fears perpetuate this empirical 
condition. This observation extends to all functional areas of autonomy in Tibet. The 
patriarch Deng Xiaoping emphasised the overriding primacy of stability i.e. security over 
ethnic interests, leading one Chinese scholar to argue that the Dengist model of autonomy 
‘may override the need to protect some rights of autonomy.’150 Accordingly, two analysts 
noticed that ‘there is less autonomy in Tibet than there is in any other region or province of 
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the PRC.’151 So far, our attention has focused on the instruments of state-building to counter 
the perceived threats within Tibet itself. However, Beijing also has a strategy to deal with 
Dharamsala. 
 
The United Front and Beijing’s Dialogue with Dharamsala 
While China’s policies in the Tibetan regions are designed for state-building, Beijing’s 
diplomacy towards the Dalai Lama and exile Tibetans is designed to protect its state-building 
gains made in the last six decades. The Party-State’s security apprehensions over meeting 
Tibetan demands—reversals in the parlance of Beijing’s linear logic of state-building and its 
unitary self-image as a state—largely drive Beijing’s positions towards the Dalai Lama and 
TGIE. This is clear from its hard-line position on the Tibet issue, uncompromising responses 
to Dharamsala’s proposals, and its institutional context of policy-making on Tibet. As 
discussed before, events in the late 1980s aggravated Beijing’s siege mentality and hardened 
its policies towards the Tibetans. The following discussion examines the fall-out on the 
dialogue between Beijing and Dharamsala.  
 As we learnt in the previous chapter, Sino-Tibetan dialogue commenced in 1979 
when Deng Xiaoping met Gyalo Dhondup, the Dalai Lama’s elder brother, in Beijing and 
told him that apart from independence all matters could be discussed and problems 
resolved.152 The hard-line policy shift also extended to the flailing dialogue process, although 
talks did not break down completely even in the poisoned atmosphere of repeated Tibetan 
protests and hardening Chinese policies under martial law. Beijing and Dharamsala 
communicated through Hong Kong-based Gyalo Dhondup. Yet, because of the CCP’s 
compromised position in China after the Tiananmen Square events and its fears of a 
perceived alignment between the Dalai Lama and the West on account of the latter’s 
felicitation of the former and their criticism of Chinese policies, Beijing was in no mood to 
reciprocate Dharamsala’s gestures to ease the stalemate.153 The internationalisation strategy 
of the exiles and the rapidly unfolding events in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union made 
the Chinese even more loath to engaging the Tibetans in any meaningful sense. On 23 May, 
1993, 1000 Tibetans took to the streets of Lhasa in the largest Tibetan demonstration since 
the lifting of martial law.154 Although it started as a protest against rising food prices, the 
demonstration soon turned into shouts for Tibetan independence. It spread to a number of 
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rural areas in Central Tibet and Southern Qinghai, where the influx of Chinese migrants and 
their increasing control of the Tibetan economy became targets of the protestors. Faced with 
international opprobrium and clear demonstrations of local Tibetan disapproval of Chinese 
policies, Beijing organised the Third Tibet Work Forum in July 1994, which heralded a more 
hostile attitude towards the Dalai Lama, seeing him as insincere and as acting as an agent of 
hostile Western states. 
 Beijing’s approach towards the Dalai Lama worsened considerably when their 
complicated effort to collaborate in the selection of the reincarnation of the Panchen Lama 
failed, culminating in the Dalai Lama’s pre-emptive declaration of a six year old boy, Gedun 
Chokyi Nyima, as the 11th Panchen Lama in 1995. Interpreting this as an ‘aggressive political 
act’ and a sign of bad faith, Beijing unleashed the series of political campaigns discussed 
above to malign him, not least the anti-Dalai Lama campaign. Gedun Choekyi Nyima and his 
family have been held incommunicado to this day and another boy named Gyaltsen Norbu 
was installed as the 11th Panchen Lama. 
Curiously, even as vitriolic campaigns against the Dalai Lama were taking place in 
Tibet, Beijing did not completely cut off relations with him. This was partly driven by the 
realisation of its serious lack of legitimacy among the Tibetans and partly because of the 
frequent mention of Tibet by Western leaders and indeed because of the headway the 
Tibetans were making in acquiring some types of support from the American government in 
the 1990s (More detail in Chapter Seven). During a televised press conference during the 
summit between President Bill Clinton and President Jiang Zemin in 1998, the latter 
surprised both the domestic population and the international community when he said, 
‘Actually, we are having several channels of communications with the Dalai Lama.’155 
Apparently, formal contact had been re-established in early 1997 and three rounds of 
exploratory talks had taken place.156 The excitement generated among the Tibetans was 
quickly dashed as the CCP ‘mouth-piece’ Xinhua published an article that claimed that Jiang 
Zemin accused the Dalai Lama of trying to ‘deceive public opinion’.157 This was closely 
followed by the Dalai Lama’s declaration that all formal channels for communication with 
Beijing had broken down.158 Rabgey and Sharlho argued that lack of consensus in Beijing 
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among the top leaders accounted for the failure of the short-lived initiative.159 Whatever the 
reasons, the dialogue process was dead even before it took off.  
However, a four-member Tibetan delegation suddenly travelled to Beijing in 
September 2002, beginning a new process of dialogue. At the time of finishing this 
dissertation (2011), this dialogue process is still active—officially at least—after nine rounds 
of talks by February 2010. However, the two sides are nowhere closer to beginning serious 
negotiations, let alone resolving the outstanding issues. The following section examines the 
Chinese behaviour in their dialogue with Dharamsala.  
 
State of Denial and Rejectionism in Dialogue 
Despite that apparently liberal opening, Chinese approach to the dialogue has been hard-line 
and rejectionist. First, Beijing’s formal position on Sino-Tibetan dialogue still conforms to 
the Hu Yaobang’s five-point proposal of 28 July, 1981,160 which dismissed the existence of a 
Tibetan issue and offered to talk only about the Dalai Lama’s return.161 Zhang Qingli, the 
former Party Secretary of TAR, told the German daily Spiegel:  ‘The current contacts merely 
involve a few individuals from his immediate surroundings. The talks revolve around his 
personal future.’162  Even talks about the Dalai Lama’s return have been saddled with pre-
conditions. During a televised news conference, Prime Minister Wen Jiabao said:  
Our policy towards the Dalai Lama is explicit and consistent. That is to say, as long as the Dalai 
Lama recognizes that Tibet is an inalienable part of China's territory, that Taiwan is an inalienable 
part of China's territory, and as long as he abandons separatist activities, then we can conduct 
dialogues with him over his personal career.163  
 
Perhaps, these public statements are part of Beijing’s diplomatic strategy,164 but the security 
concerns weigh heavily on such an uncompromising line. Acknowledging the existence of a 
‘Tibet Issue’ destroys the neat ideologically constructed edifice of liberation, equality, unity, 
legitimacy, stability and Tibetan contentment, and the sense of closure that Beijing has 
propagated in front of the Chinese and international publics. It would revive a host of 
uncomfortable historical, legal, political, territorial and moral questions surrounding China’s 
invasion and occupation of Tibet that Beijing thinks it has left behind long ago. Most 
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importantly, it would require Beijing to address the demands put forward by Dharamsala, 
which are perceived to have security implications for the Party-State. To sustain its ‘No Tibet 
Issue’ position, it is necessary to keep refuting the Dalai Lama’s proposals pertaining to the 
Tibetan interests and Tibet’s political status. Commentaries in China’s official press, 
recycling the same content under different authors and titles, dismiss the Dalai Lama’s 
proposals as negating the PRC constitution, being ‘independence in disguise’, as demanding 
the withdrawal of the PLA and Chinese settlers, and as ‘ethnic cleansing’. 
A 2006 commentary criticising the Dalai Lama’s Middle Way Approach that was 
widely propagated in the official media is illustrative. It observed that the Dalai Lama (1) 
refuses to accept Tibet as a part of China; (2) attempts to destroy the current political system; 
(3) is trying to create a ‘large Tibetan areas [Greater Tibet]’; and (4) distorts the ‘meaning of 
the autonomous region’ [through his argument that the provisions of the Autonomy Law are 
not being implemented sincerely].165 It goes on to charge that the Dalai Lama (1) seeks to 
create a peace zone in Tibet which requires China to violate its own national defence and 
sovereignty by withdrawing troops from Tibet; (2) wants to discriminate against and purge 
Tibet of non-Tibetans; (3) is under the influence of western anti-China forces; (4) pursues a 
‘swindle’ and really aims for Tibetan independence in the disguise of ‘high level autonomy’; 
(5) and changes his attitude according to prevailing international conditions.166 In front of the 
world’s media, Wen Jiabao also accused the Dalai Lama of demanding the withdrawal of the 
PLA and Chinese settlers in the Tibetan regions.167 Whether intentionally as diplomatic 
strategy or due to out-dated information about Dharamsala’s evolving positions (the next 
chapter discusses this), the above critique concerns the Dalai Lama’s proposals in the 1980s, 
much of which Dharamsala has taken off its agenda.168 Samdong Rinpoche confirmed that 
Dharamsala no longer demands demilitarisation and has only called for stopping the official 
policy of population transfer or regulation of Chinese migration, never the withdrawal of 
Chinese settlers.169 Beijing’s concerns over the security implications of acknowledging the 
existence of the ‘Tibet Issue’ and addressing the Dalai Lama’s remaining and modified 
demands are clear from the following analysis.  
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The next chapter chronicles the compromises and modifications of Dharamsala’s 
positions since 1979, but two demands have remained consistent throughout: ‘genuine 
autonomy’ and unification of all Tibetans under one administration. Dharamsala has defined 
autonomy and unification slightly differently over the recent decades to placate Beijing, but 
Beijing has invariably spurned its overtures, labelling them as separatist plots to achieve 
independence, revive feudalism, theocracy and as ethnic cleansing.  
When the Tibetans asked for Hong Kong-style ‘one country, two systems’ or Special 
Administrative Region (SAR) status in 1982, Beijing rebuffed them saying that unlike Hong 
Kong and Taiwan, Tibet had already been liberated and enjoyed the socialist economic 
system like China.170 Beijing has subsequently repeatedly rejected SAR status for Tibet with 
that same argument and charged that the Dalai Lama is trying to restore ‘feudal serfdom’ 171 
and seeking a ‘back door route to independence.’172 Next, when the Dalai Lama demanded a 
liberal democratic, internally autonomous Tibet, with foreign affairs and defence in Beijing’s 
hands at Strasbourg (1988) Beijing rejected this outright as ‘independence in disguise’ or 
‘two countries, two systems.’173 Dharamsala’s new post-2002 formulation of ‘meaningful 
autonomy’ within the framework of the PRC’s Constitution and Autonomy Law, which 
represents important modifications from how autonomy and unification were defined in the 
1980s, not to mention from its clearly pro-independence stance before that, has not fared any 
better in China.174 Beijing has rejected this too, arguing that the Dalai Lama’s ‘high degree 
autonomy’ really seeks to overthrow China's social system, meaning socialism and the 
CCP.175 In 2006, Yedor contended that ‘nothing stands between his [Dalai Lama’s] “high-
level autonomy” and “Tibetan independence.”’ Dharamsala’s most recent proposal for 
Tibetan autonomy, ‘Memorandum on Genuine Autonomy for The Tibetan People’, which 
was submitted to Beijing in 2008, was summarily dismissed as a separatist plot as well. 
However Dharamsala defined autonomy and however much it foreswore independence, 
Beijing has unfailingly branded them as separatist plots.  
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Beijing has also rejected Dharamsala’s demand for unification as requiring 
‘unconstitutional’ and ‘illegal’ border adjustments and as a plot to ‘eventually seeking 
Tibetan independence.’176 To be sure, China has adjusted provincial borders elsewhere taking 
into account economic, administrative and security factors.  
Beijing’s oft-cited justification for rejecting the Dalai Lama’s proposals is that the two 
key demands violate the Chinese constitution, Autonomy Law and the socialist political 
system and threaten China’s sovereignty, territorial integrity and national unification.177 In 
short, they are considered as separatist threats to the Party-State’s security and control over 
Tibet. The charge that the Dalai Lama is plotting ‘Tibetan independence’ is likely motivated 
by Chinese insecurities regarding how future generations of Tibetans will think and behave, 
especially in the context of a weakened and embattled China. Beijing’s rejection of 
Dharamsala’s proposals also reveals institutional vulnerability and regime insecurity in Tibet.  
In any case, Beijing’s unyielding stance during the nine rounds of talks between 
September 2002 and February 2010 took its toll on Dharamsala. In 2008, the Dalai Lama said 
that he was losing faith in the Chinese government’s commitment to finding a solution.178 On 
10 March, 2010, he said, ‘Judging by the attitude of the present Chinese leadership, there is 
little hope that a result will be achieved soon.’179 Unless Beijing makes a dramatically 
positive gesture, this dialogue process appears to be heading towards a collapse.  
How do the Tibetans perceive the state-building policies and practices examined 
above? The next chapter opens by examining the identity insecurity generated among the 
Tibetans by these Chinese policies and how they have been implemented in Tibet. The 
Tibetan identity insecurity will be discussed in terms of vertical state policies, horizontal 
cultural influences and Chinese migration. But first, if security concerns weigh so heavily on 
Beijing’s policy in Tibet and dialogue with the Dalai Lama, a more coherent understanding of 
the security threats that Beijing and local officials perceive in Tibet is necessary. The next 
section is dedicated for this purpose. 
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Threat Perceptions in Beijing and Lhasa 
It is true that some people in the Dalai clique wish to work for the "Tibet 
independence". But they know that the balance of forces and the situation do not 
allow them to do so. Once they believe the situation is advantageous to them, 
clearly, they will do whatever they please. 
 
Zhu Weiqun, Executive Vice-Minister of the United Front Work Department of the 
CPC Central Committee; Chief Interlocutor in the Sino-Tibetan dialogue.   
 
Insights from the security studies literature dealing with non-western states tell us that states 
are concerned or ‘obsessed,’ in the words of Ayoob, with both state and regime security.180 In 
fact, state and regime security are deliberately entwined by rulers in these states to legitimise 
their selfish ends.181 State security is a loaded concept that encompasses a variety of material 
and ideational interests and values ranging from sovereignty, territorial integrity, institutional 
structure, ideology, national identity, legitimacy and national image.182 Both internal 
challenges (secessionism or autonomy movements by ethno-national, religious, linguistic and 
ideological minority groups, revolutions, coups etc.) and external military interventions and 
peaceful evolution strategies threaten these interests.183 This is clearly the case with respect to 
China’s security practice in Tibet. 
Wu Xinbo argues that in the post-Mao Chinese security practice, state and regime are 
the ‘key referents of security’ and that ethnic groups, mainly the Tibetans, Uyghur and 
Mongols, constitute one of the chief threats to state and regime security because they identify 
neither with the state nor with the regime.184 The minorities’ security goals clash with those 
of the nationalising Party-State. Wu also contends that China’s post-Mao security practices 
are a continuation of Mao’s obsession with state and regime securities, but the scope of 
security has broadened from military and political dimensions to include ‘social, economic, 
scientific and technological elements.’185 Wu identifies five broad goals of China’s 
contemporary security policy: economic growth, preserving territorial integrity, consolidating 
regime security, maintaining a favourable strategic balance and expanding international 
influence.186 Yizhou Wang compiled a similar list of objectives: managing great power 
relations, settling the Taiwan issue and containing other separatist hot-spots, stabilising 
sovereignty disputes around its coastal and land borders, protecting Chinese interests abroad, 
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and taking international responsibilities befitting a great power.187 Regime security is absent 
because Wang’s focus is state security in the ‘period of peaceful development,’ but it is 
central to Beijing’s security calculus.188 Relevant official documents corroborate these points. 
Article 4 (1) of The State Security Law of the PRC reveals three broad referent objects 
for China’s state security: the government and the Party leadership, the political system and 
state.189 Article 23 identifies external ‘organisations, groups and individuals’ working alone 
or through internal ‘organisations, groups and individuals’ as threats to China’s national 
security. The State Security Department of Tibet Autonomous Region (TAR) elaborates on 
the referents, perceived threats and the internal-external linkages:  
State security means…a country’s independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity [from being] 
threatened or invaded by foreign forces…that the country’s political and economic systems will 
not be overturned; economic progress, national harmony and social stability are not threatened; 
that state secrets are not stolen; that state functionaries will not be incited to rebellion; and that 
state bodies are not infiltrated…. The work of safeguarding state security covers…national 
defence, foreign affairs, struggle on the covert front…public security, ideology, culture, 
economics, science and technology.190 
 
These documents confirm that in countries like China, the line between state and regime 
security is blurred191and that domestic and international conflicts, or ‘class struggles’ as the 
Chinese documents sometimes refer to, are inter-connected.192 In short, the Tibetans and their 
perceived foreign ‘patrons’ are seen as threatening the material and ideational values that 
underpin the security of the Party-State.193 Wu captures the insecurity dilemma in Tibet 
(Xinjiang and Inner Mongolia):  
Central government policies that tighten control over minority areas are perceived by these groups 
as threats to their political autonomy and cultural traditions; the central government, for its part, 
views some of these groups’ activities as threats to national unity.194  
 
In the following section, Chinese security concerns in Tibet will be discussed in terms of 
three analytically separate, but practically overlapping categories: political security, societal 
security and military security. 
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Political Security Concerns 
Political security challenges include the threat of Tibetan secessionism to sovereignty, 
territory and resources, and Tibetan Buddhism’s challenge to the official ideologies. The 
Tibetans’ democratic agenda and alternative institutional recommendations threaten the state 
institutions and laws underpinning the Leninist political system, the most important of which 
are the Constitution, the Autonomy Law and the RNA system through which China controls 
Tibet. The Fear of peaceful evolution (heping yanbian) strategy to change China politically 
by smuggling in Western ideas is a recurrent theme in the official discourses. The legitimacy 
of Chinese policies and its rule over Tibet is constantly assailed through a combination of 
Tibetan protests and international criticism. The centrality of the Dalai Lama to all of China’s 
insecurities in Tibet, owing to his historical role and current stature inside Tibet and 
international popularity, is apparent.  
Regime survival, sovereignty and territorial integrity top Beijing’s priority in Tibet.195 
Chinese officials routinely contend that the Tibet issue concerns ‘China's sovereignty and 
territorial integrity, and anti-splittist undertakings.’196 In the wake of the 2008 Tibetan 
uprising, President Hu Jintao defended the violent crackdown by arguing that sovereignty is 
at stake: ‘It is a problem either to safeguard national unification or to split the motherland.’197 
Prime Minister Wen Jiaobao said during a press conference that the Tibet issue ‘concern the 
issues of China's reunification, sovereignty, and territorial integrity.’198 Accordingly, Chinese 
authorities brand dissident views inside Tibet and the Dalai Lama’s autonomy proposals as 
separatism, hence violation of its sovereignty and territorial integrity. Zhu Weiqun, executive 
vice minister of the United Front Work Department and one of the chief interlocutors in the 
dialogue process, assailed Dharamsala’s Middle Way approach: ‘By denying China's 
sovereignty over Tibet, the Dalai Lama is seeking a legal basis for his activities of ‘Tibet 
independence’, ‘semi-independence’ and ‘independence in a disguised form.’199 Sita, Vice-
Minister of the United Front Work Department and another interlocutor on the Chinese side 
said during a press Conference in Washington DC that the Tibet ‘issue involves China's 
sovereignty and territorial integrity.’200 Beijing’s consistent rejection of the Tibetan demand 
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for unifying all Tibetans under one administrative is partly calculated to minimise the loss of 
territory in the event of successful Tibetan separatism in the future.201 This demonstrates that 
concerns over sovereignty and territory are heavily influenced by Chinese uncertainties about 
future intentions of the Tibetans. Beijing’s response to the Dalai Lama’s demands for 
meaningful autonomy and unification is characteristic of the worst-case assumption of actors 
caught in the insecurity dilemma. Historical experience from the Chinese perspective also 
exacerbated the worst-case calculation. Accounting for Beijing’s intransigence in the early 
1980s, Goldstein wrote: 
On the Chinese side, opponents of Hu Yaobang’s Tibet moderation policy….explicitly saw this 
[Dharamsala’s criticism on human rights and prevarication in dialogue] as déjà vu—a replay of 
what they considered the duplicitous behaviour of the Dalai Lama and his government in the 
1950s.202 
 
Hard-liners in the 1990s and thereafter could similarly argue that Hu Yaobang’s liberal 
policies in the 1980s only led to protests and riots in Lhasa and justify their policies in Tibet. 
Overtures made to the Dalai Lama, such as inviting his delegations for talks, inviting him 
personally to Beijing to officiate the Panchen Lama’s funeral rites and involving him in the 
search for Panchen Lama’s reincarnation were not reciprocated, in Beijing’s view, with 
appropriate behaviour and reasonable demands. This memory of the past is likely to colour 
present expectations of future Tibetan intentions and actions.  
No wonder then that a People’s Daily commentary characterised the Dalai Lama’s 
Middle Way approach as a blue-print for achieving Tibetan independence in two stages: ‘His 
so-called “middle way'” equates with the “high-level autonomy”– the first stage of his 
seeking the independence of Tibet, a circumstance the central government will never 
accept.’203 Another critique of MWA asserted that ‘all people with a sober mind can see that 
what the Dalai Lama does is his plan to dish out his “Tibetan independence” when conditions 
ripen again according to his own standards.’204 A commentary carried by many official 
mouthpieces in 2006 dismissed the Tibetan demand for unification as driven by the ‘ulterior 
motive’ of ‘eventually seeking Tibetan independence.’205 As Zhu Weiqun said above, ‘Once 
they believe the situation is advantageous to them, they [Tibetans] will do whatever they 
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please [seek independence].’ Beijing’s insistence on the Dalai Lama to publicly declare that 
Tibet and Taiwan have been historically inalienable parts of China is designed to weaken the 
moral and legal force of future secessionist movements.206 Wang Lixiong brings out clearly 
the security imperatives, the uncertainties and worst-case calculations guiding Beijing’s 
policies and positions on Tibet.207 
While the Dalai Lama per se might be sincere, as to whether he can control coming developments, 
and as to how those who come after him will act, he has no control. So when considering the 
future prospects of the Tibet matter, we have to see Tibetan independence as a possibility that will 
always exist, rather than holding simplistically that just because the Dalai Lama says that he is 
not seeking independence, there will be no further Tibetan independence matter. As to the Tibetan 
independence matter, even if we do not consider it from the perspective of values such as "a 
righteous national cause," we at least have a bottom line that no country in today's world should 
overlook: national security. In the world's political shifts, anything could happen. To cope with 
such a world, we need to govern our country from the perspective of the worst possibility, not 
placing our hopes on the best one.208 
 
This is more representative of the currently prevailing official view point than anything 
resembling Wang Lixiong’s liberal, Tibet-friendly views today.209 
In May 2006, Lhakpa Phuntsok of China Tibetology Research Center (CTRC) gave 
another reason for rejecting the Tibetan demands of ‘meaningful autonomy’ and unification: 
it requires changing the Chinese constitution and nationality autonomy laws.210 In the 
commentary mentioned above, Yedor charged that the Dalai Lama’s demands for genuine 
autonomy or ‘one country, two systems’ are threats to the CCP rule, socialist political system 
and state institutions:  
In a nutshell, the CPC leadership, the socialist system, the people's congress system and the 
national regional autonomy in Tibet, which have been in place in Tibet for decades in accordance 
with the PRC Constitution, should all be refuted, and a whole new system introduced according to 
what he says “real autonomy.”211  
 
A more recent article reveals the same concern for the survival of the existing political 
system and state institutions and by implication the CCP.212 This particular concern has 
become a permanent feature of virtually every major critique of Middle Way approach. The 
upshot is that Beijing perceives threats to the political system and state institutions and laws 
that bind Tibet to China, allows China to control Tibetan activities and keeps the CCP in 
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power in China. Any erosion of the force of RNA, the Autonomy Law and the Constitution as 
currently designed and practised is seen as undermining CCP rule and Chinese control over 
Tibet.213 This explains the dogged resistance against the Dalai Lama’s proposals, which 
require at least some revisions if not a fundamental re-writing and redesigning of these laws 
and institutions. 
The Tibetans also pose ideological challenges to Beijing. Tibetan Buddhism was a 
formidable challenge to communism during the Maoist years.214 Buddhism is a principal 
pillar of Tibetan identity and source of national pride. As Goldstein writes, ‘Tibetans saw 
religion [Buddhism] as a symbol of their country’s identity and of the superiority of their 
civilisation.’215 Naturally, defence of faith [?@] was the rallying cry of the Tibetan 
guerrillas when they rose up in revolt against the Chinese communists between the mid-
1950s and 1974.216 Their armed group Four Rivers, Six Ranges [A
tibB] was also 
called the Volunteer Force for Defence of the Faith [?@		tib]. Monks and nuns 
were at the forefront of the pro-independence demonstrations in Lhasa between 1987 and 
2011.217 Monasteries and nunneries in Tibet are hotbeds of Tibetan nationalism. The 2008 
uprising began with peaceful demonstrations of monks and nuns in Lhasa.218 Because it 
underpins contemporary Tibetan nationalism, Tibetan Buddhism clashes with Chinese 
nationalistic goals in Tibet.219  
Moreover, it is not lost to the Chinese analysts and leaders that when the Mongols 
conquered much of Asia including Tibet, Tibetan lamas converted the Mongol Khans and 
their subjects to Tibetan Buddhism.220 When the Manchus overran China, the Tibetans had 
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already converted the Qing Emperors to Tibetan Buddhism.221 As such, Beijing’s hostility 
toward Tibetan Buddhism even as it promotes Buddhism as a home-grown religion that 
promotes harmony and stability222 is not surprising. Beijing’s domestic and international 
media strategy of portraying Tibetan monks, including the Dalai Lama, as violent and riotous 
criminals and ‘terrorists’ in the wake of the recent uprising can be understood as moves to 
prevent the growing popularity of Tibetan Buddhism in China from becoming a stronger 
ideological challenge against the CCP. The same is intended to neutralise the Dalai Lama’s 
and Tibetan Buddhism’s international appeal, which poses political and diplomatic 
challenges for Beijing. 
Another ideological challenge, possibly to a lesser degree, is the Tibetan vision of a 
liberal democratic future for Tibet. One of the Dalai Lama’s key demands in the Five Point 
Peace Plan and the Strasbourg Proposal was the introduction of a democratic political 
system in Tibet, until recently a major component of the Middle Way Approach.223 Although 
democracy no longer appears to be a formal demand in the talks, the Dalai Lama makes no 
secret of his admiration for democracy. In his last 10th March statement, the Dalai Lama 
urged China to ‘follow the modern trend in terms of developing a more open society, free 
press and policy transparency.’224 These sentiments have found concrete practice in the 
incremental democratisation of the exile government culminating in the Dalai Lama’s 
devolution of all his political powers to elected officials in 2011.225 Norbu argues that 
ideological conservatives in Beijing object to the democratic aspirations of the Tibetans 
because the ‘Western capitalist political system’ negates the ‘superior socialist system in 
Tibet.’226 Predictably, Beijing seeks to undermine the democratic credentials of the exile 
government. An article on Xinhua noted that the ‘Dalai clique had been using every 
opportunity to talking its [sic] democratic achievements for years, while some Western forces 
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have also been trying to portrait Dalai as the symbol of democracy (sic).’227 It concluded, 
‘[A]nyone who knows the Dalai clique would be able to tell that it is an autocratic theocracy 
that is anything but democracy (sic).’ Wen Jiabao made the same point to Fareed Zakaria.228 
To be sure, painting the Dalai Lama, Tibetan exiles and monks in Tibet in a negative light is a 
response to the cultural diplomacy of the Tibetans inside and outside China to reduce the 
international appeal of the Tibetan cause (more on this later in Chapters Six and Seven). 
Although it is hard to establish how widespread democratic thoughts are in Tibet, 
there is some evidence that Tibetans in Tibet desire democracy and its associated rights.229 As 
early as 1988 monks distributed copies of ‘The Meaning of the Precious Democratic 
Constitution of Tibet,’ portrayed as a liberal democratic constitution for a free Tibet.230 They 
were given lengthy prison sentences. Schwartz notes:  
The severity of the sentences, intensely ideological denunciation of the “crimes,” and the public 
spectacle of a mass sentencing rally indicate how seriously the Chinese government perceives the 
threat posed by the ideas of the Drepung monks.231 
 
All three post-Mao leaders have made it clear that western-style democracy has no place in 
China and Tibetan aspirations for democracy militate against CCP rule in Tibet and the 
Leninist political system there. Furthermore, in the Tibetan demand for democracy, Beijing 
perceives the designs of Western countries to topple the CCP and undermine China’s rise. 
The spectre of ‘peaceful evolution’ haunts the CCP elite and Tibetan demands for democracy 
are seen as a Trojan horse of hostile countries.232 A critique of the Dalai Lama’s positions in 
Beijing Review assails the demand for democracy in exactly these terms: ‘By such 
sentiments, the Dalai Lama is attempting to sing the praises of the Western capitalist system 
and negate socialism.’233 
Furthermore, if Tibet is given greater autonomy or democracy, Beijing fears that 
Uyghurs and Mongols will demand the same causing a ‘chain reaction among other minority 
ethnic groups.’234 Rex Li argues, ‘To grant more independence to Tibet, Chinese leaders fear, 
would encourage other regions to break away from the centre, thus jeopardizing China’s 
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“national unity and territorial integrity.”’235 Moreover, in today’s highly nationalistic context 
in China, any loosening of Chinese rule in Tibet would undermine the CCP’s own position in 
China. Hence, Beijing always dismisses the Dalai Lama’s Middle Way with the argument 
that it requires changing the apparently sacrosanct Chinese constitution and autonomy 
laws.236 In Beijing’s view, tampering with these institutions is a slippery slope and represents 
a reversal of the state-building gains that it believes it has achieved in Tibet since 1949.  
In fact, allegations of collusion between Tibetans and hostile forces are made on the 
entirety of the Tibetan agenda, not just its democratic component. Phuntsok of TAR State 
Security Department concluded his report on state security: 
Domestic and international class struggles are always linked together. International hostile forces 
always try every possible way to cultivate similar forces on the domestic front as their "internal 
responsive forces" to subvert the socialist system, whereas domestic hostile forces always regard 
their foreign counterparts as their patrons and draw support from them.237 
 
Zhang Qingli, TAR Party Secretary, accused the Dalai Lama of travelling world-wide to 
‘form alliances with anti-Chinese forces.’238 Concerns about a nexus between Tibetan 
‘separatists’ and foreign rivals are not entirely unfounded given the presence of Tibet lobbies 
in Washington, Brussels, London and Berlin. More importantly, in the 1950s and 1960s, 
America gave covert military support to Tibetan guerrillas fighting the Chinese invasion of 
Tibet.239 Tibet is a problem in US-China relations,240 Sino-Indian, Canadian-US and Sino-
European relations. The next chapter examines the role that Tibet plays in each of these 
important bilateral relations. Suffice it to say here that some Chinese analysts and specialists 
in foreign affairs see Tibet as a serious ‘weak link in China’s political system.... vulnerable to 
manipulation by hostile forces’.241 
 If ‘politics is...also a contest over legitimacy,’ as Nye argued,242 then China’s Tibet 
policy, if not its rule, is vulnerable to Tibetan protests and campaigning and international 
condemnation. As Smith argues, ‘The legitimacy of Chinese sovereignty [over Tibet] is so 
sensitive for China that it cannot be flexible on any issue relevant to that legitimacy, 
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including the nature of Tibetan autonomy within the Chinese State.’243 Zhu Feng also senses 
a relevance to regime legitimacy: ‘competing national allegiances within China and an 
inefficient state apparatus...undermine leadership legitimacy and stability.’244 In this contest 
for legitimacy, historical representations and symbols have come to play prominent roles.245 
The conflict over legitimacy is not just about history and sovereignty, but also about the very 
idea of China as constructed and propagandised by the CCP.246 As Sperling contends: 
Indeed, to question the legitimacy of Tibet’s incorporation into the PRC is to question the 
legitimacy of the idea of the Chinese state as constructed by the Chinese Communist Party; it is to 
raise questions against the cultural and political nationalism that has been fostered within the PRC 
and that has taken root both inside and outside official party and governmental circles....Tibet’s 
history has become a fundamental and existential issue, one that has significant bearing on the 
modern identity of China.247 
 
 Such being the case, Beijing’s frequent accusation that the Dalai Lama is seeking Tibetan 
independence based on his refusal to accept that Tibet has always been an integral part of 
China speaks to the insecurity of historical legitimacy.248 This anxiety over legitimacy also 
explains the ubiquitous genitive such as in ‘China’s Tibet,’ ‘Tibet, China’ or ‘Tibet of China’ 
in Chinese websites, books, magazines and exhibitions that simultaneously reveals the 
possessiveness and insecurity over Tibet.249  
 
Societal Security Concerns 
Furthermore, societal insecurity is set off by expressions of Tibetan nationalism and assertion 
of identity. The ‘national’ identity of an over-arching Chinese ‘nation’ (zhonghua minzu) 
consisting of the 56 nationalities that the CCP and previous Chinese nationalists have been 
trying to construct is frustrated by the persistence of a strong Tibetan identity.250  As noted 
above, questioning China’s historical claim over Tibet and incorporation of Tibet also 
questions contemporary Chinese national identity.  
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The assertion of Tibetan identity and the growing Chinese interest in Tibetan 
Buddhism pose a challenge to Chinese civilisation, whether it is construed as Confucianist or 
socialist. Furthermore, Tibetan nationalism militates against Chinese nationalism in both its 
state-led and Han-supremacist varieties.251 Tibetan nationalism also negates both the 
traditional Chinese practice of frontier security through cultural assimilation and the Marxist 
expectation of national differences and religious beliefs to wither away in the process of 
socialist transformation. As Buzan and Hansen wrote societal security is relevant ‘where the 
state, or other political actors, mobilised society to confront internal or external threats.’252 
 
Military-Strategic Concerns 
In view of the fact that the PLA is the Party’s army charged with defending both the Party 
and state, the above political security themes are relevant to military security too. In addition, 
Tibetan secessionism or any autonomy arrangement that curtails the presence and scope of 
PLA activities in Tibet threatens the strategic advantage that the Tibetan plateau proffers 
from a military point of view and the consequent vulnerability of the Chinese heartland.253 
This threat to strategic interests could arise from potential Tibetan insurrections as well as 
from external adversaries such as India. The security of Chinese migrants in Tibetan areas is 
an unstated military security remit in the same way that the armies of European empires 
provided security to western colonists, traders and missionaries in the colonies.  
The Dalai Lama’s demand in the 1980s for demilitarisation of Tibet fed fears of future 
Tibetan insurrections254 as well as Indian military threats.255 Demilitarisation and declaration 
of Tibet as a zone of peace is no longer on the exile’s agenda, but Beijing continues to dwell 
on these issues as obstacles to dialogue.256 A demilitarised Tibet will become easier for 
Tibetan nationalists to renew their armed insurrection and easier for India to regain a foothold 
in Tibet. The 10, 000 Tibetans soldiers of the Special Frontier Force (SFF) in the Indian 
army, who played critical roles in the Indo-Pakistan wars and domestic crises, compounds 
these concerns.257 Wang Lixiong brought out most clearly the military-strategic logic of 
Beijing’s security fears, arguing that a non-Chinese Tibet would inevitably be pulled into 
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India’s embrace and the Indian army will have free run on the Tibetan plateau making the 
Chinese heartland easy targets for Indian troops and missiles. He wrote that ‘preparing for a 
possible future conflict with India is the bottom line as to why the…Central Government 
cannot retreat or compromise on the demands for Tibetan independence or covert 
independence.’258 Tibet, he warned, is China’s ‘fatal “underbelly”’. 
As pervasive as such calculation is to the Chinese officialdom today, it predates the 
formation of the PRC. Republican Chinese officials in the 1910s expressed similar 
assessments: ‘Tibet is a buttress on our national frontiers—the hand, as it were, which 
protects the face—and its prosperity or otherwise is of the most vital importance to China.’259 
Such statements leave no doubts as to the military-strategic value of Tibet for China and help 
explain the active role the PLA and other security forces play in Tibet policy making. For 
Beijing, it seems immaterial whether Tibetans are demanding independence or autonomy; 
autonomy is just another stage to independence. Indeed, as the Tibetan proverb goes, the 
Tibetans are betrayed by their hopefulness, the Chinese by their suspiciousness.260 
Inasmuch as the Dalai Lama is the most potent symbol of Tibet’s separateness from 
China—he was the temporal and spiritual head of Tibet before the Chinese invasion—he is 
somehow relevant to all the insecurities discussed above. Henry Kissinger described Konrad 
Adenauer, the post-World War II German Chancellor, as endowed with a ‘serenity which was 
startling in the leader of an occupied country’ and credits him for ‘restoring self-respect to his 
occupied, demoralised, and divided society.’261 The Dalai Lama has played a similar role for 
the Tibetans in far more difficult circumstances, but he has transcended his traditional role to 
become a celebrated global moral leader.262 In a survey ‘World Leaders’ conducted for 
France-24 and International Herald Tribune by Harris Interactive, the Dalai Lama was voted 
the most respected world leader by Western Europeans and Americans.263 The loyalty of 
most Tibetans to the Dalai Lama and his international stature constitutes a dilemma for 
Beijing: whether to meet his minimal demands and risk a nationalist upsurge in Tibet around 
his leadership or to wait him out, hoping that the Tibetan movement will fizzle out after his 
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death, and risk inevitably more Tibetan resentment without a unified Tibetan leadership to 
deal with. Since 1994, an anti-Dalai Lama campaign has been going on in the monasteries, 
nunneries, workplaces, schools and colleges.264 He is persona non grata in Tibet and the 
target of virtually all the political campaigns in Tibet. Beijing is also conducting a campaign 
of isolation and denial of political space for the Tibetans on the international arena, cajoling, 
pressuring and bullying leaders of foreign governments from meeting and engaging with the 
Dalai Lama.  
Yet, he remains as popular as ever among most Tibetans inside and outside Tibet.265 
Wang described the Dalai Lama’s power: 
Unfortunately for Beijing, a Dalai Lama exists among the exiled Tibetans. He cannot be vilified or 
forgotten; to all Tibetans, he is a “Bodhisattva” who gives meaning to life and significance to the 
pursuit of human life. In the face of such a Bodhisattva, secular power, armed force, and political 
schemes seem to be no match.266 
 
Wang may have been a bit carried away here, but many in China, particularly the United 
Front Department, hope that the Tibet issue will disappear when he passes away.267 
In summing up this section, China’s perception of security threats concerning Tibet 
cut across the divides between the so-called traditional and new security issues, 
encompassing both material and ideational concerns. It is to remove these threats and 
insecurities that Beijing has deployed the state-building policies analysed in the first section 
of this chapter. It will also be these pre-existing threats and insecurities that would be 
heightened as a result of the Tibetan positions and activities that will be analysed in the next 
chapter. 
 
Conclusion 
China’s Nationality Policy is driven by insecurity and geared towards mitigating that 
insecurity through state-building. Beijing’s Tibet Policy too is dictated by and designed to 
address her security challenges in Tibet through state-building in its institutional-, 
infrastructure- and nation-building dimensions, while its policy towards the Dalai Lama has 
been designed to protect the apparent gains in state-building achieved since 1959.  
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In the late 1980s, a number of domestic, transnational and global events conspired to 
heighten Beijing’s Tibet insecurities enough for it to impose martial law and adopt a hard-line 
assimilationist policy in 1989. China’s security fears in Tibet relate to sovereignty, territorial 
integrity, legitimacy, Marxist and nationalist ideologies, the Leninist political system and 
state institutions, national identity and image and regime survival in the context of perceived 
alliances between Tibetan separatists and hostile foreign forces. These political, societal and 
military fears arise both from uncertainty about the future Tibetan intentions and past 
experience in dealing with the Tibetans. The distinction between security challenges to the 
state, nation and regime emanating from Tibet are blurred because the CCP practically owns 
the state and its leaders and apparatchiks are essentially Chinese nationalists.  
A variety of state-building instruments ranging from violent force to softer hearts-
and-minds approaches have been deployed: military invasion, Nationality Identification 
Project, RNA, economic development, political campaigns and the United Front. Reducing 
Chinese insecurities in Tibet through infrastructure-, institution-, and nation-building are the 
key objectives of these policy instruments. In its dialogue with Dharamsala, Beijing has 
simply resorted to stone-walling and extracting maximum concessions from the aging Dalai 
Lama and his desperate flock. This is clear from Beijing’s consistent refusal to acknowledge 
even the existence of a Tibet issue and rejecting proposal after proposal from Dharamsala. 
The security implications of recognising and addressing Dharamsala’s demands explain this 
conservative behaviour as much as its confidence in its rising power. 
The next chapter looks at Tibetan identity insecurity bred by the above mentioned 
policies implemented by Beijing and its local officials. It also examines the various strategies 
and instruments that the Tibetans have used both inside and outside Tibet to reduce their 
insecurity.  
 
  
172 
 
Chapter 6 
Identity Insecurity and the Tibetan National Struggle 
 
In the previous chapter, we examined the links between Chinese insecurities and the post-
1989 policies of rejecting political liberalisation, ruthless enforcement of stability and rapid 
economic development inside Tibet and the side-lining of the Dalai Lama—the so-called 
‘grasping with both hands’ approach brought in by Hu Jintao—and the various policy-
instruments employed to achieve Beijing’s state-building objectives. The chapter also 
attempted a more detailed and coherent exposition of the Chinese insecurities or perceived 
security challenges in relation to Tibet.  
This chapter will first examine the Tibetan identity insecurity created by the Chinese 
policies, practices and externalities examined in the previous chapter in terms of three 
overlapping sources: ‘assimilationist’ state policies, migration and cultural imperialism. The 
chapter then examines how the Tibetans have responded to that identity insecurity. To that 
end, the various strategies and instruments used by the Tibetans, both inside and outside 
Tibet, to counter the threats from Chinese policies, migration and cultural practices will be 
examined. This analysis will reveal the political divisions among the Tibetans in terms of the 
objectives that they seek to achieve, although united by their common fears for identity and 
loyalty to the Dalai Lama. In the end, this chapter will link back to Chapter Five by 
explaining how the Tibetan strategies and activities heighten the Chinese sense of the security 
challenges examined in the previous chapter and the policy implications, thereby completing 
the cycle of the insecurity dilemma. 
 
Tibetan Societal Insecurity 
 tibtib	
	tib
	tibtibtib		tib	 tibtibtibtib	
tib
	
 tib	tib

tibtib tib
tib	 
Tibetan brethren do not fall asleep under the deception of the Chinese. Wake up fighting for your 
nation, religion, language and national consciousness! 
Protest leaflet distributed during a mass protest on 25 
August, 2011, Serta County, Kartze TAP, Sichuan. 
 
As explained before, the concept of societal security is deployed to understand Tibetan 
identity insecurity. To recapitulate, societal security is about identity just as state security is 
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about sovereignty. Societal insecurity develops when a group defines a particular 
‘development or potentiality’ as a threat to its identity, i.e. survival as a distinct community. 
The threats perceived by members of that group fall into three analytically distinct but 
practically intertwined themes of vertical assimilationist state policies, migration and 
horizontally homogenising cultural imperialism. Depopulation is relevant when the identity 
of the group is targeted. As the Copenhagen School posits, these threats range from 
‘intentional, programmatic and political...to unintended and structural.’1 The Dalai Lama 
often complains that Tibetan culture faces threats from ‘intentional’ state policies and 
practices and unintentional socio-economic consequences of these policies.2 For most 
Tibetans inside and outside Tibet, survival and protection of their national identity has 
become the core objective of their struggle. In his 10 March, 2008 address on the anniversary 
of the 1959 Lhasa uprising, the Dalai Lama said:  
[A]s a result of their policy of population transfer the non-Tibetan population has increased many 
times, reducing native Tibetans to an insignificant minority in their own country. Moreover, the 
language, customs and traditions of Tibet, which reflect the true nature and identity of the Tibetan 
people, are gradually fading away. As a consequence, Tibetans are increasingly being assimilated 
into the larger Chinese population.3  
 
He accuses the Chinese government of conducting ‘cultural genocide’ in Tibet,4 by which he 
means the erosion of Tibetan identity as a result of both assimilationist policies and 
unintended structural and socio-economic consequences.5  
This fear for Tibetan identity is shared by most Tibetans inside Tibet. Germano 
observed a ‘deep, abiding cultural depression among...the educated youth and religious elite 
to nomads and villagers.’6 Tibetans lament ‘that their religious and intellectual as well as 
political situation is hopeless, given the continuing Chinese cultural and political onslaught.’7 
One gets an appreciation of this anxiety about identity from Tibetan language blogs, literary 
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magazines and popular media emerging from Tibet.8 The case of Kartze TAP in Sichuan is 
illustrative of the outcome of these pressures on Tibetan identity. Derong Tsering Dhondup, a 
Tibetan official and intellectual from Kartze, carried out an investigation of 6,044 Tibetan 
cadres in the Karze (Ch. Ganzi) Tibetan Autonomous Prefecture and found that  
Only 991 cadres, 16.4% of the total, knew the Tibetan written language. In Kanding it was 3.1%, 
Bathang 5.3%, Lithang 9.9%, Ganzi 21.6%, Xinlong 9.5%, Derge 38.7%, Baiyu [Palyul] 13.2%, 
Serxu 30.7% and Serta 15%.9 
 
He also carried out an investigation involving 25 Tibetan students at a Middle School in 
Kangding (Tib. Dhartse mdo) and found that  
...5 of them, ie., 20%, could make fluent conversation in the Tibetan language for any occasion; 4 
people, ie., 16%, could only make conversation in Tibetan for ordinary occasions; 9 people (36%) 
could understand Tibetan language but could only speak it for everyday use; and 7 people (28%) 
could understand it but could not even speak in Tibetan for everyday use.10 
 
Dhondup laments that the ‘rich, fine language and literature’ of Tibet will disappear in a 
generation.11 He attributes this state of affairs to (1) ‘the mistaken idea of speeding up the 
fusion of nationalities’, (2) ‘The erroneous view that there is “no use for the written Tibetan 
language”’ and (3) ‘the lack of self-respect and pride amongst Tibetans.’12 How do these 
Tibetan fears for the survival of their identity manifest in concrete terms? 
 
‘Assimilationist’ Policies and Vertical Threats 
In the previous chapter, I argued that Beijing seeks to reduce its insecurity in Tibet through a 
policy that consists of the manipulation of ethnic identity, affirmative action, economic 
development, political campaigns, the United Front and RNA. Tibetans feel that these 
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instruments directly threaten the core pillars of Tibetan identity. These state policies and 
practices also exacerbate Tibetan fears of Chinese migration and cultural imperialism.13 
Tibetans see RNA as a charade in which the key positions of power are held by Han 
Chinese and Tibetans are powerless.14 An official publication of TGIE argues: 
Tibetans have little or no say in running their own affairs. All the decisions of the administration 
are taken by the Chinese Communist Party through its Regional CCP....Tibetan people's 
participation in the government is only to rubber stamp Communist Party decisions. Tibetans on 
the plateau do not hold any key positions—even within the "TAR" Communist Party. The 
Secretary of the "TAR" Communist Party is the most powerful position in the "TAR" and this 
post has been held by Chinese since 1959....The population of half of Tibet—living in eastern 
regions now merged into neighbouring Chinese provinces—are completely deprived of their 
political identity and labelled an insignificant minority nationality in their own land.15  
 
Further, Tibetans argue that the division of Tibetans into separate nominally autonomous 
prefectures, counties and TAR has ‘contributed to the weakening and erosion of [the Tibetan] 
nationality's unique identity and characteristics, as well as its ability to grow and develop.’16 
When the NPC passed the law on regional autonomy in May 1984, the Tibetans in Tibet 
dismissed it as ‘thunder that does not bring any rain’ because of the various obstacles 
identified in the previous chapter.17 Phunwang characterised Beijing’s existing policy in Tibet 
as ‘assimilationist’18 and endorsed the Dalai Lama’s demand for meaningful autonomy for all 
Tibetans under one administration.19 In short, the Tibetans view both the level and design of 
autonomy as inimical to the meaningful expression and reproduction of Tibetan identity. This 
is consistent with the observations of scholars, such as Moseley, Zhao and Smith who 
described RNA as ‘regional detention,’ an instrument for serving the Party-State’s security 
interests rather than Tibetan [Uighur or Mongol] interests and identity. 
 Economic development has been an important element of China’s Tibet policy since 
the early 1980s, but became a core component along with coercive enforcement of stability in 
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1989.20 Indeed, as discussed in the previous chapter, Beijing’s economic policy in Tibet has 
always had a strong security rationale.  
Nevertheless, the Tibetans do acknowledge the economic development that has taken 
place on the Tibetan plateau. The Dalai Lama said on 10 March, 2005, ‘There has been a 
great deal of economic progress along with development in basic infrastructure.’21 However, 
they criticise the economic development, specifically Western Development Campaign, for 
focusing excessively on hard infrastructure such as the Qinghai-Tibet Railway, fertiliser 
plants, natural gas pipelines and hydro-electric plants constructed by imported labour from 
China on lands ‘forcibly’ taken from local Tibetans and neglecting soft infrastructure such as 
health, education and local human capacity-building.22 They contend that this form of 
development is fostering the social exclusion of Tibetans in their own country, destroying 
Tibet’s ‘fragile’ environment, encouraging Chinese immigration into Tibet, increasing the 
economic marginalisation of Tibetans, all of which contributes to hastening the erosion of 
Tibetan identity.23  
Essentially, the Tibetans see in China’s modernisation and development in Tibet a 
colonial project to exploit Tibetan resources and ‘civilise’ the Tibetans by undermining their 
religion, language and customs.24 Hence, a leading Tibetan NGO in exile saw the Railway as 
‘a tool of cultural genocide.’25 ICT, another influential organisation blamed the Railway for 
bringing about a ‘“second invasion” of Tibet by accelerating the influx of Chinese’ and 
endangering ‘Tibet’s culture and religion, which is integral to Tibetan identity’.26 Woeser 
wrote in an essay on the Railway: ‘Regrettably, violence of various degrees—hard, soft and 
in-between—prevails in the vast land of Tibet, and all of it bears the standard of development 
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and in the name of modernization works its impact on the senses and hearts of the people.’27 
As such, there is a wide-spread feeling among the Tibetans that economic development, 
while enriching a small percentage of Tibetans, has marginalised most Tibetans and is having 
a debilitating impact on Tibetan identity. 
 The various political campaigns conducted in the Tibetan society, which invariably 
morph into campaigns against ‘separatism’, the Dalai Lama and Tibetan traditions are 
perceived as ultimately targeting Tibetan national identity.28 Finally, the Tibetans see the 
United Front to deal with the Dalai Lama and Tibetan exiles as a counterproductive strategy 
to divide the Tibetan exile community,29 a perception exacerbated by the fact that the United 
Front Department, an institution with conservative positions and vested interests in thwarting 
a solution to the Tibet issue and the return of the Dalai Lama, is in charge of managing 
Tibetan affairs.30 
 
Chinese Migration: Demographic, Political and Cultural Implications 
The migration of Han and Hui Chinese into TAR was made possible through a conscious 
policy decision during the Second Tibet Work Forum in 1984.31 In Eastern Tibet, 
immigration of non-Tibetans began in the 18th century when the Qing Dynasty annexed these 
regions. Immigration in the reform era began with an economic development rationale,32 but 
was aided by infrastructure building, especially in the transportation sector. The Tibetan 
concerns about the Railway’s abetting of the influx of Chinese into Tibet is illustrative of 
their sense that Chinese policies contribute indirectly, if not directly, to the problem of 
Chinese immigration into Tibet. 
Tibetans both inside and outside Tibet consider Chinese immigration as a grave threat 
to Tibetan identity.33 The Dalai Lama, for instance, raised fears of a Chinese plan to resettle 1 
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million Chinese in TAR after the Beijing Olympics.34 Migration is not just a simple numbers 
game because it has social, cultural and political implications.35 The question of Chinese 
migration is controversial because Tibetan and Chinese positions diverge considerably.  
Tibetans base their figures on population structures in all areas recognised as Tibetan 
autonomous regions and argue that Beijing is implementing a policy of population transfer 
that has resulted in the Tibetans being reduced to a minority of six million against a Chinese 
population of 7.5 million.36 Beijing claims that only TAR is Tibet and, even there, excludes 
the large military presence and unregistered Chinese migrants, the so-called ‘floating 
population’, arguing that Tibetans constitute 92.8% of Tibet’s population.37 Han Chinese 
already outnumber Tibetans in Tsochang (Haibei) Tibetan Autonomous Prefecture (TAP), 
Tsonub (Haixi) Mongolian and TAP, Tsolho (Hainan) TAP and Haidong Prefecture in 
Qinghai and live in large numbers in Ngaba (Aba) Tibetan and Qiang Autonomous Prefecture 
and Kanlho (Gannan) TAP.38 According to the 1990 census, Tibetans were still dominant in 
Kardze (Ganzi) TAP, and Ngaba (Aba) Tibetan and Qiang Autonomous Prefecture. In TAR, 
although the country-side is predominantly Tibetan, as in the neighbouring provinces (over 
85% of Tibetans live in rural areas in TAR),39 Han Chinese now outnumber Tibetans in 
Lhasa and Shigatse, the two biggest cities of TAR.40  
Chinese immigration into Tibetan regions is the result of a combination of state policy41 
and voluntary migration of Han and Hui Chinese to take advantage of the economic 
opportunities opened up by Beijing’s investment in Tibet. A portion of the Chinese 
population in Tibet is temporary and seasonal, but the Tibetans fear it will increase over time. 
Moreover, Beijing could legalise their residency in Tibet whenever the security situation 
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deteriorates.42 The perception of Han and Hui Chinese swamping the Tibetans is accentuated 
by their pattern of migration to and dominance of politics and economics in Tibet’s urban 
centres.43  
Tibetans see the increasing number of Chinese, coupled with the policies of privileging 
Mandarin Chinese in education and public life and the greater freedom of cultural expression 
of the Chinese, as threatening to Tibetan identity. Immigration is a sensitive issue even in 
secure nations as evidenced by the contentious debates in America and Europe, but the 
demographic imbalance between the Tibetans and the Chinese exacerbates Tibetan 
vulnerabilities. Tibetans fear that their future would be akin to the present state of the 
Manchus, once a proud people that conquered and ruled China, now thoroughly sinicised. 
The Manchu language is hanging on the last eighteen tongues.44 Consequently, as quoted 
above, the Dalai Lama made an explicit connection between Chinese migration and erosion 
of Tibetan identity in his 10 March, 2008 address.45 This is also the basis of his frequent 
charge that the Chinese policies in Tibet are causing ‘cultural genocide’ in Tibet.46 
Chinese migration also changes the physical characteristics of the places where they 
settle, constantly reminding Tibetans of the vulnerability of their identity. Through official 
fiat or selling rights to Chinese property developers, many traditional parts of Lhasa were 
knocked down and contemporary Chinese-style houses built. Street signs and business names 
are written in bold Chinese characters with barely visible Tibetan characters. The Tibetan 
writer, Woeser, decried the ‘ugly construction’ taking place in Tibetan cities, where once 
traditional Tibetan architecture was prevalent.47 She also deplored the visibly Chinese 
appearance of Lhasa during Tibetan New Year, complete with Chinese-style lanterns 
everywhere.48  
As in most ethnic conflicts, Tibetan fears for their identity mix with fears of political 
and economic marginalisation. They fear that the situation in Inner Mongolia—the Mongols 
have become such a minority in their own land that even the so-called ‘organs of autonomy’, 
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the Regional People’s Congress and Government, are dominated by the Han Chinese—will 
be replicated in Tibet soon.  
Economic grievances interact with cultural and political fears to constitute a witch’s 
brew of a conflict. Fischer finds that in Tibetan areas, economic inequality manifests not just 
across the urban-rural spatial divide as in the rest of China, but also across the urban ethnic 
divide whereby Tibetans are distinctly disadvantaged.49 He writes that ‘competition in urban 
economic opportunities underlies the controversy of Chinese migration into the Tibetan 
areas.’50 This plays out in two ways.  
One, educated Tibetans have to compete for jobs and other opportunities in Chinese 
language with Han and Hui Chinese, who are better qualified and better connected in the 
corruption- and guanxi-ridden system. Lustgarten met a trilingual Tibetan entrepreneur 
‘educated at one of Beijing's best universities’ who was struggling to make it in the new 
economy, while a tour guide lost his licence when the police required annual exams in 
Mandarin.51 A businessman was compelled to change the name of his business after a 
Chinese entrepreneur chose the same name for his shop.52 Even educated and enterprising 
Tibetans are finding it hard to succeed, giving rise to anti-Chinese feelings right across the 
Tibetan population.  
Second, rural Tibetans migrating to Tibetan urban centres have to compete not only 
with the established Tibetan and Chinese urban elites, they also have to fight over the residual 
spoils of economic development with the increasing number of Chinese migrants, who have 
an edge simply by virtue of their native proficiency in the Chinese language.53 Hence, in 
TAR, population swamping ‘can be seen as a reactive lens through which locals interpret 
their experience of exclusion within urban growth.’54 In eastern Tibet, the overall 
demographic balance has shifted in favour of the Chinese, although most Tibetans live 
separately in rural and nomadic areas.  
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Demographic shifts, actual or potential, often give rise to conflicts and wars in multi-
ethnic societies and the Sino-Tibetan conflict is being fuelled partly by the increasing number 
of Chinese migrants in Tibet.   
 
Cultural Imperialism and Horizontal Threats 
Horizontal cultural threats or cultural imperialism take place because of the ‘overriding 
cultural and linguistic influence from [a] neighbouring culture.’55 Due to the state’s 
ownership and control of the vehicles of cultural production, propagation and transmission—
the media and communications infrastructure and public education, etc.—coupled with 
Chinese immigration, Tibetans feel that the onslaught of Chinese culture is gradually 
undermining Tibetan identity.56 The design of RNA, which gerrymanders autonomous 
regions to include as many nationality groups, preferably Han Chinese, within these 
autonomous units presents horizontal challenges to Tibetan identity. The economic 
development strategy of encouraging Chinese immigration and the emphasis on infrastructure 
building abets cultural imperialism. Finally, the materials used for the various political 
campaigns denigrate and undermine Tibetan identity. The following pages bear out these 
points. 
Wang Lixiong wrote that ‘today imperialism manifests itself more often through those 
aspects of life termed as culture’ and that Tibet is facing two types of imperialism.57 First, 
suppression of Tibetan national ‘self-articulation’ renders the remnants of Tibetan traditions 
culturally meaningless, as they can only be used to ‘re-iterate the voice of the ruling empire’ 
and not the true feelings of the Tibetan nation. Arguing that cultural preservation is not just 
about ‘repeating [nation’s] history or acting out its traditions,’ but more importantly about 
expressing the ‘true feeling of the nation, he writes: 
From such a perspective, the damage and suppression that Chinese rule has inflicted on to Tibetan 
culture becomes apparent. No matter how much it has tried to achieve benefits, it has categorically 
suppressed Tibetan self-expression. The empire wants to control expression of any kind; any 
breakthrough invites punishment.58 
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Secondly, Wang contends, ‘Political imperialism has been extended and transformed into 
cultural imperialism, an egotistic sense of cultural superiority that permeates all levels of the 
Chinese presence in Tibet—officials, rickshaw drivers, fruit vendors, construction 
labourers.59 They all look down upon the Tibetans as ‘lazy, conservative, short of or low in 
cultural qualities’ and ‘exaggerate their own achievements in forcing the locals’ to reform 
themselves.60 He recounts specific examples of Chinese cadres, writers and artists in Tibet 
displaying various kinds of condescension towards Tibetans that reveal their imperial sense 
of superiority and civilizing mission. As a physical manifestation of this cultural chauvinism, 
he gives the example of the ‘“Taizhou Plaza” an “aid Tibet project” that shows typical 
characteristics of cultural imperialism.’61 He condemns the plaza as ‘a symbol of naked 
cultural violence and occupation.62 The speech on literature, arts and culture to Tibetan 
professionals and cadres given by Chen Kuiyen is typical of the attitude that Wang 
described.63 Another illustration of ‘cultural violence’ is the requirement for Tibetan news-
readers and TV personalities to go to China for ‘modern’ voice coaching in how to speak 
Tibetan language!64  
Tibetans are fearful that because of the official policies, preponderance of material 
power and greater freedom of cultural expression of the Han Chinese and the climate of fear, 
Tibetan culture will lose out gradually in a cultural war of attrition. Pragmatic and materialist 
pressures could also hasten the process. Some Tibetan families send their children to Chinese 
language schools at the expense of Tibetan language education because they see that as the 
only way they can have better futures.65 The feeling that there is no use for Tibetan language 
compels some Tibetan parents to privilege Chinese language education for their children. The 
lack of self-respect makes some Tibetans, especially the young and impressionable ones, to 
speak the language of their ‘colonial’ rulers.66 Not all Tibetan regions have reached the 
deplorable situation described by Derong in Kartze TAP above, but the Tibetans fear that it is 
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just a matter of time if the current Chinese policies and practices persist. Popular media such 
as songs and blogs from inside Tibet are littered with expressions of fear of Tibetan identity 
generally.67 It was in the context of such identity insecurity and anomie arising from 
powerlessness in the face of ‘hostile’ Chinese policies that the Tibetan uprising in 2008 took 
place.68 As chapter eight demonstrates, while the economic and externalist (transnational 
Tibetan instigation and American Tibet policy) rationales played some role, the chief cause of 
the Tibetan uprising was identity insecurity in the context of their powerlessness to determine 
the future of their own identity.  
If the Tibetans feel identity insecurity so acutely, what have they done to mitigate it? 
The next section examines the various strategies and instruments that the Tibetans have used 
to address their insecurity in both Tibet and exile. 
 
Politics in Diaspora, Resistance at Home  
First as the preceding historical chapters demonstrated, the Tibetans have used both military 
and non-military strategies and instruments in their six-decade struggle against China. Non-
military means included both cultural and conventional diplomacy and alignment with 
sympathetic international forces. While the violent dimension of the Tibetan struggle ended, 
when the CIA-backed Tibetan guerrilla base in Nepal was closed in 1974, sporadic violence 
in the form of riots continues to break out in Tibet. In the face of perceived Chinese 
inflexibility, violence is still being considered by some Tibetans in Tibet and exile.69 Yet, the 
Tibetan movement as represented by the Dalai Lama and TGIE has adhered to non-violence 
in their struggle. Tibetans are exploring both autonomy (through the Dalai Lama’s Middle 
Way approach) and secessionism (independence as pursued by the critics of the Middle 
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Way). The Middle Way arguably enjoys the support of most Tibetans.70 The Tibetans, 
especially in exile, have also actively sought the intercession of the international community 
on their behalf, in which their Tibetan Buddhist culture and the Dalai Lama’s leadership have 
been of some help. This section elaborates on all the above strategies, as pertains to activities 
and links between the Tibetans inside Tibet and their diasporic brethren, leaving the 
international dimension for the next chapter. 
The Tibetan struggle against Chinese rule has evolved in both goal and strategy. 
However, it would be misleading to posit a monolithic movement, because these shifts in 
goal and strategy have happened in the context of heated contestations that continue in the 
Tibetan Diaspora in the form of the split between the Dalai Lama’s (and TGIE’s) position of 
seeking autonomy and that of the independence activists. In addition to sparring over goals 
and strategies, the Middle Way Approach has also come under fire from some Tibetans for 
appeasing Beijing without anything concrete to show for it, as will become clear in 
subsequent chapters. For instance, when dialogue resumed in September 2002, TGIE 
repeatedly appealed to Tibetan exiles and supporters around the world to refrain from 
protesting against visiting Chinese leaders and on sensitive anniversaries, with the goal of 
‘creating a conducive environment’ for the talks.71 Independence activists and organisations 
assailed these appeals as infractions of their democratic rights to protest and as futile acts of 
appeasement.72 Middle Way advocates accuse their critics of irresponsibility and conducting 
activities that harm the dialogue process and by implication Tibetan interests.73 What follows 
is a detailed examination of the dynamic politics of the Tibetan struggle against China, 
identifying relevant linkages with the Tibetan population inside Tibet. 
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In the last five decades since the Dalai Lama and 80,000 Tibetans escaped to India in 
1959, the Tibetan national struggle has gone through fundamental shifts in both goal and 
strategy. The transformations are obvious from the Dalai Lama’s annual statements to 
commemorate the Tibetan uprising in Lhasa on 10 March, 1959, which can be described as a 
‘State of the Struggle’ address. On the third anniversary in 1962, he began by saying:  
On the 10th of March 1959 the Tibetan people reasserted their independence, suffering almost nine 
years of foreign domination. Foreign rule, alas, still continues in Tibet but I am proud to know 
that the spirit of our people remains uncrushed and unshaken in their resolve to fight on till 
independence is regained. I know that the struggle, which began a few years ago is still being 
waged in Tibet against the invader….74 
  
He appealed to the UN General Assembly to ‘…help restore the independence of Tibet’ and 
advised the Tibetan refugees in South Asia to ‘prepare…to…return…and build a happier and 
greater independent Tibet.’75 The goal back then was unambiguously to regain political 
independence. As he was speaking, violent resistance was raging inside Tibet, covertly 
supported by America.76  Fast-forward to 10 March, 2007, the same Dalai Lama said: 
The most important reason behind my proposal to have genuine national regional autonomy for 
all Tibetans is to achieve genuine equality and unity between the Tibetans and Chinese by 
eliminating big Han chauvinism and local nationalism. This will contribute to the country's 
[China’s] stability through mutual help, trust and friendship between the two nationalities….77 
 
On various other occasions the Dalai Lama and TGIE has clearly renounced independence 
and separatism.78 During the presentation of the Congressional Gold Medal by the US 
Congress in October 2007, he sought to dispel any Chinese doubts about his sincerity: ‘I am 
not seeking independence. I am seeking a meaningful autonomy for the Tibetan people within 
the People’s Republic of China.’ The objective of the Tibetan struggle from the point of view 
of Dharamsala has changed from restoring independence to securing autonomy and 
unification within China.  
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As we remember from the last chapter, there was a transitional phase in the 1980s when 
the Dalai Lama demanded a different form of autonomy consisting of all three traditional 
Tibetan provinces or Chol kha sum (tib G	&), a democratic political system and 
demilitarisation of Tibet into a zone of peace.79 Before 1991, Dharamsala has been 
demanding the unification of the territories of the three provinces. However, faced with 
Beijing’s stone-wall, the Dalai Lama formally withdrew the Strasbourg Proposal on 10 
March 1991, saying:  
My proposals have not elicited any official response from the Chinese leadership.... If in the near 
future there are no new initiatives from the Chinese I will consider myself free of any obligation 
to the proposal made in the Strasbourg Address.80  
 
Yet, in both public statements and private correspondence with Deng Xiaoping and Jiang 
Zemin, the Dalai Lama reiterated his commitment to finding a solution within the parameters 
of Tibetan autonomy inside PRC and not seeking independence.81 Beyond that, the clarity of 
the Strasbourg Proposal was missing until dialogue formally resumed in September 2002. 
Since 2002, Dharamsala has been asking for ‘meaningful autonomy,’ which requires 
implementing the provisions of the Chinese constitution and Autonomy Law in letter and 
spirit.82 Dharamsala has also demanded the administrative unification of TAR and areas of 
Kham and Amdo in the neighbouring provinces where the Tibetan nationality is still in 
majority. This is different from the strictly territorial definition of unification in the 
Strasbourg Proposal. According to some exile parliamentarians, TGIE has even banned the 
use of Chol kha sum from its official publications.83  
However, when presenting the official position to the exile community, Dharamsala 
has at times been ambiguous about its bottom-line and the status of its other demands in the 
1980s, presumably to blunt criticism by Tibetans and foreign supporters of conceding too 
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much. This confuses both the Tibetans84 and the Chinese, drawing accusations from Beijing 
that the Dalai Lama is demanding the withdrawal of the PLA and Chinese migrants.85 
Dharamsala appears to have taken these off the formal agenda after 2002.86 The Tibetan 
demand for meaningful autonomy is a product of their acute identity insecurity. Their 
insecurity, caused by past and current Chinese policies and practices and their externalities, is 
reinforced by the uncertainty with respect to future Chinese intentions and fears of radical 
policy changes in the future after the Tibetans will have let down their guard. The latest 
Tibetans proposal Memorandum on Genuine Autonomy for the Tibetan People [tibtib	

tib
 tibtibR
tib%tib
tib)
tib
], submitted to Beijing in 2008, 
makes this clear: 
The Tibetan people's culture and identity can only be preserved and promoted by the Tibetans 
themselves and not by any others. Therefore, Tibetans should be capable of self-help, self-
development and self-government, and an optimal balance needs to be found between this and the 
necessary and welcome guidance and assistance for Tibet from the Central Government and other 
provinces and regions of the PRC.87 
 
Tibetans see autonomy as a security guarantee against uncertain and adverse shifts in Chinese 
policies and practices in the future with regard to Tibetan identity. In the language of 
international relations, Tibetan autonomy is a search for security in the face of historical 
ordeals, current threats and uncertainty about Chinese intentions in the future. Autonomy is 
an insurance against hostile policy shifts in the future.  
Therefore, The Memorandum calls for ‘clear divisions of powers and responsibilities 
between the Central Government and the government of the autonomous region’ and 
demands autonomous decision making powers in the issue areas of language, culture, 
religion, education, environment, natural resources, economic development and trade, public 
health, public security, regulation of migration, cultural, educational and religious exchanges 
with other countries. The foreign and defence affairs should be handled by the Central 
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Government. The Memorandum considers as a ‘crucial element’ ‘the guarantee’ that ‘the 
Constitution or other laws provide that powers and responsibilities allocated to the 
autonomous region cannot be unilaterally abrogated or changed’. It is clear that the Tibetans 
view ‘meaningful autonomy’ as a security guarantee to protect Tibetan identity and interests 
in the long run. Seeing Tibetan demands as products of their insecurity is a significant 
departure from the current academic, official and popular discourses that sees the Tibetan 
proposals through the prism of nationalism, which appears threatening to and evokes less 
empathy from the Chinese people. 
Dharamsala’s second demand is the unification of all Tibetans into one administrative 
unit.88 This is a controversial demand as the Lhasa government was not in political control of 
the Tibetan areas outside of present-day TAR at the time of the invasion in 1950. These areas 
that Tibetans call Kham and Amdo or Eastern Tibet were annexed by the Qing Empire in the 
18th century. For the Tibetans, unification under a single administration is a necessary step to 
protect their identity. The latest Memorandum makes this point amply clear: 
In order for the Tibetan nationality to develop and flourish with its distinct identity, culture and 
spiritual tradition through the exercise of self-government on the above mentioned basic Tibetan 
needs, the entire community, comprising all the areas currently designated by the PRC as Tibetan 
autonomous areas, should be under one single administrative entity. The current administrative 
divisions, by which Tibetan communities are ruled and administered under different provinces 
and regions of the PRC, foments fragmentation, promotes unequal development, and weakens the 
ability of the Tibetan nationality to protect and promote its common cultural, spiritual and ethnic 
identity.89  
 
Some Western analysts argue that the demand for unification is a major obstacle to 
rapprochement.90 They further argue that this demand is significant because eastern Tibetans 
constitute a sizable portion of the exile community and play prominent roles in the exile 
political structure.91It is true that Eastern Tibetans hold important positions in TGIE, but as 
explained below, there are more compelling historical and political reasons for making this 
demand. While Dharamsala’s focus in the 1980s was on territorial unification, now it is 
stressing the unification of the Tibetan nationality, down-playing the importance of 
traditional Tibetan territories that have a majority non-Tibetan population today.92 This is not 
just pragmatism in the face of Chinese intransigence, but necessitated by the need to avoid 
                                                 
88
 ‘The Strasbourg Proposal’; Gyari, Brookings Institute, 14 November, 2006. 
89
 ‘The Memorandum’, November 2008. 
90
 Goldstein 1997: 71. 
91
 Ibid. 
92
 Interview with Dawa Tsering (Joint Secretary, China Desk, TGIE), Dharamsala, August, 2007.  
  
189 
 
the demographic fate of Inner Mongolia. Under Ulan Fu, the Mongol Revolutionary and 
Party Secretary of Inner Mongolia, the region regained ancestral Mongol territories in the 
1960s, but practically committed demographic suicide because the territories came with an 
overwhelming majority of Chinese settlers. Today ethnic Mongols constitute only 18 per cent 
of the population of Inner Mongolia. 
The unification of all Tibetans under one administration is not a demand conjured up 
anew by exiled Tibetans, as even some scholars seem to believe.93 In the 20th century, some 
Eastern Tibetans considered resurrecting a united Tibetan state through force and revolution 
against Lhasa. In October 1946, Eastern Tibetan communist revolutionaries like Phuntsok 
Wangyal and Ngawang Kalsang established the Eastern Tibet People’s Autonomous Alliance 
[tib[tib
%tib
T] and plotted to establish a Khampa Autonomus 
Region and then to ‘over-throw the rest of Tibet or force the Tibetan government to accept 
democratic reforms.’94  Because they could not establish a strong base even in their native 
regions let alone in other Tibetan regions, the anti-communist vigilance of the Lhasa 
government and the failure to win support from Moscow and the Indian communists, the 
Tibetan communists had to collaborate with the Chinese communist party. Tibetans from 
both the Lhasa polity and Eastern Tibet proposed unification in the 1950s and some Chinese 
officials, such as Vice-Premier Chen Yi, agreed with the suggestions in principle.95 These 
ideas became casualties of the tumultuous events in Tibet and the leftist turn of politics in 
China in the late 1950s. In 1980, Tibetan cadres from Qinghai and Gansu proposed 
consolidating the various Tibetan regions under one administration and Tibetan intellectuals 
attributed Tibet’s political fragmentation to an ill-conceived Chinese strategy of divide-and-
rule.96 The 10th Panchen Lama also endorsed the unification push. Most Chinese authorities 
were ill-disposed to the unification of the Tibetan regions irrespective of whether the 
proposals came from Dharamsala or from Tibetans working for the Party and the Chinese 
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government. As recently as 2004, Phunwang warned Hu Jintao of the ‘grave mistake’ of 
implementing different policies on the same nationality.97 He wrote: 
The Tibetans living in Qinghai, Kham and on the Tibetan plateau are a nationality sharing the 
same language, traditions, economic structure, common spiritual wellbeing and are geographically 
linked and they have the same faith in the religion that has lasted for thousands of years.98 
 
A cursory observation of contemporary popular media from Tibet also reveals a strong 
integrationist sentiment in all Tibetan regions. Moreover, the fact that most of the 2008 
protests took place in Eastern Tibet show that most Tibetans all over the plateau share the 
same political aspirations. However the Chinese gerrymander their homeland, the Tibetans 
think they are from one Tibet, Bod [tib] or Gangjong [	
\tib
] in Tibetan. Some of the 
most popular songs that emerged from Tibetan regions outside TAR in recent years, among 
hundreds of similar political songs, are titled Ganjong Lungpa [	
\tib
] Tibet or 
literally, the land of Snows, Gangchenpa [	
8] Tibetans or literally denizens of the 
Land of Snows.99 The upshot is that a high level of convergence exists between the 
integrationist aspirations of the Tibetans inside Tibet and outside Tibet.100 Most Tibetans 
view this push for unification in the context of autonomy within PRC, not for an independent 
Tibet.101 
 As such, a solution that excludes more than half of the Tibetan population will not be 
sustainable. There is a historical precedence, as we learned in Chapter Four for such a failure 
in the collapse of the 17 Point Agreement in 1959. After the Chinese take-over in 1950, 
Beijing practised two sets of policies based on the legal distinction of whether a particular 
area fell under Lhasa rule or not.102 Those under the Lhasa administration enjoyed the 
gradualist terms of the 17 Point Agreement. Those that fell outside were subjected to radical 
communist reforms where a violent rebellion spread to Lhasa itself, culminating there on 10 
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March, 1959. The Dalai Lama had to escape and the 17-Point Agreement collapsed. As 
Norbu argued: 
...[W]ith regard to ethnic Tibet (Kham and Amdo) the Chinese policy was based on a rigid 
legality and lack of realism: treat ethnic Tibetans living in China-twice as numerous as those 
under the Dalai Lama—as both de jure and de facto Chinese, since they were not under the 
jurisdiction of Lhasa. This was one of fundamental flaws of Chinese policy in Tibet and a basic 
cause of the revolt....For the fact was, that in the 1950s, no matter how far these Eastern Tibetans 
were away from Lhasa or even how relatively close they were to the Chinese provinces, they 
behaved and acted like any other Tibetan. And this social fact should have been taken into 
consideration.103 
 
Hence, an agreement that excludes the Eastern Tibetans risks prolonging the vexing problem 
of Tibet into the future. Renewed bickering could break out on the Tibetan plateau in the 
form of peaceful protests, riots and even large-scale organised violence. 
However, Dharamsala’s pursuit of autonomy and unification could be more consistent 
and coherent in the interests of the Tibetans and their supporters, the Chinese interlocutors 
and third parties. Dharamsala should avoid what Rabgey and Sharlho called its ‘uneven 
commitment to engagement’ in the 1980s and 1990s.104 It could also be more coherent in its 
articulation of its positions. On the creation of Tibet as a zone of peace (and withdrawal of 
PLA from Tibet) and democratisation of Tibet—these were once part of the Tibetan 
proposals in the 1980s, but dropped from the dialogue agenda after 2002—clarity is still in 
question, as the Dalai Lama, the Cabinet, Parliament and the Envoys sometimes make 
mutually dissonant remarks and statements on these issues.  
While the Memorandum does not make any mention of zone of peace and 
democratisation, the Tibetan exile parliament published its own version of the Middle Way 
approach in 2009 in which electoral democracy endowed with an independent judiciary and 
the aspirations for a zone of peace are included as ‘important’ elements of the Middle Way.105 
The explanation of the Middle Way on the Dalai Lama’s own website also contains 
democracy and the zone of peace as ‘Important Components.’106 The Dalai Lama also makes 
approving comments about democracy that sits uncomfortably with Dharamsala’s acceptance 
of the current political system and role of the CCP in Tibet. Such incoherent policy 
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statements confuse the Tibetans and third parties and no doubt contribute to the suspicions 
about Tibetan intentions that abound in Beijing and Lhasa. Hence, Rabgey and Sharlho’s 
observation that Dharamsala has ‘pursued the goal of dialogue with discipline and tenacity’ is 
only partly correct, while their recommendation to articulate a coherent intellectual argument 
for dialogue is sound. In short, Dharamsala has some work to do in the pursuit of meaningful 
negotiations too.  
Meanwhile, parallel to the Dalai Lama’s efforts for autonomy, many Tibetans are 
working within the constraints of the Chinese system to work for Tibetan rights. Barnett finds 
that many Tibetan cadres working for the Chinese government practise ‘strategic deception,’ 
i.e. concealing their true objectives and loyalties, and use the limited and transitory ‘public 
space’ to work for Tibetan rights and identity.107 The late 10th Panchen Lama is exemplary in 
this regard. In a similar vein, Kapstein refers to Tibetans as adopting a ‘dimorphism of values 
by adhering publicly to the official culture while masking their true sentiments.’108 
Furthermore, there is a high level of convergence between the Dalai Lama’s demands for 
autonomy and unification and the aspirations of most Tibetans inside Tibet, including many 
Chinese-educated Tibetans in Tibet.109 
However, an active constituency for complete independence exists both inside and 
outside Tibet, which challenges the Dalai Lama’s autonomy agenda and occasionally his 
commitment to non-violence.110 The pro-independence activists argue that the Middle Way 
approach is undemocratic since it does not represent the genuine wishes of most Tibetans, 
especially the ones struggling inside Tibet, that it is naive and futile to expect autonomy from 
an apparently insincere and intransigent China, and most seriously that it is selling out 
Tibetan interests.111 They further reason that even if an autonomy settlement is reached, it 
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would be unsustainable.112 The Tibetan Youth Congress (TYC) provides the most significant 
platform in exile for independence-activism. TYC describes itself as a ‘worldwide 
Organisation of Tibetans united in our common struggle for the restoration of complete 
independence for the whole of Tibet, which includes the three traditional provinces of U-
Tsang [Central and Western Tibet], Do-toe [Kham], and Do-med [Amdo].’113 It is a non-
ideological, non-sectarian and non-regional organisation claiming to have more than 30,000 
members worldwide.114 TYC swears loyalty to the Dalai Lama as the supreme leader of 
Tibet, but forswears his proposals for autonomy and disapproves of his dialogue-oriented 
approach to dealing with China. Instead, TYC has a tradition of carrying out more action-
oriented activities such as fasts-unto-death and storming of Chinese embassies and consulates 
in India. Occasionally, TYC members threaten China with violence, although the only acts 
that would qualify as violence has been the throwing of Molotov cocktails into the embassy 
in Delhi in the 1970s and occasionally gate-crashing and graffiti-painting its walls. 
Guchusum [‘Nine, Ten, and Three’ representing the months in which pro-
independence demonstrations broke out in Lhasa in 1987 and 1988] also works for 
independence. It is an organisation formed by former political prisoners who took part in 
demonstrations on September 27, 1987, October 1, 1987, and March 5, 1988.115 Guchusum 
carries some weight in the exile community since its members are former political prisoners 
who spent time in Chinese prisons for demanding independence.116 The Tibetan organisations 
are reinforced by some Indian and foreign support groups which actively campaign for 
Tibetan independence. Friends of Tibet India117 and, the New York based, Students for a Free 
Tibet118 are vocal supporters of Tibetan independence. 
Important individuals within the exile community have been long-standing advocates 
of Tibetan independence. Two of the Dalai Lama’s brothers, late Thupten Jigme Norbu 
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(Taktse Rinpoche) and Ngari Rinpoche, have publicly criticised their brother for selling out 
the Tibetans’ legitimate right to national self-determination.119 The award winning writer-
activists Jamyang Norbu120 and Tenzin Tsundue,121 film-maker Tenzing Sonam,122 Karma 
Chophel, former speaker of the Parliament-in-exile, and Sonam Topgyal, former chairperson 
of the Cabinet-in-exile,123 are vocal promoters of independence. In terms of strategy, despite 
the common tendency to equate the independence activists with violence, most of these 
fervent critics of autonomy are also committed pacifists.124 Only one firebrand, Lhasang 
Tsering, has been outspoken about the need for violence. Recently, he called for a ‘mosquito 
strategy’ [	_	tib)^
] of undermining Chinese governance and economics with 
stealthy civil disobedience and a pestering campaign of asymmetric warfare to achieve 
Tibetan independence.125 
Although the independence camp is fragmented into different organisations and 
individuals with strong personalities, they constitute an articulate and influential group. In 
May 2007, the International Tibet Support Network (ITSN), which is charged with 
coordinating the activities of Tibet Support Groups (TSG) worldwide, organised the 5th 
International TSG Conference in Brussels with the goal of galvanising support for the Dalai 
Lama’s autonomy efforts.126 Organisations like Friends of Tibet, India, not only refused to 
participate, but held a rival ‘Conference for an Independent Tibet.’127 Jamyang Norbu, 
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Lhasang Tsering and Tenzin Tsundue and Indian and foreign supporters held a boisterous 
conference on Tibetan independence.  
The Tibetan struggle has evolved in a strategic sense too. Contrary to popular 
perception in the West, there was a violent dimension to the Tibetan struggle during the Cold 
War, as discussed before.128 Armed resistance started in Eastern Tibet, where the Chinese 
conducted harsh communist reforms in the mid-1950s.129 As the PLA suppressed the 
resistance in the East, the guerrillas moved first to Central Tibet, and then relocated to 
Mustang, Nepal from where, with US, Nepalese and Indian assistance, they conducted raids 
across the border against the Chinese troops. This armed resistance ended in 1974 due to a 
number of reasons ranging from internal feuding, Nepalese objections and most importantly 
the freezing of American aid and the Dalai Lama’s personal request to disband.130 Non-
violence has been a sacred principle for the Dalai Lama for which he was awarded the Nobel 
Peace Prize in 1989. Most of those Tibetans clamouring for independence also remain 
wedded to peace, although given the lack of progress in Sino-Tibetan negotiations, the debate 
about the relative efficacy of non-violence and more militant tactics rumbles on in both Tibet 
and exile. The above analysis demonstrates that the Tibetan exiles are not united under one 
political banner and takes issue with the caricature that they have always been peaceful.131 
However, it is unhelpful to exaggerate the depth of the autonomy versus 
independence divide in the Tibetan community as the international media is sensationalising 
and the propensity of the independence advocates for violence.132 Those Tibetans who are 
                                                 
128
 Knaus 1999;  Norbu 1994;  BBC, 'The Shadow Circus: The CIA in Tibet,' 1998; :	5?@tib	
gtib
 
[Takla Phuntsok Tashi], tib@tibtib^htibtib	tib
 [Recounting Life Experience-Vol. 2], Dharamsala: 
tibtibtibItibG [Library of Tibetan Works and Archives], 1995: 217-249;  Takla, Recounting Life 
Experience-Vol. 3, 1995: 83-133. 
129
 Shakya 1999: 136; Goldstein 1997: 53. 
130
 Ibid: 358-63. 
131
 Donald S. Lopez, Jr. Prisoners of Shangri-La: Tibetan Buddhism and the West, Chicago and London: 
University of Chicago Press, 1998; Orville Schell, Virtual Tibet: Searching for Shangri-La from the Himalayas 
to Hollywood, New York: Henry Holt and Co., 2000; Thierry Dodin and Heinz Rather (eds.) Imagining Tibet: 
Perceptions, Projections and Fantasies, Boston: Wisdom Publications, 2001; Peter Bishop, Dreams of Power: 
Tibetan Buddhism and the Western Imagination, Madison, NJ: Fairleigh Dickinson University Press, 1993; Jan 
Magnusson, ‘A Myth of Tibet: Reverse Orientalism and Soft-Power’ in P. Christiaan Klieger (ed.) Tibet, Self 
and Diaspora: Voices of Difference, Brill, 2002; Tsering W. Shakya, ‘Tibet and the Occident: The Myth of 
Shangri-la,’ Lungta, 1991: 20-25; 
132
 Jeremy Page, ‘Radicals left frustrated by Dalai Lama’s tactics,’ The Times,18 March, 2008; Tim Johnson, 
‘Dalai Lama finds leading Tibetans harder than being peace icon,’ McClatchy Newspapers, 26 March, 2008; 
Jason Motlagh, ‘Young Tibetans Question Path of Non-Violence,’ Christian Science Monitor, 1 April, 2008.  
  
196 
 
struggling for independence have the same level of devotion and respect for the Dalai Lama 
as their critics. The very first objective of TYC, for instance, is to serve Tibet and the 
Tibetans ‘under the guidance of His Holiness the Dalai Lama, the Spiritual and Temporal 
Ruler of Tibet.’133 Hence, even if any organisation in exile veers towards violence, there is 
little doubt that the Dalai Lama would be able to rein it in. Many hunger-strikes-unto-death 
that TYC organised in the past had to be called off when the Dalai Lama intervened. As 
noted, the Tibetan guerrilla campaign against China was ended in 1974 when the Dalai Lama 
personally asked the fighters to give up their armed struggle. The important question is what 
will happen once the Dalai Lama passes away in the future.  
Meanwhile, as events in 2008 demonstrated, there is also a sizable number of 
Tibetans inside Tibet who aspire for an independent Tibet. Because they directly experience 
China’s repressive policies, some of them also rioted violently in Lhasa and other regions on 
14-16th March, 2008. Were they acting on their own or were they being egged on and 
masterminded from exile? The question of how much communication and coordination there 
has been between the Tibetans inside and outside Tibet is interesting in light of Beijing’s 
categorical accusation that the Dalai Lama masterminded the protests and riots that took 
place in Tibet in March 2008.134 [Chapter Eight will address this question.]  
Despite these disagreements on goals and strategy, the Tibetan struggle is ultimately 
about Tibet’s identity. Whether they are struggling for independence or autonomy through 
non-violence and dialogue or violent intifada, the Tibetans are ultimately driven by their 
identity insecurity. At the peak of the 2008 uprising in Tibet, the Dalai Lama told the 
international media that he ‘is seeking autonomy necessary to safeguard its [Tibet’s] 
heritage.’135 TYC lists the protection of Tibetan identity as the first objective of its struggle 
against China.136 As Jamyang Norbu wrote in his obituary for Taktser Rinpoche, ‘Rimpoche 
was convinced that Tibet needed independence not for some exalted ideological reason but as 
a fundamental condition, an essential requisite for the survival of the people, their language, 
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their culture and even their religion.’137 Lhasang Tsering, one of the most forceful advocates 
of independence in exile, said in a documentary film, ‘Our struggle is not for a piece of land. 
It is for a way of life. It is for a culture. It is for a civilisation….’138 In short, the concern for 
Tibetan identity and loyalty to the Dalai Lama and his commitment to non-violence unite the 
Tibetan Diaspora and the Tibetans inside Tibet. 
The next section examines the nature of the general nexus between the Tibetan exiles 
and their brethren inside Tibet. 
 
 
Tibet and its Diaspora 
Beijing points its finger at the Dalai Lama or the ‘Dalai clique’ whenever protests flare up in 
Tibet, sometimes concurrently portraying him as being irrelevant and without support in 
Tibet.139 In 2005, when the Chinese were conducting strident anti-Dalai Lama and Patriotic 
Education campaigns in Tibet, the Chairman of the TAR government claimed that the 
Tibetans ‘did not support any of the Dalai Lama’s schemes to upset [Tibet’s] stability.’140 
Beijing’s reaction to the Tibetan protests and riots in 2008 followed this familiar script. This 
is not a new development however. The Chinese blamed the Dalai Lama for instigating and 
engineering the protests in the late 1980s.141 As Beijing has not produced any credible 
evidence, it is hard to establish ‘whether there was a direct connection between the 
demonstrators and the exiled group.’142 In any case, some Chinese officials subsequently 
admitted that ‘ultra-leftist’ policies implemented improperly by local officials were to blame 
for the protests and riots in the 1980s.143 
Some analysts also argue that the pro-independence protests that rocked Lhasa in the 
late 1980s were inspired by the Dalai Lama’s activities abroad, especially when he gave his 
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first political speech in America on 21 September, 1987.144 However, they do not go as far as 
the Chinese officials in accusing the ‘Dalai clique’ of directly orchestrating protests in Tibet. 
Even then, such analyses overestimate the ability of the exiles to mobilise Tibetans inside 
Tibet living under restrictive conditions, downplaying in the process the degree of local 
Tibetan insecurity generated by Chinese policies and practices. Schwartz acknowledges a 
‘feed-back effect’ between Tibetan protests and international attention, but argues that the 
‘protest is generated from indigenous sources’ because protests also occurred in rural areas 
without any external access and continued long after Tibet was closed to exiles and 
foreigners.145 A similar argument was made about the outbreak of unrest in 2008.146 A 
research report brought out by Gongmeng Law Research Center, Beijing, also recognised 
some external influence, but apportioned most of the blame on Beijing’s policy-failures for 
the 2008 unrests in Tibet.147 
However, it is undeniable that there has been increasing communication, hence 
mutual influence in a host of areas, most significantly culture and politics, between local 
Tibetans and exile Tibetans. This began when Tibetans were allowed to travel in and out of 
Tibet relatively freely after 1978. These transnational contacts grew in step with the 
development of information technology and the onset of cross-border movement of goods 
and information. Websites, blogs, music videos, radio programs and increasing cross-border 
physical mobility provide crucial platforms for information exchange between the Tibetan 
communities. Political literature and other materials authored in exile do make their way into 
Tibet, where they are clandestinely distributed and consumed.148 The reverse is also true. All 
these linkages and exchanges are fundamental to diasporism.  
The institutions and activisms of the exiles have always inspired the Tibetans inside 
Tibet. One former political prisoner writes in his memoir about the arrival of the Dalai 
Lama’s delegations in Tibet: 
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[W]hen Tibetans who had been living under Chinese rule heard from the exile delegation about 
the activities of His Holiness and the situation of the exile government it gave them new hope and 
strengthened their resolve, and even those few who had believed the Chinese propaganda regained 
some confidence in their own people, changed their tune, and started to repent their views.149 
 
When the exiles went to the polls to elect their parliamentarians and ‘Kalon Tripa’ (Prime 
Minister), after the Dalai Lama devolved his political authorities to them in 2011, the 
Tibetans inside Tibet participated actively in the process short of voting—discussions on 
blogs and in call-in radio programmes, singing songs and dramatisations, which were 
recorded on video and surreptitiously distributed inside Tibet and smuggled abroad.150 For 
instance, on the day the results of the Kalon Tripa election was announced, many Tibetans 
called in to Tibetan language programmes in exile to congratulate the winner Lobsang 
Sangay and some Tibetans organised an ‘underground’ conference involving Tibetans from 
various Tibetan regions, which was broadcast on Radio Free Asia.151  
As the Tibetans inside Tibet are influenced by the activities of their compatriots in 
exile, the reverse is no less true. When the Sino-Tibetan dialogue started in 1978 and 
Dharamsala was allowed to send fact-finding delegations, the Dalai Lama and the Tibetan 
government were not sure what the Tibetans inside Tibet were thinking about the Dalai Lama 
and Chinese-Tibetan relations broadly, especially given Chinese propaganda that Tibetans 
were happy and reports that China had managed to indoctrinate young Tibetans.152 As we 
saw earlier, when the delegations visited Tibetan areas in TAR and other provinces, they 
were mobbed by thousands of emotionally-charged Tibetans who recounted terrible tragedies 
that they had suffered, much to the embarrassment of Beijing and its local officials.153 In 
Lhasa, the reception they received surpassed anything they had witnessed in six months of 
touring. The tragedies and continuing suffering were laid bare. As Shakya observed,  
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The enthusiastic reception had a profound effect on Dharamsala. Any doubts were wiped away; 
they could now confidently rebuff any Chinese claims about social progress in Tibet. The visits 
had shown that there was popular support for the Dalai Lama and that the people’s religious faith 
remained uncontaminated by twenty years of Communism.154 
 
Goldstein concurred, ‘The... delegations...bolstered the confidence of the exiles at a difficult 
time in their history.’155 Despite Beijing’s objectives of using economic development to wean 
the Tibetans away from the Dalai Lama and repeated proclamations of success on this front, 
the Tibetans showed that they were behind the Dalai Lama and his exile administration. Such 
periodic endorsement from the Tibetans inside Tibet is a necessary fillip for the exile 
establishment, whose relevance is constantly challenged.  
There is no denying that transnational cross-fertilisation of Tibetan political activism 
is increasing with the growth of information technology and cross-border mobility of 
information and people, in spite of China’s considerable apparatus of censorship and 
surveillance. During the 2008 unrests and thereafter, despite China’s media black-out and 
censorship of the internet, Tibetans were able to email pictures of Tibetans apparently shot by 
the security forces, and use mobile phones to conduct live conversations, sometimes in the 
thick of protests and crackdowns with Tibetan language radio programmes in India and 
America.156 They were able to counter Chinese claims that no lethal force was used on 
Tibetans. In this TGIE and various NGOs in exile acted as intermediaries between the 
Tibetans inside Tibet and the international community. 
 In short, without any formal mechanisms, Tibetans inside and outside Tibet have used 
various informal channels of communication to coordinate their activities and formulate 
positions towards Chinese rule. This raises interesting questions about how this will evolve 
when the septuagenarian Dalai Lama passes away. After all, he remains the single-most 
important institution and leader that binds the two communities together. Only time will tell. 
 In addition to the various political and diplomatic strategies and instruments described 
above, Tibetan culture has proved useful in gaining the support of sections of Chinese and 
Western publics. 
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Cultural Revival and Strengthening of Identity 
True to the logic of the insecurity dilemma, Tibetans both inside and outside Tibet have also 
worked hard for cultural survival and revival. In exile, led by the Dalai Lama and other 
religious and secular leaders, the Tibetans have managed to preserve the key elements of their 
culture within the limits of refugee life in a foreign, albeit tolerant country. The key 
monasteries of Tibet have been replicated in India and Nepal and 77 schools (excluding pre-
primary schools) educate Tibetan children in exile in the Tibetan language.157 In the words of 
a Tibet scholar, the Dalai Lama has successfully created a ‘cultural nation’ in exile.158 A 
specific program for strengthening culture involves the Dalai Lama’s teaching of Buddhism 
to Tibetan high school and college students in exile.159 A leading abbot told the Tibet Times 
about this program, ‘Generally, there are two ways to save a nation: through culture and 
politics. For the long-term survival and strength of a nation, I think, culture is the more 
important means of protecting the nation.’160 The Tibetans have not only used culture to 
construct a unified national identity that transcends the traditional regional and sectarian 
cleavages, but also deployed it to galvanise international support for their cause. The spread 
of Tibetan Buddhism in America and Europe in the 1960s, 1970s and 1980s contributed to 
the positive reception of the Dalai Lama’s international campaign in the late 1980s and still 
accounts partly for the popular support for the Tibetan cause in the West.161  
More will be said in the next chapter on the utility of Tibetan Buddhism for the 
Tibetan international campaigns, but this deployment of Tibetan Buddhism also extends to 
the overseas, Singaporean, Taiwanese and Mainland Chinese.162 The Dalai Lama, Karmapa 
and other lamas attract many Chinese students to India and other countries that they visit. For 
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instance, 400 Chinese came all the way from Mainland China in January 2006 to attend a 
Buddhist sermon which the Dalai Lama gave in a remote Indian town.163 Because the Dalai 
Lama is persona non grata in China, Chinese Buddhists travel to neighbouring countries such 
as Japan where he gives religious sermons or public talks on social, political, religious and 
environmental issues.164  There is a growing fascination with Tibet and its culture among 
some Chinese, which has contributed to a degree of receptivity to Tibetan Buddhism.165 
Casting Buddhism as one of the complicating factors in the future of the Sino-Tibetan 
conflict, Rabgey and Sharlho writes, ‘By the late 1990s, wealthy Chinese tycoons and 
members of the emerging middle-class began to gather around charismatic Tibetan lamas for 
spiritual instruction.’166 As discussed earlier, the charismatic lama Khenpo Jigme Phuntsok 
had over one thousand resident Chinese disciples in his institute, which was not surprisingly a 
target of a crackdown in 2001. In fact, a Chinese source revealed that the Dalai Lama’s 
request for a pilgrimage to Wu Taishan in 1998 was turned down because Jiang Zemin was 
worried that the Lama’s charisma might have ‘unpredictable effects’ on not just the Tibetans 
but also on ethnic Chinese people.167 
Tibetans inside Tibet have also worked hard to revive their culture in both the sense 
of artefacts and living practices. Tibetans have used the limited liberalisation in the post-
Cultural Revolution era, especially in the 1980s, to revive Tibetan Buddhism and other 
elements of the Tibetan identity, such as literature, arts and music. Goldstein traces the 
tortuous revival of monastic Buddhism and the growth of political activism with the case 
study of Drepung monastery near Lhasa.168 Germano analyses the gter (treasure) movement 
as revived principally by the late Khenpo Jikphun, the charismatic lama from Sichuan, whom 
we encountered earlier, and its significance for the revival of Tibetan identity.169 Kapstein 
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explores the links between the revival of the Tibetan tradition of 	
n  [pilgrimage] and 
the (re)formation of Tibetan national identity with his first-hand observation of "tibPEtib
tibtib [Drigung Phowa Chenmo] in Drikung, TAR.170 Epstein and Wenbin examine a lay folk 
religious ritual called otib  (musical festivity) in Repkong, Qinghai, and how such folk 
events ‘foster a pan-Tibetan identity.’171 Kapstein also considers the comparative ‘revival 
and…vicissitudes’ of Tibetan Buddhism in both TAR and Eastern Tibet up to the early 
2000s.172 
Arguing that Tibetan national identity today is expressed not only through Buddhism, 
but also through secular traditions—epic literature and folk beliefs such as the mountain 
cult—Karmay examines the revival of the reading, recitation and singing of the epic of King 
Gesar, arguably the longest epic in the world, and the practice of ‘mountain cult’ or the 
secular worship of mountain deities, as a reassertion of Tibetan identity.173 Stoddard found 
that besides translating the ‘entire body of Marxist-Leninist and Maoist doctrine’, Chinese 
official documents and traditional Chinese and some Western classics into Tibetan language, 
Tibetan intellectuals in Tibet were busy republishing traditional Tibetan classics in history, 
arts, literature and religious cannons, and producing new scholarship and literature and text 
books in Tibetan after the Cultural Revolution.174 She argues that language, literature and 
religion become the focus of national expression in response to the attempts of Marxist 
societies that reject tradition as backward, superstitious and feudalistic to eliminate national 
differences.175 This multi-pronged reassertion of Tibetan culture is a direct reaction to 
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Chinese attempts to undermine and annihilate (during the Cultural Revolution) Tibetan 
identity. As Karmay wrote:  
The greater the repression of his culture and identity, the more articulate he becomes.... This very 
concrete experience [destruction of Tibetan culture], which was and perhaps still is intended 
mainly to extirpate national sentiments and erase Tibet’s national identity, has in fact taught the 
Tibetans to be more aware of their culture than ever before.176 
 
Cultural revival strengthens national identity across the Tibetan regions. 
The 10th Panchen Lama advised that protecting the traditional culture of a nation is 
key to developing the educational level of that nation.177 Beijing-based Woeser is most 
articulate in making this case.178 She expresses pride in Tibetan culture: ‘In fact, we should 
be full of confidence, because our cultural tradition remains illuminating after so many 
hardships and stormy struggles.’179 Advocating the conscious observance of Tibetan 
traditions, she makes the case for using Tibetan culture to defend their identity: 
However, there is no dominating power which cannot be resisted. This power of resistance 
actually exists in our traditional culture.... Since in history the iron hoofs of the Mongolian army 
trampled a large part of the world, so China—such a big country—was defeated, changing the 
whole era then, how come Tibetans, instead of being defeated and eliminated, became the 
religious masters of the Mongolians and have remained their brothers to this day? If our 
traditional culture could tame the Mongolians, then why can’t the Chinese of today be tamed? 
...In fact,  the migrant Han Chinese in Lhasa are often seen worshipping and making their 
offerings in monasteries, while the elite among the Han Chinese are beginning to feel a need for 
this kind of religious belief.180  
 
Such talk could be dismissed as punching above their weight and that the modern Chinese are 
not medieval Mongols, but there is evidence that Buddhism has infiltrated even the Chinese 
hierarchy of power. When Zhao Ziyang, the former Premier and CCP General Secretary 
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purged by Deng Xiaoping in the wake of the Tiananmen Square massacre, was on his death-
bed in January 2005, he requested the Dalai Lama to conduct Buddhist rituals for him.181 His 
children reported that the Dalai Lama was literally the last word on his lips when he passed 
away.182 Zhao was a disgraced official, but Woeser revealed that her late half-Chinese, half-
Tibetan father, a top ranking PLA Commander, had been a ‘closet Buddhist’ all along.183 It is 
believed that many Chinese officials and their families practise some form of religion. 
Furthermore, as pointed out above, Tibetan Buddhism has become appealing to the new 
Chinese middle-class. Jianglin Li, the Chinese writer on Tibetan issues said that China does 
not want the Dalai Lama back because there is a trend of Tibetan culture, especially Tibetan 
Buddhism becoming more and more popular among the Chinese: ‘large groups of Chinese 
will pop up as his followers. That is a huge threat to the Chinese government.’184 The point 
here is to demonstrate that the Tibetans are using culture to protect their identity. This is 
consistent with Joseph Nye’s insight that an attractive culture is a chief source of soft-
power.185  
 The revival of Tibetan culture, albeit under the constraints of exile and Chinese rule, 
has had important implications for the Tibetans. For the exiles, their common culture has 
been the main unifying factor, which the Dalai Lama has used to forge a cultural nation 
outside its homeland. Calling the Tibetan exiles as ‘the most successful’ among ‘refugee 
histories’, Barnett attributes their success to the Dalai Lama’s leadership and his use of 
Tibetan culture to construct the Tibetan diaspora: ‘A refugee community that leaves its 
country in sizeable numbers and that becomes stronger over 50 years rather than 
disintegrating.’ 186 Clearly, to the extent to which the diaspora is a force in the larger Tibetan 
struggle against China as discussed above, the continued reproduction and development of 
Tibetan culture has implications for the future of Chinese-Tibetan relations.  The stronger and 
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more vibrant the Tibetan culture becomes, more cohesive the Tibetan diaspora will be and 
stronger its role in the future of the conflict. For Tibetans inside Tibet, cultural revival after 
the traumatic decades (1950-mid-1970s) has been partial and precarious, and achieved at 
great sacrifice and hard-work by the Tibetans themselves in spite of Chinese policies. 
Chinese policies, they complain, have in fact been on a relentless mission to undermine their 
culture and identity.187 Whatever remains in terms of culture is precious and constantly 
threatened by Chinese policies—a siege mentality has set in among the Tibetans. For both the 
Tibetans inside and outside Tibet, cultural revival is not just desirable in itself, but also 
instrumental for their larger goal of protecting Tibetan identity and political interests. For 
China, the revival and assertion of Tibetan culture is ‘a thorn in the dragon’s side.’188 
The significance of the analysis in this chapter is the reinforcement of the insecurity 
dilemma through the multi-faceted Tibetan resistance both local and diasporic and the 
consequent heightening of the threats that the Chinese perceive in Tibet as discussed in the 
previous chapter. Dharamsala’s autonomy and unification demands, not to mention the 
aspirations of the pro-independence camp, feed the security concerns of the Chinese officials 
inasmuch as the Tibetans believe and the Chinese fear that these measures would strengthen 
Tibetan identity, not to mention the territorial, sovereignty, institutional, ideological and 
regime security considerations. The international campaigns of the exiles constantly put a 
question mark on the legitimacy of Chinese rule over Tibet and their policies in Tibet. The 
issue of ‘face’ or national image on account of local Tibetan protests, diasporic public 
relations and international opprobrium is no less relevant to the thesis of this research.  The 
aspirations of most Tibetans on the plateau, which also centre on culture, identity and 
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political rights189 bear upon those security concerns even more intensely. Collectively, the 
strategies and instruments that the Tibetans have used in their struggle to achieve these goals, 
as examined in this chapter, have had a feed-back effect on Chinese policies through the 
threat perceptions outlined above. The perception of cooperation between Tibetan 
‘separatists’ and ‘hostile’ transnational and international forces working against Chinese 
interests in Tibet further magnifies the vulnerabilities that Beijing and local officials feel 
along the lines outlined in Chapter Five. 
 
Conclusion: This chapter first picked up the analysis from the preceding chapter by 
examining the Tibetan identity insecurity generated by the Chinese policies directly or 
indirectly through socio-economic externalities. Tibetan insecurity was shown to arise from 
three broad and overlapping sources: state policies (vertical threats), migration and cultural 
imperialism (horizontal threats).  
Next, the evolving and diverging goals, political strategies and diplomatic positions of 
the Tibetans in their effort to address the identity insecurity were examined. The Tibetans had 
used violence in the past, but since the 1974, they have eschewed any organised violence 
against China, although violent riots have occasionally convulsed a number of Tibetan 
regions as recently as 2008. The mainstay of the Tibetan strategy since 1974 has been to 
simultaneously engage Beijing in dialogue, non-violent direct action campaigns targeting 
China’s legitimacy and image abroad, and seeking support from foreign governments, public 
and rights organisations around the world. The mainstream Tibetan goal, championed by the 
Dalai Lama, is to find an internal solution which would allow Tibet autonomy within PRC. 
Other Tibetans both inside and outside articulate and pursue a more conventional nationalist 
agenda of resurrecting a Tibetan state. Tibetans have also used their Buddhist culture in 
China, albeit under considerable restrictions, and abroad with some success. How this is 
being done inside Tibet and China was discussed here, but how Tibetan Buddhism has helped 
the Tibetan cause in the West is one of the topics in the next chapter. 
The chapter then linked up to the analysis in the previous chapter by explaining that 
the Tibetan goals, strategies and actions examined here heighten Beijing’s overlapping 
political security, societal security and military-strategic security challenges. Those security 
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fears, exacerbated by Tibetan activism at home and international relations abroad, strengthen 
the hands of the hard-line faction of the Chinese bureaucracy and drive Beijing’s policies 
towards Tibet. In turn, this feeds back into Tibetan identity insecurity, stiffening up their 
resistance. The analytical cycle of the insecurity dilemma is thus completed and the empirical 
cycle is demonstrated to be perpetuated. 
As indicated in Chapter Five, Beijing’s vulnerabilities over Tibet are aggravated by 
fears of foreign intervention and peaceful evolution through their Tibetan Trojan horse. In the 
next chapter, the external dimension of the insecurity dilemma will be isolated and analysed 
in detail. The transnational elements will also be developed beyond the homeland-diaspora 
connection that this chapter examined here.  
209 
 
Chapter 7 
Transnational and International Dimensions of the Sino-Tibetan Conflict 
 
The Dalai Lama frequently advises the Tibetans to ‘hope for the best, but prepare for the 
worst’ [tib	
tibtib].1 Accordingly, the Tibetan diaspora has been 
preparing for a long-drawn out struggle by deepening the democratisation of their political 
institutions and strengthening identity at the same time as searching for a negotiated 
settlement through dialogue with Beijing. Seeking support from foreign governments and the 
global civil societies and publics to confront Beijing’s hard-line and to address the power 
imbalance vis-à-vis Beijing and strengthening relations with peoples who share ethnic, 
cultural and religious ties with Tibet are integral to that preparation. It has been noted in 
previous chapters that the Tibetans have purposefully internationalised their cause to win the 
support of foreign governments, civil societies, publics and international organisations and 
that the Chinese government has reciprocated with its strategy of isolating and denying 
political space for the Tibetan exiles, using its considerable military, diplomatic and 
economic muscle. 
These are aspects of the external dimension of the insecurity dilemma. In Chapter Two, 
it was posited that both the state and its domestic ethno-national adversaries forge economic, 
political and military links with other states and their publics, norm entrepreneurs, civil 
society groups and ethnic, cultural and religious kin in their competition for security. It also 
noted that vulnerabilities to external intervention drive states to suppress internal opposition, 
which creates more incentives for these groups to seek greater external support. Hence, the 
insecurity dilemma plays out within the larger contexts of regional and international politics. 
Interactively or in isolation, interests, norms and ethics play roles in the intrusion of the 
international system into the affairs of its constituent member states. This chapter examines 
the external dimensions of the Sino-Tibetan insecurity dilemma in greater detail. Specifically, 
this chapter examines the place of the Tibet issue in China’s foreign relations with America, 
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India, Europe, Taiwan, and Russia. It also considers the transnational forces at work in the 
conflict above and beyond the homeland-diaspora connexion discussed in Chapter Six. 
Specifically, the role of the transnational Tibetan Buddhist community in the Indian and 
Nepalese Himalayas, Mongolia, the Russian Buddhist Republics and the West in Sino-
Tibetan politics will be examined here.  
 Like the domestic dimension, this chapter will demonstrate that the international 
aspects of the Sino-Tibetan insecurity dilemma assume a cyclical form. Chinese hard-line 
policies in Tibet and inflexible positions in dialogue compelled the Dharamsala to 
internationalise the Tibet issue in the late 1980s.2 However, the involvement of foreigners 
increased fears of Western regime change strategies through peaceful evolution, as in Eastern 
Europe and the Soviet Union, and even military intervention as in Saddam’s Iraq and 
Yugoslavia.3 Such security concerns harden Beijing’s intransigence in both policy and 
practice.4 The toughening of Beijing’s stance only enhances the Tibetans’ need for more 
international support to influence Beijing. As the Dalai Lama told the Mayor and officials of 
the city of Nantes during his 2008 visit to France:  
We gave our right hand to the Chinese government and the left hand to our supporters in the free 
world for help to solve our problem, but the right hand is empty and even burning without getting 
anything. So it is natural we ask help from supporters like the mayor and you all.5 
 
However, greater international scrutiny and criticism increases the security threats that the 
Chinese perceive, or at least, gives the hard-liners in Lhasa and Beijing an excuse for political 
inflexibility. Hence, it feeds back into Chinese policy and diplomacy, completing the cycle of 
Beijing’s hard-line and Tibetan international efforts.  
First, the next section examines the strategic, institutional and resource issues 
underpinning the Tibetan international strategy. It will become apparent that the Tibetan 
international efforts rely mainly on soft power resources: Tibetan Buddhism and culture, the 
Dalai Lama’s leadership and promotion of universal values such as non-violence, inter-
dependence, democracy, religious harmony, universal responsibility, secular ethics and 
democratic practices in exile. The Tibetans have the resources neither to conduct Taiwan’s 
check-book diplomacy nor the Palestinians’ rocket-lobbing hard power, but they have 
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managed to stay afloat in the competing sea of priorities in the international media and 
politics.  
 
Institutions, Strategies and Resources in Diaspora 
Observing that the Tibetan exiles have ‘established a state-like polity in exile’ complete with 
de facto sovereign practices, Fiona McConnell argues that TGIE engages in ‘paradiplomacy,’ 
a form of foreign relations usually attributed to sub-national governments.6 These diplomatic 
activities are targeted at individuals, NGOs, International NGOs, international organisations 
and national and regional governments of various states around the world. Internally 
organised as a hierarchically-instituted democracy, the Tibetan diaspora conducts their 
international relations through a complex network of political Tibet Support Groups (TSGs), 
Tibetan Buddhist Centres and cultural institutions around the world that pay direct 
institutional or indirect sentimental allegiance to TGIE, sometimes through the institution and 
person of the Dalai Lama. These organisations radiate out from the central TGIE structure in 
Dharamsala. 
At the centre of the exile’s international strategy has always been the Dalai Lama’s 
charismatic leadership.7 It would not be an exaggeration to argue that he single-handedly 
raised the international profile of the Tibet issue to the current level from near-irrelevance in 
the 1970s and early 1980s. Whenever the Dalai Lama travels abroad, the Tibet issue gets a 
burst of media coverage and attention from government leaders who, willingly or under 
public pressure, meet him to discuss the Tibet issue. Hence the Office of His Holiness the 
Dalai Lama sits at the top of the institutional apparatus of their international strategy and 
manages the Dalai Lama’s mix of political advocacy and spiritual mission around the world.8  
In March 2011, the Dalai Lama devolved all his political authorities to the popularly 
elected officials such as the Kalon Tripa (Prime Minister), Parliament and Supreme Justice 
Commission, thereby deepening the democratic processes, institutions and culture in exile. 
While in institutional form, the Dalai Lama and his office have been separated from TGIE, 
practically and substantially, not much has changed in terms of the Dalai Lama’s leadership 
on the Tibet issue. After all, the current TGIE political leadership has staunchly adopted the 
Dalai Lama’s Middle Way approach to relations with Beijing, continues to refer to the Dalai 
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Lama as our ‘supreme leader’ and fulfilling his visions as their central tasks. On his part, the 
Dalai Lama has vowed to work for the Tibetan people until his last breath. 
Behind the Dalai Lama’s spectacular and personal diplomacy, the Department of 
Information and International Relations (DIIR), which is considered a Ministry within TGIE, 
conducts much of the groundwork for public and international relations. DIIR is charged with 
providing information on the ‘political, human rights and environmental conditions in Tibet’ 
to the international community and instilling ‘political, human rights and environmental 
consciousness among the Tibetans.’9 DIIR is divided into Information, International 
Relations, Administrative and Branch sections, but the first two are most relevant and 
important. The Information section consists of a Print Media and Website division, which 
handles the development and dissemination of the materials for the print and web-based 
public diplomacy. The International Relations division oversees 10 Offices of Tibet (de facto 
Embassies) in New Delhi, New York, Geneva, Tokyo, London, Canberra, Paris, Moscow, 
Pretoria and Taipei, 1 Liaison Office for Latin America in New York, 1 EU Coordination 
Office in Brussels and 1 Tibetan Refugee Welfare Office in Kathmandu.10 They are charged 
with conducting TGIE’s international relations and UN initiatives, including establishing 
‘contacts with governments, parliamentarians, Tibet Support Groups, non-governmental 
organisations and human rights groups and keep them posted on recent developments in 
Tibet’ and coordinating the ‘exchange of information between individuals and organisations 
working for the welfare of the Tibetan people.’11 The Offices of Tibet serve as bridges 
between 54 Tibetan Community Associations in various countries and TGIE.12 These 
Associations not only tie individual Tibetans to TGIE, but they also conduct their own 
political campaigns for Tibet in their countries of residence. The Tibetan Community in 
Britain (TCB) consists of two campaign managers who organise political events to publicise 
the Tibetan cause in collaboration with TSGs and the Office of Tibet or independently.13 
The International Relations Department also consists of ‘Desks’ for ‘Tibet Support 
Groups’ (TSGs), ‘Environment and Development,’ ‘China,’ ‘UN, EU, and Human Rights’ 
and ‘Protocol.’ The TSG Desk liaises with TSGs around the world. The Environment and 
Develop Desk monitors, analyses and reports on the environmental situation inside Tibet and 
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promotes environmentalism within the exile community. The China Desk does outreach work 
in relation to overseas Chinese. The UN, EU and Human Rights Desk monitors and 
publicises the human rights violations in Tibet and provides information to the UN and EU 
bodies and rights groups, governments, parliaments and individuals around the world. 
Finally, the ‘Protocol Section’ officially receives and facilitates the programs of diplomats, 
government officials, parliamentarians, members of media and human rights groups and 
NGOs, researchers, Tibet and China watchers, and interested individuals who visit the 
Tibetan settlements in India.  
The TSG desk is especially significant as Tibet Support Groups constitute a major 
force for advocacy on Tibet’s behalf in the corridors of power in their respective countries. 
TSGs are non-governmental organizations formed by individuals who support the Tibetan 
cause through various non-violent means. According to the DIIR, there are 268 TSGS in 
various parts of the world,14 of which 180 are members of the International Tibet Support 
Network (ITSN), an umbrella organisation that describes itself as ‘a global coalition of Tibet-
related non-governmental organisations. Its purpose is to maximise the effectiveness of the 
worldwide Tibet movement’ through campaigning, coordination and capacity building 
projects.15 Although, these organisations recognise Tibet as an occupied country, TGIE as the 
legitimate government of the Tibetan people, and non-violence as a fundamental principle, 
they are financially and operationally independent from TGIE. They also mirror the split in 
the Tibetan community between the advocates of independence and the Middle Way. As we 
saw in the last chapter, the Middle Way-Independence divide in the exile community is 
reflected in both the Tibetan NGO and TSG worlds. NGOs like TYC, Guchusum and Chushi 
Gangdruk and pro-independence intellectuals share the objective of Tibetan independence 
with TSGs like the Students for a Free Tibet,16 International Tibet Independence Movement 
(ITIM), and Friends of Tibet India.17 Many others, of course, comply with TGIE’s Middle 
Way Approach. The upshot is that Beijing considers the TSGs inconvenient enough to 
attempt to frustrate ITSN’s meetings and in 2007 succeeded in pressuring the Belgian 
government to ask the Dalai Lama to cancel his long-planned visit to Brussels to address 
ITSN’s meeting.18  
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The Parliament and the other Ministries of TGIE—Education, Health, Religion and 
Culture, Home and Security—also conduct international relations within the purview of their 
functional areas. For instance, the Parliament engages parliamentarians from independent and 
autonomous nations to seek their support for the Tibetan cause, resulting in the formation of 
‘Parliamentary Groups for Tibet’ within regional, national and European parliaments. These 
parliamentary groups hold conventions to ‘review and discuss the developments’ inside Tibet 
and discuss strategies for supporting the Tibetans. For instance, 133 parliamentarians from 
various countries attended the Fourth World Parliamentarians’ Convention on Tibet, hosted 
by members of the Scottish Parliament in Edinburgh in November 2005.19 Most significantly, 
the Department of Religion and Culture ‘maintains close contact with the Buddhist centres 
throughout the world.’20 According to Professor Janice Williams, there were 554 Tibetan 
Buddhist centres in North America in 2003 and projected the number to increase to 700 
centres by 2008.21 A similar number of Tibetan Buddhist centres exist across Europe. 
Tibetan Buddhism has proved useful for the Tibetans in their political struggle, 
irrespective of whether they are deliberately exploiting it or not. This nexus between culture 
and politics is not unique to the Tibetan case. Nye attributes soft-power to an attractive 
culture, universally appealing political values and foreign policies perceived to enjoy legal 
and moral authority.22 In this vein, Roberts and Roberts write about the political salience of 
Tibetan Buddhist culture:  
Dharma Centers like Wangyal’s became the means of introducing Westerners to Tibet’s rich 
culture, sources of fundraising, and bases from which to host travel by Tibetan lamas, including 
the Dalai Lama. These centers spawned the next generation of leaders in the movement to free 
Tibet.23 
 
Norbu too wrote that during the drugs and free-sex era of the 1960s and 1970s,  
Tibetan lamas proved themselves to be timely and valuable counsellors, helping many American 
youth to refrain from drugs, giving them a “new” sense of purpose and meaning in life, 
encouraging them to get back to their professions, advising them to be kind and respectful to their 
parents. This went beyond Tibetan mysticism and was much appreciated by both the parents and 
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the public in general....A positive image of Tibetan culture was thus created. Then two events in 
1989 transformed this cultural interest into a political passion.24 
 
Norbu’s ‘two events’ refer to the Tiananmen Square events and the awarding of the Nobel 
Peace Prize to the Dalai Lama, which raised the international profile of the Tibetan issue.25 
The 1987-1992 Tibetan pro-independence protests and the violent suppression in full view of 
Western tourists in Lhasa were also consequential. The entire mystique around Tibet, dubbed 
the ‘Shangri-La Myth’ after James Hilton’s 1933 novel Lost Horizon, has attracted the 
fascination of Westerners for centuries as a sort of repository of pristine knowledge that had 
been lost to the rest of the world.26 An open letter written by the French writer Antonin 
Artaud to the 13th Dalai Lama is instructive, ‘O Grand Lama, give us, grace us with your 
illuminations in a language our contaminated European minds can understand, and if need be, 
transform our Minds....’27 As Shakya observed, Tibet gets ‘disproportionately more attention 
in Western media and popular culture, from comic books to video games’ than Xinjiang, 
China’s other minority region that poses similar strategic and political challenges to China.28 
Uradyn Bulag laments the obscurity of the troubles in his homeland, Inner Mongolia, relative 
to the Tibetans and Uighurs.29Although the Shangri-laist brand of fascination with Tibet and 
Tibetan culture entails certain risks and constraints, it has bestowed a level of soft power to a 
people bereft of any hard power, and this is reflected in the following examination of the 
Tibet issue in international politics.30 As Jan Magnusson writes,  
If Nye is correct in his assumptions [about soft power], the attractiveness of the Shangri-la version 
can be a useful power resource in influencing the global agenda of the Tibet issue. The power 
becomes even stronger when Tibetan cultural and ideological expressions, promoted by 
supporters among the celebrities from the cinema and music, catch on and become icons of 
globalised popular culture.31  
 
International celebrities do actively promote the Tibetan cause and as Shakya, above, and the 
academic literature on the Shangri-La Myth show, Tibetan cultural elements have entered the 
arena of popular culture in the West and Taiwan. 
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 Additionally, the organisations such as the Tibetan Youth Congress (TYC), Tibetan 
Women’s Association (TWA), Guchusum, Tibetan Centre for Human Rights & Democracy 
(TCHRD) and Tesi Environmental Awareness Movement (TEAM) conduct their own 
independent international relations to promote their own political objectives. TYC, Chushi 
Gangdruk and Guchusum advocate complete independence whereas TWA supports the 
Middle Way Approach. TCHRD and TEAM are politically neutral and focus on monitoring, 
analysing and publicising the human rights and environmental conditions inside Tibet. TYC 
and the TWA have not only regional branches in many countries, but are also informally 
allied with TSGs in India and Western countries that share their political ideals. 
 Individual Tibetans and some non-Tibetan supporters make their own personal 
contributions. Without promises of material remunerations, undaunted by the seeming 
invincibility of the Chinese juggernaut and their apparently Sisyphean task, and working 
around their own personal and family obligations of setting new roots in foreign lands, most 
Tibetans have stayed loyal to and pay annual ‘voluntary dues’, effectively a form of tax, to 
TGIE’s coffer and participate in campaigning and lobbying activities.32 Some foreign 
supporters also spend long hours and hard-earned money to help Tibetan individuals, 
organisations and the government-in-exile in their political struggle as well for educational, 
health, religious and cultural undertakings. 
The outcome of this inter-connected institutional network and transnational activism 
is to endow the Tibet issue with a degree of visibility in the international agenda. How the 
governments of individual states deal with the Tibet issue vary and the rest of this chapter 
examines the Tibet factor in some of China’s important foreign relations. The purpose of this 
chapter is to bring into sharper focus the transnational and international dimensions of the 
Sino-Tibetan insecurity dilemma. In that sense, this adds to the examination in the previous 
chapter of the transnational ties regulating the aspirations and activities of the Tibetans in 
Tibet and exile. The following discussion will show that the international politics of the Tibet 
issue owes as much to norms and ethics as to the national interests of the states involved. 
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Tibet in US-China Relations: Interests, Norms and Domestic Politics 
Tibet is an obstacle in Sino-American relations,33 although its strategic heft does not compare 
with Taiwan, North Korea and trade relations. There is a long historical context to this.  
The first American contact with Tibet of any political significance took place when 
President Franklin D. Roosevelt dispatched an Office of Strategic Services (OSS) mission to 
seek Tibetan permission to use Southern Tibet as a route to carry military supplies to the 
beleaguered Nationalist Chinese fighting the Japanese during World War II.34 The Tibetan 
government refused, claiming neutrality in the war, but allowed non-military goods to be 
taken across Tibet.35 After America ‘lost’ China to Communism,36 Tibet’s strategic 
importance grew. The Tibetans quickly became hostage to America’s changing valuations of 
China as either an ideological-strategic threat or an ally in the strategic triangle to balance 
Soviet power. There is a perceptible correlation between American perceptions of threat from 
China, whether ideological or strategic, and the degree of American interest in the Tibet 
issue. When America saw the PRC as a menacing cork in the apparently monolithic 
Communist bloc, it courted the Dalai Lama and provided covert military assistance through 
the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). When America decided to exploit the Sino-Soviet 
split to undermine the Soviet Union, it ended the covert military support for the Tibetan 
guerrillas. 
However, after the demise of the Soviet Union when American discomfort with a 
potential Chinese superpower took root, Tibet re-emerged to inconvenience Sino-American 
relations, through a combination of normative public pressure through the Congress and the 
administration’s realpolitik calculation. Tibet has political utility for the Americans beyond 
its human rights concerns.37 The normative dimension took off when the Tibetan exiles 
internationalised their struggle around 1985 after human rights became part of the American 
foreign policy agenda during the Carter administration and Tibetan Buddhism had become 
established in America. The Dalai Lama’s charismatic leadership made things easier.38 The 
realpolitik dimension is a resumption of the American interest before the Nixon-Reagan deep 
freeze: in 1950-1974, it was the fear of communist ideology; after the Cold War, China’s 
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strategic challenge keeps America interested in the Tibet-card. Revealingly, Samuel 
Huntington assigns a proxy role to the Tibetans in a future Sino-Western clash of 
civilisations.39  
During the Cold War, Tibet policy was the secret domain of the US administration, 
the CIA to be precise.40 The American public and the Congress were kept completely in the 
dark during the CIA’s operations with the Tibetan guerrillas. After the Cold War, public 
opinion and Congressional activism compelled a reluctant administration to take various 
steps in support of Tibet. Congressional activism has primarily been in support of the Dalai 
Lama’s attempts to find a peacefully negotiated settlement with Beijing. However, the 
making of US Tibet policy was not free of institutional tension. Tibet policy has been subject 
to low-intensity conflicts between the Congress and the White House and State Department. 
However, executive resistance to Congressional support for Tibet has eased over-time.  
Bruce W. Jentleson argues that presidential-congressional relations in American 
foreign policy making are characterised by four patterns: cooperation, constructive 
compromise, institutional competition and confrontation.41 On Tibet, there has been a shift 
from low-intensity confrontation in the 1980s (institutional inertia of the 1970s deep-freeze 
and currency of the Cold War) to constructive compromise in the 1990s and beyond. 
Initially, the administration was somewhat critical of the Congressional support for 
Tibet.42 The Reagan Administration stayed out of the Congressional attacks on Chinese 
policies in Tibet. When the Dalai Lama addressed the US Congressional Human Rights 
Caucus on 21 September, 1987, the State Department made its disapproval known and re-
iterated its position that Tibet was a part of China. At the Senate Foreign Affairs Committee 
hearing on human rights in Tibet in October 1987, the State Department Spokesman, 
Stapleton Roy, criticised the Dalai Lama for conducting political activities in contravention 
of his religious profile, distancing the Department from the content of his speech to the 
Congressional Human Rights Caucus.43 Deputy Secretary of State, John Negroponte’s 
statement before the Senate Foreign Affairs Committee’s hearing on Tibet on 23 April, 2008, 
reflects the transformation in the US administration’s handling of the Tibet issue: 
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The President’s meetings with the Dalai Lama in both of his terms in office and his attendance at 
the Congressional Gold Medal ceremony honoring the Dalai Lama last fall are important 
demonstrations of support at the highest levels of the U.S. government. The Tibetans have 
legitimate grievances, stemming from years of repression and Chinese policies that have adversely 
impacted Tibetan religion, culture and livelihoods.44 
. 
Although the Administration has become more supportive of mainstream Tibetan positions,45 
the consistency of Congressional leadership on Tibet has been crucial for that. 
On 24 July, 1985, 91 members of the Congress sent a letter to PRC President Li 
Xiannian, calling for direct talks with the Dalai Lama and ‘to grant the very reasonable and 
justified aspirations of His Holiness the Dalai Lama and his people every consideration.’46 
The Senate and House of Representatives then passed a series of resolutions supporting the 
various proposals and statements made by the Dalai Lama, starting with his Five Point Peace 
Plan address before the Congressional Human Rights Caucus on 21 September 1987,47 urged 
the US Administration to support the Tibetans more strongly, and called upon Beijing to 
engage him on the basis of his proposals. Between September 1987 and April 2008, Congress 
had passed about twenty eight resolutions, criticising the general rights situation or specific 
violations in Tibet and supporting the Dalai Lama’s proposals for a negotiated solution.48 The 
same concerns for human rights violations and support for a negotiated settlement are 
expressed in the annual Foreign Relations Authorization Acts (FRAA).49 The FRAA for 
fiscal year 1992-1993 (Public Law 102-138), for instance, declared: 
Tibet, including those areas incorporated into the Chinese provinces of Sichuan, Yunnan, Gansu 
and Qinghai, is an occupied country under the established principles of international law; (2) 
Tibet’s true representatives are the Dalai Lama and the Tibetan government in exile as recognised 
by the Tibetan people...; (7) numerous United States declarations since the Chinese invasion have 
recognized Tibet’s right to self-determination and the illegality of China’s occupation of Tibet. 
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This sort of language is satisfying or inflammatory depending upon whether one is 
working in Dharamsala or Beijing, respectively, reinforcing the insecurity dilemma. 
Working through Congress, the Tibetans have managed not just to raise the profile of 
their struggle, but also to compel an initially reluctant, even hostile, US administration to 
provide some material and institutional support for the Tibetans.50 George H.W. Bush 
became the first American president to meet the Dalai Lama in 1991. Bill Clinton met the 
Dalai Lama several times, albeit as ‘drop-ins’. Former President George W. Bush also met 
the Dalai Lama a number of times, including once publicly during the awarding of the 
Congressional Gold medal to the latter. President Barack Obama also welcomed the Dalai 
Lama twice to the White House, despite coming under strong Chinese pressure against 
meeting him. These meetings help raise the profile of the Tibetan struggle and hold symbolic 
significance for the Tibetans. 
Congressional support also resulted in some indispensable material assistance from 
the American government. The Clinton administration created a Tibetan language service in 
the Voice of America in 1990.51 This was followed by the creation of Radio Free Asia under 
provisions of the 1994 International Broadcasting Act (P.L. 103-236) with eight broadcasting 
hours per day in Tibetan.52 Public Law (PL) P.L. 104-319) provided scholarships for 15 
Tibetans under the Fulbright scholarship programme to pursue post-graduate studies in 
American universities, which the Tibetans have stretched to allow 30 students to pursue a 
range of degree and non-degree programs.53 In November 1990, $500, 000 was allocated for 
humanitarian assistance (PL 101-513), which increased to $1.5 million in October 1992 (PL 
102-391) to $2 million for the fiscal year (FY) 2003 (P.L. 107-228).54 A separate Economic 
Support Fund (ESF) assistance for non-governmental organizations who support and preserve 
the Tibetan environment and culture and promote sustainable development was earmarked at 
$1 million in FY2000 (P.L. 106-113), averaging $4 million per year through FY2006 (P.L. 
109-102). The 110th Congress earmarked $5 million (P.L. 110-161) for ESF for Tibet. In 
total, for fiscal years 2006 and 2007, for instance, Congress authorised $6,000,000 and 
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$8,000,000 respectively for Tibet.55 Congress also compelled the Administration to make 
some procedural and institutional adjustments to strengthen support for Tibet. 
 In 1994, Congressional supporters of Tibet commenced legislation to create the 
position of a ‘Special Envoy for Tibet’ with ambassadorial rank.56 The Clinton 
Administration compromised by appointing a ‘Special Coordinator for Tibetan Issues’ on 
October 31, 199757 to promote dialogue between the Dalai Lama and the Chinese 
government.58 Although without the ambassadorial rank that Congress originally envisaged, 
it signalled more focused attention on Tibetan issues. All these legislative initiatives 
culminated in the Tibetan Policy Act of 2002, which was signed into law by President George 
W. Bush on September 30, 2002, as part of Foreign Relations Authorization Act for Fiscal 
Years 2002 and 2003 (H.R. 1646). As Rabgey and Sharlho write, ‘The Act represents a 
milestone in the institutionalization of US political support for Sino-Tibetan dialogue.’ 59  
The central objective of American Tibet policy is to ‘to support the aspirations of the 
Tibetan people to safeguard their distinct identity.’ Section 613, ‘Tibet Negotiations’ requires 
the President and Secretary of State to encourage the Chinese government to enter into 
dialogue with the Dalai Lama or his representatives to arrive at a negotiated settlement of the 
Tibetan issue and to ensure compliance after an agreement has been reached. It also 
established a presidential reporting mechanism whereby the President and Secretary of State 
are required to report annually to Congress on steps taken by the two offices to facilitate 
dialogue and negotiation between the two parties. In addition, every report on China brought 
out by the Administration should have a separate Tibet section. Section 616 outlines the ways 
and means of supporting ‘economic development, cultural preservation, health care, and 
education and environmental sustainability for Tibetans inside Tibet.’ Section 618 requires 
the Secretary of State to do his/her best to open a US ‘Branch Office’ (Consulate) in Lhasa, 
Tibet. Most significantly, Section 621 established the position of the ‘Special Coordinator for 
Tibetan Issues’ in the State Department, charged with the central objective of promoting 
‘substantive dialogue between the Government of the People’s Republic of China and the 
Dalai Lama or his representatives.’ Specifically, the position is charged with coordinating US 
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programs on Tibet and vigorously promoting the protection of ‘the distinct religious, cultural, 
linguistic, and national identity of Tibet...and human rights’ among six others. After the 2008 
uprising in Tibet, then-holder of this position, Paula Dobriansky, publicly criticised China’s 
repression of Tibetan religion, culture and freedoms and called for ‘serious and direct 
dialogues’ with the Dalai Lama as the only way to resolve the Tibetan problem.60 The cap-
stone of Congressional support was the awarding of the Congressional Gold Medal to the 
Dalai Lama in 2007.61  As the following chapter on events since the uprising in 2008 shows, 
both the Administration and Congress stepped up their criticism of Chinese policies in Tibet. 
This crescendo of high level American attention on Tibet was unimaginable only a 
couple of decades ago. In the late 1980s, the Dalai Lama’s Special Envoy to America could 
only meet low-level State Department officials ‘in some coffee shop that was as far away as 
possible from Foggy Bottom.’ 62 Tibetans have come a long way since then. Yet, American 
support for Tibet has had only mixed results. While the central objective of bringing about a 
negotiated settlement or changing Chinese policies in Tibet have not been realised, American 
policy has had the positive effect of building Tibetan capacity, keeping Tibetan hopes alive 
and moderating their agendas. 
American Tibet policy has not been successful in bringing about negotiations in the 
face of widely divergent agenda of the two sides.63 Some analysts argue that it has actually 
driven Dharamsala and Beijing further apart and worsened conditions inside Tibet.64 Their 
logic is that Tibetans inside Tibet oppose Chinese rule because they believe that America will 
intervene and force China to make concessions to the Dalai Lama.65 As mentioned in the 
introduction, American interference provokes fears and strengthens the hard-liners in Lhasa 
and Beijing, fuelling the insecurity dilemma. To the extent that American diplomatic and 
material assistance helps maintain the exile apparatus and strengthens Tibetan identity and 
resolve, Beijing’s concerns are justified, but its own intransigence drives the Tibetans to 
Washington DC. However, to contend that Tibetans in Tibet oppose Chinese rule because of 
the belief that America will coerce China to free Tibet is problematic.  
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First, it assumes that if the Dalai Lama dealt directly with China without foreign 
involvement, Beijing would be less suspicious, more benign and magnanimous towards the 
Tibetans. History does not support such a conclusion. 
The Dalai Lama’s near-exclusive engagement with the Chinese between 1951 and 
1959 under the terms of the 17 Point Agreement was not rewarded with more enlightened 
Chinese policies in the Tibetan regions. Rather it left the Tibetans frustrated and insecure 
with increasingly radical and violent communist reforms in Eastern Tibet and increasingly 
integrationist policies in Central Tibet. Indeed, these so-called reforms and policies 
engendered violent rebellions in the East, while in Lhasa, grass-roots Tibetan opposition to 
‘self-interested’ and ‘traitorous’ aristocrats and Chinese rule began to gain strength. The 
Dalai Lama’s position became untenable and he decided to escape to exile. Similarly, from 
1978-1987, the Dalai Lama dealt exclusively with the Chinese government in the hopes of 
negotiating an autonomous status for Tibet.66 Dialogue collapsed in the late 1980s under the 
weight of Beijing’s hard-line despite the Tibetan concessions outlined in the previous 
chapter. As Goldstein wrote, ‘Beijing wanted rapprochement, but did not want to enter into a 
genuine give-and-take with the exiles over the issue of changes in political control of the 
Tibet Autonomous Region.’67 It was precisely because of Beijing’s intransigence that 
Dharamsala internationalised the Tibet issue.68 The Tibetans have preferred to deal directly 
with Beijing, but the absence of international involvement has made no positive difference to 
the prospect for a resolution or the conditions inside Tibet. 
 Furthermore, the argument that Tibetans oppose Chinese rule because of the belief of 
American intervention assumes that the Tibetans are uninformed naïves willing to risk lives 
and limbs for an illusion. The most authoritative and influential proponent of this argument, 
Goldstein wrote: 
US pressure has not been simply harmless—it has had serious negative consequences, for 
America’s token actions have led many Tibetans to believe that it supports the Dalai Lama’s wish 
for democracy in Tibet and encouraged them to continue opposing China. I remember vividly a 
twelve-year old monk arguing with me about this once when I was doing research in Drepung 
monastery near Lhasa. He came up to me and asked, in a whisper, when the United States was 
going to push China out of Tibet and help the Dalai Lama return. When I tried to explain that 
China is a powerful country and the United States is not likely to do anything concrete, he refused 
to listen, saying emphatically, “No, no, I know that the U.S. is more powerful than China and is 
going to help us. 69 
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He relies on the words of a twelve-year old to paint all Tibetans as naïves who believe that 
America will actually intervene militarily to support Tibet.70 Furthermore, Goldstein 
attributes this naivety to the inability of the Tibetans, who have lived under Chinese 
totalitarianism, to appreciate that congressional positions are distinct from those of the 
Administration’s.71 However, in the same paragraph, he portrays the Tibetans in the 1980s to 
be well-informed sophisticates resourceful enough to learn about events in the West through 
BBC and Voice of America radio broadcasts in Chinese language.72 The assumption of 
Tibetan monks and nuns being literate enough in Mandarin Chinese in the 1980s to listen to 
VOA and BBC is debatable in itself. More to the point, if the Tibetans are rising up only 
because of the illusion of American intervention, one wonders whose support encourages the 
more than 100, 000 protests and riots in China itself.73 This author submits that the chief 
causes of the protests and riots in Tibet or China are the intolerability of the local situations, 
especially in the realms of culture and identity. External factors could either mitigate or 
reinforce these local pressures. 
However, American involvement has had some positive outcomes from the Tibetan 
perspective, while it has also moderated Tibetan expectations and demands from Beijing. 
First, American attention on Tibet has had the effect of keeping Tibetan hopes alive and 
strengthening their struggle. As Norbu wrote, ‘Above all a Tibetan language broadcast by the 
Voice of America and Radio Free Asia not only sustains the hopes and aspirations of the 
Tibetan people but also beaming across the Tibetan plateau new messages of human rights, 
freedom and democracy in the post-Communist context.’74 Second, the limited Western 
support strengthens the hands of moderate leaders like the Dalai Lama within the Tibetan 
community. The Dalai Lama and TGIE officials frequently attribute the international support 
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for Tibet to the ‘peaceful’ struggle and moderate aspirations of the Tibetan leadership. If the 
Tibetans adopt violent methods and demand independence, they counsel, the Tibetan struggle 
will either lose its appeal to many supporters or make it inconvenient for many organisations 
and governments to support the Tibetans. In his appeal to the Tibetans all over the world in 
the aftermath of the violent riots in Lhasa (14 March, 2008) and elsewhere, the Dalai Lama 
said: 
We should not engage in any action that could be even remotely interpreted as violent.  Even 
under the most provocative of situations we must not allow our most precious and deeply held 
values to be compromised.  I firmly believe that we will achieve success through our non-violent 
path.  We must be wise to understand where the unprecedented affection and support for our 
cause stems from.75 
 
Additionally, Tibetan government functionaries frequently respond to the calls of more 
radical elements to reinstate complete independence as the central goal of the Tibetan 
movement by reminding them that such a move would diminish the willingness and ability of 
states such as America to support the Tibetans. They have larger interests in China and 
officially accept Tibet as a part of China. Indeed, American strategic and economic interests 
have always been the final arbiters in American policies and practices on the Tibet issue. In 
that sense, America’s material assistance, which the Tibetans value highly, gives America 
diplomatic levers to control Tibetan positions and behaviour in the future. Inasmuch as 
American national interest is the bottom line for America’s policy, having this handle on the 
Tibet movement would be useful in the future. 
 It is clear from the above account of America’s Tibet policy that it dovetails with the 
societal security agenda of the Tibetans. The central objective of the Tibetan Policy Act of 
2002 is ‘to support the aspirations of the Tibetan people to safeguard their distinct identity.’76 
Inasmuch as American diplomatic and material assistance helps the Tibetans to preserve and 
strengthen their identity and institutions in exile, builds their capacity and keep their political 
hopes alive in Tibet and exile, it is relevant to the insecurity dilemma. 
Whether by design or happenstance, there is a degree of mutuality between 
mainstream Tibetan positions and American Tibet policy. The Tibetan approach to America 
was necessary to address the stark asymmetry in power,77 while America is concerned about 
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human rights and democracy, but is also interested in Tibet as a means for ‘regulating its 
relations with China.’78 The effect is to fuel the insecurity dilemma. 
 
Victim of Moralistic Idealism and New Realism: Tibet, China and India79 
Tibet impinges more directly on Sino-Indian relations than on any of China’s other bilateral 
relations. As Norbu observes: ‘The crux of the Sino-Indian strategic rivalry is this: if the 
Chinese power elite consider Tibet to be strategically important to China, the Indian 
counterparts think it is equally vital to Indian national security.’80 Independent India’s Tibet 
policy was defined by Nehru’s dreams of a Sino-Indian anti-imperialist, non-aligned Asian 
alternative to the Soviet and American superpowers. The 1962 border war with China 
changed India’s practice, if not policy, towards the Tibetan refugees. Rajiv Gandhi’s visit to 
Beijing in 1989 brought about a thaw in relations and a return to India’s China-friendly 
policy statements on Tibet before 1962, although there have been no discernible practical 
fall-outs on the Tibetan exiles. This is, perhaps, in keeping with the new realism and 
confidence in the post-Cold War Indian foreign policy, tempering the ‘idealism in its foreign 
policy with a strong dose of realism,’ as C. Raja Mohan put it.81 Mohan writes, “Facing its 
own acute vulnerabilities in Kashmir, Punjab and the North-East, [India] was unwilling to 
confront China on the issue. At the same time, India refused to bend by reducing or 
suspending its support to the Tibetan exiles and the Dalai Lama in India.’82 Eventually 
though, as one Indian analyst counselled, India will need ‘a more sophisticated policy that 
goes beyond simply curbing the Dalai Lama's activities,’83 remaining in a state of denial, or 
restating its acceptance of Tibet as a part of China. This is because at some point Beijing will 
demand that India should dissolve the TGIE and India would have to have a smarter 
response. 
Be that as it may be, there are four major issues that feed both the Sino-Tibetan geo-
strategic rivalry and the Sino-Tibetan insecurity dilemma: the status of Tibet, Chinese unease 
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with the activities of Tibetan refugees, including the Dalai Lama, Indian fears over the 
Chinese military presence on the Tibetan plateau and the long-standing border dispute.84  
 First, India’s position on the status of Tibet has changed from the British policy of 
recognising the de facto independence of Tibet— ‘completely Autonomous State’—under a 
vague form of Chinese suzerainty (1947-1951)85 to accepting Tibet as a part of China in 
1954.86 On 29 April, 1954, India relented to Chinese insistence on referring to Tibet as ‘Tibet 
Region of China.’87After the 1962 border war, India merely used ‘Tibet’ until the 1988 visit 
of Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi when the ‘Sino-Indian Joint Press Communique’ referred to 
Tibet as ‘an autonomous region of China.’88 In 2003, Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee 
signed a Declaration which recognised ‘that the Tibet Autonomous Region is part of the 
territory of the People's Republic of China.’89 This position was reiterated in the Joint 
Statement during the visit of Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao to India in 2005.90 These 
formulations led an Indian scholar to observe that India’s acceptance of Tibet as a part of 
China is conditional upon Tibet’s enjoyment of autonomy.91 China, therefore, demands 
stronger and more unambiguous statements from New Delhi on China’s sovereignty over 
Tibet, which India has resisted so far.92 
Second, India’s official policy has been consistently to disallow anti-Chinese 
activities by Tibetan refugees on Indian soil. In practice, India has allowed the Tibetans to 
run a government-in-exile, registered as the Central Tibetan Administration, given material 
assistance for the running of various projects under its aegis, and facilitated the international 
political activities of the Dalai Lama. India has so far refused to bend to Chinese pressure for 
‘reducing or suspending its support to Tibetan exiles and the Dalai Lama in India.’93 A 
relevant question is whether India will revise this policy after the demise of the current Dalai 
Lama. One Indian scholar argues that India will continue to support Tibetan exiles because it 
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is in India’s national interest.94 Another proposes that India should take upon itself the 
responsibility to nurture Tibetan language and culture as it faces ‘cultural genocide’ in 
Tibet.95 For the foreseeable future, India’s tolerance and facilitating role for the Tibetan 
struggle looks set to continue. This is a sore point for China.96 The Chinese complain that 
‘such open encouragement and support given by the Indian government to the Tibetan rebel 
bandits in their traitorous activities constitutes interference in China’s internal affairs’ and 
harms the progress of Sino-Indian relations.97 Cohen argues that in the minds of the Chinese 
elite, ‘India’s gravest threat to China resides in Tibet’ because of the sanctuary that India 
provides to over 100, 000 Tibetans and the goal of some Indian elite to resurrect Tibet as a 
buffer zone between China and India.98 Wu Xinbo also writes, ‘So long as the exiled 
community exists, Tibetan separatism will remain a major concern for PRC leaders.’99  
Third, Indian’s have their reciprocal fears arising from Chinese military presence on 
the Tibetan plateau, from the historical memory of perceived Chinese betrayal and 
humiliation during the 1962 war and from uncertainties about Chinese intentions now and in 
the future. The true extent of China’s military presence in Tibet is not clear, given the secrecy 
surrounding military information, but rough estimates are available.100 Margolis notes that in 
the early 1990s, China had deployed around 500, 000 troops on the Tibetan plateau with 
some of the best weaponry.101 Norbu estimates, however, that the likely size of the PLA in 
Tibet is around 150, 000 in Eastern Tibet and 40, 000 on the border between India and 
TAR.102 The presence of Chinese strategic forces on the Tibetan plateau adds another 
dimension to India’s China threat perception.103 Not lost on the Indian elite are the several 
airbases and tactical airstrips and the network of roads that China has built, criss-crossing the 
Tibetan plateau right up to the Indian, Nepalese and Pakistani borders with Tibet and 
Xinjiang, and the expanding railway network.104 China’s management of water resources 
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emanating from Tibet, which feed the Indian subcontinent, also features in Indian security 
conceptions.105 In sum, the ‘ghosts of 1962,’ as one Indian strategic analyst referred to the 
combination of historical memory, humiliation and sense of betrayal from the war in 1962, 
casts a long shadow over Indian perceptions of China today.106 Essentially, the host of 
mutually conflicting security concerns germane to Tibet reinforce the larger strategic rivalry 
between these two Asian giants.  
Finally, the border dispute between India and China continues to elude a resolution 
ever since they acquired a common border when China incorporated Tibet in 1950.107 The 
two countries came to share 2,520 miles of border which has not been delimited by a treaty. 
Specifically, India claims that China is occupying 38,000 square kilometres in Aksai Chin in 
the North-Eastern corner of Jammu and Kashmir, which China occupied after the war in 
1962. India also claims that Beijing is holding 5,180 square kilometres of land in Kashmir 
that Pakistan ceded to China in 1963. On their part, the Chinese claim 90,000 square 
kilometres in the Indian state of Arunachal Pradesh.108 The border row remains a major 
obstacle to further improvement in Sino-Indian relations.109  
It is noteworthy that although China has resolved territorial disputes with Russia, 
Vietnam, Burma, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Mongolia, Nepal and Pakistan,110 the border with 
India continues to bedevil bilateral relations with New Delhi.111 In 1987, India and China 
almost went to war in the North-Eastern frontier region of Sumdorung Chu.112 
There was some optimism after the signing of the ‘Agreement on the Political 
Parameters and Guiding Principles for the Settlement of the Boundary Question’ during 
Chinese Prime Minister Wen Jiabao's visit to India in April 2005. Since then not only has the 
prospect for a resolution dimmed, the border has become more contentious.113 A week before 
Hu Jintao’s visit to India in 2006, the Chinese ambassador in New Delhi, Sun Yuxi, raised 
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temperatures in India when he said, ‘In our position, the whole of the state of Arunachal 
Pradesh is Chinese territory. And Tawang is only one of the places in it. We are claiming all 
of that.’114 In May 2007, China refused to give a visa to an Indian Administrative Service 
Officer from Arunachal Pradesh to visit China, arguing that he did not require a visa in his 
own country.115 India responded by allowing then Taiwanese presidential candidate Ma 
Yingjeou to visit Delhi and to hold talks with senior Indian officials in June 2007. Not long 
after that, Indian media reported border incursions by Chinese soldiers and supply of small 
arms to separatist insurgents in India’s violence-torn North-East. Reports of Chinese military 
incursions into Sikkim, another bone of contention, in June 2008 reveal the volatility of the 
border issue.116 Some of these incursions seem to arise from the fact that the two countries 
have not even managed to demarcate a mutually agreed-upon line of control, although 
officially they refer to it as the Line of Actual Control (LAC).117 
On account of these factors, India is considered one of the ‘hostile forces’ exploiting 
the Tibet issue against China’s interests. Fears of Indian entanglement in Tibet and loss of 
strategic advantage to India are long-standing.118 Even when there were very few Indians in 
Tibet, Mao told Khrushchev in 1959: ‘The Hindus [Indians] acted in Tibet as if it belonged to 
them.’119 Although, successive Indian governments have been extremely wary of rattling the 
Chinese on Tibet and despite the overall improvement in Sino-Indian relations, Beijing 
continues to suspect India of bad intentions in Tibet. The presence of the Dalai Lama and 
TGIE in India provide the basis for these Chinese fears and suspicions. History also impinges 
on the present and the future. As Norbu wrote, ‘If India dominates Tibet (as the British Raj 
had done until 1947), the Chinese feel insecure and threatened.’120 Wang warned ominously: 
‘Preparing for a possible future conflict with India is the bottom line as to why the Central 
Government cannot allow Tibetan independence [or ‘covert independence’ meaning 
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autonomy].’121 Zhao identified three areas of Sino-Indian geopolitical rivalry: Sino-Pakistan 
alignment, Tibet and the 2, 500 kilometres long border dispute.122  
 In short, the apparently flourishing exile cultural and political apparatus in India, 
Tibet’s closer civilisational links to India, the history of British-Indian policy towards Tibet, 
the contemporary Sino-Indian strategic rivalry, and uncertainties over Indian intentions 
contribute to the range of Chinese insecurities identified in Chapter Five. As quoted in the 
previous chapter, Wang eloquently describes how India gives rise to the worst-case 
calculations driving Beijing’s Tibet policy. 
Yet, there are analysts in both China and India, who counsel that a resolution of the 
Tibet issue, one way or the other, holds the key to not just solving the border row, but easing 
the larger strategic rivalry.123 Chellaney wrote, ‘A genuine China-India rapprochement 
fundamentally demands a resolution of the Tibet issue through a process of reconciliation and 
healing initiated by Beijing with its Tibetan minority.’124 Malik opines that until Tibet has 
been totally ‘pacified’ and ‘[s]inicised as Inner Mongolia’, China would prefer an undefined 
border as a bargaining chip because of its belief that India prefers an independent Tibet and 
aids Tibetan separatists.125 Norbu argues that ‘Tibet has shaped the informal and invisible 
dynamics of Sino-Indian relations and politics from 1950 to the present.... Tibet is the legal 
foundation on which both India’s and China’s border claims rest.’126 India is reluctant to 
countenance Chellaney’s advice that India should condition any final border delineation 
between China and India to an agreement between Beijing and the Dalai Lama, so as to push 
Sino-Tibetan reconciliation forward. This does not bode well for the resolution of the often-
tense Sino-Indian border dispute as the Tibet issue is neither close to a resolution nor are the 
Tibetans supine enough for assimilation any time soon. Some Chinese scholars also advised 
Beijing in 2001 that resolving the Tibet issue with the Dalai Lama would ‘reduce China’s 
strategic risks in the volatile region of the Indian sub-continent.’127 The hard-liners undercut 
their advice and nothing came of it as the current dead-lock in dialogue shows. Hence, the 
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Sino-Tibetan insecurity dilemma is intimately entwined in a mutually reinforcing relationship 
with the Sino-Indian strategic rivalry.128 
Tibet also impinges on some of China’s other important foreign relations, especially 
with Europe and Taiwan. If history is any guide, the apparently friendly, but fundamentally 
competitive Russo-Chinese relationship may also see a role for Tibet. 
 
Europe and Tibet: Venus and Her Normative Imperatives 
Historically, apart from Great Britain, other European states did not have diplomatic relations 
with Tibet. After the Chinese takeover of Tibet in 1950, Europe was largely silent on Tibet. 
Great Britain, which had the most extensive diplomatic relations with Tibet,129  washed its 
hands off it after the Chinese invasion, choosing to expect India to take the lead.130 In fact, 
Britain did its best to stifle Tibetan diplomacy during the dying moments of the Tibetan state 
and at the United Nations when Tibet was debated in the General Assembly in 1959 and the 
early 1960s.131 Buried within a carefully worded statement released on October 2008 through 
an obscure channel called ‘Ministerial Written Statement’, Britain effectively changed its 
policy on Tibet to recognise Chinese sovereignty for the first time, describing its formal 
position of accepting Chinese suzerainty as an ‘anachronism’ and ‘suzerainty’ as ‘an outdated 
concept.’132 The timing of the statement, happening in the thick of the global financial crisis, 
has led Barnett to ask: ‘Did Britain just sell Tibet?’ 133 He argued that Britain’s economic 
troubles and the need for Chinese investment led to the shift in policy. Perhaps, Britain has 
performed the last act of what Tibetologists call Tibet’s ‘“bad  friend  syndrome”—Western 
powers professing friendship for Tibet but refusing to support it in its fundamental objective 
of political independence while actually bolstering China's claim of real ownership.’134 To be 
fair, the statement also abhorred the human rights condition in Tibet, recognised the Dalai 
Lama’s peaceful leadership, expressed support for the dialogue process and the necessity of 
Tibetan autonomy for a resolution of the Sino-Tibetan conflict. Despite this ambiguity of the 
British response, major European countries such as Germany and France, not known 
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traditionally for supporting Tibet, became more vocal in their criticism of Chinese policies 
towards Tibet.  
On 23 September, 2007, German Chancellor Angela Merkel held a historic meeting 
with the Dalai Lama, despite the objections of her coalition partner and predictably 
Beijing’s.135 Chancellor Merkel’s personal commitment to human rights and religious 
freedom, the likely reason for her meeting with the Dalai Lama, could be attributed to her 
experiences under Communist rule in East Germany. The meeting not only opened a 
diplomatic spat with China, but also provoked criticism within Germany, especially from the 
Chancellor’s coalition partner, the Social Democrats, and German business groups.136 We 
shall see in the next chapter that Franco-Chinese relations also took a battering on account of 
the Tibet issue in the aftermath of the Tibetan uprising in 2008. In addition, some Warsaw 
Pact countries that became free in the late 1980s actively supported the Tibetans. Two factors 
explain the new European interest in Tibet. 
First, with the end of the Cold War, many countries who had either been Soviet 
satellites ruled by Stalinist Communist Parties, such as Poland and the Czech Republic, or 
parts of the Soviet Union, such as Lithuania, Estonia and Latvia, became independent and 
democratic countries. The peoples and governments of these newly democratic countries, 
arising from their own experiences of living under Communist rule and being subjugated by a 
neighbouring great power, have expressed great solidarity with the plight of the Tibetan 
people. In fact, the Dalai Lama became the first foreign leader to address the Lithuanian 
Parliament after it regained independence in 1991.137 This explains the high level of political 
support from the governments of Poland and the Czech Republic. 
Secondly, the self-image of Europe as a normative power as opposed to authoritarian 
states like Russia and China or unilateralist America—‘Americans are from Mars and 
Europeans are from Venus’ as Robert Kagan puts it138—could explain the rising criticism of 
European states on Tibet. Ian Manners makes it clear in his seminal article on the European 
Union as a normative actor: ‘democracy, rule of law, and respect for human rights and 
fundamental freedoms’ are ‘at the centre of its relations with its Member States... and the 
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world.’139 The Tibetan struggle, due to its overall peaceful nature and moderate demands of 
the Dalai Lama, is a proper candidate for European support. For as Nancy Pelosi put it if the 
West does not confront China on Tibet, ‘we have lost all moral authority to speak out on 
human rights.’140 The failure to support the non-violent and moderate demands of the 
Tibetans would render Europe’s rhetoric and self-image as the defender and propagator of 
human rights and freedoms ring hollow.   
The new European activism must be qualified that ultimately national interests prevail 
over the normative concerns over Tibetan human rights and self-determination. No European 
country will go beyond symbolic acts of support, such as honouring the Dalai Lama with 
prizes, awards and meetings, expressions of solidarity and calls for dialogue, to put biting 
sanctions on Beijing. In that sense, Europe’s policy and practice are no different from that of 
America’s. In addition, there are active leftist groups in Europe that still support China over 
in Tibet out of what can only described as ‘ideological fundamentalism…which assigns 
enemy [or friend] status because of what the other is—its political identity—rather than how 
it actually behaves’.141 
Yet, European expressions of support and solidarity encourage the Tibetans in both 
Tibet and exile. This in itself is inimical from Beijing’s point of view. Moreover, the Chinese 
government sees in the European support for Tibet not so much the probability of military 
intervention as the depredations of peaceful evolution. It plays on China’s residual fears of 
broader Western designs on China, informed as it is by the memories of the colonial 
experience that still resonates strongly in Chinese nationalism. To that extent, European 
involvement, even if limited, reinforces the Sino-Tibetan insecurity dilemma.  
 
Taiwan: Nationalist Interest and Solidarity 
Unlike most of Europe, Taiwanese engagement with Tibet goes back farther into history. The 
Nationalist regime in Mainland China and in Taiwan after 1949 influenced American policy 
towards Tibet to a significant degree.142 The Nationalist (Kuomintang or KMT) Party, having 
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fled from China and locked in a competition with Communist China for recognition as the 
legitimate government of China, continued to claim Tibet and Mongolia as integral parts of 
China.143 The Mongolian and Tibetan Affairs Commission (MTAC), a Ministry-level body 
within the Taiwanese government, is a relic of Nationalist China’s dreams of incorporating 
Tibet and Mongolia into China.144 Even as it claimed sovereignty over Tibet, the Nationalists 
sought to use the Tibetans against their communist adversaries for both propaganda and 
military purposes from the late 1940s to 1974 in collaboration with CIA’s Tibet operations.145 
Right up to the 1990s, relations between Taiwan and the TGIE remained rancorous because 
of Taiwan’s refusal to acknowledge Tibetan independence and its clandestine and disruptive 
activities within the Tibetan communities in Nepal and India. As a result, TGIE doggedly 
refused to open formal relations until Taiwan changed its policy and behaviour towards the 
Tibetans. 
As democracy took root and pro-independence forces gained strength in Taiwan in the 
1990s146 and externally the balance of power shifted towards Mainland China, a gradual 
change also became apparent in Taiwan’s Tibet policy.147 Taiwan dropped its disruptive 
activities within the exile Tibetan community in South Asia and improved relations with 
Dharamsala. The Dalai Lama visited Taiwan for the first time in January 1997 and again in 
2001 when he met then-Presidents Lee Teng-Hui and Chen Shui-Bian.148 While TMAC as a 
constitutional body persists, a vigorous debate took place in Taiwan regarding its mandate 
and future. Its function has evolved from the explicitly political one to running cultural, social 
and educational programmes in Tibet, Mongolia and the Tibetan exile communities in South 
Asia and Taiwan.149 During his 1997 visit, the Dalai Lama and Lee Teng-Hui opened a 
representative office in Taipei, diplomatically named ‘Tibet Religious Foundation of His 
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Holiness the Dalai Lama,’150 followed by the Taiwan-Tibet Exchange Foundation, formally 
inaugurated by then-President Chen and ‘charged with handling relations with the Tibetan 
government-in-exile.’151 Tethong has interpreted this to mean that as a matter of fundamental 
policy, the Taiwanese government and MTAC have recognised the Tibetan people’s right to 
self-determination on the basis of international law,152 but there has been no formal 
legislation or statement to reflect such a shift in policy. 
The perceptibly positive transformation of Taiwan-TGIE relations happened in the 
context of growing popularity of Tibetan Buddhism, which predated the changes in 
Taiwanese politics.153 In fact, this interest in Tibetan Buddhism had roots in the pre-1949 
Nationalist China’s patronage of Tibetan Buddhism for political purposes154 and the 
proselytisation of famous Tibetan Lamas such as the 9th and 10th Panchen Lamas (the latter’s 
estate switched allegiance to the CCP during the final years of the Chinese civil war),155 and 
Changkya Rolpe Dorje (who escaped to Taiwan with the KMT).156 As in America and 
Europe, Tibetan Buddhism appears to have been useful, albeit unintentionally, in preparing 
the ground for subsequent Tibetan political activism and diplomatic work in Taiwan. 
However, Taiwan’s democratization and policy-shift on Tibet paralleled the rise of 
China’s power. Taiwan was looking for a strategy to ensure its survival in the face of the 
steady rise of its arch-rival across the Straits and democratisation was as much a survival 
strategy as a function of domestic demands for it. Improving relations with Dharamsala could 
also be seen in this light. In the words of one Taiwanese analyst, the Dalai Lama’s high 
profile visits to Taiwan ‘did not simply project Taiwan’s international image, but one which 
was as distinct as Tibet, one that was fighting for democracy and freedom just like the Tibet 
leader, and one that was fighting against being reunified by the Beijing government.’157 It is 
tantamount to piggy-bagging on the Dalai Lama’s international appeal to supplement 
Taiwan’s considerable military and economic assets. However, the dependence is not 
unidirectional. As Norbu writes, ‘A Taipei-Dharamsala united front would enormously 
enhance their collective bargaining power against Beijing in their negotiation for peaceful 
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political settlements.’158 For the Tibetans, Taiwan, with its common language and culture as 
China’s, is also a back-door to influencing public opinion in Mainland China on the Tibet 
issue. The Tibet Religious Foundation of His Holiness the Dalai Lama has been running a 
Chinese language radio program in cooperation with the Broadcasting Corporation of China, 
Taiwan. Again, a mix of national interests, domestic political imperatives, commitments to 
freedom, human rights and democracy and interest in Tibetan Buddhism accounted for 
Taiwan’s improvement of relations with Dharamsala. 
However, with the election of a China-friendly KMT to the presidency and majority 
in the Parliament, Tibetans wonder whether Taiwanese policy towards Tibet will revert to the 
old nationalist claims and divisive activities in the Tibetan community.159 The non-partisan 
nature of commitment to democracy and interest in Tibetan Buddhism in Taiwan will cushion 
Taiwan-Dharamsala relations against complete deterioration. However, Taiwanese interests 
will ultimately prevail over principles. Just as the Dalai Lama turned down an invitation by 
Chen Shui-bian to attend his inauguration ceremony upon being elected as Taiwan’s 
president in 2000160 so as not to damage the secretive Beijing-Dharamsala dialogue 
underway, Taiwan will also implement a Tibet policy guided by its view of its own interests 
vis-à-vis China. Hence, in 2008, the Ma Yingjeou government refused to give a visa to the 
Dalai Lama when his followers invited him to Taiwan, saying the timing was not right. 
Taiwan only reluctantly issued a visa to him in 2009 when he was invited by the leaders of 
seven local governments in Southern Taiwan to console and pray for the victims and 
survivors of Typhoon Morakot in 2009.161  
Beyond the question of ‘collective bargaining power,’ the democratic self-identities of 
both Taiwan and the exile government could be interpreted as a threat to the CCP. The 
possibility of Taiwan becoming a major conduit for influencing Han Chinese public opinion 
on Tibet should also concern Beijing. This nexus between two ‘separatist’ forces was 
disturbing enough for China to attempt to frustrate it. Soon after the Dalai Lama’s first trip to 
Taiwan, which drew huge crowds, Beijing added another precondition for Sino-Tibetan 
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dialogue to resume: the Dalai Lama should declare publicly that Taiwan is a province of 
China.162  
Russia: Could History Repeat Itself? 
On the face of it, dragging Russia into Chinese-Tibetan affairs might sound like stretching the 
imagination. After all, Russo-Chinese relations have been on the upswing since the 
conclusion of the Cold War. Russia and China are leading members in the Shanghai 
Cooperation Organisation, enjoy growing economic complementarities and friendly relations 
at the elite level,163 and share the common strategic goal of balancing American power. The 
resolution of the long-standing border dispute is proof of the improved relations between 
these erstwhile communist adversaries.164  
Yet, it is also true that Sino-Russian relations are based on fragile fundamentals. As 
Yu Bin writes, ‘Current leaders in Moscow and Beijing are “still sleeping in different beds 
and dreaming different dreams.”165 Behind the facade of elite-level bonhomie lie mutual 
uncertainties and suspicion as evidenced by Russia’s ambivalence on whether to construct an 
oil pipe-line from Angarsk (Russia) to Daqing (China) as desired by China or from Angarsk 
to Nakhodka, a Russian coastal city. The Russians are concerned by the apparently 
unstoppable rise of China.166 Not surprisingly, the Russian military vetoed the Angarsk-
Daqing route because ‘it would give China access to Russia’s strategic fuel stocks.’167 It is 
also noteworthy that Russia still refuses to sell its most advanced weaponry to China, even 
those that it sells to India, which enjoys the same formal relationship with Russia as China, 
i.e. ‘strategic partnership.’168 Russian fears are compounded by the immigration of Chinese 
into the Russian Far East, where the local population has been declining.169 Moreover, 
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beyond a vague preference for multi-polarity, the relationship is not based on shared 
ideological or international strategic visions to guide the two powers safely in the long run.170 
 In that context, it is plausible to ask if Russia will seek to play a role in the Tibet issue 
in the future. Russian-Tibetan relations go back to the late 19th to early 20th century, when the 
13th Dalai Lama, sought to engage the Czar in diplomatic relations for protection against the 
Chinese and the British.171 A Buryat Tibetan Buddhist monk, Agvan Dorjiev, who became a 
close confidante of the 13th Dalai Lama intermediated between the two courts to establish a 
Russo-Tibetan Patron-Priest relationship. Weakened by her defeat by Japan and preoccupied 
with internal problems, Russia demurred, but the British felt threatened enough to launch the 
Younghusband Expedition in 1904,172 which, in turn ignited Chinese insecurities.173 A long 
hiatus punctuated Russian-Tibetan contacts after the Communist Revolution in Russia and 
the Sino-Soviet honeymoon from 1949 to 1964. 
 Stalin’s death and Kruschev’s attack on Stalin’s ‘cult of personality’ threw Sino-
Soviet relations on a downward spiral, culminating in the 1969 border clash.174 As America 
under Nixon and Kissinger coaxed China out of the Soviet embrace and Jimmy Carter 
normalised relations with Beijing in 1979, Moscow scrambled to strengthen existing ties with 
India and seek new relations with the Tibetans. In 1964, encouraged by then-Indian 
ambassador to the Soviet Union, T.N. Kaul, the Dalai Lama’s elder brother, Gyalo Dhondup, 
met with a group of KGB officials who claimed to have been sent specifically to meet him by 
Alexander Paniushkin, the head of the First Directorate of the KGB.175 They offered a 
sceptical Dhondup ‘everything’ in support—money, arms and training for Tibetan guerrillas 
and transportation into Tibet for fighting with the Chinese army.176 However, when the 
Soviet agents refused to support Tibet’s cause in international institutions such as the United 
Nations, Dhondup severed connections with the Soviet agents in 1967. Soviet-Tibetan 
dealings did not end completely. The Dalai Lama visited the Soviet Union and Mongolia for 
the first time in 1979. 
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 Russian interest in and verbal support of Tibet continued well into the 1980s. In May 
1980, the Soviet Union openly declared its support for the Tibetan cause if the Dalai Lama 
requested it.177The Tibetans were cautious enough not to avail of the Soviet offer and nothing 
came of this advance. The Soviet interest in Tibet was motivated purely by the strategic 
imperative of balancing China, but it contributed to China’s opening of dialogue with the 
Dalai Lama.178 Given this history, Russia could revive its interest in the Tibet issue in the 
event of deterioration in Sino-Russian relations. It will be easier for Russia in the future. 
First, Moscow has allowed Dharamsala to open a representative office in Moscow through 
which relations could be activated without going through third parties.179 Moreover, thanks to 
the post-Soviet revival of Buddhism, Tibetans have ready allies and intermediaries in the 
ethnic Mongols of the Russian Republics of Tuva, Buryatia and Kalmykia, who practise 
Tibetan Buddhism and consider the Dalai Lama their pre-eminent teacher. Traditional 
religious ties between Tibetans and Mongols have been revived with Mongols coming to 
study Buddhism in Tibetan monasteries in India and Tibetan teachers, including the Dalai 
Lama, teaching in these Russian Republics.180 These Russian Mongols express high levels of 
solidarity with the Tibetans181 and revere the Dalai Lama.182 So the potential for a Russian 
role in Chinese-Tibetan relations in the future exists, although it is by no means inevitable. 
 
Mobilising Cultural Kin and Co-Religionists: This brings us to another group of people 
whose support the Tibetans are starting to mobilise: people in various countries that have 
traditional religious, cultural and ethnic ties with Tibet.183 These include the Ladakhis, 
Kinnauris (Himachal Pradesh), Sikkimise and Monpas (Arunachal Pradesh) from Northern 
India, the Bhutanese, the various ethnic groups of Northern Nepal (Chum, Dolpo, 
Gyalsumdo, Manang, Nupri, Mustang, Sherpa, Tamang, Thakali, Walung and Yolmo), 
Mongols from independent Mongolia and the Russian Republics of Tuva, Buryatia and 
Kalmykia, and Chinese and Western Buddhists. On January 7, 2008, the Dalai Lama gave a 
speech to Ladakhi, Kinnauri, Monpa and Bhutanese Buddhists, who had come to South India 
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especially to hear his teachings. He appreciated the past efforts of the Himalayan Buddhists 
in keeping Tibetan Buddhism alive in exile by enrolling in large numbers in the Tibetan 
monasteries in India, and reminded them of their future responsibilities: ‘Should the culture 
and the people of Tibet, the Land of Snows, face a catastrophe, then the responsibility of 
preserving, at any cost, this world heritage, this pristine spiritual lineage of Tibet, which is in 
the tradition of the ancient university of Nalanda, will rest with you, the trans-Himalayan 
people living in free countries.’184 The people of the Himalayan regions of India are 
increasingly active in voicing and organising support for Tibet.  
The Tibetan Buddhists of Nepal are also coalescing around their common religious and 
cultural identity and the goal of establishing a united Himali Autonomous State along Nepal’s 
border with Tibet.185 In the midst of Nepal’s heavy-handed crackdown on the almost daily 
Tibetan protests in Kathmandu, in deference to Beijing, an elected Sherpa legislator wrote in 
the official newspaper: 
We, the people of Himalayan region of Nepal such as Sherpa, Tamang, Lhopa, Yolmo, Manang, 
Dolpo, Lemi, Mukumpa, Gyasumdo, Tsumpa etc share with the Tibetans a common religion, 
culture, spiritual teacher, costumes, habits, language, ultimate wish for enlightenment and seek 
refuge in the same three gems. Although geographically and politically we are citizens of different 
countries but we all belong to the same Bhotia [Tibetan] race and nobody can separate us.... 
Survival of Tibetan Buddhism will depend on the survival of rich cultural heritage of Tibet. It is 
absolutely necessary to strive for the preservation of this rich cultural heritage of Tibet, which is 
based on Buddhist philosophy, if we are aspiring for peace and stability in China, Tibet, India, our 
country Nepal and the world. 186 
She summed up by asking of ‘all the Nepali citizens of Himalayan region who share the same 
religion and culture with the Tibetans, Isn't it time that we all stood up with the Tibetans in 
solidarity?’ She warned of ‘unprecedented sectarian violence’ if the Nepalese police 
continued to conduct arbitrary arrests of Buddhist monks and nuns.187 Again, on 7 August, 
2008, Nepalese police tore a piece out of a portrait of the Dalai Lama and tore down prayer 
flags in the midst of cracking down on Tibetans and Nepalese Buddhists protesting against 
China.188 In a statement released to the press, The Nepal Buddhist Federation (NBF) 
condemned the ‘vilification of our spiritual master,’ demanded an apology from the police 
and warned the government of ‘ugly sectarian communal violence.’ The statement referred to 
historical and contemporary cultural ties: 
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Ever since the introduction of Buddhism in Tibet in the 7th century, Himalayan Buddhists of 
India, Nepal and Bhutan used to go to Tibet for studies in the various monasteries and after the 
closing of the northern border in 1959, Himalayan Buddhists continue to go to monastic 
educational institutions in India and return to their respective countries after graduation to serve 
their communities. The unbroken close spiritual bond between the Dalai Lamas and the Buddhist 
followers of the Himalayan regions began 363 years ago during the great 5th Dalai Lama and is 
continued even today. The Dalai Lama is our root Guru.189 
Because the Dalai Lama is not allowed to visit Nepal, Nepalese Buddhists travel to India for 
his teachings. During his most recent visit to America, Nepalese Buddhists in America 
requested the Dalai Lama to give a separate teaching for them, when he called them ‘twin 
brothers and sisters’ of the Tibetans.190 In short, there is a growing sense of solidarity among 
the Nepalese Buddhists for the Tibetan situation.191 This is consistent with the literature on 
diasporas that examine the political significance of ties between co-ethnics and co-religionists 
across state-borders. 
As mentioned above, the Mongols of Mongolia and Russia also support the Tibetan 
cause and could potentially play the role of intermediaries in Russia. Telo Tulku Rinpoche, 
the spiritual head of the Kalmyk Russians, wrote in his promotion of the Dalai Lama’s 
teachings to the Kalmyk people in Philadelphia on 16 July, 2008, “He is my hero, our 
nation’s hero and modern world hero because of his tremendous contribution to the well-
being of the world at large....”192 In 2006, the Kalmyk Republic awarded its White Lotus 
Order to the Dalai Lama, when the President Kirsan Nikolayevich llyumzhinov said, ‘At a 
time when our long shared cultural and spiritual values are endangered by hostile factors, 
there is an urgent need to come together hand in hand to preserve and promote them.’ In 
2008, White Russians and Mongols carried out a pro-Tibetan protest despite severe obstacles 
placed upon them by the Russian state.193 The Dalai Lama also visits majority Tibetan 
Buddhist Mongolia where he is warmly received and Mongolian monks come to study 
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Buddhism in Tibetan monasteries in India.194 Historical ties are thus revived and strengthened 
through contemporary exchanges. 
Tibetans are also trying to mobilise the support of Western Tibetan Buddhists. The 
Office of Tibet in New York organized the first ever conference of Tibetan Buddhist Centres 
in the Americas in New York in September, 2003. In his welcome address Dr. Nawang 
Rabgyal, Representative of the Dalai Lama and the organiser of the conference thanked 
Western Buddhists and Centres for the ‘direct and indirect contributions toward creating 
awareness about Tibet and its civilization’ and called upon them to shoulder their ‘moral 
responsibility to work for [the] happiness and freedom in the land of snow.’195 He continued, 
‘[H]aving seen the benefit of the Buddha Dharma as practiced in the Tibetan tradition, 
Dharma students should naturally be concerned about the situation of Tibet, a country that 
had nourished and developed this rich tradition of Buddhism.’ Although it is not clear how 
politically inclined the Western adherents of Tibetan Buddhism are, it is a growing source of 
potential support for the Tibetan cause.196 Indeed, as mentioned above, the spread of Tibetan 
Buddhism in America in the 1960s and 1970s was instrumental in the post-Cold War 
popularity of the Tibetan cause in America and elsewhere.197 
The significance of these Tibetan Buddhist practitioners in the future politics of Tibet 
cannot be underestimated. The current Dalai Lama has repeatedly stated that his 
reincarnation, i.e. the 15th Dalai Lama, will be born in a free country outside of China to 
continue his predecessor’s work. Since the 4th Dalai Lama was a Mongol and the 6th Dalai 
Lama a Monpa from the Indian state of Arunachal Pradesh, the 15th Dalai Lama could be 
selected from any of these various groups of Tibetan Buddhists.198 In a TV programme titled 
‘Succession of the Dalai Lama’ broadcast by the Tibetan language service of VOA, Lodi 
Gyari said that Tibetan Buddhists all over the world including Westerners should have a say 
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in the selection of the next Dalai Lama.199 This means, at least, that the politics of Tibetan 
Buddhism will be more crowded than Beijing would like it to be. 
Conclusion: This chapter developed the theme of Tibetans seeking international allies to face 
the threats to their identity from Chinese political domination and cultural imperialism. 
Tibetans have found their Tibetan Buddhist culture helpful in this effort. Owing to a host of 
geopolitical, normative, historical and cultural-religious factors and successful Tibetan 
lobbying, the Tibetan issue has affected China’s bilateral relations with America, India, 
Europe, Taiwan, and potentially Russia in the future. Due to ethnic and cultural ties, the 
Tibetan Buddhists of India, Nepal, Mongolia, Russia and the West are becoming increasingly 
relevant to the Sino-Tibetan dispute. The chapter examined how interests, norms, culture, 
personalities and domestic politics shape the role that Tibet plays in each of these bilateral 
relations. 
American, Indian and Taiwanese reasons for engaging with the Tibet issue include 
rational interests, domestic politics and humanitarian considerations, and in the case of India, 
also civilizational ties. While the limited European support for the Tibetans stem from 
normative imperatives, Moscow’s fleeting dealings with Tibet have come exclusively from 
rational strategic interests.  Although the factors at play in each of these cases are different, 
the two constants are the patient and persistent Tibetan efforts and the utility of Tibetan 
Buddhism in breaking the ground for mobilising public support in these countries. The 
Tibetan Buddhist culture can be seen as a source of soft power, which according to Nye ‘is 
relevant to the realisation of “milieu goals.”’200 Shaping an environment conducive to 
political mobilisation is an example of a milieu goal. This is how the transnational Tibetan 
Buddhist world is relevant to the Chinese-Tibetan insecurity dilemma, inasmuch as it 
increases the number of stake-holders in the Tibet issue, thereby complicating Beijing’s 
efforts to at least render Tibetan Buddhism and culture compatible to the interests of the 
Party-State, if not undermine its very existence. 
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Chapter 8 
 
 The Insecurity Dilemma and the Tibetan Uprising in 20081 
 
 
In March 2008, Tibetans on the Tibetan plateau rose up in the biggest challenge to Chinese 
rule since the 1950s.2 The Chinese government claimed that 18 civilians and one policeman 
died and 382 civilians were injured on 14 March, 2008.3 The Tibetan Government-in-exile 
(TGIE) and rights groups claim that 220 Tibetans were killed, 5600 arrested or detained, 
1,294 injured and 290 sentenced and over 1,000 disappeared in the ensuing crackdown.4 The 
consequences were far reaching. Not only did the uprising widen the chasm between 
Dharamsala, the seat of the Dalai Lama and TGIE, and Beijing, it temporarily disrupted some 
of China’s key foreign relations. While the Tibetans were awarded the “Media Tenor Special 
Award for Agenda Setting” for breaking “through the awareness threshold of almost all TV-
news”5, China’s international image took a tumble.6 China’s brutal crackdown made the tour 
of the Beijing Olympics a magnet for solidarity protests by Tibetans and supporters around 
the world. This provoked counter-protests by overseas Chinese who accused the Western-
media of anti-Chinese bias.7 
  Beijing claimed that it had ‘plenty of evidence’ proving that uprising was ‘organized, 
premeditated, masterminded and incited by the Dalai Lama clique,”8 while the Tibetans 
attributed the protests to ‘deep-rooted resentment of the Tibetan people’ under China’s 
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‘flawed and repressive policies.’9 Amidst these claims and counter-claims, talking heads also 
speculated on the causes of the uprising, providing a variety of explanations.  
Straight up, this thesis will argue that Tibetan identity insecurity was the principal 
cause of the uprising and that the uprising and its continuing aftermath is the latest cycle of 
the Sino-Tibetan insecurity dilemma. The uprising was a direct response to the post-1989 
hard-line Chinese policies. Peaceful protests and occasionally violent riots have been integral 
to Tibetan efforts to mitigate the societal insecurities they feel on account of ‘assimilationist’ 
Chinese policies, Chinese migration and cultural imperialism. However, Tibetan protests and 
riots heighten Chinese insecurities and harden Beijing’s policies both inside Tibet and 
towards the Dalai Lama. This chapter also examines the heightening of Chinese nationalism 
in response to the Tibetan uprising and the policy implications. The 2008 Tibetan uprising is 
the most recent episode in the cycle of the insecurity dilemma. However, other analysts have 
provided a range of causal explanations that span from the fantastical to the plausible, mostly 
in the popular media. 
After surveying the various explanations suggested by other analysts, this chapter will 
first attempt a provisional reconstruction of the events of spring 2008 in Tibet. Next, 
reflecting the cyclical action-reaction process of the insecurity dilemma, Tibetan identity 
insecurity before and during the uprising will be revealed as the underlying cause of the 
uprising. Then, the insecurities behind China’s crackdown and hardening policy will be 
discussed with particular reference to how popular Chinese nationalism interacts with state 
policy and practice.  Due attention is also given to the bitterness and insecurity that hardline 
policy and practices are generating in the Tibetan psyche, foreshadowing a potential Tibetan 
upheaval in the future. In short, this chapter will demonstrate the workings of the insecurity 
dilemma with a compacted cycle of Chinese state-building and Tibetan defensive retaliations.  
 
Analytical Overview  
Some analysts saw the Tibetan protests and riots through the prism of Western, principally 
American, anti-China designs executed through the ‘Dalai clique.’10  William Engdahl was 
more specific, arguing that the American government, specifically the US State Department, 
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the National Endowment for Democracy (NED), the ‘CIA's Freedom House’ and Trace 
Foundation, run by George Soros’ daughter, orchestrated an ‘ultra-high risk geopolitical 
game with Beijing by fanning the flames of violence in Tibet’ through Tibetan NGOs in 
exile.11 Reproducing Goldstein’s analysis of the 1987 protests in Lhasa, Patrick French 
contended that ‘American politics provided an important spark for the demonstrations.’12 
Specifically, he argued that the awarding of the Congressional Gold Medal to the Dalai Lama 
emboldened the Tibetans to protest. Calling Engdahl’s assertions ‘insinuations’ and 
‘simplistic arguments based on “guilt by association,”’ Shakya pointed to Chinese policies 
failures instead.13 Indeed, most of the better-informed analyses coalesced around policy 
failures. In the orgy of policy analysis, both Dharamsala and Beijing were put under the 
microscope. 
French described the Dalai Lama as ‘a poor and poorly advised political strategist’ 
who should have closed the ‘Hollywood strategy’ a decade ago and renounced the demand 
for ‘a so-called Greater Tibet.’14 Others raised questions about the Dalai Lama’s authority in 
among the Tibetans in Tibet and exile.15 However, the spot-light was overwhelmingly on 
China’s Tibet policy.  
Robbie Barnett wrote that the monks from Drepung Monastery who initiated the 
protests on 10 March 2008 had ‘several reasons to be antagonized about China's policies in 
Tibet [centring around] restrictions on religion and culture introduced in 1994 in order to 
erode the suspected sources of Tibetan nationalism.’16 In an unprecedented open letter, 29 
Chinese intellectuals living and working in China put the blame squarely on ‘serious mistakes 
in the work that has been done with regard to Tibet. The relevant government departments 
must conscientiously reflect upon this matter, examine their failures, and fundamentally 
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change the failed nationality policies.’17 Wang Lixiong made the same argument in his 
writings.18 While the above perspectives are concerned mainly with Chinese policies on 
autonomy, religion, culture and the Dalai Lama, others have put forward more materialist 
arguments concerning economic marginalisation and exclusionary modernisation. Ben 
Hillman blamed ‘unequal development’ and ‘economic marginalisation’ for the uprising.19 
Pankaj Mishra fingered the ravages of ‘internal colonialism’—Chinese migration, coercive 
and exclusionary modernisation and cultural imperialism, and the Tibetan fears for their 
‘threatened identity’ and their place in the new economy and the fragile ecology of their 
homeland.20 While all these perspectives captured slices of a complex process, they suffer 
from the trade-off between coherence and complexity. While economic marginalisation is 
coherent, it denies many other issues that are equally if not more relevant. Mishra is more 
comprehensive, but he fails to integrate the various issues into a coherent explanation as there 
is neither prioritisation nor an attempt to examine the linkages among the various factors that 
he identified. The insecurity dilemma provides a coherent yet inclusive framework for 
explaining and understanding the Tibetan and Chinese actions since 10 March, 2008. After 
all, identity is not just a value to be secured, but also a powerful instrument of mobilisation, 
defensive weapon, an organising principle or a lens into the world, all rolled into one. 
 
10 March 2008 and the Aftermath 
On 10 March, in the evening according to some sources, a number of monks from Drepung 
Monastery marched towards the centre of Lhasa.21 Security forces stopped the monks at the 
main road into the city, where they carried out a sit-in protest, reciting a long-life prayer for 
the Dalai Lama and another prayer for Tibet’s well-being composed by the Dalai Lama 
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himself. The monks called for the release of their colleagues who were arrested in October 
2007, when they attempted to celebrate the awarding of the Congressional Gold Medal to the 
Dalai Lama.22 Eyewitnesses reported that they also shouted pro-independence slogans and 
unfurled a homemade version of the banned Tibetan flag.23 After a tense stand-off, about 15 
monks were arrested and Drepung Monastery was shut down by People’s Armed Police 
(PAP). 
However, about 14-15 monks from Sera Monastery, about 3 miles north of the 
Central Lhasa, reached Jokhang Temple around six in the evening where they shouted pro-
independence slogans, waving the Tibetan flag. Two European tourists, who witnessed the 
incident, blogged that the lay Tibetan pilgrims and passers-by joined the protest and formed 
‘a strong, silent, peacefull [sic] circle around the police who keep the middle of the square 
open.’24 Police reinforcements dispersed the crowd, beating and arresting the protesters, 
including about 6 monks. Sera Monastery was blockaded by the security forces and tour 
agents were instructed to inform clients that ‘the monasteries were closed for renovation.’25 
But protests also took place in at least three places in Amdo (Tibetan regions of Qinghai and 
Gansu provinces) and one place in Kham (Tibetan region in Sichuan province) in places like 
Bayankhar, Mangra, Sangchu and Zoge.26 That the Tibetans scattered across four different 
administrative divisions chose 10 March to express their grievances is historically and 
politically significant. 
10 March is the anniversary of the fateful Tibetan uprising in 1959, which resulted in 
the flight of the Dalai Lama and the dissolution of the Tibetan government by Communist 
China. Tibetans in exile commemorate this day as the National Uprising Day and the Dalai 
Lama unfailingly gives a ‘State of the Struggle’ address.27 On 10 March, 2008, he said that 
‘on the fundamental issue [of autonomy and unification of Tibetans], there has been no 
concrete result at all [from dialogue]. And during the past few years, Tibet has witnessed 
increased repression and brutality.’28 The Dalai Lama was referring to the dialogue that his 
representatives had been holding with the Chinese government. Inside Tibet, although 
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Tibetans may have privately commemorated the day, it was never observed with large-scale 
protests even in Lhasa. In the past, protests and rebellions have been, at least initially, about 
local issues, and even when they involved larger Tibetan issues, they were isolated by issues, 
space and time. In 2008, not only did the Tibetans protest on the same day, they were united 
in their concern for Tibetan identity, rights and the Dalai Lama’s exile. 
In the three following days, there were more protests around Lhasa, led by the monks 
of Sera and Gaden Monasteries and Chubsang nunnery.29 They met the same fate: beatings, 
tear-gas and arrests.30 Around mid-day on 14 March, some monks from Ramoche Temple 
located in the city centre and close to the Tibetan quarters protested outside their temple.31 
Their protest, which began peacefully, turned into one of the most explosive clashes between 
the Tibetans and their Chinese rulers. Unlike the previous protests, the beatings and arrests of 
the monks took place in a populated area where many Tibetans lived or worshipped as 
pilgrims from all parts of the Tibetan plateau. Incensed by the sight of police and PAP 
beating the monks and the conspicuous presence of plainclothes police among the crowd, the 
lay Tibetans attacked the security forces with rocks.32 A 19 year-old Canadian back-packer, 
John Kenwood, joined the crowd shouting ‘Free Tibet.’33 What happened next shocked him: 
‘There was no more crowd to be part of. It looked like they [the rioters] were turning on 
everybody.’  After the security forces retreated, the euphoric crowd split up into groups, 
gathering rocks and pulling out knives, and turned on other symbols of Chinese rule: 
government buildings, banks, police vehicles and Chinese migrants and their businesses. 
James Miles of the Economist magazine, who was the only accredited foreign journalist in 
Lhasa that week, told CNN, ‘It was an extraordinary outpouring of ethnic violence of a most 
unpleasant nature to watch, which surprised some Tibetans watching it.’34According to 
Chinese state media, 18 civilians including one Tibetan girl died from fire or beatings and 
estimated the ‘direct economic losses’ on that day at 250 million RMB.35  
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What intrigued many analysts was why the security forces took so long to take control 
of the streets.36 In fact, Miles reported that it was not until mid-day on 15 March that the 
security forces came out in force to reclaim the streets. The Chinese intellectuals mentioned 
above blamed the Chinese authorities of ‘dereliction of duty’ for doing nothing even as they 
claimed to have ‘sufficient evidence’ to prove the ‘Dalai clique’s hand in the violence.37 One 
can only surmise that image considerations before the Beijing Olympics paralysed the 
authorities momentarily. 
When the security forces did move in, it was a full-scale military operation by the 
PAP and PLA troops. Chinese officials resisted declaring martial law, denied deploying any 
regular soldiers and rejected the death of any Tibetans. Miles reported that Lhasa was 
effectively under martial law and reported seeing ‘numerous…military vehicles, military 
looking vehicles with tell-tale license plates covered up or removed. And also many troops 
there whose uniforms were distinctly lacking in the usual insignia of either the police or the 
riot police. So my very, very strong suspicion is that the army is out there and is in control in 
Lhasa.’38 Andrei Chang, a defense analyst confirmed: ‘T-90/89 armored personnel carriers 
and T-92 wheeled infantry fighting vehicles appeared on the streets as the 149th Division of 
the No. 13 Group Army under the Chengdu Military Region was dispatched to Lhasa.’39 He 
also observed that the soldiers were ‘all wearing the “leopard” camouflage uniforms 
specifically designed for mountain warfare operations’ of the 149th Division.40  
In Lhasa, a number of Tibetans were killed by the security forces.41 But large scale 
protests also took place in various other Tibetan areas on 14 March: Toelung Dechen and 
Chushul, Samye and Shigatse in Utsang (TAR), Sangchu (Gansu) and Dzoge (Sichuan) in 
Amdo and Lithang and Sershul in Kham (Sichuan).42 On 16 March, prisoners were paraded 
through the streets of Lhasa in military vehicles. Despite the heavy military presence, 
protesters lingered on in and around Lhasa and the death toll mounted on the Tibetan side. 
TGIE claims that over 80 Tibetans died on 14 March and 160 by the end of March in Lhasa.43 
Using police photos and the ubiquitous surveillance cameras, the authorities began to issue 
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daily ‘Most Wanted Lists’ and text messages were sent to all mobile users in Tibet directing 
them to inform on protestors.44 However, in the following days and weeks, the most vigorous 
protests continued in Eastern Tibet.  
The bloodiest protests took place in Tongkhor, Lithang and Tehor, Kartze Tibetan 
Autonomous Prefecture (TAP) and Kirti Monastery, Ngawa TAP in Sichuan, and Labrang, 
Machu, Luchu, Chone and Tsoe, Kanlho TAP in Gansu. In Kanlho alone, Xinhua reported 
that there were “serious protests” at the administrative buildings of some 105 county-level or 
city-level work units, 113 town-level work units and 22 village committees.45 In the days 
following March 14, Tibetans carried out ninety-six protests in Eastern Tibet and Chinese 
internal reports projected that about 30,000 Tibetans participated in those protests.46 TGIE 
estimated that 23 Tibetans were killed in Ngawa on 16 March and 3 Tibetans in Dabpa 
County, Kartze TAP, on 11 March.47 ICT estimated that 4 other Tibetans were shot dead on 
18 March in Kartze,48 while Woeser claimed 7 Tibetans died there.49 8 more Tibetans were 
killed in Tongkhor, Kartze, on 3 April when monks led the local Tibetans in a protest 
demanding independence and the return of the Dalai Lama.50 Death tolls in the Tibetan 
sources vary, while the Chinese officials admitted to shooting, but not killing any Tibetans in 
Sichuan. By the time the Chinese forces were able to enforce a sulking calm before the 
Beijing Olympics, 130 confirmed cases of largely peaceful protests had broken out in Tibetan 
areas.51 Figure 3 and 4 show the geographical extent of the protests from March to August 
2008. By April 2009,160 confirmed cases of protests had taken place.52 Considering that 
during the previous major unrest in Tibet, 144 protests and riots rocked Lhasa and its vicinity 
within the span of 7 years (1987—1993), it is notable that 130 protests took place within a 
few months in 2008.53 In short, the geographical and social spread of the protests in 2008 was 
unprecedented since the 1950s. Monks and nuns, farmers, nomads, schoolchildren, university 
students in Chinese cities, intellectuals, urban professionals and party members took some 
part in the uprising.54  
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On 16 March, students in the Machu Tibetan Language Primary School and Middle 
School, Kanlho TAP (Gansu) led a protest of monks and local Tibetans which turned into a 
riotous destruction of non-Tibetan businesses and government offices.55 Students of Tsoe 
Teacher’s College, Kanlho, Qinghai Teacher’s College and other Tibetan schools in Kartze 
and Ngawa also protested on that day. In the same evening, 500 Tibetan students at 
Northwest University for Nationalities in Lanzhou, Gansu, staged a silent vigil on campus 
and posted posters expressing solidarity with the protesters in Tibet. On 17 March, students in 
the Tsoe Medical School and Mewa Tibetan Middle School, Ngawa, also came out to protest. 
Hundreds of Tibetan students in the Central University for Nationalities in Beijing and South-
Western University for Nationalities in Chengdu staged silent vigils in their campuses lasting 
several hours. In the evening of 18 March, Tibetan students of Qinghai Institute for 
Nationalities held a silent vigil.  
Intellectuals and public figures were involved and suffered in the process. Under 
house-arrest in Beijing with her husband Wang, Woeser communicated with other Tibetans 
from the affected regions and maintained a frequently updated blog, which was closed down 
and hacked into several times, serving as the sole source of information for the outside world, 
especially after China closed down all Tibetans regions to foreign tourists and journalists. 
Jamyang Kyi, a prominent Tibetan TV personality, singer/song-writer, blogger and women’s 
rights activist, was detained without charge on 1 April 2008.56 Jamyang’s friend and writer 
Norzin Wangmo was arrested and sentenced to five years in prison for communicating with 
people abroad.57 Other intellectuals like Arig Dolma Kyab, Golog Palchen Gyal and Go 
Sherab Gyatso were arrested for their roles one way or the other in the uprising.58 Apart from 
Jamyang Kyi, who was subsequently released, they are all serving prison sentences of 
varying lengths. Two years on, China has extended its assault on Tibetan society beyond 
those openly protesting against Chinese rule and those who abet them, to public figures who 
have assiduously avoided politics and concentrated on today’s quintessential Chinese pursuit 
of ‘getting rich.’  
On 24 June 2010, Karma Samdup, antiques dealer, philanthropist and 
environmentalist, who was previously celebrated as a model Tibetan on Chinese national TV 
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and media and in a book for his philanthropy and social services, was sentenced to 15 years 
in prison on charges of grave–robbing in Xinjiang.59 Apparently, this charge was dropped by 
the police in 1998 because Karma produced his license to deal in antiques and denied 
knowing that items he bought in Xinjiang came from graves.60 The real reason for reviving 
the charge appears to be his defence of his two brothers, Jigme Namgyal and Rinchen 
Samdrup, who were arrested on charges of inciting ‘separatism’ and harming ‘national 
security’.61 They were incarcerated because they accused a local official of poaching 
endangered animals in a nature reserve.62 Then on June 26, 2010, Dorje Tashi, another 
Tibetan tycoon, philanthropist and CCP member was sentenced to life apparently for offering 
money to the Dalai Lama.63 The crackdown, it appears, is not over yet. 
  
 
 
Map 3: Protests as of 12 April, 2008. Barnett, ‘Thunder from Tibet.’ 
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Map 4: Protests as of May 2008. Shakya, ‘Interview: Tibetan Questions.’ ICT 2008: 18 contains an updated map 
with protests as of August 2008.  
 
Olympics, New Year Boycott and Renewed Protests 
By the time of the devastating 12 May earthquake in Ngawa, Sichuan, which claimed 87,000 
lives and left 5 million homeless, Tibetans in nearby Kartze were still protesting, but the 
earthquake stole all the media coverage.64 Tibetans in Nepal, who have been holding daily 
protests in Kathmandu since March, suspended their protests in solidarity with the earthquake 
victims. Many of the same monasteries whose monks led protests against Chinese rule 
performed prayers for the earthquake victims.65 The monks of Kirti Monastery, Ngawa, 
which was under heavy security blockade since the massive protests which resulted in the 
death of at least ten Tibetans, dictated a message of reconciliation on phone to Tibetan exiles, 
requesting the freedom to minister to the spiritual needs of the victims of the earthquake.66 By 
the time of the Beijing Olympics, through a combination of heavy military presence, 
domestic anti-Tibetan propaganda and censorship of the media, arrests and detentions, and 
the shutting down of telecommunications infrastructure in the Tibetan regions, an uneasy 
                                                          
64
 BBC, ‘Tight security a month from quake,’ 12 June, 2008. Perhaps the best collection of media coverage in 
both Chinese and English languages on the 2008 Sichuan earthquake and continuing aftermath is available at 
http://chinadigitaltimes.net/china/2008-sichuan-earthquake/.  
65
 ICT, ‘Tibetans in monasteries under crackdown hold prayer ceremonies for earthquake victims: message of 
reconciliation from monastery under repression,’ 21 May, 2008. 
66
 ICT acquired a copy of the message and translated it into English in ICT 2008: 77-79. 
256 
 
quiet had been restored in Tibet. Protests resumed in eastern Tibet after the Olympics 
though.67  
Around that time, Tibetans came up with a different form of protest against Chinese 
policies and to mourn the death of Tibetans in the 2008 crackdown. It was a form of civil 
disobedience, refusing to celebrate the Tibetan New Year.68 The Chinese authorities tried 
compel the Tibetans to celebrate New Year through a combination of threats and 
inducements such as money and fireworks.69 In the end, the Tibetans largely boycotted the 
festivities, while the officials orchestrated celebrations that were extensively publicised in the 
state media.70 At the time of writing this paper in April 2009, a farming boycott is also going 
on in Kartze.71 Tibetans and Chinese soldiers clashed in Machu, Kanlho.72 The Voice of 
Tibet radio program reported a protest in Nyagrong, Kartze, on 15 April, 2009, leading to 
security forces firing into the crowd and injuring seven Tibetans and arresting nine others.73 
The uprising in Tibet, happening as it did in the year of the Beijing Olympics, attracted a lot 
of attention from the international media and governments. 
 
The World Responds to Events in Tibet 
American Responds 
In the wake of the 10 March, 2008 Tibetan uprising, both the American Administration and 
Congress stepped up their criticism of Chinese policies in Tibet and called for substantive 
dialogue.74 The House of Representatives passed a Resolution and the Senate held a hearing, 
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both of which expressed support for Tibetan aspirations, criticised Chinese policies and 
pressured the US administration to take specific steps in support of the Tibetans.75 Prominent 
American legislators asked key figures in the Bush Administration to take specific measures 
on Tibet.76 Congressional support for Tibetan aspirations is truly bipartisan, compelling the 
administration to take some steps. In further evidence of the resonance of the Tibet issue in 
American domestic politics, the presidential candidates condemned China and called for 
serious dialogue with the aim of settling the Tibetan issue.77 
John McCain, the Republican Party nominee said, rather opportunistically, that Tibet 
is one of the first things he would address as president.78 Barack Obama wrote to Bush that 
the situation in Tibet is ‘deeply disturbing’ and that he should prevail upon the Chinese 
authorities to negotiate the return of the Dalai Lama and the exercise of genuine autonomy in 
Tibet. He urged Bush ‘to speak out forcefully and publicly to disabuse [Beijing] of the notion 
that they can...escape international censure’ if the Chinese take ‘private diplomacy as a 
license for inaction or continued repression.’79 McCain met the Dalai Lama on 25 July, 2008 
and expressed his support for the Tibetans, drawing criticism from Beijing.80 Not to be 
outdone, Obama wrote to the Dalai Lama on 24 July to express regret for not being able to 
meet due to their ‘respective travel schedules’ and pledged to ‘continue to support you and 
the rights of the Tibetans.’81  
However, American support for Tibet is substantively confined to cultural 
preservation, human rights and dialogue for autonomy and limited by larger national 
interests. While Bush raised the Tibet issue with senior Chinese leaders and called for 
meaningful dialogue, he resisted domestic pressures to boycott the opening ceremony of the 
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Beijing Olympics. Especially with the onset of the financial crisis that started in America, 
senior Bush Administration officials were increasingly reticent on Tibet. The young Obama 
administration has adhered closely to the script of subordinating the moral and normative 
concerns over Tibet to the larger strategic and economic interests of America. Secretary of 
State Hillary Clinton’s remark ahead of her first official visit to China is illustrative: ‘But our 
pressing on those issues [Tibet, Taiwan and human rights] can't interfere with the global 
economic crisis, the global climate change crisis, and the security crisis.’82 National interests 
trumped normative concerns and Tibet did not have the strategic heft to overturn the priority 
or fuse the two. 
  
The European Response 
Quite unexpectedly, Europe was more vociferous in supporting the Tibetans than their 
traditional patrons, India and America. While Bush never wavered from his decision to attend 
the Olympics opening ceremony, the Polish president Donald Tusk,83 Czech president Vaclav 
Klaus,84 German chancellor Angela Merkel,85 European Parliament Speaker Hans-Gert 
Pöttering86 and, in a reluctant about-turn, Gordon Brown decided to stay away. French 
President Nicolas Sarkozy also conditioned his attendance during the Olympics to progress in 
the Sino-Tibetan dialogue, but in the end he reconsidered, revealing the tight-rope that 
leaders of even major states have to walk in the face of China’s growing clout.87 Sarkozy also 
equivocated on meeting the Dalai Lama by sending his wife and Foreign Minister when the 
Dalai Lama visited France in August 2008. The two leaders finally met in the Czech 
Republic, but Sarkozy’s diplomacy mollified neither the Chinese government nor the public.   
 
The Origins of the 2008 Uprising 
The 2008 uprising was a Tibetan response to the perceived threats to their identity originating 
from Chinese policies, migration and cultural influences. As Shakya told the New Left 
Review, ‘...I do not think the demonstrations were principally to do with economic disparities 
or disadvantages suffered by Tibetans. Rather, I think these were defensive protests, 
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concerning questions of national identity.’88 Indeed, the protests were Tibetan attempts to 
halt, if not reverse, the tidal waves that they perceived to be eroding their treasured identity. 
Indeed, the Tibetan sense of threats to their identity was clearly palpable before the 
uprising. In 2004, the veteran Tibetan communist revolutionary, Phuntsok Wangyal, 
expressed his fears to Hu Jintao in very diplomatic terms of ‘potential controversies hidden 
deep beneath’ such as ‘the critical trend of sinocisation in all aspects of day-to-day life in 
society, especially the replacement of the Tibetan language by the Chinese language....’89 On 
10 March, 2005, Woeser wrote ‘In Memory of this Day in History, Let’s Stick to Our 
Culture’ in which she bemoaned the grave threats to Tibetan identity from Chinese 
‘occupation’ policies, migration and cultural imperialism, while proposing the use of Tibetan 
culture to defend their identity.90 In August 2006, she described the train to Lhasa as a ‘one-
way road to destruction’ of Tibetan culture and environment because of Chinese immigration 
and cultural imperialism.91 The role of identity insecurity was also obvious during the 
protests in 2008, as expressed in blogs,92 literary magazines93 and documentaries. 
On 22 March, 2008, an educated Tibetan from Lhasa wrote a letter in which he 
refuted the Chinese allegations against the Dalai Lama and explained five ‘main causes that 
contribute to the dissatisfaction and unrest in the Tibetan community.’94 ‘Han immigration’, 
‘lack of religious freedom’, ‘dilution of Tibetan culture and identity’, ‘provocative 
propaganda in the media’ and ‘unrestricted exploitation of the natural resources of Tibet’ 
dammed up Tibetan anger that exploded in the streets of Lhasa and elsewhere.  
In the magazine Shar-Dungri, Zursuma ["$ pseudonym] wrote that ‘this year’s 
bloody [%&tibtib] ethnic conflict in Amdo, Utsang and Kham [tib'$] was a 
struggle [(tib] for national survival…the ability of a nation to develop without losing its 
unique characteristics.’ Chinese policies, he argued, not only give few freedoms for the 
Tibetans to preserve, manage and develop their language and culture, but in fact gravely 
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threaten Tibetan identity.95 In ‘Leaving Fear Behind’ [tib], a documentary made by two 
Tibetans who secretly interviewed other Tibetans about the Beijing Olympics and Sino-
Tibetan relations, also contains similar expressions of identity insecurity.96 Jigme Gyatso, a 
monk of Labrang Monastery, Gansu, who made a video-testimony of his ordeal of arrest and 
torture in prison after the protests of 2008, expressed the same fears for Tibetan identity.97 
Chapter Six contains a more detailed examination of the general Tibetan vulnerabilities, but 
the above discussion demonstrates the deep societal insecurity gripping the collective Tibetan 
psyche immediately preceding and during the uprising. Not surprisingly, consistent with the 
logic of the insecurity dilemma, the uprising drew a harsh Chinese crackdown. 
 
‘Safe-guarding National Unity or Splitting the Motherland’: The Crackdown  
The Chinese response to the Tibetan uprising went beyond the military actions mentioned 
above, and had domestic, transnational and international dimensions. Unlike in the past, the 
state did not have a monopoly in responding to the Tibetan protests; many ordinary Chinese 
both at home and abroad rallied behind the Chinese government in a dramatic upsurge of 
Chinese nationalism. Equally unprecedentedly, a number of Chinese, especially intellectuals, 
lawyers and artists criticised its handling of the protests and the general policy background. 
The measures taken by the Chinese addressed perceived threats to sovereignty, legitimacy, 
national identity and national image from the Tibetan protests, but regime security was 
paramount. 
 After the Tibetan uprising Chinese officials, including President Hu Jintao, and 
analysts have declared that Tibet is a core national security interest at par with Taiwan.98 
Noting that China has recently been actively articulating Taiwan, Tibet, South China Seas 
and Yellow Seas as ‘national core issues’, Da Wei, a Research Fellow at the China Institute 
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of Contemporary International Relations in Beijing, observed that it ‘is a gesture, which 
combines defensive and offensive strategies.’99 Western analysts have also noticed that the 
rank order of security issues for the Chinese leaders today is Tibet, Xinjiang and Taiwan, 
while in the past, it has been the reverse. As Michael J. Green said: 
In the leadership discussions now, when the orders come down, the security concerns are number 
one Tibet, number two Xinjiang and number three Taiwan, which I think reflects some of 
Beijing’s confidence about how cross-straits issues are going, but also their intense worries about 
Tibet as a security problem.100 
 
Timothy Garton Ash also wrote that Chinese officials are worried about ‘two Ts’ that could 
jeopardise Sino-Western relations: trade and Tibet.101 The security concerns are obvious from 
the statements of Chinese leaders, the military response to largely peaceful protests and the 
near-total lock-down and information black-out on Tibet.102 
Hu Jintao described the Chinese-Tibetan conflict as ‘a problem either to safeguard 
national unification or to split the motherland.’103 Wen Jiabao told Fareed Zakaria the same 
thing on CNN.104 Foreign Minister Yang Jiechi also told a European journalist that the Tibet 
issue, which he termed as a ‘Dalai issue,’ concerns ‘China's sovereignty and territorial 
integrity. This is not a religious or ethnic issue.’105 When the Chinese media started to cover 
the riots in Lhasa, in a decidedly one-sided propaganda, Chinese netizens commented on 
Strong Nation Forum, a discussion-forum hosted by People's Daily, from which the BBC 
Worldwide Monitoring carried ‘a sample of the postings.’106 The discussion clearly revealed 
that many ordinary Chinese also interpreted the Tibetan uprising as a threat to ‘national 
security.’ 
The uprising exposed not just the security concerns of the Chinese, but also a well-
spring of jingoistic anti-Tibetan nationalism. Beijing adroitly tapped into this nationalism to 
face the Tibetan challenge and mobilise public support for the CCP. We will return to this 
theme later, but first, specifically, how did the Chinese behave in Tibet and towards the Dalai 
Lama?  
                                                          
99
 Ibid. 
100
 Michael J. Green, ‘The Strategic Importance of Tibet,’ American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy 
Research, Washington DC, 26 March, 2006; the video of this panel discussion is available at 
http://www.aei.org/video/101069. 
101
 Timothy Garton Ash, ‘Only a strategic partnership with China will keep this new dawn bright,’ The 
Guardian, 27 November, 2008. 
102
 WWM, ‘China urges EU not to take “dual standard” on Tibet issue,’ 28 March, 2008. 
103
 China Daily 12 April, 2008. 
104
 CNN, ‘Transcript of interview with Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao,’ 29 September, 2008; available at 
http://edition.cnn.com/2008/WORLD/asiapcf/09/29/chinese.premier.transcript/index.html. 
105
 WWM, ‘“Full text” of Chinese foreign minister's news conference,’ 12 March, 2008. 
106
 WWM, ‘Chinese media break silence on Tibet riots,’ 15 March, 2008. 
262 
 
 As mentioned above, all Tibetan regions, except Dechen TAP (Yunnan), were shut 
down to foreign visitors and journalists and the PAP and PLA were deployed in force, even 
in Dechen where protests did not take place.107 Monasteries were blockaded and Beijing’s 
Patriotic Education Campaign (PEC) and anti-Dalai Lama Campaigns were stepped up in all 
Tibetan regions, requiring the Tibetans to denounce the Dalai Lama, the most heart-breaking 
thing for most Tibetans to do, and the reading and statement of many other topics as detailed 
in subsequent chapters) that Tibetans greatly detest.  Leading an official delegation to Lhasa 
in 23-24 March, the Chinese Minister of Public Security, Meng Jianzhu, told members of the 
management committees of the Lhasa monasteries that the Dalai Lama is ‘unfit to be a true 
follower of Buddhism’ and called for broader ‘patriotic education’ in TAR.’108 A Regulation 
publicised on 18 July, 2008 in Kartze TAP (Sichuan), ‘Order No. 2 of the People’s 
Government of Kartze TAP’ threatened the entire monastic hierarchy with a range of 
reprisals for any anti-Chinese disturbances.109 Monks and nuns who protest and refuse to 
‘conform’ and submit to PEC will be expelled and their residence demolished. Tulkus and 
senior monks could be ‘stripped of the right to hold the reincarnation lineage’ for 
communicating with foreigners or engaging in anti-China protests. Monasteries and 
nunneries where a specific percentage of monks or nuns have engaged in dissident activities 
will banned from performing Buddhist rituals. And senior Buddhist teachers could face 
public ‘rectification’ or imprisonment if they ‘tolerated’ any protest activity, peaceful or 
otherwise. Students in many Tibetan regions were also subjected to PEC sessions.110 PEC 
was vigorously conducted in the eastern Tibetan regions of Gansu and Qinghai too, where 
ordinary Tibetans were forced under threats of imprisonment to denounce the Dalai Lama 
and declare loyalty and gratitude to the Party.111 Woeser’s updates and testimonies by actual 
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participants/witnesses show that in many cases Tibetan protests were provoked by PEC 
sessions.112 
 On 1 April, the authorities conducted PEC inside Za Wonpo Monastery, Zachukha 
County, Kartze, ordering the monks to criticize and denounce the Dalai Lama and provoked a 
monk-led protest.113 On 2 April, PEC was initiated in Ba Chode Monastery, Batang County, 
Kartze, resulting in clashes and arrests of monks, including the abbot and disciplinarian.114 
On 3 April, PAP and a PEC work unit ransacked Tongkor monastery, Kartze, confiscating 
mobile phones and throwing the photographs of the Dalai Lama and the monastery’s abbot to 
the ground, and ordered the monks to ‘curse’ the Dalai Lama. The monks started a protest 
joined by lay Tibetans from that area, reportedly resulting in many fatalities.115 Monks of 
Pada Sangdruling Monastery in Dzachukha, Kartze, refused to cooperate in a PEC session on 
26 April.116 PEC was intensified in other Tibetan regions fomenting great resentment.117  
The anti-Dalai Lama rhetoric heated up both at the official and popular levels among 
the Chinese. Wen Jiabao accused the ‘Dalai clique’ of planning and instigating the unrests.118 
On 2 April, 2008, the Chinese authorities and media began to publish ‘evidences of Dalai 
clique's masterminding of riots,’119which the Los Angeles Times described as ‘little more 
than a schedule of international meetings by foreign Tibet activists—what would pass for 
normal political activity in most countries.’120 State media labelled the Dalai Lama a 
‘terrorist’ colluding with ‘Muslim terrorists’ to sabotage the Beijing Olympics.121 Zhang 
Qingli, TAR Party Secretary, called the Dalai Lama a ‘wolf in monk's robes, a devil with a 
human face, but the heart of a beast,’ adding, ‘We are now engaged in a fierce blood-and-fire 
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battle with the Dalai clique, a life-and-death battle between us and the enemy.’122 He called 
the CCP a parent to the Tibetans and that ‘The Central Party Committee is the real Buddha 
for Tibetans.’123 Security personnel conducted raids in monasteries and private homes all 
over Tibet, often trampling and disfiguring the photographs of the Dalai Lama. Jigme, the 
Labrang monk, who made the video-testimony, talked about the trauma of seeing the Dalai 
Lama’s photographs being abused by Chinese security forces: 
Right in front of our eyes, they stamp with their feet on the picture of the Precious One [the Dalai 
Lama], break the picture frames with butts of guns, shred the pictures into pieces and burn them in 
the fire. We, being Tibetans and Buddhists, when we see the picture of our object of refuge being 
trodden under foot, and torn into pieces, we view these as irreparable acts. When Tibetans break a 
few windowpanes, they say that such acts caused hundreds of millions of Yuan worth of damage. 
How do you measure the damage caused to our hearts by seeing our most revered One's picture 
trampled underfoot? 
 
As mentioned above, such behaviour on the part of the security forces provoked great 
resentment among the Tibetans. There is no doubt that the enmity generated by such acts and 
the hardening policy environment is turning the wheel of the insecurity dilemma inexorably 
towards the next Tibetan uprising. Indeed the uprising and the ensuing crackdown has set off 
an unprecedentedly conscious strengthening Tibetan identity as the 4/ [Lhakar] 
movement demonstrates. Tibetan resistance also rumbles on most tragically in the form of 
self-immolations. Five monks from eastern Tibet have either died or got seriously burnt from 
their self-immolation attempts in 2011. These are desperate tactics and one can only guess 
where this lead to next. 
The Chinese government amplified its offensive against the Dalai Lama by 
controlling the media coverage of the uprising and its aftermath both domestically and 
internationally and restricting the flow of information and people from inside and outside 
Tibet. The communication infrastructure in the Tibetan regions were shut down to prevent the 
uprising from spreading further and to stop news about the suppression from reaching the 
exile community and indeed the international community. After initially keeping out foreign 
journalists,124 the Chinese authorities began to organise guided foreign media and diplomatic 
tours to some of the worst-hit Tibetan areas. Two of these managed-tours flopped 
spectacularly when Tibetan monks disrupted the official programmes and expressed their 
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support for the Dalai Lama and complained about the lack of freedom and human rights and 
the restrictions that had been put in place to quell the uprising.125  
Furthermore, to shape the popular Chinese perception of the uprising, images and 
description of the Tibetan rioters attacking Chinese civilians and burning destroying Chinese 
and state properties were played round the clock on national TV and filled up the pages of 
domestic print media. Consequently, as Barnett wrote, ‘For most people in China, the story of 
the Tibet uprising starts and ends with what is now called “the 3/14 incident”—what has been 
portrayed there as the brutal beating and killing of Chinese civilians by rabid Tibetan 
nationalists.’126 There was however ‘little or no mention of the Tibetan shop-workers who 
died in the same fires [nor, later of any Tibetans killed or injured by security forces].’127 
There was no soul-searching on the grievances that drove the Tibetans to riot, and no mention 
of the more than a hundred other peaceful protests that had happened all over Tibet. Many of 
these stories were relayed on overseas Chinese media outlets. Partly out of nationalistic 
anger, but also because of the state’s media manipulation, Chinese netizens, both at home and 
overseas, spewed vitriol on the Dalai Lama and branded ‘TYC, associated with the Dalai 
clique...a terrorist organisation’ in websites, blogs and video-sharing sites.128 Influenced by 
the portrayal of Tibetans and their protests in the official media and private channels, 
Tibetans and Uyghurs became targets of official surveillance and public discrimination in the 
Chinese areas.129 Tibetans complained frequently of racial profiling in their own homeland: 
the security forces stop Tibetans for identity check, letting the Chinese go un-accosted.  
The rally-behind-the-flag behaviour of many Chinese proved useful for Beijing when 
the Olympic torch made its way around the world. To use the Olympics glare and in 
solidarity with the Tibetans inside Tibet, overseas Tibetans and supporters assailed the 
Olympic torch as it travelled through London, Paris, San Francisco, Tokyo, Seoul and 
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Sydney. In London and Paris, protestors attempted to wrest the torch away from the hands of 
the torch-bearers, including a wheel-chair bound Chinese para-olympian in Paris. Such 
scenes provoked a Chinese nationalist back-lash, which the Chinese embassies and consulates 
used to mobilise and facilitate the transnational Chinese community to organise counter-
protests, occasionally turning into physical attacks on Tibetans and supporters as in Seoul, 
and online campaigns against alleged Western media-bias in the coverage of the Tibetan 
uprising.130  
The nationalist mood also led to witch-hunts against Chinese individuals who 
expressed pro-Tibetan sentiments or stayed neutral through a phenomenon known as ‘human 
flesh search engine’ (renrou sousuo yinqing).131 Grace Wang, a Duke University student from 
Qingdao, got between rival rallies representing Chinese students and Tibet supporters on the 
campus and called for dialogue rather than emotional shouting matches. She was immediately 
castigated as a ‘traitor’ and given the complete ‘human flesh search engine’ treatment.132 
Grace’s photograph, ‘Traitor to her country’ written across her forehead, her parents’ ID 
numbers and detailed directions to their home were posted on the internet.133 Netizens were 
egged on to teach ‘this shameless dog’ a lesson. Her parents in Qingdao went into hiding and 
a bucketful of human faeces was dumped on their door-step.  
However, it is also possible that the upsurge of popular Chinese nationalism also 
constrained Beijing’s options in quelling the uprising and its diplomacy towards Dharamsala. 
As Allen Carlson said during a panel discussion on Tibet after the uprising, Beijing was 
‘squeezed’ into a policy ‘quandary’: wanting to appear as a responsible power on the one 
hand and pursuing ‘totalising’ domestic and foreign policies under the influence of the 
‘extreme’ and ‘hate-full’ outpouring of Chinese nationalism in March and April 2008.134 
Indeed, the genie that the CCP created after the 1989 Tiananmen Square events to re-
legitimise its own rule had now begun to control its master. The nationalistic response to the 
uprising could also be understood in terms of societal security or ontological security 
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reaction. As Smith has written, ‘When some Tibetans reveal a lack of gratitude [for the 
perceived Chinese economic benevolence, cultural upliftment and political liberation of the 
Tibetans], it upsets this Chinese narrative and poses an existential threat to the Chinese 
people’s conception of themselves.’135  
Responding to the chorus of concerns from Western governments and Japan and the 
Dalai Lama’s visits to Western capitals, the Chinese government stepped up its efforts to 
deny international political space to the Tibetans. Perhaps reflecting the realist principles 
underlying its foreign relations, Beijing’s efforts were especially strong in divided Europe 
and less powerful states such as Canada and South Africa, while America escaped the full 
brunt of its ire. When Sarkozy met the Dalai Lama in Poland, while holding the EU 
presidency, Beijing cancelled a long scheduled EU-China Summit that was to be held on 1 
December, 2008.136 A peace conference associated with the football World Cup in South 
Africa had to be cancelled, when the South African government, apparently under Chinese 
pressure, denied a visa to the Dalai Lama.137 Beijing also stated its routine objection to a 
meeting between Barack Obama and the Dalai Lama when the latter visited America in 
October 2009.138 Obama did not to meet the Dalai Lama in advance of his schedule visit to 
China in November 2009, inviting the criticism of many rights organisations and the media in 
America, but their subsequent meeting in February 2010, drew a sharp rebuke from Beijing 
and worsening the already strained US-Chinese relations.139 
Beijing’s hardening stance also extended to the flailing Sino-Tibetan dialogue that 
resumed in September 2002. After seven rounds of unproductive talks, the dialogue became 
hostage to the general atmosphere of mutual recrimination. After a brief meeting on 4 May 
2008 in the Chinese city of Shenzhen, which Dharamsala characterised as an 
‘informal...meeting of principals without aides’ to find ways of stabilising riot-torn Tibet and 
to discuss the ‘seventh’ round of talks,140 the two sides met again in Beijing from 30 June-3 
July, 2008, without any substantive outcomes.141 When the Dalai Lama’s representatives met 
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Chinese officials again November 4-5, 2008, they submitted a ‘Memorandum on Genuine 
Autonomy for the Tibetan People’ [tibtib7tibtibtib8#tib	tib7tib,tib9.].142 
Beijing categorically rejected the fresh Tibetan proposal through a coordinated media 
strategy and diplomatic offensive. One of the chief interlocutors on the Chinese side, Zhu 
Weiqun, gave an unprecedented press conference in which he outlined the reasons for 
rejecting the Tibetan memorandum: The Dalai Lama refused to recognize Tibet as a ‘part of 
China since ancient times,’ he is ‘scheming for a “Greater Tibet”’ and attempting to 
‘overthrow the current social and political system’ in TAR, calling for the ‘withdrawal of the 
PLA from “Greater Tibet”,’ and attempting to drive away ‘other ethnic groups from the area 
of “Greater Tibet.”’143 Commentaries in China's official press, recycling the same content 
with different authors and titles, were supplemented by robust diplomatic trips to Western 
capitals, led by Zhu Weiqun and invariably comprising some Tibetans. As mentioned above, 
this robust intransigence on Beijing’s part was buttressed by the virulent popular nationalism, 
which on other one hand strengthened Beijing’s hand, but on the other hand, restricted 
Beijing’s policy options out of regime security concerns. 
However, not everyone on the Chinese side followed the hard-line official script or 
the ultra-nationalist hysteria. 
The above-mentioned, Duke University student, Grace Wang is part of the 
unprecedented phenomenon of a number of Chinese individuals, especially intellectuals, 
artists and writers, who have openly supported the Dalai Lama’s moderate positions and 
criticised the Chinese policies and its handling of the protests and riots in 2008. 338 Chinese 
intellectuals, writers, artists and other professionals in China published ‘Twelve Suggestions 
for Dealing with the Tibetan Situation’ and called for a fundamental rethink and reform of the 
failed nationality policy, an end to the ‘one-sided propaganda of the official Chinese media’ 
and an end to the violence on both sides, declared support for the ‘Dalai Lama’s appeal for 
peace’ and challenged Beijing to produce evidence of the ‘Dalai cliques’ premeditated 
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orchestration of the riots, which it claimed to possess.144 After the authorities arrested over 
5000 Tibetan protestors and rioters, a group of 18 Chinese lawyers offered to defend the 
Tibetans at great peril to their own livelihoods and lives.145 Many other Chinese individuals 
criticised Beijing’s hard-line policies in Tibet in their writings and statements. This shows the 
complexity inherent in a rapidly transforming contemporary Chinese society. 
While most Tibetans are heartened by such enlightened support from these Chinese 
individuals, the harsh crackdown and continuing repression has fuelled great resentment and 
insecurity among the Tibetans. Furthermore, the jingoistic Chinese nationalism had the effect 
of confirming the existing Tibetan images of the Chinese and hardening their anti-Chinese 
feelings. The duelling nationalisms thus strengthened continue to reinforce the insecurity 
dilemma. The insecurity dilemma has not finished its tragic run and it seems just a matter of 
time before the Tibetans vent their pent up fury again. This chapter has demonstrated that the 
Tibetan uprising and the Chinese responses, both governmental and popular, reinforced the 
decades-old insecurity dilemma. 
  
Conclusion 
This chapter used the 2008 Tibetan uprising to demonstrate the Chinese-Tibetan insecurity 
dilemma in action. It argues that the Tibetan perception of threats to their identity was the 
chief cause of the uprising. Following a survey of the various explanations offered by 
analysts of various stripes, it provides a preliminary reconstruction of the widespread protests 
that rocked Tibet and the transnational and international developments in its aftermath. The 
chapter then developed a provisional etiology of the uprising with special focus on the 
Tibetan fears for their identity. While acknowledging the role of economic forces and 
external—transnational and international—factors, identity fears, more than anything else, 
animated the Tibetan uprising in 2008. To illustrate this point, the chapter examined the 
Tibetan political mood immediately preceding and during the uprising.  
Security fears were no less salient for the Chinese and the chapter examined the 
security and nationalist bases of the Chinese responses, both statist and popular, to the 
Tibetan challenge. The chapter also dwelt upon the resentment and fears that the crackdown 
and nationalist backlash has already provoked among the Tibetans, prompting this question:  
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Is a Tibetan reaction already on the anvil? The tragic history appears certain to repeat itself, 
unless the Tibetans and the Chinese find a way to escape from the insecurity dilemma. 
The next chapter concludes the dissertation by summarising the key findings and 
contributions and asks whether the insecurity dilemma could be resolved in the Sino-Tibetan 
encounter. 
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Chapter 9: Conclusion 
 
This research began by asking what accounts for the protracted nature of the Sino-Tibetan 
conflict? The starting point of this research was to turn the analytical focus on understanding 
how security and the lack thereof, i.e. insecurity, affect the course of the conflict. This is a 
novel perspective in the analysis of the conflict. As such, this research posited the Sino-
Tibetan conflict as a dilemmatic interplay of the insecurities or threat perceptions of the 
Chinese party-state and the Tibetan nation and adopted the insecurity dilemma and developed 
it as a theoretical framework not just for this research, but also generally applicable to other 
ethnic conflicts around the world. This decision enabled a comprehensive analysis of not just 
the dynamic historical and contemporary interplay between the policies and practices of the 
Chinese and the Tibetans, but also the feed-back effect operating between the conflict and the 
transnational and international environment within which it is embedded.  
This concluding chapter first recapitulates the main theoretical contributions and 
empirical findings of this research. The chapter then considers three main scenarios for the 
future of the Sino-Tibetan conflict and the implications on the relevance of the insecurity 
dilemma. Finally, it looks at some of the limitations of this dissertation, which becomes the 
basis for identifying avenues for future research.   
 
Key Analytical Contributions 
First, this research raised a number of issues with theoretical or empirical significance. Six main 
issues will be singled out for discussion in this section. 
 
Theoretical Development of the Insecurity Dilemma: First, while noting its theoretical 
potential and advantages of over other theories to shed light on the security practices of weak, 
insecure states, and the ethnic conflicts therein, Chapter Two developed the insecurity 
dilemma to address a number of problems identified with the classical versions advanced by 
Job and Ayoob. 
  
Incorporating the societal security 
By incorporating societal security or identity security, the insecurity dilemma was equipped 
not just to explicate the security policies and practices of weak and insecure states, mostly but 
not exclusively in the global south (which the classical versions do well), but also to analyse 
the intra-state conflicts in these states by enabling the close study of the internal composition 
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and security practices of the adversarial ethnic groups. Societal security opens up space for 
and provides the conceptual tools for explicating the role of identity in the insecurity dilemma 
and security studies and international relations broadly. The analytical move to integrate 
societal security into the insecurity dilemma moderated the stifling state-centrism in the first 
generation of scholarship on the insecurity dilemma by giving play not just to the adversarial 
ethnic groups, but also their constituent units and non-state transnational actors complicit in 
the conflicts. Diasporas, co-religionists and elements of the global civil society are exemplary 
in this respect.  
 
Relevance of external actors 
Such openness to external actors, especially non-state actors, is contrary to the classical 
insecurity dilemma where the internal-external nexus is limited to state-to-state arms trade or 
security pacts. Indeed, this research argued and demonstrated that the connexion between the 
domestic and the external in most of these conflicts far exceeds such a parsimonious 
depiction. This research showed that both the state and its ethnic adversary forge and 
maintain transnational and international relations, chiefly but not restricted to the political, 
military, economic and cultural realms, with other states, diasporas (of various types) and 
other transnational organisations of various stripes (global civil society and norm 
entrepreneurs, multi-national corporations, triads, terror groups and so on). The possibilities 
in terms of the areas of cooperation and the types of partners are endless. This 
reconceptualization of the insecurity dilemma has broader theoretical implications for 
security studies and IR. 
 
Uncertainty  
The concept of uncertainty was enlisted into the insecurity dilemma to do part of the 
analytical heavy-lifting to avoid conflating the paradox with the dilemma. Uncertainty was 
used as a complement to historical experience as a source of insecurity in the spirit of Booth 
and Wheeler’s emphasis, in relation to ethnic conflicts, on ‘the importance of the shadow of 
the past as well as future uncertainty in shaping how actors manage their dilemmas of 
interpretation and response….’1 Uncertainty forces the actors to make worst-case 
assumptions about each other’s future intentions and prevents them from making difficult 
concessions today. It deserves pointing out that the use of uncertainty in the insecurity 
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dilemma is innovative inasmuch as the structural requirement of anarchy is thrown out of the 
window. This research has shown that uncertainty could also prey on hierarchic relationships, 
challenging one of the key tenets and distinguishing features of neorealism that uncertainty 
originates from anarchy. 
  
The action-reaction cycle 
The drafting in of societal security and uncertainty produced a richer account of the strategic 
dynamics between the state and its ethno-national adversary. Pitting the security practice of 
the state (explicated by classical insecurity dilemma) against that of the ethno-national 
challenger (guided by societal security), the strategic dynamic of the insecurity dilemma was 
reconceptualised as an action-reaction cycle of state-building and ethno-national resistance. 
They are bridged by mutual threat perceptions and insecurities generated by the ‘shadow of 
the past’ and uncertainty about each other’s future intentions. 
 Since much of the debates raging within security studies resonate with or draw upon 
theoretical debates within IR, these refinements have broader theoretical significance for 
International relations and Security Studies. This dissertation questions the state-centrism of 
IR theory by demonstrating that non-state actors, whether domestic, transnational or global 
(ethno-national groups, diasporas and global civil society) play consequential roles in 
international politics. Unit-level factors interact with transnational and systemic forces. The 
Sino-Tibetan conflict also illuminates the increasingly transnational nature of global politics. 
Finally, with the relevance of identity, culture, nationalism, legitimacy and image as 
discussed in the pages of this dissertation, the ultra-materialist ontology and rationalist 
epistemology of traditional international relations are challenged here. However, the 
dissertation recognises the continued relevance of the state and military and political security 
issues. States and sub-state actors and external actors, materialist and ideational factors and 
the domestic and external dimensions interact in complex ways which can be analysed by 
adopting a case-specific methodology. Indeed, over the last two decades, the rise of social 
constructivism as a theoretical approach in IR has been occasioned by the rationalist criticism 
that constructivism is not amenable to an empirically-driven research agenda. In this sense, 
this research contributes to the constructivist research programme by augmenting its 
empirical record of studying non-state actors and non-materialist values in IR and security 
studies.  
Furthermore, this research began by noting that traditional IR and security theories 
that derive their core assumptions and categories from a Eurocentric or Western historical 
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experience are inadequate for understanding contemporary security and international 
relations and conflicts especially in the global south. By developing and applying the 
insecurity dilemma on the Sino-Tibetan conflict, this research promoted an alternative 
theoretical framework, backed up by a sustained empirical application. The 
reconceptualization of the insecurity dilemma in the above terms provided the conceptual 
tools for studying various aspects of the Sino-Tibetan conflict in ways that problematise the 
existing analyses of the conflict. As such, the following key empirical points were raised by 
this research. 
 
Security and Nationalism in the Conflict 
Examining the Sino-Tibetan conflict from the security angle is a novel departure from the 
existing scholarship on the conflict. This research addressed the state-centrism pervading the 
existing analyses of the conflict and the consequent discursive and representational practice 
of describing the conflict in terms of Tibetan nationalism versus Chinese security. This 
research imputes security rationale to the Tibetan positions, demands and activities for which 
societal security provides the conceptual tool. At the same time, Beijing’s security practice 
was analysed systematically, unlike the cursory manner in which the existing literature treats 
the security motivations behind China’s Tibet policy. Societal security was helpful in 
establishing the significance of Chinese nationalism, popularly expressed in the Chinese 
cyberspace and streets and exploited by the party-state, in the relational dynamics of the 
insecurity dilemma. Chapter Eight reveals the opportunities and constraints that Chinese 
nationalism presented to Beijing in the wake of the Tibetan uprising in spring 2008. This 
demonstrated that societal security is also relevant to the overall security agenda of the state 
and dominant group. In short, it demonstrated that threat perceptions and insecurities push the 
Chinese and the Tibetans into acting out their tragic roles in the insecurity dilemma. 
 
The Insecurity Dilemma as History  
The insecurity dilemma allowed an alternative reading of the history of Sino-Tibetan 
relations. The pre-communist history demonstrated that conflict was not always inevitable 
between Tibetans and foreign (Mongol or Manchu) regimes in Beijing. Tibetans have not 
always turned against foreign overlords, not even when they exercised considerable 
administrative control from Beijing. Chapters Three and Four showed that the crucial 
determinants for Tibetan toleration or hostility towards Beijing-based rulers are two-fold: (1) 
whether they were inimically or positively disposed towards Tibetan identity, and (2) whether 
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they allowed an adequate level of Tibetan autonomy. These two criteria accounted for the 
Tibetan cooperation with the Mongol Yuan and early Qing dynasties as well as their violent 
uprisings and non-violent resistance against the late Qing Empire and Communist China. The 
historical perspective produced in these chapters demonstrates that over the decades, the 
conflict has transformed itself both structurally and discursively, contrary to the picture of 
static primordiality and discursive and structural stability that the existing literature implies 
across the historical periods.  
 
State-building, resistance and the core of the insecurity dilemma 
The insecurity dilemma enabled a more inter-subjective or social analysis of the conflict in 
comparison to the existing scholarship, while acknowledging the structural parameters such 
as the considerable material power-asymmetry between the Tibetans and the Chinese and the 
present reality of Tibet as a part of the multi-national Chinese state. As such, the examination 
of the policies and practices of both the Chinese and the Tibetans revealed a dynamic cycle of 
action and reaction, which is determined not just by changing material and structural 
conditions, but also animated by ideational concerns such as identity, nationalism, legitimacy 
and image or ‘face’. Chapters Five and Six showed this cycle in action in the post-1989 
period. Chapter Five drew upon insights from the classical insecurity dilemma and portrayed 
China’s policies towards the Tibetans (on administration, religion, language, economy and 
dialogue) in terms of three components of state-building, namely nation-building, institution-
building and infrastructure-building. These state-building efforts are designed to address 
Beijing’s vulnerabilities in terms of state, regime and societal security that are also outlined 
in the second half of Chapter Five. The manner in which the Tibetans receive these policies 
has a determining effect on the severity of the insecurity dilemma. 
The first part of Chapter Six then examined the Tibetan identity insecurity generated 
directly by the Chinese policies and indirectly through Chinese migration and cultural 
imperialism. In other words, the Tibetans perceive Chinese state-building in their homeland 
as ‘hegemonic’ and ‘assimilationist’ rather than ‘accommodating’ and inclusive. To counter 
these perceived threats to identity, the Tibetans have used a variety of strategies and 
instruments to resist what they call ‘cultural genocide’ in Tibet, as outlined in the second half 
of Chapter Six. These Tibetan actions, however, heighten China’s pre-existing vulnerabilities 
which feed back into hardening policies and practices. The cycle of the insecurity dilemma is 
thus kept going on and on. While Chapters Three, Four, Five and Six demonstrated the 
cyclical and social dynamic in the Sino-Tibetan core of the conflict over the longue durée, 
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Chapter Eight showed the same process working in the shorter time-frame of the 2008 
uprising and its aftermath.  
 
External Actors in the Conflict  
This dissertation challenged Job’s understatement of the role of transnational and 
international actors in reinforcing or mitigating the insecurity dilemma. In reality, external 
actors play strong roles in many domestic conflicts and both the state and its ethno-national 
opponents forge transnational and international relationships against each other. Indeed, as 
demonstrated in Chapter Seven, Beijing fears foreign intervention and peaceful evolution 
strategies through the Tibetans in exile and Tibet. The chapter explored the complex ways in 
which strategic and economic interests, normative principles, domestic politics, culture and 
leadership interacted to shape the ups-and-downs of the Tibet issue in the harsh realities of 
international politics. The role that the Tibet issue did or could play in US-Chinese, Sino-
Indian, Euro-Chinese, Sino-Taiwanese and Sino-Russian relations and the transnational 
Tibetan Buddhist world in the future was considered. It was not just states, but also other 
transnational actors that play important roles in the conflict. In Chapters Six and Seven, the 
roles of the global Tibetan diaspora and the network of global Tibet Support Groups are 
considered. The Tibetans also work hard to maintain the support of international rights 
advocacy groups around the world or norm entrepreneurs. In the rough and tumble of 
international politics, Tibetans have so far weathered the shifting realpolitik and normative 
landscapes with patient and persistent lobbying efforts, using the appeal of Tibetan culture, 
especially Buddhism, and the Dalai Lama’s leadership. Predictably, China has always sought 
to reduce diplomatic space for the Tibetan exiles and undermine the appeal of Tibetan 
Buddhism and the Dalai Lama’s following on the international arena. As Chapter Eight 
showed in the context of the demonstrations around the world by Tibetans and supporters and  
human rights campaigners targeting the Olympic Torch relay, the Chinese government also 
mobilised the overseas Chinese community, mostly students, to organise counter-
demonstrations in its support. In short, this dissertation demonstrated the agency of external 
actors in an apparently domestic conflict. 
  
Tibetans and Diaspora Theories: The Tibetan diaspora plays a crucial role in the Sino-
Tibetan conflict. Through the pages of this research, the Tibetan diaspora has been shown to 
possess unique characteristics that have theoretical implications for diaspora studies in terms 
of definition, emergence, organisational and spatial logics and political agency. Firstly, 
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because the Tibetan diaspora is diverse in its migration history, distance (both temporally and 
experientially) from traumatic events, attachment to Tibetan culture, nostalgia for Tibet as a 
homeland and commitment to the political project of the Tibetan government-in-exile 
(TGIE), the Tibetan case cries out for a redefinition that avoids the Charybdis of traumatic 
original dispersion and the Scylla of treating diaspora as a catch-all concept. A redefinition of 
the diaspora has to relax the strict requirement of traumatic original dispersion, while 
protecting its conceptual clarity by excluding certain categories from it. 
The Tibetan diaspora is also complex in terms of its emergence and continued 
existence, which problematises the instrumentalist, constructivist and primordialist theories 
of diaspora-formation. Again, the Tibetans force us to rethink the perception of diasporas as 
rootless and mindless stooges of state elites and ethnic entrepreneurs (instrumentalists), out-
of-the-blue ‘inventions’ (social constructivists) or un-evolved ancient creatures 
(primordialists). An ethno-symbolist approach provides the theoretical repertoire for 
capturing this complexity by challenging and bridging the above theories.  
Secondly, with regard to the strict dichotomies in the literature between 
hierarchically-organised states vs. network-based diasporas and territorial states vs. de-
territorialised diasporas, the Tibetan case suggests more nuanced understandings of their 
organisational and spatial logics. Institutionally, the Tibetan diaspora is organised 
hierarchically with TGIE or the Central Tibetan Administration (complete with a popularly 
elected tibtib (Sikyong) or Prime Minister and ‘Ministries’, Parliament and Judiciary 
headquartered in Dharamsala, India, with local offices and de facto embassies around the 
world). This challenges the notion that diasporas operate only through horizontal networks. 
On territoriality, there is a cognitive dissonance in the literature. On the one hand, diasporas 
are treated as de-territorialised entities, on the other hand, some diasporas are supposed to 
inhabit ‘sacred’ territories valued by themselves and coveted by both host-states and 
neighbouring states ruled by co-nationals, causing the spread of ethnic conflicts and inter-
state wars. The Tibetan case calls for clarity on this contradiction in the literature. While the 
Tibetans from Tibet proper are certainly de-territorialised, what about Monpas, for instance, 
who are culturally Tibetan and whose homeland, Tawang, was historically part of Tibet. All 
over the Indian and Nepalese Himalayas, there are many other people like the Monpas. Are 
they part of the Tibetan diaspora or not? What the Tibetan case suggests at the least is a 
distinction between ‘territorial’ and ‘de-territorialised’ diasporas and analysis of their 
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respective behaviour to improve our knowledge of diasporas in relation to international 
conflicts.  
Thirdly, the Tibetan diaspora also indicates that it is possible to develop a fuller 
account of diasporic political agency than the existing IR scholarship shows. Policy agency is 
arguably the most important reason for studying diasporas within IR as the political, 
economic and ideational services that they provide to co-nationals, homelands and host-states 
implicate them in domestic and international conflicts. Unsurprisingly, a rich tapestry of 
diaspora political agency has already been created in the literature, which helps understand 
the Tibetan diasporic practices. However, the Tibetan diaspora adds something unique to this 
tapestry: not only is it organised hierarchically like state institutions and perform similar 
functions, it has also democratised, just like an Ancien Régime transforming itself into a 
democracy. As noted earlier, the Dalai Lama has given up all his political authorities to 
popularly elected officials. For the Tibetans, democratisation is not only desirable for its 
intrinsic benefits for internal governance and conflict-resolution, but also for its external 
instrumentality (vis-à-vis China) in the same way as states see foreign policy and security 
benefits behind democratisation and democracy promotion. The examination of Tibetan 
diasporic democratisation also challenges state-centrism in the democratisation literature 
which requires and inevitably assumes statehood. Clearly, the Tibetan diaspora plays a 
crucial role in the protracted Sino-Tibetan conflict and democratisation should be seen partly 
in the context of diasporic agency in this conflict. It is beyond the scope of this research to 
develop these important themes. 
   
Future Scenarios and the Insecurity Dilemma 
The future of the Sino-Tibetan conflict can be envisioned in terms of three scenarios with 
different implications for the relevance of the insecurity dilemma. First, China could pursue a 
policy of utter repression to score a swift and outright victory and finish off the Tibetans as a 
viable opponent. This could be accompanied by a policy of massive settlement of Chinese in 
Tibet as an additional security measure. In retaliation, the Tibetans could reinstate complete 
independence as the official goal and/or even adopt organised violence as a strategy. This 
would turn the Tibetan plateau into a zone of unmitigated bloodshed. Secondly, Beijing and 
the Tibetans could find a way to resolve the conflict while the current Dalai Lama is still 
leading the Tibetan people. Finally, hoping to exploit the anticipated post-Dalai Lama 
disarray among the Tibetans, the Chinese government could play the waiting game by simply 
continuing with its hard-line policies in Tibet and engaging in dialogue with the Dalai Lama’s 
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representatives to mute international criticism. Conversely, the Tibetans could play their own 
waiting game with the CCP’s demise, while demanding political autonomy for a unified 
Tibet. This would drive the conflict into an indefinite stalemate with cycles of hardening 
Chinese policies and Tibetan uprisings.    
 
Utter Repression, Tibetan Violence 
There is a theoretical possibility that Beijing could pursue a policy of massive repression to 
physically eliminate or politically neuter the Tibetan nation, akin to Slobodan Milosevic’s 
campaign of ethnic cleansing in Kosovo. This scenario is more likely in the context of a 
Beijing government that may come under the strong influence or control of Chinese hyper-
nationalists. The PLA, PAP and Chinese nationalistic vigilantes would be pressed into service 
in genocidal pogroms against the Tibetans. Ethnic cleansing could be accompanied by a 
policy of ‘population swamping’ through an accelerated process of Chinese settlement in 
Tibet. Such a development could be motivated by, even justified, by the purported virtues of 
one side’s decisive victory to end the conflict once and for all. While ethnic cleansing 
remains only at the rhetorical realm of Chinese nationalistic cyberspace and private 
conversations,2 encouraging Chinese migration as a security measure is already underway to 
some degree.3 However, Beijing is unlikely to pursue such drastic measures in Tibet not just 
because of the costs involved, but also because it is confident that the policies already being 
implemented in Tibet would produce the same ends in the long run. An even more 
compelling restraint is the consequently inevitable radicalisation of the Tibetan resistance. As 
the insecurity dilemma suggests, Tibetans could respond by reinstating independence as their 
goal and/or even with organised and large-scale violence. 
As we saw in Chapter Six, there is a vocal bloc among the Tibetans who believe that 
the Dalai Lama should not have given up independence in 1987. They argue that he and 
TGIE should reinstate independence as the goal of the national struggle, especially since 
China has repeatedly rebuffed their conciliatory proposals. Many delegates attending the 
Special Meeting in Dharamsala in November 2008 recommended that, in view of China’s 
intransigence, TGIE should ‘stop sending envoys and pursue complete independence or self-
determination.’4 Reinstating independence as a goal will no doubt inject greater coherence 
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 WWM, ‘Chinese media break silence on Tibet riots,’ 15 March, 2008. 
3
 Goldstein 1997: 95-96. 
4
 CTA, tibtibtib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
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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and unity to the Tibetan struggle and it will be psychologically satisfying to many Tibetans. 
Restoring the goal of independence would also be the Tibetan answer to Beijing’s waiting 
game. Just as Beijing is playing a waiting game with the Dalai Lama, some Tibetans are 
envisaging dealing with a post-CCP democratic China. One of the most articulate proponents 
of independence wrote that since Beijing has categorically rejected the Middle Way approach 
and the Memorandum in November 2008 after ‘leading Dharamsala up the garden path of 
promised negotiations,’ TGIE should put independence back as the goal of the struggle and 
persist in a ‘Baltic solution.’5 He continued:  
And in some distant future, when the Communist Party of China no longer holds power, these 
measures would also do much to prepare the ground for real negotiations, and for the possibility 
of either complete independence or genuine autonomy in its true sense.6 
 
However, such a notion not only ignores the grave threats to Tibetan identity that exist on the 
ground, and the inevitability of the Chinese hardening their positions and accelerating the 
implementation of their assimilationist policies in response. Equally significantly, in view of 
the fact that no government, not even those sympathetic to Dharamsala’s aspirations, 
recognises the independence of Tibet, there will be adverse implications on the limited 
financial and moral support that they do provide to the Tibetans.  
Even more devastating will be a Tibetan turn towards violence out of ‘nationalistic 
emotions coupled with desperation and anger.’7 Although the Tibetans have the potential to 
give a bloody nose to China and seriously destabilise its economy, especially if they take the 
fight to the soft targets in the Chinese cities, they cannot hope to prevail in a violent 
confrontation with China. As the Dalai Lama says, it will be a suicidal move. It will bring so 
much misery and destruction upon the Tibetans inside Tibet and make India inhospitable to 
the Tibetan refugees and their institutions. It will also reduce the public support that the 
Tibetan cause enjoys in many parts of the world. The only context in which the Tibetans have 
any hope of success with violence is an embattled China in the throes of a civil war or a 
violent clash with another great power. Even then, success is not guaranteed and the price of 
failure will be steep.  
 Although the outcome of this scenario is quite predictable, i.e. utter devastation of the 
Tibetans as a viable political community, descend of the Tibetan plateau into open violence 
                                                                                                                                                        
Charter], 21 November, 2008; Tibetan version available at 
http://www.tibet.net/tb/flash/2008/november/21A1108.html and English at 
http://www.tibet.net/en/index.php?id=595&articletype=flash&rmenuid=morenews. 
5
 Sonam May 2009.  
6
 Ibid. 
7
 Goldstein 1997: 116. 
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and bloodshed will not just be a highly destabilising and costly contingency for China, it 
would also be difficult to respond and manage for countries like India, Nepal and America. 
For all these reasons, it is hard to imagine that the above scenario of utter Chinese repression 
and a violent Tibetan reaction will be empirically realised.  
 
Reconciliation  
If the unmitigated violence of the previous scenario is unlikely, current trends do not offer 
optimism for a resolution of the conflict in the near future either. Yet, there are constituencies 
in both the Chinese and Tibetan camps for resolving this conflict. Furthermore, the on-again, 
off-again dialogue between Chinese officials and the Dalai Lama’s emissaries suggest that 
these constituencies overlap with the officialdom in both camps. Therefore, it is proper to 
explore what the broad outlines of a settlement for the Sino-Tibetan conflict should look like 
from the perspective of the insecurity dilemma. 
First and foremost, any solution that will endure must address the security concerns 
on both sides. Secondly, this solution must be based on the recognition of some fundamental 
realities by both parties and the consideration of long-term interests rather than short-term 
balances of power and moral or legal entitlements.  
Beijing must recognise that Tibetan national identity has survived the ‘Democratic 
Reforms’ and the Cultural Revolution and it will be difficult to erase it altogether. Beijing 
must disabuse itself of the illusion of copying the colonial-era destruction of native Indians in 
the Americas or repeating the imperial-era assimilation of China’s other minorities. The 
Tibetans differ considerably from the American Indians and other minorities in China in 
terms of the depth, integrity and resilience of their national identity. Moreover, trying to 
assimilate an entire people in the age of globalisation and internet and a world with a 
normative context far different from the might-makes-right rules of the past will prove 
immensely costly, even if possible. The researchers of the Gongmeng Consultancy pointed 
out that Chinese policies over the last five decades have only strengthened the sense of 
Tibetan national identity among the younger Tibetans who grew up in ‘liberated’ Tibet 
compared to the older generation.8 Beijing would do well to heed the advice of Fan Ming, 
one of its top officials in Tibet in the 1950s. He compared Han chauvinism to a spear and 
                                                 
8
 Fool’s Mountain, ‘Chinese think tank investigation report of 3.14 incident in Tibet,’ 19 May, 2009; available at 
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Tibetan nationalism to a shield, reflecting the logic of the insecurity dilemma, and counselled 
that ‘the one who held the spear must lay it down before the one who carried the shield was 
required to lay down his weapon.’9 
 Tibetans need to recognise that their historical memory of independence and the sense 
of entitlement to national self-determination notwithstanding, Tibet and the Tibetans have 
become deeply embedded in the national identity of a 1.2 billion strong Chinese nation and 
the state identity of an economic super-power with nuclear weapons.10 Blame it on 
propaganda or Chinese imperialism, but no amount of historical and moral argumentations, 
barring a geopolitical tectonic shift in Asia, will change this reality. A clear-eyed 
understanding of the widening imbalance of capabilities should induce a sobering distinction 
between realistic aspirations and unrealistic historical or legal entitlements.  
Real Tibetan autonomy and continued primacy of the CCP in Tibet, albeit through 
Tibetan party members, could be the basis of a solution that would address most of the fears 
on both sides. Anything short of real autonomy in the sense of institutionalised division of 
power between Beijing and the local Tibetan polity will not address Tibetan insecurities. As 
discussed in Chapter Three, history bears witness to this assertion. As we saw in Chapter Six, 
the latest Tibetan Memorandum on Genuine Autonomy for the Tibetan People [tibtib tib
tibtib!tibtib tib"tib] asked for ‘clear divisions of power and 
responsibilities’ between Beijing and the Tibetan authorities and the ‘guarantee’ that the 
powers and responsibilities allocated to the Tibetans ‘cannot be unilaterally abrogated or 
changed’. The working of uncertainty and credible commitment problems is unmistakable 
here. 
This autonomy arrangement should be extended to a unified Tibet, failing which any 
agreement will be unsustainable. Chapter Six explained the historical, cultural and political 
reasons behind this observation and Dharamsala’s signals for flexibility on where the actual 
borders should be drawn, taking into account the demographic and political implications of 
regaining territory with heavy settlement of Han and Hui Chinese. It only remains to be 
added that identity insecurity and problems of uncertainty and credible commitment are just 
as relevant to the eastern Tibetans. In fact, being closer to the Chinese cultural areas, they feel 
even more insecure, which explains why they have always been more aggressive in 
challenging Chinese rule. 
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However, just as importantly, any agreement that leaves the slightest doubts as to 
Chinese rule over Tibet and the CCP’s primacy in Tibet will fall by the wayside. The Dalai 
Lama and Dharamsala are sensitive to this reality. The Tibetan Memorandum, for instance, 
forswears ‘separation or independence’ and repeatedly expresses the objective of and 
confidence in seeking an autonomy solution ‘compatible with the principles on autonomy in 
the Constitution of the People’s Republic of China (PRC).’ The Dalai Lama’s signature on 
the agreement, his public recognition of Chinese sovereignty and his counsel to the Tibetan 
people to accept Tibet’s place inside China will be the strongest guarantee against Tibetan 
independence. This will be unacceptable to some Tibetans, but most Tibetans would follow 
the Dalai Lama’s pragmatic course. As the Dalai Lama told Fareed Zakaria, the CCP should 
continue to rule Tibet and the democratisation of Tibet could be left contingent on the pace of 
political liberalisation in China itself. However, Tibet should be governed by Tibetan 
members of the Party, a compromise between Chinese leaders who are seen as colonialists by 
the Tibetans and the ‘Dalai clique’ who are seen as anti-Chinese and anti-CCP by Beijing. 
The Dalai Lama has also repeatedly stated since the 1980s that he would forsake all his 
political responsibilities and dissolve TGIE and associated institutions once an agreement is 
reached. The 2008 Memorandum also concludes with these pledges. 
In short, Tibetan autonomy and unification and Chinese sovereignty and CCP rule 
through Tibetan communists could form the broad outlines of a negotiated settlement. Beijing 
should take a longer-term perspective and demonstrate political will and wisdom to exploit 
the opportunity to find a lasting solution while the Dalai Lama is alive. On its part, 
Dharamsala needs to approach the dialogue process more coherently and consistently. While 
the clear understanding of the dynamics of the insecurity dilemma by all parties involved in 
the conflict will prove helpful when a progressive atmosphere opens up, especially in Beijing, 
current trends do not hold much hope for a resolution in the foreseeable future. Instead, a 
stalemate in the form of continued hard-line Chinese policies and Tibetan resistance will be 
the likely scenario. The insecurity dilemma seems set to persist for the foreseeable future. 
 
Stalemate and the Insecurity Dilemma 
The hard-line faction in Beijing and Lhasa has been pushing for a unilateral solution to the 
Tibet issue by remorselessly persisting with the policies that in time, they hope, will render 
the Tibetans demographically and politically insignificant in Tibet and by side-lining the 
Dalai Lama whose death could be the beginning of the end of the Tibetan struggle. In fact, 
this has been Beijing’s strategy since the mid-1980s. While there has been no let-up in the 
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rigid policies in Tibet, engagement with the Dalai Lama also appears dead-locked. The latest 
Tibetan Memorandum, which was submitted to the Chinese officials during the seventh round 
of talks in October-November 2008, was rejected and publicly criticised by the Chinese 
officials as ‘independence in disguise’ and violating China’s constitution and autonomy 
law.11 The apparent trajectory of Beijing’s approach appears to be more of the hard-line and 
development-focused policies. 
 From Beijing’s point of view, the advantages of this approach outweigh any negative 
fall outs. This would forestall the danger of the domino-effect in other minority regions and 
minimise the fears of the Tibetans using greater autonomy over the Tibetan plateau as a 
stepping stone towards complete independence in the future. Furthermore, this would avoid 
both the unpredictable outcomes of the return of the Dalai Lama and the probable Han 
Chinese nationalist backlash against the CCP for giving in to Tibetan ‘separatist’ demands. 
Finally, Beijing hopes that the combination of its development-focused policies (and 
externalities), Chinese migration and cultural influence and the death of the septuagenarian 
Dalai Lama will take care of the Tibet issue. In short, they calculate that time is on China’s 
side and that the Dalai Lama’s presence would be more a powder-keg than an asset. From the 
perspective of institutions such as the United Front Department and certain local Tibetan and 
Chinese leaders, their institutional turf, powers and privileges would be protected from the 
vagaries of new local and national regimes for running Tibetan affairs.  
The Tibetan side has also made it clear that they have reached their bottom-line in the 
dialogue process on the two core issues of genuine autonomy and the uniform administration 
for all Tibetans. Lodi Gyari, the Special Representative of the Dalai Lama to America and the 
chief Tibetan interlocutor in the Sino-Tibetan dialogue revealed that genuine autonomy has 
always been the Tibetan bottom-line.12 As noted before, Samdhong Rinpoche, the incumbent 
Prime Minister of TGIE told the conference of the International Tibet Support Network that 
the demand for unified administration of all Tibetans is so crucial that the TGIE will not work 
with Tibet Support Groups that deviate from that position. Another indication that a 
resolution is not in sight from the Tibetan perspective is the frequent declaration by the Dalai 
Lama ever since Beijing’s rejection of Dharamsala’s Memorandum that his faith in the 
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Chinese government in the dialogue is getting ‘thinner and thinner.’13 Furthermore, a frequent 
theme in the Dalai Lama’s speeches to the Tibetans is to ‘hope for the best, but prepare for 
the worst’ by strengthening the Tibetan movement for a lengthy struggle. As events from 
Tibet testify, the hard-line policies, migration and cultural imperialism would provoke more 
unrest in the future, especially when and after the Dalai Lama passes away. The trends in 
both Beijing and the Tibetan camp indicate that the cycle of the insecurity dilemma will go 
on for the foreseeable future. 
 
Abetting and Countervailing Factors 
A number of factors will come into play in determining which of these scenarios would 
materialise. First, the direction of China’s political development would have major 
repercussions. Whether China democratises or persists in its Leninist authoritarianism will 
have a marked difference on the prospects for reconciliation or stalemate. Democratisation 
could open up more space and instil confidence in mutual accommodation,14 but it is just as 
possible that democratic politicians would be held hostage by their hyper-nationalistic 
constituencies to adopt hard-line positions.  Relatedly, the outcome of the struggle between 
liberals and hyper-nationalists over the soul of China will have a direct bearing on whether a 
basis of co-existence between the Tibetans and the Chinese could be crafted or whether 
stalemate or even utter repression becomes the reality. For instance, a loose coalition of first 
generation Tibetan communist officials, retired senior military officials of the 18th Army, 
liberal intellectuals, security analysts and foreign policy specialists had pushed the benefits of 
a resolution of the Tibetan issue with the current Dalai Lama.15 The ascendance of these 
groups relative to the nationalistic—conservative forces would make constructive 
engagement with the Dalai Lama and the Tibetans more likely. The institutional environment 
for managing Tibetan affairs in Beijing—how crowded, bureaucratic and professionalised it 
is and the personnel turnovers—and the dialogue process in Dharamsala will also have a 
bearing on the course of the dialogue process.16 
Second, the increasing interest in Tibetan Buddhism among the wealthy and middle-
class Chinese is a wild card. The place of religion in general in Chinese society and 
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Buddhism’s relationship with the Party and state will determine how the growing prestige of 
Tibetan Buddhism will influence the state of Chinese-Tibetan relations. 
Third, the level of instability in Tibet and the associated economic costs for Beijing of 
keeping the Tibetan plateau on a tight leash is another factor. As noted before, Beijing is all 
but subsidising the Tibetan economy on top of the costs of maintaining a substantial military 
presence, internal security and propaganda and civilian administrative apparatus. This ‘blood 
transfusion’ economy is not just a huge drain on the resources; it is riddled with distortions, 
inefficiencies and destabilising ethnic disparities. At some point, Beijing’s policy of ruthless 
control and economic development could unravel under the weight of these weaknesses and 
increasing obligations.17 Either Beijing would initiate constructive negotiations with the Dalai 
Lama to ease the pressures or the pent-up stress could boil over into instability. If China’s 
economy continues to sustain the costs of the hard-line policies, the cycle of the insecurity 
dilemma would also persist. 
Fourth, as the Sino-Tibetan conflict is entwined with broader regional and global 
political and strategic affairs, the direction of the conflict would also depend upon the state of 
relations between China and key states such as India, America and Russia. The nature of the 
emerging regional strategic balance, especially in the context of the growing US-India ties, 
would have a material impact on Beijing’s handling of the Tibetan issue. Usually dismissive 
of India as a rival and its great power aspirations, Beijing ‘must be wary of any dramatic 
increase in Indian power or an alliance between New Delhi and some hostile major state.’18 
The fluid India-America-China triangular balance has the potential to affect China’s Tibet 
policy. As Norbu argued, ‘…India’s threat [to use the Tibet card] becomes credible only 
when Beijing perceives it to be acting in close cooperation with great powers.’19 Beijing’s 
decision to open dialogue with the Dalai Lama is partly the result of international criticism. 
Whether the Tibetans will be able to maintain or increase the level of international interest in 
Tibet or Beijing will be successful in reducing diplomatic space for the Tibetans through its 
growing economic, diplomatic and military clout will be a relevant factor.20 
Finally, how the Tibetans will fare after the demise of the 14th Dalai Lama will have a 
determining effect on the course of the conflict. No wonder, many Chinese expect the Tibetan 
struggle to fade away with the Dalai Lama. There is also a lot of international interest on how 
the Tibetans and the Chinese will handle the selection of the 15th Dalai Lama, and how the 
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Tibetans, especially in exile, would cope in the post-Dalai Lama period.21 The Chinese and 
the Tibetans are preparing for that eventuality. In 2007, the Chinese State Administration of 
Religious Affairs (SARA) passed ‘Measures on the Management of the Reincarnation of 
Living Buddhas [reincarnates] in Tibetan Buddhism’ or ‘Order No. 5’, which requires all 
Tibetan Lamas to petition the State for permission to ‘reincarnate’ and be approved by the 
appropriate state bodies.22 In 2010, China passed ‘Management Measures for Tibetan 
Buddhism’ barring any foreign forces from interfering in Tibetan monasteries, temples and 
other religious sites.23 Beijing is undoubtedly putting these measures in place to undercut the 
Dalai Lama’s influence and crucially in anticipation of the selection of his reincarnation.  
The Tibetan exiles have also been busy. The Dalai Lama has categorically stated that 
his reincarnation will be born outside Chinese control to carry on his work, and has also 
floated a number of ways, both traditional and novel, to select his reincarnation. He has 
suggested choosing his reincarnation before death [#$], a Roman Catholic style 
conclave of senior Tibetan Lamas, a female Dalai Lama, and the traditional method of 
searching for a child after his death. Other senior Tibetans have also recommended 
mobilising the non-Tibetan Tibetan Buddhists across the world in the selection process to 
maximise legitimacy and to protect the Dalai Lama institution. To ensure the survival of the 
Tibetan struggle and TGIE, the Dalai Lama has retired from his temporal and administrative 
duties to empower other Tibetans to take leadership positions and to consolidate the exile 
democracy.24 These are all measures in the spirit of his advice to ‘hope for the best and 
prepare for the worst.’ In summary, how the Tibetans will conduct themselves in the post-
Dalai Lama scenario would have a decisive effect on the course of the conflict. 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
21
 The Economist, ‘The indispensable incarnation: Talk of the Dalai Lama’s “retirement” shows how much 
Tibet still needs him. Yet so does China,’ 6 January 2011; Janes Intelligence Review, ‘Reborn supremacy: 
China's control of Tibetan reincarnation,’ 21 January, 2008. 
22
 State Administration of Religious Affairs, ‘Management Measures for the Reincarnation of Living Buddhas in 
Tibetan Buddhism,’ 18 July, 2007. The original Chinese is available on the website of SARA at 
http://www.sara.gov.cn/GB//zcfg/89522ff7-409d-11dc-bafe-93180af1bb1a.html. The English translation is 
available on the website of the Congressional-Executive Committee on China at 
http://www.cecc.gov/pages/virtualAcad/index.phpd?showsingle=98772&PHPSESSID=2a2c4245f4a54ce8dc1da
e02eb9c7f14. 
23
 Global Times, ‘Foreign forces must not interfere in Tibetan Buddhism affairs: government,’ 9 October, 2010. 
24
 AFP, ‘Dalai Lama 'to retire' from government-in-exile role,’ 22 November, 2010. 
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Research Limitation and Future Research Avenues 
This research needs development in one key area: getting a more nuanced understanding of 
the insecurity dilemma as it manifests at the local and regional levels by consulting more 
Chinese language documents and conducting field research in Tibet and China.  
This research posited the conflict as a dynamic interplay of Chinese and Tibetan 
insecurities and policy responses. However, the respective insecurities and remedial policies 
and practices could be examined only at the macro-levels, i.e. at the national and regional 
levels on the Chinese side and at the level of Tibetans as a national group. In addition, this 
author could not gain a satisfactory understanding of the nuances within the Chinese 
bureaucratic apparatus on their perceptions of the Tibetan issue and prescribed policy 
response. Due to restrictions on travel to Tibetan areas in the past few years, and the 
sensitivity of the issue at hand in China, this author has been unable to conduct research on 
the ground to understand how state and regime insecurities, policies and implementation 
manifest in the local and regional contexts and how insecurities across the regional and 
sectarian divisions in the Tibetan society and the bureaucratic terrain of the Party-State. 
This is significant because some China scholars have contended that the national, 
regional and local agents of the Chinese Party-state have slightly different interests, concerns 
and react differently to problems and threats. They argue that despite the Communist Party’s 
assertion of ‘unified leadership’ and the common perception of total power and control 
enforced by the Party and Central government, Beijing’s ability to unilaterally impose its will 
throughout China is more limited than that. China’s authoritarian regime lacks the capacity to 
implement decisions uniformly throughout its vast polity. Even when Beijing issues more 
categorical commands, local compliance is far from certain. The ancient Chinese proverb 
‘The Mountains are high and the emperor is far’ is still relevant to some extent. Although, 
this line of thinking is more applicable to issue areas like the economy and environment than 
to Party-State security, and to Han Chinese provinces than to sensitive frontier regions like 
Tibet and Xinjiang, there is some evidence even in Tibetan affairs of disconnect between 
local and national authorities and significant variations even among the Tibetan regions. 
On the Tibetan side, there are many traditional divisions that are based on religious 
and regional affiliations. The traditional government of Tibet headed by the Dalai Lama was 
a theocratic regime monopolised by the Geluk sect of Tibetan Buddhism. However, there are 
three other main sects of Buddhism and Bon, the pre-Buddhist religion of Tibet. Arguably, 
the various sects feel different levels of loyalty to the Dalai Lama, hence, different levels of 
political activism. I would like to confirm if this is indeed the case, in which case, the 
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implication is that the Chinese authorities feel different levels of insecurity and implement 
state policies differently across the sectarian divides in Tibetan society. Similarly, in the post-
Mao period, Eastern Tibetan areas incorporated into the Chinese provinces had, at times, 
relatively more freedom than in Tibet Autonomous Region. One speculation is that because 
these Eastern Tibetan regions have been heavily settled by Chinese migrants, the authorities 
feel more secure and feels more confident to allow more freedom there. Since the late 1990s 
and especially after the spring 2008 protests and riots in these regions, the situation has 
become more homogenous.  
Accordingly, a future project would be to conduct additional research, preferably in 
the field in the Tibetan regions to examine if the insecurity dilemma adapts in severity to 
these divisions in the Party-State and Tibetan society. In the same vein, more focused 
research projects examining how the insecurity dilemma works on particular issue areas such 
as Tibetan Buddhism, language, education, economy, folk traditions, to name a few could 
branch off from this dissertation.  
A related topic for potential refinement is whether the threat perception and security 
policy for addressing China’s vulnerabilities in Tibet are homogenous or heterogeneous 
within the Chinese officialdom. Engaging with the factional approach to studying Chinese 
politics, some Tibet scholars have argued that there are liberal and conservative camps within 
the Chinese government who have different understandings of the Tibet issue and propose 
conciliatory and assimilationist policies, respectively. However, no one has studied the 
dynamics of this bureaucratic divide and the relative strength of each faction in detail. An 
understanding of the factional politics on Tibet issues will produce a more nuanced picture of 
the insecurity dilemma too. More research is needed to confirm or rule out the hypothesised 
factional split on dealing with the problems in Tibet and how it affects the insecurity 
dilemma. More field work within China and consultation of more documents and materials to 
refine, develop and update the general arguments about Chinese policies and practices that I 
advance here would be beneficial. 
 
Conclusion: This chapter first discussed the key analytical issues raised by this research. It 
considered how the insecurity dilemma was developed theoretically and how its application 
problematizes the existing accounts of the Sino-Tibetan conflict. Next, the chapter sketched 
three possible scenarios for the future of the Sino-Tibetan conflict. The first scenario 
envisioned a highly nationalistic China engaging in a policy of utter repression, including 
attempts at ethnic cleansing and population swamping, to bring about a quick and decisive 
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end to their Tibetan problem. It also envisaged a desperate Tibetan counter-measure 
including organised violence and terrorism. It was concluded that this scenario is highly 
unlikely to materialise. Second, the probability of a resolution of the conflict and the broad 
shape it would take was considered. Based on the current trends in both China and Tibet and 
Dharamsala, it is hard to envision a resolution of the conflict in the foreseeable future. 
Instead, those trends point towards China’s reliance on the present policy of harsh control and 
economic development in Tibet, irrespective of the Tibetan interpretations of the motivations 
and effects of these policies. The Tibetans are likely to resist these through a range of 
strategies and instruments encompassing subtle, within-the-system efforts, peaceful 
demonstrations, violent uprisings and external diplomatic efforts, relying on cultural and 
moral resources. The implication of this stalemate is that the cycle of the insecurity dilemma 
would persist well into the future. 
 Following that, it outlined the key factors that would either abet or countervail the 
intensity or duration of the insecurity dilemma. Some factors involve China’s domestic 
context, such as the prospects for democratization or authoritarian resilience in China, the 
relative influence and growth of nationalist forces on the one hand and liberal, pro-
engagement forces and Chinese Tibetan Buddhist adherents on the other hand, and the 
institutional mechanisms for managing Tibetan affairs and dialogue in Beijing. The state of 
the evolving China-India-America strategic triangle, the cohesion of the Tibetan exile 
community and TGIE, and China’s ability to undermine the exile community and deny 
international political space for the Tibetans will operate at the transnational and international 
levels. These factors would largely determine the course of Sino-Tibetan relations in the 
future, but this research concludes, projecting from current trends, that for the foreseeable 
future, the insecurity dilemma will continue into the foreseeable future. 
 Finally, the chapter discussed a key limitation of this research in need of redress 
through additional research.  
 In conclusion, noting the inadequacies of existing IR theories to explain the security 
policies of states in the global south and the frequent intra-state conflicts there, this research 
demonstrated the analytical capacity of the insecurity dilemma as an alternative framework 
by developing it and applying it on the Chinese-Tibetan conflict. This research argued that, 
conscious of its weakness as a state, which has implications for state, regime and ‘national’ 
security, China has pursued state-building through its policies on religion, language, 
education and economy in Tibet. Beijing also denies the existence of a ‘Tibet Issue’ and 
rejects the various Tibetan proposals for autonomy because of the perceived threats to their 
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state-building project in Tibet, especially in the uncertain future. Conversely, Tibetan identity 
insecurity, generated by these state policies, Chinese migration and cultural influences inside 
Tibet, historical experiences and future uncertainties, explains both the Dalai Lama’s 
unpopular decision to give up his erstwhile aspiration for Tibetan independence as well as his 
steadfast demands for autonomy and unification of all Tibetans under one administration, 
albeit within the framework of the Chinese constitution. Identity insecurity also drives the 
multi-faceted Tibetan resistance inside Tibet. Although the intentions of both Beijing and the 
Tibetans are to increase their respective securities as mentioned above, the outcome has been 
greater insecurity for both, plunging them into dilemmatic cycles of state-building and 
hardening of policies on the Chinese side and strengthening of identity and resistance on the 
Tibetan side. This study gave play to a multiplicity of actors, objectives and strategies on 
both sides and examined the feed-back effect that exists between the Sino-Tibetan conflict 
and the regional and global political, strategic and ideological competitions. The most 
significant conclusion is that despite the existence of some unpredictable reinforcing or 
mitigating variables, the current trends point towards the continued relevance of the 
insecurity dilemma as the defining feature of Sino-Tibetan relations for the foreseeable 
future. It would test the wisdom of the Tibetan and Chinese leaders to the maximum with 
potentially bloody repercussions in the years to come. 
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Appendix 1 
 
THE AGREEMENT OF THE CENTRAL PEOPLE'S GOVERNMENT AND THE LOCAL 
GOVERNMENT OF TIBET ON MEASURES FOR THE PEACEFUL LIBERATION OF TIBET 
 
23 MAY, 1951 
 
The Tibetan nationality is one of the nationalities with a long history within the boundaries of China and, 
like many other nationalities, it has done its glorious duty in the course of the creation and development 
of the great motherland. But over the last hundred years and more, imperialist forces penetrated into 
China, and in consequence, also penetrated into the Tibetan region and carried out all kinds of deceptions 
and provocations. Like previous reactionary Governments, the Kuomintang reactionary government 
continued to carry out a policy of oppression and sowing dissension among the nationalities, causing 
division and disunity among the Tibetan people. The Local Government of Tibet did not oppose 
imperialist deception and provocations, but adopted an unpatriotic attitude towards the great motherland. 
Under such conditions, the Tibetan nationality and people were plunged into the depths of enslavement 
and suffering.  
In 1949, basic victory was achieved on a nation-wide scale in the Chinese people's war of 
liberation; the common domestic enemy of all nationalities—the Kuomintang reactionary government—
was overthrown; and the common foreign enemy of all nationalities—the aggressive imperialist forces—
was driven out. On this basis, the founding of the People's Republic of China and of the Central People's 
Government was announced. In accordance with the Common Programme passed by the Chinese 
People's Political Consultative Conference, the Central People's Government declared that all nationalities 
within the boundaries of the People's Republic of China are equal, and that they shall establish unity and 
mutual aid and oppose imperialism and their own public enemies, so that the People's Republic of China 
may become one big family of fraternity and cooperation, composed of all its nationalities. Within this big 
family of nationalities of the People's Republic of China, national regional autonomy is to be exercised in 
areas where national minorities are concentrated, and all national minorities are to have freedom to 
develop their spoken and written languages and to preserve or reform their customs, habits, and religious 
beliefs, and the Central People's Government will assist all national minorities to develop their political, 
economic, cultural, and educational construction work. Since then, all nationalities within the country, 
with the exception of those in the areas of Tibet and Taiwan, have gained liberation. Under the unified 
leadership of the Central People's Government and the direct leadership of the higher levels of People's 
Governments, all national minorities have fully enjoyed the right of national equality and have exercised, 
or are exercising, national regional autonomy.  
In order that the influences of aggressive imperialist forces in Tibet may be successfully 
eliminated, the unification of the territory and sovereignty of the People's Republic of China 
accomplished, and national defence safeguarded; in order that the Tibetan nationality and people may be 
freed and return to the big family of the People's Republic of China to enjoy the same rights of national 
equality as all other nationalities in the country and develop their political, economic, cultural, and 
educational work, the Central People's Government, when it ordered the People's Liberation Army to 
march into Tibet, notified the local government of Tibet to send delegates to the Central Authorities to 
hold talks for the conclusion of an agreement on measures for the peaceful liberation of Tibet. At the 
latter part of April, 1951, the delegates with full powers from the Local Government of Tibet arrived in 
Peking. The Central People's Government appointed representatives with full powers to conduct talks on 
a friendly basis with the delegates of the Local Government of Tibet. The result of the talks is that both 
parties have agreed to establish this agreement and ensure that it be carried into effect. 
  
1. The Tibetan people shall be united and drive out the imperialist aggressive forces from Tibet; 
that the Tibetan people shall return to the big family of the motherland--the People's Republic 
of China. 
 
2.  The Local Government of Tibet shall actively assist the People's Liberation Army to enter 
Tibet and consolidate the national defences. 
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3.  In accordance with the policy towards nationalities laid down in the Common Programme of 
the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference, the Tibetan people have the right of 
exercising national regional autonomy under the unified leadership of the Central People's 
Government. 
 
4.  The Central Authorities will not alter the existing political system in Tibet. The Central 
Authorities also will not alter the established status, functions and powers of the Dalai Lama. 
Officials of various ranks shall hold office as usual. 
 
5.  The established status, functions, and powers of the Panchen Ngoerhtehni shall be 
maintained. 
 
6.  By the established status, functions and powers of the Dalai Lama and of the Panchen 
Ngoerhtehni is meant the status, functions and powers of the 13th Dalai Lama and of the 9th 
Panchen Ngoerhtehni when they were in friendly and amicable relations with each other. 
 
7.  The policy of freedom of religious belief laid down in the Common Programme of the 
Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference will be protected. The Central Authorities 
will not effect any change in the income of the monasteries. 
 
8.  The Tibetan troops will be reorganised step by step into the People's Liberation Army, and 
become a part of the national defence forces of the Central People's Government. 
 
9.  The spoken and written language and school education of the Tibetan nationality will be 
developed step by step in accordance with the actual conditions in Tibet. 
 
10. Tibetan agriculture, livestock raising, industry and commerce will be developed step by step, 
and the people's livelihood shall be improved step by step in accordance with the actual 
conditions in Tibet. 
 
11. In matters related to various reforms in Tibet, there will be no compulsion on the part of the 
Central Authorities. The Local Government of Tibet should carry out reforms of its own 
accord, and when the people raise demands for reform, they must be settled through 
consultation with the leading personnel of Tibet. 
 
12. In so far as former pro-imperialist and pro-KMT officials resolutely sever relations with 
imperialism and the KMT and do not engage in sabotage or resistance, they may continue to 
hold office irrespective of their past.  
 
13. The People's Liberation Army entering Tibet will abide by the above-mentioned policies and 
will also be fair in all buying and selling and will not arbitrarily take even a needle or a thread 
from the people.  
 
14.  The Central People's Government will handle all external affairs of the area of Tibet; and 
there will be peaceful co-existence with neighboring countries and the establishment and 
development of fair commercial and trading relations with them on the basis of equality, 
mutual benefit and mutual respect for territory and sovereignty.  
 
15. In order to ensure the implementation of this agreement, the Central People's Government 
will set up a military and administrative committee and a military area headquarters in Tibet, 
and apart from the personnel sent there by the Central People's Government it will absorb as 
many local Tibetan personnel as possible to take part in the work. Local Tibetan personnel 
taking part in the military and administrative committee may include patriotic elements from 
the Local Government of Tibet, various district and various principal monasteries; the name 
list is to be prepared after consultation between the representatives designated by the Central 
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People's Government and various quarters concerned, and is to be submitted to the Central 
People's Government for approval. 
 
16.  Funds needed by the military and administrative committee, the military area headquarters and 
the People's Liberation Army entering Tibet will be provided by the Central People's 
Government. The Local Government of Tibet should assist the People's Liberation Army in 
the purchases and transportation of food, fodder, and other daily necessities. 
 
17.  This agreement shall come into force immediately after signatures and seals are affixed to it. 
  
Signed and sealed by delegates of the Central People's Government with full powers:  
Chief Delegate: Li Weihan (Chairman of the Commission of Nationalities Affairs);  
Delegates: Zhang Jingwu, Zhang Guohua, Sun Zhiyuan.  
 
Delegates with full powers of the Local Government of Tibet:  
Chief Delegate: Kalon Ngabo Ngawang Jigme  
Delegates: Khemey Sonam Wangdu, Lhawutara Thupten Tenthar, Thupten Lekmon Rimshi, Sampo 
Tenzin Thondup. 
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Appendix 2 
 
ON THE POLICIES FOR OUR WORK IN TIBET—DIRECTIVE OF THE CENTRAL 
COMMITTEE OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY OF CHINA 
6 April, 1952  
The Central Committee essentially approves the instructions which the Southwest Bureau and the 
Southwest Military Area cabled on April 2 to the Working Committee and Military Area in Tibet. It holds 
that the basic policies (except the point about reorganizing the Tibetan troops) and the various specific 
steps set forth in the telegram are correct. Only by following them can our army establish itself in an 
invulnerable position in Tibet.  
Conditions in Tibet are different from those in Sinkiang. Tibet compares poorly with Sinkiang, whether 
politically or economically. But even in Sinkiang, the first thing the army units under Wang Chen did 
when they got there was to pay the utmost attention to strict budgeting, self-reliance and production for 
their own needs. They have now gained a firm foothold and won the warm support of the minority 
nationalities. They are carrying out the reduction of rent and interest and will proceed to agrarian reform 
this winter, and by then we can be sure of even greater support from the masses. Sinkiang is well 
connected with the heartland of the country by motor roads, and this is of great help in improving the 
material welfare of the minority nationalities. As for Tibet, neither rent reduction nor agrarian reform can 
start for at least two or three years. While several hundred thousand Han people live in Sinkiang, there are 
hardly any in Tibet, where our army finds itself in a totally different minority nationality area. We depend 
solely on two basic policies to win over the masses and put ourselves in an invulnerable position. The first 
is strict budgeting coupled with production for the army's own needs, and thus the exertion of influence 
on the masses; this is the key link. Even when highways are built, we cannot count on moving large 
quantities of grain over them. India will probably agree to send grain and other goods to Tibet on the 
basis of exchange, but the stand we must take is that our army should be able to carry on even if India 
stops sending them some day. We must do our best and take proper steps to win over the Dalai and the 
majority of his top echelon and to isolate the handful of bad elements in order to achieve a gradual, 
bloodless transformation of the Tibetan economic and political system over a number of years; on the 
other hand, we must be prepared for the eventuality of the bad elements leading the Tibetan troops in 
rebellion and attacking us, so that in this contingency our army could still carry on and hold out in Tibet. 
It all depends on strict budgeting and production for the army's own needs. Only with this fundamental 
policy as the cornerstone of our work can we achieve our aim. The second policy, which can and must be 
put into effect, is to establish trade relations with India and with the heartland of our country and to 
attain a general balance in supplies to and from Tibet so that the standard of living of the Tibetan people 
will in no way fall because of our army's presence but will improve through our efforts. If we cannot 
solve the two problems of production and trade, we shall lose the material base for our presence, the bad 
elements will cash in and will not let a single day pass without inciting the backward elements among the 
people and the Tibetan troops to oppose us, and our policy of uniting with the many and isolating the 
few will become ineffectual and fail. 
Of all the views set forth in the Southwest Bureau's telegram of April 2 there is only one that calls for 
further consideration; what I refer to is the feasibility and advisability of reorganizing the Tibetan troops 
and setting up a military and administrative commission fairly soon. It is our opinion that the Tibetan 
troops should not be reorganized at present, nor should formal military sub-areas or a military and 
administrative commission be established. For the time being, leave everything as it is, let this situation 
drag on, and do not take up these questions until our army is able to meet its own needs through 
production and wins the support of the masses a year or two from now. In the meantime there are two 
possibilities. One is that our united front policy towards the upper stratum, a policy of uniting with the 
many and isolating the few, will take effect and that the Tibetan people will gradually draw closer to us, so 
the bad elements and the Tibetan troops will not dare to rebel. The other possibility is that the bad 
elements, thinking we are weak and can be bullied, may lead the Tibetan troops in rebellion and that our 
army will counter-attack in self-defence and deal them telling blows. Either will be favourable for us. As 
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the top echelon in Tibet sees it, there is no sufficient reason now for implementing the [17-Point] 
Agreement in its entirety or for reorganizing the Tibetan troops. But things will be different in a few 
years. By then they will probably and that they have no choice but to carry out the Agreement to the full 
and to reorganize the Tibetan troops. If the Tibetan troops start one or even several rebellions and are 
repulsed by our army each time, we will be all the more justified in reorganizing them. Apparently not 
only the two Silons [Prime Ministers] but also the Dalai and most of his clique were reluctant to accept 
the Agreement and are unwilling to carry it out. As yet we don't have a material base for fully 
implementing the Agreement, nor do we have a base for this purpose in terms of support among the 
masses or in the upper stratum. To force its implementation will do more harm than good. Since they are 
unwilling to put the Agreement into effect, well then, we can leave it for the time being and wait. The 
longer the delay, the stronger will be our position and the weaker theirs. Delay will not do us much harm; 
on the contrary, it may be to our advantage. Let them go on with their insensate atrocities against the 
people, while we on our part concentrate on good deeds—production, trade, road-building, medical 
services and united front work (unity with the majority and patient education) so as to win over the 
masses and bide our time before taking up the question of the full implementation of the Agreement. If 
they are not in favour of the setting up of primary schools, that can stop too.  
The recent demonstration in Lhasa should be viewed not merely as the work of the two Silons and other 
bad elements but as a signal to us from the majority of the Dalai clique. Their petition is very tactful 
because it indicates not a wish for a break with us but only a wish for concessions from us. One of the 
terms gives the hint that the practice of the Ching Dynasty should be restored, in other words, that no 
Liberation Army units should be stationed in Tibet, but this is not what they are really after. They know 
full well that this is impossible; their attempt is to trade this term for other terms. The Fourteenth Dalai is 
criticized in the petition so as to absolve him from any political responsibility for the demonstration. They 
pose as protectors of the interests of the Tibetan nationality, being aware that while they are inferior to us 
in military strength, they have an advantage over us in social influence. We should accept this petition in 
substance (not in form) and put off the full implementation of the Agreement. The timing of the 
demonstration to take place before the Panchen's arrival in Lhasa was deliberate. After his arrival they will 
probably go all out to work on him to join their clique. If on our part we do our work well and the 
Panchen does not fall into their trap but reaches Shigatse safe and sound, the situation will then become 
more favourable to us. Nevertheless, since neither our lack of a material base nor their advantage over us 
in social influence will change for the time being, neither will the unwillingness of the Dalai clique to carry 
out the Agreement fully. At present, in appearance we should take the offensive and should censure the 
demonstration and the petition for being unjustifiable (for undermining the Agreement), but in reality we 
should be prepared to make concessions and to go over to the offensive in the future (i.e., put the 
Agreement into force) when conditions are ripe. What are your views? Please consider and wire your 
reply. 
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Appendix 3 
 
HU YAOBANG’S 5 POINTS REGARDING THE DALAI LAMA’S RETURN 
 
28 July, 1981 
 
1. The Dalai Lama should recognise that China has now entered a new period of stability and 
economic change. If he doubts the reforms, he should observe the changes for the next few 
years. 
 
2. The Dalai Lama should not raise the history of repression that followed the suppression of 
the 1959 rebellion. 
 
3. The Chinese government sincerely welcomes the Dalai Lama and his followers to return to 
the motherland. China hopes that the Dalai Lama would contribute to upholding China’s 
unity and promote solidarity between Han and Tibetan nationalities. 
 
4. The Dalai Lama would have the same status as he had enjoyed before 1959. He may be 
appointed Vice-Chairman of the NPC. But it would be necessary that he should not live in 
Tibet or hold any position in Tibet as there are younger Tibetans who have taken office and 
are doing their jobs well. He may visit Tibet as often as he likes. 
 
5. When the Dalai Lama returns he may make press statements, and arrangements would be 
made to receive him by a suitable minister. 
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APPENDIX 4 
 
ADDRESS TO MEMBERS OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT BY HIS HOLINESS THE 
DALAI LAMA 
 
Strasbourg, June 15, 1988 
  
We are living today in a very interdependent world. One nation's problems can no longer be solved by 
itself. Without a sense of universal responsibility our very survival is in danger. I have, therefore, always 
believed in the need for better understanding, closer cooperation and greater respect among the various 
nations of the world. The European Parliament is an inspiring example. Out of the chaos of war, those 
who were once enemies have, in a single generation, learned to co-exist and to co-operate. I am, 
therefore, particularly pleased and honored to address this gathering at the European Parliament.  
 
As you know, my country—Tibet—is undergoing a very difficult period. The Tibetans--particularly those 
who live under Chinese occupation--yearn for freedom and justice and a self-determined future, so that 
they are able to fully preserve their unique identity and live in peace with their neighbors.  
 
For over a thousand years we Tibetans have adhered to spiritual and environmental values in order to 
maintain the delicate balance of life across the high plateau on which we live. Inspired by the Buddha's 
message of non-violence and compassion and protected by our mountains, we sought to respect every 
form of life and to abandon war as an instrument of national policy. 
  
Our history, dating back more than two thousand years, has been one of independence. At no time, since 
the founding of our nation in 127 B.C., have we Tibetans conceded our sovereignty to a foreign power. 
As with all nations, Tibet experienced periods in which our neighbors - Mongol, Manchu, Chinese, British 
and the Gorkhas of Nepal - sought to establish influence over us. These eras have been brief and the 
Tibetan people have never accepted them as constituting a loss of our national sovereignty. In fact, there 
have been occasions when Tibetan rulers conquered vast areas of China and other neighboring states. 
This, however, does not mean that we Tibetans can lay claim to these territories. 
  
In 1949 the People's Republic of China forcibly invaded Tibet. Since that time, Tibet has endured the 
darkest period in its history. More than a million of our people have died as a result of the occupation. 
Thousands of monasteries were reduced to ruins. A generation has grown up deprived of education, 
economic opportunity and a sense of its own national character. Though the current China leadership has 
implemented certain reforms, it is also promoting a massive population transfer onto the Tibetan plateau. 
This policy has already reduced the six million Tibetans to a minority. Speaking for all Tibetans, I must 
sadly inform you, our tragedy continues. 
  
I have always urged my people not to resort to violence in their efforts to redress their suffering. Yet I 
believe all people have the moral right to peacefully protest injustice. Unfortunately, the demonstrations 
in Tibet have been violently suppressed by the Chinese police and military. I will continue to counsel for 
non-violence, but unless China forsakes the brutal methods it employs, Tibetans cannot be responsible 
for a further deterioration in the situation. Every Tibetan hopes and prays for the full restoration of our 
nation's independence. Thousands of our people have sacrificed their lives and our whole nation has 
suffered in this struggle. Even in recent months, Tibetans have bravely sacrificed their lives to achieve this 
precious goal. On the other hand, the Chinese totally fail to recognize the Tibetan people's aspirations 
and continue to pursue a policy of brutal suppression. 
  
I have thought for a long time on how to achieve a realistic solution to my nation's plight. My Cabinet 
and I solicited the opinions of many friends and concerned persons. As a result, on September 21, 1987, 
at the Congressional Human Rights Caucus in Washington, D.C., I announced a Five Point Peace Plan 
for Tibet. In it I called for the conversion of Tibet into a zone of peace, a sanctuary in which humanity 
and nature can live together in harmony. I also called for respect for human rights and democratic ideals, 
environmental protection and a halt to the Chinese population transfer into Tibet.  
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The fifth point of the Peace Plan called for earnest negotiations between the Tibetans and the Chinese. 
We have, therefore, taken the initiative to formulate some thoughts which, we hope, may serve as a basis 
for resolving the issue of Tibet. I would like to take this opportunity to inform the distinguished gathering 
here of the main points of our thinking. 
  
The whole of Tibet known as Cholka-Sum (U-Tsang, Kham and Amdo) should become a self-governing democratic political 
entity founded on law by agreement of the people for the common good and the protection of themselves and their environment, 
in association with the People's Republic of China.  
 
The Government of the People's Republic of China could remain responsible for Tibet's foreign policy. The Government of 
Tibet should, however, develop and maintain relations, through its own Foreign Affairs Bureau, in the fields of religion, 
commerce, education, culture, tourism, science, sports and other non-political activities. Tibet should join international 
organizations concerned with such activities. 
  
The Government of Tibet should be founded on a constitution of basic law. The basic law should provide for a democratic 
system of government entrusted with the task of ensuring economic equality, social justice and protection of the environment. 
This means that the Government of Tibet will have the right to decide on all affairs relating to Tibet and the Tibetans. 
  
As individual freedom is the real source and potential of any society's development, the Government of Tibet would seek to 
ensure this freedom by full adherence to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, including the rights to speech, assembly, 
and religion. Because religion constitutes the source of Tibet's national identity, and spiritual values lie at the very heart of 
Tibet's rich culture, it would be the special duty of the Government of Tibet to safeguard and develop its practice. 
  
The Government should be comprised of a popularly elected Chief Executive, a bi-cameral legislative branch, and an 
independent judicial system. Its seat should be in Lhasa.  
The social and economic system of Tibet should be determined in accordance with the wishes of the Tibetan people, bearing in 
mind especially the need to raise the standard of living of the entire population. 
  
The Government of Tibet would pass strict laws to protect wildlife and plant life. The exploitation of natural resources would 
be carefully regulated. The manufacture, testing and stockpiling of nuclear weapons and other armaments must be prohibited, 
as well as the use of nuclear power and other technologies which produce hazardous waste. It would be the Government of 
Tibet's goal to transform Tibet into our planet's largest natural preserve. 
  
A regional peace conference should be called to ensure that Tibet becomes a genuine sanctuary of peace through 
demilitarization. Until such a peace conference can be convened and demilitarization and neutralization achieved, China 
could have the right to maintain a restricted number of military installations in Tibet. These must be solely for defence 
purposes. 
  
In order to create an atmosphere of trust conducive to fruitful negotiations, the Chinese Government should cease its human 
rights violations in Tibet and abandon its policy of transferring Chinese to Tibet.1 
  
These are the thoughts we have in mind. I am aware that many Tibetans will be disappointed by the 
moderate stand they represent. Undoubtedly, there will be much discussion in the coming months within 
our own community, both in Tibet and in exile. This, however, is an essential and invaluable part of any 
process of change. I believe these thoughts represent the most realistic means by which to re-establish 
Tibet's separate identity and restore the fundamental rights of the Tibetan people while accommodating 
China's own interests. I would like to emphasize, however, that whatever the outcome of the negotiations 
with the Chinese may be, the Tibetan people themselves must be the ultimate deciding authority. 
Therefore, any proposal will contain a comprehensive procedural plan to ascertain the wishes of the 
Tibetan people in a nationwide referendum. 
  
I would like to take this opportunity to state that I do not wish to take any active part in the Government 
of Tibet. Nevertheless, I will continue to work as much as I can for the well-being and happiness of the 
Tibetan people as long as it is necessary.  
                                                 
1
 Italics added. 
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We are ready to present a proposal to the Government of the People's Republic of China based on the 
thoughts I have presented. A negotiating team representing the Tibetan Government has been selected. 
We are prepared to meet with the Chinese to discuss details of such a proposal aimed at achieving an 
equitable solution. 
  
We are encouraged by the keen interest being shown in our situation by a growing number of 
governments and political leaders, including former President Jimmy Carter of the United States. We are 
also encouraged by the recent changes in China which have brought about a new group of leadership, 
more pragmatic and liberal.  
 
We urge the Chinese Government and leadership to give serious and substantive consideration to the 
ideas I have described. Only dialogue and a willingness to look with honesty and clarity at the reality of 
Tibet can lead to a viable solution. We wish to conduct discussions with the Chinese Government bearing 
in mind the larger interests of humanity. Our proposal will therefore be made in a spirit of conciliation 
and we hope that the Chinese will respond accordingly.  
 
My country's unique history and profound spiritual heritage renders it ideally suited for fulfilling the role 
of a sanctuary of peace at the heart of Asia. Its historic status as a neutral buffer state, contributing to the 
stability of the entire continent, can be restored. Peace and security for Asia as well as for the world at 
large can be enhanced. In the future, Tibet need no longer be an occupied land, oppressed by force, 
unproductive and scarred by suffering. It can become a free haven where humanity and nature live in 
harmonious balance; a creative model for the resolution of tensions afflicting many areas throughout the 
world. 
  
The Chinese leadership needs to realize that colonial rule over occupied territories is today anachronistic. 
A genuine union or association can only come about voluntarily, when there is satisfactory benefit to all 
the parties concerned. The European Community is a clear example of this. On the other hand, even one 
country or community can break into two or more entities when there is a lack of trust or benefit, and 
when force is used as the principal means of rule.  
 
I would like to end by making a special appeal to the honorable members of the European Parliament 
and through them to their respective constituencies to extend their support to our efforts. A resolution of 
the Tibetan problem within the framework that we propose will not only be for the mutual benefit of the 
Tibetan and Chinese people but will also contribute to regional and global peace and stability. I thank you 
for providing me the opportunity to share my thoughts with you. 
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APPENDIX 5 
 
MEMORANDUM ON GENUINE AUTONOMY FOR THE TIBETAN PEOPLE 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Since the renewal of direct contact with the Central Government of the People's Republic of China 
(PRC) in 2002, extensive discussions have been held between the envoys of His Holiness the 14th Dalai 
Lama and representatives of the Central Government. In these discussions we have put forth clearly the 
aspirations of Tibetans. The essence of the Middle Way Approach is to secure genuine autonomy for the 
Tibetan people within the scope of the Constitution of the PRC. This is of mutual benefit and based on 
the long-term interest of both the Tibetan and Chinese peoples. We remain firmly committed not to seek 
separation or independence. We are seeking a solution to the Tibetan problem through genuine 
autonomy, which is compatible with the principles on autonomy in the Constitution of the People’s 
Republic of China (PRC). The protection and development of the unique Tibetan identity in all its aspects 
serves the larger interest of humanity in general and those of the Tibetan and Chinese people in 
particular. 
 
During the seventh round of talks in Beijing on 1 and 2 July 2008, the Vice Chairman of the Chinese 
People’s Political Consultative Conference and the Minister of the Central United Front Work 
Department, Mr. Du Qinglin, explicitly invited suggestions from His Holiness the Dalai Lama for the 
stability and development of Tibet. The Executive Vice Minister of the Central United Front Work 
Department, Mr. Zhu Weiqun, further said they would like to hear our views on the degree or form of 
autonomy we are seeking as well as on all aspects of regional autonomy within the scope of the 
Constitution of the PRC.   
 
Accordingly, this memorandum puts forth our position on genuine autonomy and how the specific needs 
of the Tibetan nationality for autonomy and self-government can be met through application of the 
principles on autonomy of the Constitution of the People’s Republic of China, as we understand them. 
On this basis, His Holiness the Dalai Lama is confident that the basic needs of the Tibetan nationality can 
be met through genuine autonomy within the PRC.  
 
The PRC is a multi-national state, and as in many other parts of the world, it seeks to resolve the 
nationality question through autonomy and the self-government of the minority nationalities.  The 
Constitution of the PRC contains fundamental principles on autonomy and self-government whose 
objectives are compatible with the needs and aspirations of the Tibetans.  Regional national autonomy is 
aimed at opposing both the oppression and the separation of nationalities by rejecting both Han 
Chauvinism and local nationalism. It is intended to ensure the protection of the culture and the identity of 
minority nationalities by powering them to become masters of their own affairs.  
 
To a very considerable extent Tibetan needs can be met within the constitutional principles on autonomy, 
as we understand them. On several points, the Constitution gives significant discretionary powers to state 
organs in the decision-making and on the operation of the system of autonomy. These discretionary 
powers can be exercised to facilitate genuine autonomy for Tibetans in ways that would respond to the 
uniqueness of the Tibetan situation. In implementing these principles, legislation relevant to autonomy 
may consequently need to be reviewed or amended to respond to the specific characteristics and needs of 
the Tibetan nationality. Given good will on both sides, outstanding problems can be resolved within the 
constitutional principles on autonomy. In this way national unity and stability and harmonious relations 
between the Tibetan and other nationalities will be established. 
 
II. RESPECT FOR THE INTEGRITY OF THE TIBETAN NATIONALITY 
Tibetans belong to one minority nationality regardless of the current administrative division.  The 
integrity of the Tibetan nationality must be respected. That is the spirit, the intent and the principle 
underlying the constitutional concept of national regional autonomy as well as the principle of equality of 
nationalities.  
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There is no dispute about the fact that Tibetans share the same language, culture, spiritual tradition, core 
values and customs, that they belong to the same ethnic group and that they have a strong sense of 
common identity. Tibetans share a common history and despite periods of political or administrative 
divisions, Tibetans continuously remained united by their religion, culture, education, language, way of life 
and by their unique high plateau environment.  
 
The Tibetan nationality lives in one contiguous area on the Tibetan plateau, which they have inhabited for 
millennia and to which they are therefore indigenous. For purposes of the constitutional principles of 
national regional autonomy Tibetans in the PRC in fact live as a single nationality all over the Tibetan 
plateau.  
 
On account of the above reasons, the PRC has recognised the Tibetan nationality as one of the 55 
minority nationalities. 
 
 
III. TIBETAN ASPIRATIONS 
Tibetans have a rich and distinct history, culture and spiritual tradition all of which form valuable parts of 
the heritage of humanity. Not only do Tibetans wish to preserve their own heritage, which they cherish, 
but equally they wish to further develop their culture and spiritual life and knowledge in ways that are 
particularly suited to the needs and conditions of humanity in the 21st century.  
 
As a part of the multi-national state of the PRC, Tibetans can benefit greatly from the rapid economic 
and scientific development the country is experiencing. While wanting to actively participate and 
contribute to this development, we want to ensure that this happens without the people losing their 
Tibetan identity, culture and core values and without putting the distinct and fragile environment of the 
Tibetan plateau, to which Tibetans are indigenous, at risk. 
 
The uniqueness of the Tibetan situation has consistently been recognised within the PRC and has been 
reflected in the terms of the ‘17 Point Agreement’ and in statements and policies of successive leaders of 
the PRC since then, and should remain the basis for defining the scope and structure of the specific 
autonomy to be exercised by the Tibetan nationality within the PRC. The Constitution reflects a 
fundamental principle of flexibility to accommodate special situations, including the special characteristics 
and needs of minority nationalities.   
 
His Holiness the Dalai Lama’s commitment to seek a solution for the Tibetan people within the PRC is 
clear and unambiguous.  This position is in full compliance and agreement with paramount leader Deng 
Xiaoping's statement in which he emphasised that except for independence all other issues could be 
resolved through dialogue. Whereas, we are committed, therefore, to fully respect the territorial integrity 
of the PRC, we expect the Central Government to recognise and fully respect the integrity of the Tibetan 
nationality and its right to exercise genuine autonomy within the PRC. We believe that this is the basis for 
resolving the differences between us and promoting unity, stability and harmony among nationalities.  
 
For Tibetans to advance as a distinct nationality within the PRC, they need to continue to progress and 
develop economically, socially and politically in ways that correspond to the development of the PRC and 
the world as a whole while respecting and nurturing the Tibetan characteristics of such development. For 
this to happen, it is imperative that the right of Tibetans to govern themselves be recognised and 
implemented throughout the region where they live in compact communities in the PRC, in accordance 
with the Tibetan nationality’s own needs, priorities and characteristics.  
 
The Tibetan people's culture and identity can only be preserved and promoted by the Tibetans 
themselves and not by any others.  Therefore, Tibetans should be capable of self-help, self-development 
and self-government, and an optimal balance needs to be found between this and the necessary and 
welcome guidance and assistance for Tibet from the Central Government and other provinces and 
regions of the PRC. 
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IV. BASIC NEEDS OF TIBETANS 
Subject Matters of Self-government 
1.  Language 
Language is the most important attribute of the Tibetan people’s identity. Tibetan is the primary means of 
communication, the language in which their literature, their spiritual texts and historical as well as 
scientific works are written. The Tibetan language is not only at the same high level as that of Sanskrit in 
terms of grammar, but is also the only one that has the capability of translating from Sanskrit without an 
iota of error. Therefore, Tibetan language has not only the richest and best-translated literatures, many 
scholars even contend that it has also the richest and largest number of literary compositions. The 
Constitution of the PRC, in Article 4, guarantees the freedom of all nationalities “to use and develop their 
own spoken and written languages ...”. 
 
In order for Tibetans to use and develop their own language, Tibetan must be respected as the main 
spoken and written language. Similarly, the principal language of the Tibetan autonomous areas needs to 
be Tibetan.  
 
This principle is broadly recognised in the Constitution in Article 121, which states, “the organs of self-
government of the national autonomous areas employ the spoken and written language or language in 
common use in the locality.”  Article 10 of the Law on Regional National Autonomy (LRNA) provides 
that these organs “shall guarantee the freedom of the nationalities in these areas to use and develop their 
own spoken and written languages....”  
 
Consistent with the principle of recognition of Tibetan as the main language in Tibetan areas, the LRNA 
(Article 36) also allows the autonomous government authorities to decide on “the language used in 
instruction and enrolment procedures” with regard to education.  This implies recognition of the 
principle that the principal medium of education be Tibetan. 
 
2.  Culture 
The concept of national regional autonomy is primarily for the purpose of preservation of the culture of 
minority nationalities. Consequently, the constitution of PRC contains references to cultural preservation 
in Articles 22, 47 and 119 as also in Article 38 of the LRNA. To Tibetans, Tibetan culture is closely 
connected to our religion, tradition, language and identity, which are facing threats at various levels. Since 
Tibetans live within the multinational state of the PRC, this distinct Tibetan cultural heritage needs 
protection through appropriate constitutional provisions. 
 
3.  Religion 
Religion is fundamental to Tibetans and Buddhism is closely linked to their identity. We recognise the 
importance of separation of church and state, but this should not affect the freedom and practice of 
believers. It is impossible for Tibetans to imagine personal or community freedom without the freedom 
of belief, conscience and religion. The Constitution recognises the importance of religion and protects the 
right to profess it.  Article 36 guarantees all citizens the right to the freedom of religious belief. No one 
can compel another to believe in or not to believe in any religion. Discrimination on the basis of religion 
is forbidden.  
 
An interpretation of the constitutional principle in light of international standard would also cover the 
freedom of the manner of belief or worship. The freedom covers the right of monasteries to be organised 
and run according to Buddhist monastic tradition, to engage in teachings and studies, and to enroll any 
number of monks and nuns or age group in accordance with these rules. The normal practice to hold 
public teachings and the empowerment of large gatherings is covered by this freedom and the state 
should not interfere in religious practices and traditions, such as the relationship between a teacher and 
his disciple, management of monastic institutions, and the recognition of reincarnations. 
 
4.  Education 
The desire of Tibetans to develop and administer their own education system in cooperation and in 
coordination with the central government’s ministry of education is supported by the principles contained 
in the Constitution with regard to education. So is the aspiration to engage in and contribute to the 
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development of science and technology. We note the increasing recognition in international scientific 
development of the contribution which Buddhist psychology, metaphysics, cosmology and the 
understanding of the mind is making to modern science.  
 
Whereas, under Article 19 of the Constitution the state takes on the overall responsibility to provide 
education for its citizens, Article 119 recognises the principle that “[T]he organs of self-government of 
the national autonomous areas independently administer educational .... affairs in their respective areas...”  
This principle is also reflected in Article 36 of the LRNA.    
 
Since the degree of autonomy in decision-making is unclear, the point to be emphasised is that the 
Tibetan need to exercise genuine autonomy with regard to its own nationality’s education and this is 
supported by the principles of the constitution on autonomy.   
 
As for the aspiration to engage in and contribute to the development of scientific knowledge and 
technology, the Constitution (Article 119) and the LRNA (Article 39) clearly recognise the right of 
autonomous areas to develop scientific knowledge and technology.  
  
5.  Environment Protection 
Tibet is the prime source of Asia's great rivers. It also has the earth's loftiest mountains as well as the 
world's most extensive and highest plateau, rich in mineral resources, ancient forests, and many deep 
valleys untouched by human disturbances. 
  
This environmental protection practice was enhanced by the Tibetan people's traditional respect for all 
forms of life, which prohibits the harming of all sentient beings, whether human or animal. Tibet used to 
be an unspoiled wilderness sanctuary in a unique natural environment.  
 
Today, Tibet's traditional environment is suffering irreparable damage. The effects of this are especially 
notable on the grasslands, the croplands, the forests, the water resources and the wildlife. 
 
In view of this, according to Articles 45 and 66 of the LNRA, the Tibetan people should be given the 
right over the environment and allow them to follow their traditional conservation practices. 
 
6.  Utilisation of Natural Resources 
With respect to the protection and management of the natural environment and the utilisation of natural 
resources the Constitution and the LRNA only acknowledge a limited role for the organs of self-
government of the autonomous areas (see LRNA Articles 27, 28, 45, 66, and Article 118 of the 
Constitution, which pledges that the state “shall give due consideration to the interests of [the national 
autonomous areas]]”.  The LRNA recognises the importance for the autonomous areas to protect and 
develop forests and grasslands (Article 27) and to “give priority to the rational exploitation and utilization 
of the natural resources that the local authorities are entitled to develop”, but only within the limits of 
state plans and legal stipulations. In fact, the central role of the State in these matters is reflected in the 
Constitution (Article 9). 
 
The principles of autonomy enunciated in the Constitution cannot, in our view, truly lead to Tibetans 
becoming masters of their own destiny if they are not sufficiently involved in decision-making on 
utilisation of natural resources such as mineral resources, waters, forests, mountains, grasslands, etc. 
 
The ownership of land is the foundation on which the development of natural resources, taxes and 
revenues of an economy are based.  Therefore, it is essential that only the nationality of the autonomous 
region shall have the legal authority to transfer or lease land, except land owned by the state. In the same 
manner, the autonomous region must have the independent authority to formulate and implement 
developmental plans concurrent to the state plans.  
 
7.  Economic Development and Trade 
Economic Development in Tibet is welcome and much needed. The Tibetan people remain one of the 
most economically backward regions within the PRC.  
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The Constitution recognises the principle that the autonomous authorities have an important role to play 
in the economic development of their areas in view of local characteristics and needs (Article 118 of the 
Constitution, also reflected in LRNA Article 25). The Constitution also recognises the principle of 
autonomy in the administration and management of finances (Article 117, and LRNA Article 32). At the 
same time, the Constitution also recognises the importance of providing State funding and assistance to 
the autonomous areas to accelerate development (Article 122, LRNA Article 22). 
 
Similarly, Article 31 of the LRNA recognises the competence of autonomous areas, especially those such 
as Tibet, adjoining foreign countries, to conduct border trade as well as trade with foreign countries. The 
recognition of these principles is important to the Tibetan nationality given the region’s proximity to 
foreign countries with which the people have cultural, religious, ethnic and economic affinities.   
 
The assistance rendered by the Central Government and the provinces has temporary benefits, but in the 
long run if the Tibetan people are not self-reliant and become dependent on others it has greater harm. 
Therefore, an important objective of autonomy is to make the Tibetan people economically self-reliant. 
 
8.  Public health 
The Constitution enunciates the responsibility of the State to provide health and medical services (Article 
21). Article 119 recognises that this is an area of responsibility of the autonomous areas. The LRNA 
(Article 40) also recognises the right of organs of self-government of the autonomous areas to “make 
independent decisions on plans for developing local medical and health services and for advancing both 
modern and the traditional medicine of the nationalities.”  
 
The existing health system fails to adequately cover the needs of the rural Tibetan population.  According 
to the principles of the above-mentioned laws, the regional autonomous organs need to have the 
competencies and resources to cover the health need of the entire Tibetan population. They also need the 
competencies to promote the traditional Tibetan medical and astro system strictly according to traditional 
practice. 
 
9.  Public Security 
In matters of public security it is important that the majority of security personnel consists of members of 
the local nationality who understand and respect local customs and traditions. 
 
What is lacking in Tibetan areas is absence of decision-making authority in the hands of local Tibetan 
officials. 
 
An important aspect of autonomy and self-government is the responsibility for the internal public order 
and security of the autonomous areas. The Constitution (Article 120) and LRNA (Article 24) recognise 
the importance of local involvement and authorise autonomous areas to organise their security within 
"the military system of the State and practical needs and with the approval of the State Council." 
 
10. Regulation on population migration 
The fundamental objective of national regional autonomy and self-government is the preservation of the 
identity, culture, language and so forth of the minority nationality and to ensure that it is the master of its 
own affairs. When applied to a particular territory in which the minority nationality lives in a concentrated 
community or communities, the very principle and purpose of national regional autonomy is disregarded 
if large scale migration and settlement of the majority Han nationality and other nationalities is 
encouraged and allowed.  Major demographic changes that result from such migration will have the effect 
of assimilating rather than integrating the Tibetan nationality into the Han nationality and gradually 
extinguishing the distinct culture and identity of the Tibetan nationality. Also, the influx of large numbers 
of Han and other nationalities into Tibetan areas will fundamentally change the conditions necessary for 
the exercise of regional autonomy since the constitutional criteria for the exercise of autonomy, namely 
that the minority nationality “live in compact communities” in a particular territory is changed and 
undermined by the population movements and transfers. If such migrations and settlements continue 
uncontrolled, Tibetans will no longer live in a compact community or communities and will consequently 
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no longer be entitled, under the Constitution, to national regional autonomy. This would effectively 
violate the very principles of the Constitution in its approach to the nationalities issue. 
 
There is precedent in the PRC for restriction on the movement or residence of citizens. There is only a 
very limited recognition of the right of autonomous areas to work out measures to control “the transient 
population” in those areas. To us it would be vital that the autonomous organs of self-government have 
the authority to regulate the residence, settlement and employment or economic activities of persons who 
wish to move to Tibetan areas from other parts of the PRC in order to ensure respect for and the 
realisation of the objectives of the principle of autonomy. 
 
It is not our intention to expel the non-Tibetans who have permanently settled in Tibet and have lived 
there and grown up there for a considerable time. Our concern is the induced massive movement of 
primarily Han but also some other nationalities into many areas of Tibet, upsetting existing communities, 
marginalising the Tibetan population there and threatening the fragile natural environment.  
 
11.  Cultural, educational and religious exchanges with other countries 
Besides the importance of exchanges and cooperation between the Tibetan nationality and other 
nationalities, provinces, and regions of the PRC in the subject matters of autonomy, such as culture, art, 
education, science, public health, sports, religion, environment, economy and so forth, the power of 
autonomous areas to conduct such exchanges with foreign countries in these areas is also recognised in 
the LRNA (Article 42).  
  
   
V. APPLICATION OF A SINGLE ADMINISTRATION FOR THE TIBETAN NATIONALITY IN 
THE PRC 
In order for the Tibetan nationality to develop and flourish with its distinct identity, culture and spiritual 
tradition through the exercise of self-government on the above mentioned basic Tibetan needs, the entire 
community, comprising all the areas currently designated by the PRC as Tibetan autonomous areas, 
should be under one single administrative entity.   The current administrative divisions, by which Tibetan 
communities are ruled and administered under different provinces and regions of the PRC, foments 
fragmentation, promotes unequal development, and weakens the ability of the Tibetan nationality to 
protect and promote its common cultural, spiritual and ethnic identity. Rather than respecting the 
integrity of the nationality, this policy promotes its fragmentation and disregards the spirit of autonomy. 
Whereas the other major minority nationalities such as the Uighurs and Mongols govern themselves 
almost entirely within their respective single autonomous regions, Tibetans remain as if they were several 
minority nationalities instead of one. 
 
Bringing all the Tibetans currently living in designated Tibetan autonomous areas within a single 
autonomous administrative unit is entirely in accordance with the constitutional principle contained in 
Article 4, also reflected in the LRNA (Article 2), that “regional autonomy is practiced in areas where 
people of minority nationalities live in concentrated communities.” The LRNA describes regional national 
autonomy as the “basic policy adopted by the Communist Party of China for the solution of the national 
question in China” and explains its meaning and intent in its Preface:   
 
the minority nationalities, under unified state leadership, practice regional autonomy in areas where they 
live in concentrated communities and set up organs of self-government for the exercise of the power of 
autonomy. Regional national autonomy embodies the state’s full respect for and guarantee of the right of 
the minority nationalities to administer their internal affairs and its adherence to the principle of equality, 
unity and common prosperity of all nationalities. 
 
It is clear that the Tibetan nationality within the PRC will be able to exercise its right to govern itself and 
administer its internal affairs effectively only once it can do so through an organ of self-government that 
has jurisdiction over the Tibetan nationality as a whole.  
 
The LRNA recognises the principle that boundaries of national autonomous areas may need to be 
modified. The need for the application of the fundamental principles of the Constitution on regional 
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autonomy through respect of the integrity of the Tibetan nationality is not only totally legitimate, but the 
administrative changes that may be required to achieve this in no way violate constitutional principles. 
There are several precedents where this has been actually done. 
 
VI. THE NATURE AND STRUCTURE OF THE AUTONOMY 
The extent to which the right to self-government and self-administration can be exercised on the 
preceding subject matters largely determines the genuine character of Tibetan autonomy. The task at hand 
is therefore to look into the manner in which autonomy can be regulated and exercised for it to 
effectively respond to the unique situation and basic needs of the Tibetan nationality. 
 
The exercise of genuine autonomy would include the right of Tibetans to create their own regional 
government and government institutions and processes that are best suited to their needs and 
characteristics. It would require that the People’s Congress of the autonomous region have the power to 
legislate on all matters within the competencies of the region (that is the subject matters referred to 
above) and that other organs of the autonomous government have the power to execute and administer 
decisions autonomously. Autonomy also entails representation and meaningful participation in national 
decision-making in the Central Government. Processes for effective consultation and close cooperation 
or joint decision-making between the Central Government and the regional government on areas of 
common interest also need to be in place for the autonomy to be effective. 
 
A crucial element of genuine autonomy is the guarantee the Constitution or other laws provide that 
powers and responsibilities allocated to the autonomous region cannot be unilaterally abrogated or 
changed. This means that neither the Central Government nor the autonomous region’s government 
should be able, without the consent of the other, to change the basic features of the autonomy. 
 
The parameters and specifics of such genuine autonomy for Tibet that respond to the unique needs and 
conditions of the Tibetan people and region should be set out in some detail in regulations on the 
exercise of autonomy, as provided for in Article 116 of the Constitution (enacted in LRNA Article 19) or, 
if it is found to be more appropriate, in a separate set of laws or regulations adopted for that purpose. 
The Constitution, including Article 31, provides the flexibility to adopt special laws to respond to unique 
situations such as the Tibetan one, while respecting the established social, economic and political system 
of the country. 
 
The Constitution in Section VI provides for organs of self-government of national autonomous regions 
and acknowledges their power to legislate. Thus Article 116 (enacted in Article 19 of the LRNA) refers to 
their power to enact “separate regulations in light of the political, economic and cultural characteristics of 
the nationality or nationalities in the areas concerned.”  Similarly, the Constitution recognises the power 
of autonomous administration in a number of areas (Article 117-120) as well as the power of autonomous 
governments to apply flexibility in implementing the laws and policies of the Central Government and 
higher state organs to suit the conditions of the autonomous area concerned (Article 115).  
 
The above-mentioned legal provisions do contain significant limitations to the decision-making authority 
of the autonomous organs of government. But the Constitution nevertheless recognises the principle that 
organs of self-government make laws and policy decisions that address local needs and that these may be 
different from those adopted elsewhere, including by the Central Government.  
 
Although the needs of the Tibetans are broadly consistent with the principles on autonomy contained in 
the Constitution, as we have shown, their realisation is impeded because of the existence of a number of 
problems, which makes the implementation of those principles today difficult or ineffective.  
 
Implementation of genuine autonomy, for example, requires clear divisions of powers and responsibilities 
between the Central Government and the government of the autonomous region with respect to subject 
matter competency. Currently there is no such clarity and the scope of legislative powers of autonomous 
regions is both uncertain and severely restricted. Thus, whereas the Constitution intends to recognise the 
special need for autonomous regions to legislate on many matters that affect them, the requirements of 
Article 116 for prior approval at the highest level of the Central Government - by the Standing 
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Committee of National People’s Congress (NPC) - inhibit the implementation of this principle of 
autonomy. In reality, it is only autonomous regional congresses that expressly require such approval, 
while the congresses of ordinary (not autonomous) provinces of the PRC do not need prior permission 
and merely report the passage of regulations to the Standing Committee of the NPC “for the record” 
(Article 100). 
 
The exercise of autonomy is further subject to a considerable number of laws and regulations, according 
to Article 115 of the Constitution. Certain laws effectively restrict the autonomy of the autonomous 
region, while others are not always consistent with one another. The result is that the exact scope of the 
autonomy is unclear and is not fixed, since it is unilaterally changed with the enactment of laws and 
regulations are higher levels of the state, and even by changes in policy. There is also no adequate process 
for consultation or for settling differences that arise between the organs of the Central Government and 
of the regional government with respect to the scope and exercise of autonomy. In practice, the resulting 
uncertainty limits the initiative of regional authorities and impedes the exercise of genuine autonomy by 
Tibetans today. 
 
We do not at this stage wish to enter into details regarding these and other impediments to the exercise of 
genuine autonomy today by Tibetans, but mention them by way of example so that these may be 
addressed in the appropriate manner in our dialogue in the future. We will continue to study the 
Constitution and other relevant legal provisions and, when appropriate, will be pleased to provide further 
analysis of these issues, as we understand them. 
 
 
VII. THE WAY FORWARD 
As stated at the beginning of this memorandum, our intention is to explore how the needs of the Tibetan 
nationality can be met within the framework of PRC since we believe these needs are consistent with the 
principles of the Constitution on autonomy. As His Holiness the Dalai Lama stated on a number of 
occasions, we have no hidden agenda. We have no intention at all of using any agreement on genuine 
autonomy as stepping stone for separation from the PRC. 
 
The objective of the Tibetan Government in Exile is to represent the interests of the Tibetan people and 
to speak on their behalf. Therefore, it will no longer be needed and will be dissolved once an agreement is 
reached between us. In fact, His Holiness has reiterated his decision not to accept any political office in 
Tibet at any time in the future. His Holiness the Dalai Lama, nevertheless, plans to use all his personal 
influence to ensure such an agreement would have the legitimacy necessary to obtain the support of the 
Tibetan people.  
 
Given these strong commitments, we propose that the next step in this process be the agreement to start 
serious discussions on the points raised in this memorandum. For this purpose we propose that we 
discuss and agree on a mutually agreeable mechanism or mechanisms and a timetable to do so effectively. 
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